Jones 190298 v. Garcia

1 WO — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA — 8 — 9 Edward Lee Jones, Sr., No. CV-18-04872-PHX-MTL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 N. Wood, et al., 13 Defendants. — 14 — 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Edward Lee Jones’ Motion for Plaintiff to be 16 Unshackled During Trial (Doc. 177). Defendant Samantha Garcia filed a response in 17 opposition (Doc. 179), and the motion is now ripe. 18 I. 19 Plaintiff is an inmate currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 20 Eyman, on convictions of child prostitution, pandering, and aggravated assault. Plaintiff 21 brought this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , for violations of his 22 procedural due process rights arising out of the State’s decision to move him to 23 maximum custody. A jury trial on Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is scheduled 24 to begin on March 21, 2022. At the Final Pretrial Conference held on March 11, 2022, 25 the Court informed the parties that it was inclined to order that Plaintiff remain 26 shackled during the trial. The Court ordered Plaintiff to file his objections, if any, in 27 the form of a motion to remain unshackled. Plaintiff then filed in the instant motion, 28 and Defendant responded. 1 II. 2 Plaintiff argues, based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Claiborne v. Blauser, — 3 — 934 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2019), that shackling is unwarranted in this case and could 4 unfairly prejudice the jury against him. In Claiborne, the Ninth Circuit held that an 5 inmate may only be visibly shackled during a civil proceeding “when there is an 6 ‘individualized security determination’ that ‘take[s] account of the circumstances of the 7 particular case.” Id. at 895 . The court further held that the two-pronged test for 8 determining whether a criminal defendant may be shackled during a jury trial also applies 9 in the civil context. Id. at 895–97. Thus, before an inmate may be shackled during a civil 10 jury trial: (1) the trial court must be persuaded by compelling circumstances that the 11 measure is necessary to maintain security; and (2) the court must pursue less restrictive 12 alternatives before imposing physical restraints. Id. at 895 . 13 “Compelling circumstances” may include a prisoner’s underlying criminal 14 convictions, custody status, disciplinary record, propensity for violence, potential flight 15 risk, and history of unruly conduct. See, e.g., Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 , 1485 16 (9th Cir. 1985). While Plaintiff’s status as a convicted felon, standing alone, does not 17 justify ordering him to remain shackled during trial, see Claiborne, 934 F.3d at 895 , the 18 Court may consider the nature and seriousness of his convictions in determining whether 19 physical restraints are necessary. See Wilson, 770 F.2d at 1485 . 20 Plaintiff argues there is “no particular reason Mr. Jones must be shackled” here, 21 because “there is nothing in Mr. Jones’s [disciplinary] violations since his confinement 22 in 2004 that would indicate that Jones, like Claiborne, would disrupt court proceedings, 23 act disrespectfully in court, or attempt to escape.” (Doc. 177.) Defendant, in response, 24 argues that Plaintiff’s contention is belied by his “lengthy record of major violent 25 infractions—including staff assault.” (Doc. 179 at 1.) 26 After careful consideration, the Court concludes that compelling circumstances 27 justify physically restraining Plaintiff in this case. First, Plaintiff’s underlying convictions 28 are serious and, in the case of his aggravated assault convictions, are for violent offenses. 1|| Second, Plaintiffs disciplinary record indicates that he could become dangerous and 2|| disruptive during proceedings. Since just since 2019, he has had eight disciplinary || violations, including two “assaults on staff,” one of which “involved serious injury.” (Doc. 179-1 at 3.) Third, Plaintiff has admitted to being a member of a criminal street gang, 5 || which increases the risk that he may try to escape if not restrained. Fourth, Plaintiff has || long-since been in high custody and is currently in maximum custody with a high internal || risk score, indicating that he poses a genuine risk to ADCRR and court staff and to the 8 || public. For these reasons, the Court finds that restraining Plaintiff during the upcoming 9|| jury trial is warranted. 10 The Court will take steps, however, to mitigate any prejudice that could arise 11 || from Plaintiff being shackled. For instance, the Court will apply a table skirt to □□□□□□□□□□□ || table, concealing his restraints from the jury, and will ensure that Plaintiff approaches 13 || and departs the witness stand outside the jury’s presence. Upon Plaintiff's request, the 14], Court will also consider giving a mitigating jury instruction regarding □□□□□□□□□□□ 15 || restraints, should such an instruction prove necessary. As Defendant notes, these measures will mitigate any potential prejudice and ensure Plaintiff's right to a fair trial 17 || while also providing for the safety of all those involved in trial proceedings. 18 Il. 19 Accordingly, 20 IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for Plaintiff to be Unshackled || During Trial (Doc. 177). 22 Dated this 16th day of March, 2022. — 23 — Wichal T. Fburde 29 Michael T. Liburdi 26 United States District Judge — 27 — — 28 — -3-