Travieso v. Glock Incorporated

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Carlos Daniel Travieso, No. CV-20-00523-PHX-SMB 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Glock GesmbH, et al., 13 Defendants. [14] 15 Before the Court is Defendant Glock Ges.M.B.H.’s (“Glock”) Motion for Summary 16 Judgment (“MSJ”) Based on Release. (Doc. 92.) Plaintiff Carlos Daniel Travieso filed a 17 Response (Doc. 95), and Defendant a Reply (Doc. 103). Defendant also filed a Separate 18 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of the MSJ (Doc. 93), and Plaintiff 19 submitted a Controverting Statement of Facts in Response (Doc. 99). All were filed under 20 seal. Oral argument was scheduled for April 5, 2023. However, after consideration of the 21 pleadings and the relevant law, the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary and will 22 vacate oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f) (“The Court may decide motions without oral 23 argument.”). The Court will also grant Glock’s MSJ for the following reasons. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff became a paraplegic after being shot with a Glock Model 19 Gen5 semi26 automatic pistol on March 17, 2018. (Doc. 92 at 2.) Plaintiff was participating in a youth 27 camping trip organized by . 28 (Docs. 92; 93; 99 at 2.) , owned the pistol and kept it inside his vehicle during the camping trip. (Docs. 93; 99 at 2.) x 2 || 3 | 4| EE (The pistol was visible between the front console and front passenger seat. || (Ud.) The pistol was loaded with a cartridge in the chamber and cartridges in the magazine. Ud.) 7 During the drive home, ggg left Plaintiff and the minors unattended in the car 8 || while he entered a convenience store. (/d.) During this time, C.M.T., a fourteen-year-old girl seated in the backseat, asked Plaintiff, seated in the front passenger seat, to pass her 10}| the pistol. Ud.) Plaintiff removed the pistol’s magazine before passing it to C.M.T. (dd. at3.) Plaimtiff did not eject the cartridge in the chamber. (/d.) Mistakenly thinking the 12}| gun was unloaded, C.M.T. pulled the trigger while the pistol was pointing at the front seat. 13} Ud.) The bullet struck Plaintiff in the back, resulting in serious injuries, including paraplegia. (/d.) 15 After the incident, Plaintiff and gg began settlement discussions. □□□□□□□□□□ counsel and exchanged emails on January 15, 2019, consisting of negotiations and changes to a proposed settlement agreement. (Doc. 92 at 3.) For example, □□□□□□□□□□□ counsel requested a specification that the settlement agreement be construed under Arizona 19}| law. Ud.) Plaintiff's counsel also requested ministerial edits, changes to the structure and payment terms of the settlement funds, and for the confidentiality terms to not apply to specific government agencies that serviced Plaintiff. (/d. at 4.) The parties executed the final “Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims” (“Settlement Agreement’) on || January 16, 2019, for x (Ud. at 3—4, 93-3 at 5-10.) 24 Over a year later, Plaintiff—through the same counsel—sued Glock, alleging the | pistol from Plaintiff's incident is defectively designed, Defendants failed to provide || appropriate warnings, and Defendants were therefore nonparties at fault. (Ud. at 4—5.) Glock served discovery requests on Plaintiff and production subpoenas addressed to || nonpartics—. (Doc. 92 at 5.) Plaintiff never disclosed to Glock that 1 he raised a prior claim against arising from the same incident, or that he 2 received a settlement from . (Id.) Glock alleges they learned of the Settlement 3 Agreement after serving a subpoena on . (Id.) 4 Plaintiff opposed Glock’s attempt to obtain the subpoena, resulting in a discovery 5 conference and Glock’s filing a Motion to Compel. (Id.) However, the parties agreed to 6 the disclosure of the Settlement Agreement without further judicial intervention (see Doc. 7 83). (Doc. 92 at 5.) Now, Plaintiff and Glock dispute the meaning of the Settlement 8 Agreement. Glock argues Plaintiff’s current claims are barred by the Settlement 9 Agreement’s terms because it precluded any claim against a third party and the “settlement 10 sum constitutes a complete settlement, discharge and accord and satisfaction of a disputed 11 sum.