Peoples v. Honeywell International Incorporated

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Alquondra Peoples and Tonyea Warren, No. CV-21-00842-PHX-SMB 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 Honeywell International Incorporated, 13 Defendant. [14] 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant Honeywell International, Inc.’s 16 (“Honeywell”) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 17 (Doc. 21.) Plaintiffs Alquondra Peoples and Tonyea Warren filed a Response, (Doc. 22), 18 and Defendant filed a Reply, (Doc. 23). Neither party requested that the Court hold oral 19 argument, and the Court finds it unnecessary. See LRCiv 7.2(f). The Court has considered 20 the pleadings and the relevant caselaw and will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The allegations in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) center around 23 the uncleanliness of Honeywell’s work environment. Both Plaintiffs worked for 24 Honeywell from October 31, 2020 to November 29, 2020. (Doc. 20 at 1.) The SAC 25 alleges that Honeywell manufactured N-95 masks in filthy conditions and that Honeywell 26 failed to comply with the OSH Act and CDC guidelines. (See id. at 3.) The SAC also 27 alleges that Honeywell forced Plaintiffs to commit “crimes against humanity and corporate 28 crimes” by making Plaintiffs pick up dirty masks off the floor to be sent out worldwide. 1 (Id. at 2.) The Court construes Plaintiffs’ SAC as alleging claims for violation of the OSH 2 Act, “crimes against humanity and corporate crimes,” and negligence. (Id.) 3 On June 30, 2021, the Court issued an order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 4 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 18.) In its order, the Court ruled that 5 Plaintiff Warren did not have standing to pursue claims against Honeywell because 6 Plaintiffs’ FAC never alleged that she was an employee of Honeywell. (Id. at 5.) The 7 Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ criminal claims because civilians are not permitted to bring 8 such claims. (Id. at 5–6.) The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under the OSH Act 9 because the Act does not provide a private cause of action. (Id. at 6.) Lastly, the Order 10 ruled that Plaintiffs failed to plead a claim for gross negligence. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs’ 11 SAC commands the same result as their FAC. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 14 the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the 15 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice 16 of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, [17] 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Dismissal 18 under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence 19 of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 20 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal 21 theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, which, if 22 accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, [23] 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ). Facial plausibility exists if 24 the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 25 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the 26 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” [27] Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility 28 that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 1 ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 2 possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 3 557). 4 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pled factual allegations are 5 taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. 6 Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 7 factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 8 of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 9 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Honeywell argues that Plaintiffs’ SAC should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have 12 failed to adequately allege a gross negligence claim and because the Court has already 13 ruled that Plaintiffs’ criminal claims and claims under the OSH Act cannot prevail. (Doc. 14 21 at 2.) The Court agrees. 15 Plaintiffs’ criminal claims and claims under the OSH Act must be dismissed. The 16 Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs—who are civilians—cannot bring criminal claims 17 against Honeywell. (Doc. 18 at 5–6); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 , (1973) (“[I]n 18 American jurisprudence, at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in 19 the prosecution of another.”). Thus, Plaintiffs’ criminal claims will again be dismissed. 20 Likewise, the Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims brought under the OSH Act, 21 finding that the Act does not allow a litigant to bring a private cause of action. (Doc. 18 at 22 6); Glanton v. Harrah’s Ent., Inc., 297 F. App’x 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2008). The claim must 23 again be dismissed for the same reasons. 24 The Court construes Plaintiffs’ remaining claims as ones for negligence and gross 25 negligence. While Honeywell construes this claim only as a gross negligence claim, 26 Honeywell apparently failed to recognize that Plaintiffs mention Honeywell’s negligence 27 throughout the SAC. (See Doc. 20 at 3–5.) A negligence claim in Arizona requires a 28 plaintiff to prove four elements: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain 1 standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection 2 between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson 3 v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007). A gross-negligence claim requires the additional 4 showing of gross, willful, or wanton conduct. Noriega v. Town of Miami, 407 P.3d 92 , 98 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). “Duty is defined as an obligation, recognized by law, which requires 6 the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others 7 against unreasonable risks of harm.” Id. (quoting Gipson, 150 P.3d at 230 ) (cleaned up). 8 Honeywell contends that Plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence claims must 9 fail because they have not properly pled the existence of a duty owed to them. (Doc. 21 at 10 3.) Plaintiffs’ SAC states that Honeywell “had a duty to uphold the Osh Act of 1970 section 11 5/29 USC 654 which provides employees with a safe, healthy, and hazard free 12 environment.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) Arizona courts, however, have concluded that the OSH Act 13 will not support a cause of action for personal injuries to an employee. Pruett v. Precision 14 Plumbing, Inc., 554 P.2d 655, 660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Wendland v. AdobeAir, Inc., 221 15 P.3d 390, 393 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Black v. Sensing Enterprises Inc., No. 1 CA-CV-2016 0024, 2020 WL 7625306 , at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2020). Plaintiffs also allege that 17 Honeywell had a duty to follow the CDC guidelines for the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 18 1 at 1.) But Plaintiffs provide no authority for the Court to be able to conclude that the 19 CDC guidelines create a duty for employers to follow under Arizona law. Thus, this is 20 also an insufficient basis to allege that Honeywell had a duty to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, 21 Plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence claims must be dismissed. 22 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 23 Plaintiffs request leave to amend the SAC in their Response. (Doc. 22.) Leave to 24 amend should be granted unless a court finds that it is absolutely clear that the plaintiffs 25 cannot cure the deficiencies in their complaint by amendment. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 26 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs’ SAC cannot be cured by 27 amendment. Plaintiffs have tried multiple times to bring criminal claims and a claim under 28 the OSH Act against Honeywell. Plaintiffs simply cannot proceed on such claims. Additionally, as stated above, Plaintiff cannot point to a legal duty that Honeywell owed for their negligence claims. Thus, it appears that amendment would be futile. The Court 3 || will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. 4 Vv. CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, 6 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted, (Doc. 21), and 7\| that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 20), is dismissed with prejudice. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in accordance with this Order and to terminate this case. 10 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2021. [12] 13 = . RP oO 15 Gnvted States District ude. [28] _5-