Jatto v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA — 8 — 9 Hilda Jatto, No. CV-21-00604-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, — 13 — Defendant. — 14 — — 15 — 16 Plaintiff Hilda Jatto applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits in May 17 2017 and Supplemental Security Income a month later. (AR 190-98.) After state agency 18 denials, she appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on October 28, 2019. 19 (AR 32.) The ALJ rejected both applications on November 15, 2019 (AR 14-26), and that 20 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration 21 (“Commissioner”) when the Appeals Council declined to review it (AR 1-4). Plaintiff filed 22 a complaint with this Court on April 8, 2021, seeking review of the denial of benefits. 23 (Doc. 1.) The Court vacates the decision of the ALJ and remands. 24 I. Standard 25 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 26 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 27 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 28 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 1 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 2 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 3 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 4 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947 , 5 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported 6 by substantial evidence “is a highly deferential standard of review.” Valentine v. Comm’r 7 of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s 8 decision, the district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 9 decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503 , 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 11 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a). The claimant bears the burden of 12 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 13 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 14 the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 15 §404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 16 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(ii). At 17 step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 18 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 19 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 20 found to be disabled. Id. If not, the analysis proceeds. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 21 claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 22 still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the 23 ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she determines whether the claimant can 24 perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, 25 education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is 26 disabled. Id. 27 II. Analysis 28 The sole issue on review is whether the ALJ erred by constructing an RFC without 1 relying on any medical opinion testimony. In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider 2 “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 (a)(3), 3 416.945(a)(3). “The ALJ may not ‘substitute [his] own judgment for competent medical 4 opinion,’ and [he] ‘must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make [his] own 5 independent medical findings.’” Watkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-166 00168-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL 1191093 , at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting Banks v. 7 Barnhart, 434 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2006)). 8 Here, the ALJ afforded no evidentiary weight to the four medical experts because 9 they gave opinions based on an incomplete medical record, which was ultimately presented 10 in its entirety at the hearing. (AR 24.) When the ALJ found that the four medical opinions 11 were deficient because the physicians made them without the complete record, that 12 “trigger[ed his] duty to ‘conduct an appropriate inquiry.’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 13 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 30 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)). 14 “The ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s 15 physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or 16 keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Id. 17 But the ALJ did not discharge his duty. Instead, without any guiding medical 18 opinion, he reviewed the medical evidence himself (including radiology reports, physical 19 examinations, an electromyography report, and surgical procedures) and translated the 20 evidence into functional terms to construct the RFC. (AR 23.) This was error. See Hartley 21 v. Colvin, CV-14-02421-TUC-RM-LAB, 2015 WL 9997207 , at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2015) 22 (“The ALJ is not a medical expert. [He] ordinarily must rely on the reports of the medical 23 experts . . . in order to reach a conclusion as to what level of work the claimant can 24 perform.”). 25 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not need to rely on medical opinions to 26 interpret the medical evidence and therefore did not need to develop the record. Not so. A 27 layperson reviewing the medical records relied upon by the ALJ could not determine 28 Plaintiff’s limitations. As such, the ALJ needed the assistance of medical opinions to 1 || interpret the medical records and should have developed the record to obtain opinions that 2|| had some evidentiary value. See id. 3 The Commissioner, citing Lamas v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-00852-BAM, 2020 WL 6561306 , at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2020), also argues that even if the ALJ erred, any error 5 || was harmless because he found more stringent limitations than those determined in the four || medical opinions and still found that Plaintiff could work. But the Lamas rule doesn’t apply here. In Lamas, there was no dispute over whether the medical opinions were based || onthe full record. But here, the Court cannot determine whether the ALJ’s RFC is in fact || more stringent than the medical opinions based on the full record because no such opinion 10 || was presented. Thus, the Court cannot say whether the error is harmless. 11} If. Conclusion 12 The ALJ rejected all medical opinions in the record because they weren’t made in 13 || consideration of the full record. He then made independent medical findings and relied upon them to construct the RFC. On remand, the ALJ is instructed to develop the record, || hold a de novo hearing, and conduct a new sequential analysis, articulating for each 16 || medical opinion the reasons that the ALJ finds it persuasive or unpersuasive according to 17 || the regulations. 18 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is VACATED and REMANDED || for proceedings consistent with this order. 20 Dated this 21st day of September, 2022. — 21 — — 22 — 23 {Z, 24 {UO 25 Upited States Dictric Judge — 26 — — 27 — — 28 — -4-