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff argues he only waived claims against [12] 13 (Id.) 14 The relevant sections discussed read: 1. Release of All Claims [15] The undersigned Releasor hereby acknowledges that in consideration of the 16 settlement payments described below, Releasor, on his own behalf and on behalf of all persons claiming through him with respect to the above17 described Loss1, does hereby fully and forever release and discharge 18 Releasees and their respective officers, directors, employees, agents, servants, companies or entities, successors and assigns of and from any and [19] all past, present or future claims, counterclaims, demands, rights, damages, 20 costs, expenses, or loss of any kind (including loss of consortium) which Releasor has, has had or may subsequently discover that he has on or about [21] March 17, 2018 as a result of the accidental discharge of a firearm owned by 22 (the “Accident”). The Release provided applies to all claims or actions including those that are presently, known, those that are 23 unknown, those that have already accrued and/or those that accrue in the 24 future. Releasor acknowledges and agrees that this Release is intended to be 25 construed broadly to resolve any and all claims or disputes that may arise between him and Releasees, directly or indirectly, related to the Accident. [26] 2. Future Damages 27 Insofar as the damages and effects resulting from the Accident described [28] 1 The loss is defined as “accidental discharge of a firearm owned by .” 1 herein may not be fully known and may be more numerous or more serious than it is now understood or expected, Releasor agrees, as further [2] consideration of this Agreement, that the Release applies to any and all 3 injuries, damages and losses resulting from the Accident, even though unanticipated, unexpected or unknown, as well as any and all injuries, [4] damages and losses (including claims for loss of consortium) which have 5 already developed and which are now mown or anticipated. 5. No Admission of Liability [6] Releasor understands and agrees that this Settlement Agreement and Release 7 of All Claims involves the compromise of a disputed claim. Releasor agrees, understands and stipulates that payment of the settlement sum [8] constitutes a complete settlement, discharge and accord and satisfaction 9 of a disputed claim. Releasor further acknowledges and agrees that Releasees do not, in any manner, by virtue of entering into this agreement or 10 paying the settlement sum admit liability to anyone because of any incident, 11 act or omission described in or cognizable by the claims, charges, or causes of action released hereby. By entering into this Agreement, it is the intent of 12 Releasees to void the cost of trial and the uncertainty of liability in the event 13 of litigation of the claims herein released. The existence of this Agreement and the payment of the settlement sum shall not be deemed or construed as 14 an admission of liability on the part of Releasees, by whom liability is expressly denied. [15] Releasor further understands and agrees that the existence of this Settlement 16 Agreement and payment of the settlement sum does not constitute an admission as to any specific issues upon which a claim for liability could be [17] based including, but not limited to, the claim that any individual acted 18 unreasonably or the claim that any individual is an agent of any of the entities referenced herein for purposes of respondeat superior. [19] 7. No Additional Claim 20 Releasor represents that he has not sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed of any claims related to the Accident. Releasor further [21] represents that no additional claims, complaints, demand or petitions 22 will be made by Releasor against any other party potentially liable for the claims hereby released or potentially liable for the losses, damages, 23 injuries and claims covered by this Settlement Agreement and Release 24 of All Claims.Releasor acknowledges having released any and all existing or potential claims against any and all persons, organizations or entities 25 herein provided. In the event any claim, complaint, petition or demand by 26 any person results, directly or indirectly, in additional liability, exposure or penalty of any kind which requires any form of legal defense or legal 27 assistance, Releasor covenants and agree to indemnify, demand and hold Releasees harmless from all such claims and demands including reasonable [28] attorney fees and other expenses necessarily incurred by Releasees. 1 14. Interpretation The Releasor acknowledges that the terms of this Agreement were negotiated [2] with the assistance of counsel for each of the parties. Releasor further 3 acknowledges that the terms of this Agreement shall not be interpreted or construed in favor of one party as opposed to the other party due to one party [4] being the drafter. 5 In the event any portion of this Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims is deemed invalid, the remaining portions and provisions shall be [6] given their full force and effect so as to preserve a resolution of all claims 7 that the Releasor has against Releasees. 