Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company

1 WO — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA — 8 — 9 Chase Whitehead, No. CV-22-01978-PHX-DJH 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Amica Mutual Insurance Company, 13 Defendant. — 14 — 15 This case concerns Plaintiff’s class action efforts1 to enforce the Uninsured and 16 Underinsured Motorist Coverage policies (the “Policies”) issued to him by Defendant. 17 (Doc. 1-3 at 6). After removing this action to federal court, Defendant filed a Motion to 18 Stay (Doc. 7) pending a decision from the Arizona Supreme Court2 on two certified 19 questions that are related to Plaintiff’s breach of insurance contract and bad faith claims 20 under A.R.S. § 20-259.01. (Doc. 7 at 6, 24). See Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance 21 Company, No. 2:22-cv-00540-JJT (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2022), at Doc. 47. This Court has 22 already issued a stay in Creasman v. Farmers Casualty Insurance Company, a case with a 23 similar fact pattern. No. 2:22-cv-01820-DJH (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2022), at Doc. 27. Thus, 24 the Court incorporates its findings in Creasman and grants Defendant’s Motion. 25 1 Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in Arizona Superior Court claiming Defendant breached its insurance contract and acted in bad faith when it failed to “stack” Plaintiff’s 26 benefits under the Policies. (Doc. 1-3 at 5–25); see also Chase Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company, No. CV2022-013851 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2022). The action was 27 subsequently removed to this Court. (Doc. 1). 28 2 See Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance Company, CV-22-0266-CQ (Ariz.). 1 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court 2 to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for 3 itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 428, 254 (1936). Courts 4 must weigh the following “competing interests” to determine whether to issue a Landis 5 stay: “[1] the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, [2] the hardship 6 or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and [3] the orderly 7 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and 8 question of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., — 9 — 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th 10 Cir. 1962). “If there is even a fair possibility that the stay will work damage to someone 11 else, the party seeking the stay” faces a heightened burden and “must make out a clear case 12 of hardship or inequity.” Percy v. United States, 2016 WL 7187129 , *2 (D. Ariz. 2016) 13 (quoting Lockyer, 398 F.3d 1109 ). It is proper to stay proceedings in a case “pending the 14 outcome of the ‘lead’ case even where the ‘lead’ case may not be potentially dispositive of 15 the case sought to be stayed” and “even where the ‘lead’ case may, at most, streamline the 16 issues in the case sought to be stayed.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Bashas’, Inc., — 17 — 2012 WL 13104758 , at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 6, 2012) (recognizing concurrent litigation as a 18 lead case that would “be extremely important to the legal issues before [the] Court”). 19 As they do in Creasman, the three competing interests set forth in Lockyer weigh in 20 favor of staying the present proceedings. First, Plaintiff’s argument that a stay would cause 21 substantial and irreparable harm to Defendant’s insureds is moot. (Doc. 12 at 7). This 22 concern was resolved when the parties withdrew Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 23 Injunction (Doc. 17) by stipulation. (Doc. 15). Therein, Defendant agreed it “will not 24 request or enter into a release with an insured on any claim against an Amica auto policy 25 issued in Arizona with coverage for more than one vehicle for which [Defendant] has paid 26 the per person limits for [underinsured or uninsured motorist] coverage.” (Id. at 2). Second, 27 absent a stay, the parties would potentially “undergo costly and [] unnecessary motion 28 practice and discovery . . . pending the Arizona Supreme Court’s resolution of issues 1 relevant to Plaintiff’s foundational theory.” (Doc. 7 at 6). This district has recognized such 2 evidence of hardship in the class action setting and found it weighs in favor of a stay. See 3 Winters v. Loan Depot LLC, 2020 WL 8254053 , at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2020) (finding 4 that “[d]enying the stay would subject Defendant to costs related to class certification 5 briefing, completing expert discovery, briefing dispositive motions, and potentially 6 preparing for trial, all while the [Arizona] Supreme Court considers an issue that could 7 significantly narrow the case”). 8 Finally, a stay would promote the orderly course of justice. Certain claims in 9 Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint rely on the implications of A.R.S. § 20-259.01. Thus, it 10 is in the interest of judicial economy to wait until the Arizona Supreme Court clarifies this 11 area of the law as it would avoid the use of resources on discovery and potentially fruitless 12 motions. See Berrow v. Navient Sols. LLC, 2020 WL 8267706 , at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 13 2020). Plaintiff argues that though it may be amenable to a stay after the Arizona Supreme 14 Court accepts jurisdiction, there is “no reason to stay this case while the [court] considers 15 whether to accept the certified questions.” (Doc. 12 at 9). The Court disagrees. “[T]he same 16 rationale for staying a case while waiting for the Arizona Supreme Court’s ultimate 17 decision on a certified question applies to the preliminary decision whether to accept the 18 certified question.” Bode v. Travelers, No. CV-22-01847-PHX-DWL (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 19 2022), at Doc. 17 (citing Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs. Inc., 556 F.3d 20 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2009)). 21 Moreover, the Court considers Franklin to be a “lead” case for numerous cases in 22 the District of Arizona that raise similar issues under A.R.S. § 20-259.01. See Equal Emp. 23 Opportunity Comm’n, 2012 WL 13104758 , at *1. As noted in Plaintiff’s Notices of 24 Supplemental Authority, many of these cases have been stayed pending the resolution of 25 the certification request in Franklin.3 (Docs. 14; 19). Thus, the Court will stay proceedings 26 3 See Muehlhausen, et al. v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:22-cv-01747-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz.); see also Bode v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Ins. Co., No. 2:22-CV-01847-PHX27 DWL (D. Ariz.). The Court notes the following cases in this district have also been stayed: Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., No. CV-22-00540-PHX-JJT (D. Ariz.); see also Doyle v. 28 Pekin Ins. Co., No. CV-22-00638-PHX-JJT (D. Ariz.) see also Miller v. Trumbull Ins. Co., No. CV-22-01545-PHX-JJT (D. Ariz.); see also Dale v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1 || in the present matter because it relates to the certified questions and resolution of these || questions could similarly narrow the issues raised in Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint. 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Expedited Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 7) || is GRANTED. This matter is stayed as it relates to the Arizona Supreme Court’s ultimate || disposition on the district court’s request to accept and decide the certified questions 7\| proposed in Franklin vy. CSAA General Insurance Company, No, 2:22-cv-00540-JJT (D. □□ Ariz. Nov. 2, 2022). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the parties must file a joint notice of decision within five (5) days of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision regarding jurisdiction over the 11 || certified questions. 12 Dated this 28th day of December, 2022. — 13 — 14 fe — □□ 15 norable’ Diang/4. Hunfetewa 16 United States District Judge — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 — 2:22-CV-1659-PHX-JZB (D. Ariz.). -4-