8 II. (Doc. 93-3 at 5–8, 10) (emphasis added).LEGAL STANDARD 9 Summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings and supporting documents, 10 viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ‘show that there is no genuine 11 issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 12 of law.’” Mann v. N.Y. Life Ins. and Annuity Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153 (D. Ariz. 13 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Facts are “material” when under the governing law, 14 it could affect the case’s outcome. Smith v. Internal Revenue Serv., 168 F. Supp. 3d. 1221, 15 1223 (D. Ariz. 2016). Summary judgment should not be granted if there is a dispute over 16 material facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also United 17 States v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 652 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting if a 18 “contract is unclear, ordinarily summary judgment is improper as differing views of the 19 intent of parties will raise genuine issues of material fact”). Nevertheless, it is a question 20 of law whether a contract is ambiguous, and simply because parties disagree to its meaning 21 does alone establish ambiguity. Id. Courts, under Arizona law, will also “read words in 22 the context in which they are used, and [consider] the purposes sought . . . by the 23 agreement.” Bush v. Desert Schs. Fed. Credit Union, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0157, 2013 WL 24 506616, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2013) (quoting State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., [25] 75 P.3d 1075, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)). 26 Furthermore, settlement agreements are enforced and governed by general contract 27 principles. Emmons v. County of Maricopa, 968 P.2d 582, 585 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 28 Interpreting contracts is a question of law when the terms are plain and unambiguous. Shoen v. Symons, No. CV09-1548 PHX DGC, 2011 WL 1641760 , at *1 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2011). Courts will also attempt to enforce settlement agreements consistent with the 3 || parties’ intent. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1138 (Ariz. 1993). 4|| Under Arizona law, “the release of one joint tortfeasor is not a release of any other joint 5 || tortfeasors” unless one of three exceptions applies. Adams v. Dion, 509 P.2d 201 , 203 6|| (Ariz. 1973). These include: “the document is intended to release the other tortfeasors, or || the payment is full compensation, or the release expressly so provides.” Id. 8 Hil. DISCUSSION 9 A. First Adams Exception: Intent to Release Other Tortfeasors 10 Glock and Plaintiff dispute whether the Settlement Agreement’s language || demonstrated an intent to release Glock from lability surrounding the incident. 12 1. Glock’s Interpretation 13 First, Glock points to Section 1, titled “Release of All Claims,” and argues it covers the complete release of claims against [ys 1S | □ 16 | related to Plaintiff's incident. (Doc. 92 at 8.) Next, Glock points to Section 7, titled “No 18}| Additional Claims,” which states that “no additional claims, complaints, demands or 19}| petitions will be made by [Plaintiff] against any other party potentially lable.” (d.) 20}| Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement states that Plaintiff acknowledges “having released any and all existing or potential claims against any and all persons, organizations or entities | herein provided” who are “potentially liable for the losses, damages, injuries or claims 23 | covered by this Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims.” (/d.) 24 Glock argues that because Plaintiff ee in Section | 1, the only purpose for Section 7’s additional release was for nonparties like Glock who || are not covered in Section 1’s definition of “Releasees.” (/d. at 8-9); see Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 224 P.3d 960, 975 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“It is a cardinal rule of contract 28 || interpretation that we do not construe one term of a contract to essentially render 6 - 1 meaningless another term.”); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Emps. Ins. Co. of Wausau, No. 2 CV-06-0232-PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 841413 , at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2007) (finding third 3 party was released where “the plain language of the Settlement Agreement evidences the 4 Parties’ intent to generate a final conclusion to the underlying coverage litigation as well 5 as any related litigation”). 6 Glock contends that releasing unnamed parties was essential to achieving the 7 Settlement Agreement’s stated purpose of preventing further exposure to . 8 (Doc. 92 at 9.) Section 7, in addition to its “hold harmless” clause, contains Plaintiff’s 9 agreement to “indemnify, defend and hold Releasees harmless from” any “claim, 10 complaint, petition or demand by any person [that] results, directly or indirectly, in 11 additional liability, exposure or penalty of any kind which requires any form of legal 12 defense or legal assistance.” (Id. at 10.) Taken together, Glock argues the Settlement 13 Agreement is intended to protect from exposure by: (1) ensuring Plaintiff would 14 not bring a suit that would subsequently implicate at fault by releasing all 15 claims; and (2) would not face additional legal fees or costs if a third party 16 brought a suit relating to the incident because Plaintiff in such a suit must “indemnify, 17 defend and hold harmless” in such a suit. (Id.) 18 Finally, Glock argues that because Plaintiff filed suit against them, Glock had the 19 right as a third party to name as a nonparty at fault, in which a jury could be 20 asked to assign fault to on a public jury form. (Id. at 9.) Glock argues this is 21 the very exposure and lack of confidentiality contracted to avoid, further 22 supporting it was intended to be a Releasee under Section 7. (Id.) 23 2. Plaintiff’s Interpretation 24 Plaintiff argues the intent factor of the Adams test is not satisfied because Section 25 7’s use of the phrases “hereby released” and “herein provided” establish that the Settlement 26 Agreement, when read as a whole, was not intended to release Glock. (Doc. 95 at 5); see 27 Ash v. Egar, 541 P.2d 398, 401 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (noting contracts must “be read as a 28 whole, and every part [must] be interpreted with reference to the whole”) (cleaned up)). 1 Plaintiff argues that these two phrases serve as qualifying language that apply only to 2 claims “hereby released” in the Settlement Agreement and claims directed against of the 3 entities “herein provided” in the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 95 at 5.) 4 Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Section 1 defines the Settlement Agreement’s 5 purpose as “resolv[ing] any and all claims . . . that may arise between [Plaintiff] and 6 .” (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts 7 Section 5’s language, titled “No Admission of Liability,” “confirms that the Settlement 8 Agreement was only intended to cover claims premised upon the negligence of 9 ” (Id. at 6.) The relied upon language reads: Releasor further understands and agrees that the existence of this Settlement [10] Agreement and payment of the settlement sum does not constitute an 11 admission as to any specific issues upon which a claim for liability could be based including, but not limited to, the claim that [12] 13 . 14 (Doc. 93-3 at 7.) Plaintiff argues that “it lists two illustrative examples of ‘issues upon 15 which a claim for liability could be based’—both of which would only be foundational 16 ‘issues’ in the context of the kinds of negligence claims discussed.” (Doc. 95 at 6.) Lastly, 17 Plaintiff argues that Section 14 allows the Settlement Agreement’s provisions to be 18 preserved even if one or more provisions are deemed invalid, and that the remining portions 19 should be interpreted “so as to preserve a resolution of all claims that [Plaintiff] has against 20 .” (Id.) Plaintiff contends this reinforces that the contract is only focused on 21 claims between Plaintiff and . (Id.) 22 For these reasons, Plaintiff argues that Section 7, when read with Sections 1, 5, and 23 14, demonstrates that the suit against Glock does not constitute the claims against 24 that were “hereby released,” and therefore Glock 25 was not a party “herein provided” by the Settlement Agreement. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff refutes that Section 7 encompasses third parties like Glock. Plaintiff admits 27 that he and agreed Section 1’s definition of Releasees was not broad enough, 28 and that Section 7 was needed as supplementation. (Id. at 8.) However, Plaintiff maintains 1 the context of the entire Settlement Agreement requires the language “against any other 2 party potentially liable for the claims hereby released” must be construed “by virtue of 3 some other connection to ” because the “claims hereby released” arose between 4 Plaintiff and . (Id.) 5 Plaintiff also argues that Spain v. Gen. Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div., 829 6 P.2d 1272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) demonstrates that broad language without specific intent 7 cannot be construed to release unnamed parties—as Plaintiff argues we have here. (Doc. 8 95 at 7.) 9 3. Court’s Analysis 10 The Court finds the first Adams exception applies. The Court agrees with Glock 11 that Spain is distinguishable. Spain involved broad, boiler plate language provided by an 12 insurance company, which is not the case here. As Glock notes, this a 13 Settlement Agreement with personalized terms negotiated by Plaintiff and 14 through counsel and a third party mediator. Cf. Spain, 829 P.2d at 1272–73. Spain also 15 lacked any intent by the settling parties to release unnamed third parties. Id. at 1273. Such 16 intent exists here. [17] The Settlement Agreement’s plain language demonstrates Plaintiff and [18] intent to reach finality as to any litigation related to the accidental discharge of a firearm [19] against any known or unknown defendants, and for any known or unknown injuries. For [20] example, Section 7 states that: “Releasor further represents that no additional claims, [21] complaints, demand or petitions will be made by Releasor against any other party [22] potentially liable for the claims hereby released or potentially liable for the losses, [23] damages, injuries and claims covered by this Settlement Agreement and Release of All [24] Claims.” (Doc. 93-3 at 8) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “Releasor acknowledges [25] having released any and all existing or potential claims against any and all persons, [26] organizations or entities herein provided.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Section 1 says the [27] release is to be construed broadly. (See id. at 5.) Section 2 covers all injuries, damages, [28] and losses known or unknown. (See id.) 1 Likewise, Plaintiff agreed to “indemnify, defend and hold [ ] harmless 2 from” any “claim, complaint, petition or demand by any person [that] results, directly or 3 indirectly, in additional liability, exposure or penalty of any kind which requires any form 4 of legal defense or legal assistance.” (Id. at 8) (emphasis added). Section 5 reads: 5 “Releasor agrees, understands and stipulates that payment of the settlement sum constitutes 6 a complete settlement, discharge and accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim.” (Id. at 7 6) (emphasis added). The Court must read the terms together, and in doing so, it is apparent 8 that the Settlement Agreement intended to close liability and exposure. See 9 Invitrogen Corp., 2007 WL 841413 , at *8. 10 The Court agrees with Glock that Section 1 was designed to exclusively cover 11 as releasees, whereas Section 7 was designed to more broadly 12 preclude third party suits—like here—that expose to further litigation, 13 discovery requests, etc. Plaintiff asks the Court to interpret Sections 1 and 7 as applying 14 solely to Plaintiff, . However, this would render 15 Section 7 superfluous. See Aztar Corp., 224 P.3d at 975 . Section 1’s plain language speaks 16 only to . (See, e.g., Doc. 93-3 at 5 (Plaintiff acknowledges that 17 he “hereby fully and forever release and discharge [19] 20 (emphasis added))). Yet, this is in stark contrast to Section 7’s use of “against any other 21 party potentially liable.” (See id. at 8) (emphasis added). 22 Lastly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Section 7’s use of “hereby 23 released” and “herein provided,” when viewed in the context of Sections 1, 5, and 14, 24 excludes third party claims. Plaintiff argues that the only claims “hereby released” are 25 those related to . However, 26 language is nowhere in the Settlement Agreement. In fact, as Glock 27 points out, the Settlement Agreement specifically defines the “loss” as “Accidental 28 discharge of firearm owned by .” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff’s claims against 1 Glock are clearly included in the Settlement Agreement’s definition of loss. Even without 2 this broad definition of the loss, the plain language of Section 7 releases “any other party 3 potentially liable for the claims hereby released or potentially liable for the losses, 4 damages, injuries and claims covered by this Settlement Agreement.” (Id.) (emphasis 5 added). Thus, the plain language releases other parties from more than just the “hereby 6 released” claims. 7 As previously discussed, the plain language of Sections 1 and 7 comparatively 8 demonstrate that the Settlement Agreement was intended to release liability from parties 9 other than . Otherwise, Section 7 would be rendered 10 superfluous. Next, Section 5 is titled “No Admission of Liability,” and exclusively covers 11 how does not admit liability to any negligence or related claims regarding 12 Plaintiff’s incident. (See id. at 6–7.) cannot admit liability on behalf of a third 13 party, so the Court cannot negatively construe the absence of third parties in this section. 14 However, if third party suits were permitted under the Settlement Agreement, it would 15 defeat this Section’s enforcement power, as any third party would be entitled to attempt to 16 apportion fault onto as a nonparty—as is happening here. Thus, Section 5 is 17 not in conflict with this Court’s interpretation. Plaintiff’s reliance on Section 14’s language 18 regarding Plaintiff’s preserving his claims against is only applicable if portions 19 of the Settlement Agreement are deemed invalid. Regardless, this provision does not 20 conflict with any section. 21 Even though the parties dispute the Settlement Agreement’s terms, the Court finds 22 the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous for the reasons discussed above.2 See Anderson, [23] 477 U.S. at 248 . Giving full effect to every provision of the Settlement Agreement and 24 reading the contract as a whole, see Bush, 2013 WL 506616 , at *2, the Court finds the 25 contract demonstrates intent to preclude third party liability claims under the first Adams 26 exception. See 509 P.2d at 203 . 27 B. Second Adams Exception: Intended to Provide Full Compensation 28 2 Because the Court finds the Settlement Agreement unambiguous, it will not address the parties’ parole evidence arguments. 1 The second Adams exception hinges on whether the Settlement Agreement intended 2 to fully compensate Plaintiff for all claims from the incident. If a release only applies to 3 some but not all claims, then the full compensation requirement is not satisfied. See 4 Burrington v. Gila County, 767 P.2d 43 , 47–48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). Glock relies on the 5 language in Sections 2 and 5 to support the intent to provide full compensation. 6 Specifically, Section 2 states that it “applies to any and all injuries, damages and losses 7 resulting” from the Incident, and Section 5 states that the “settlement sum constitutes a 8 complete settlement, discharge and accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim.” (Doc. 92 9 at 10.) Glock also argues that the amount of settlement— —demonstrates the 10 intent to provide full and complete compensation. 11 Plaintiff argues the language of the settlement agreement demonstrates that it was 12 not intended to fully compensate plaintiff. (Doc. 95 at 9.) Plaintiff argues that the language 13 “applies to any and all injuries, damages and losses” is qualified because it acted as 14 “consideration” underlying the contract. (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that the language in 15 Section 5 is qualified by the “disputed claim” language because at the time of the 16 Settlement Agreement, there was no disputed claim between Glock and Plaintiff. 17 The Court finds that Section 2’s language stating the Settlement Agreement “applies 18 to any and all injuries, damages and losses resulting” from Plaintiff’s incident, coupled 19 with Section 5’s statement that the “settlement sum constitutes a complete settlement, 20 discharge and accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim” satisfy the Adams exception and 21 is unambiguous. See 509 P.2d at 203 . This is especially true when these sections are read 22 in context of the entire agreement, which reads to settle any and all claim, present and 23 future, related to injuries from the accidental discharge of the firearm. And because the 24 Settlement Agreement prevents Plaintiff from initiating third party suits regarding the 25 incident, this further solidifies that full compensation was provided. Id. [26] 27 IV. CONCLUSION 28 The Court finds the Settlement Agreement precludes any and all claims against third || parties related to the accidental discharge of the firearm, including Glock, and that the 2|| Settlement Agreement intended to provide full compensation to Plaintiff. And despite both □□ parties filing separate statements of facts, there were no materially disputed facts impacting 4|| the Court’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement’s language. Therefore, 5 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant Glock’s MSJ. (Doc. 92.) 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating oral argument scheduled for April 5, 2023 || and instructing the Clerk of Court to terminate this case and file this order under seal. 8 The Court also intends to release a public ruling. Therefore, 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the parties must submit proposed redactions to the 10 || Court by no later than April 7, 2023. 11 Dated this 31st day of March, 2023. [12] 13 See ~P oO fonorable Susan M. Brnovich = 15 United States District Judge [28] -13-