Ramos v. Pierce

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Thao Ramos, No. CV-22-01956-PHX-DJH 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Avery Brin Pierce, et al., 13 Defendants. [14] 15 Defendants Gina Pate Pierce and Stephen R. Pierce (collectively “Gina and 16 Stephen”) have specially appeared to file a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27).1 The Court must 17 determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen under Federal Rule 18 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). For the following reasons, the Court grants Gina and 19 Stephen’s Motion. 20 I. Background 21 This matter concerns a vehicle collision (the “Collision”) between Plaintiff Thao 22 Ramos (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Avery Pierce (“Avery”) that occurred while Avery was 23 driving a 2015 Silverado owned by Gina and Stephen, who are Avery’s parents. (Doc. 124 3 at ¶¶ 11–14; 7 ¶¶ 11–14). 25 A. The Defendants 26 Gina and Stephen are married and reside in Wyoming. (Doc. 27-1 at 8, 12). They 27 have three adult children: Avery, Cole, and Grant. (Docs. 27-1 at 19; Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 12). 28 1 The matter is fully briefed. (See Response at Doc. 28 and Reply at Doc. 29). 1 Gina and Stephen own a vacation home in Arizona located at 10792 E. Sundance 2 Trail Scottsdale, Arizona 85262 (the “Arizona Vacation Home”), which they purchased in 3 May 2018. (Doc. 27-1 at 9, 13). According to Gina and Stephen, they or their children 4 have visited the Arizona Vacation Home on eleven separate occasions from April 2019– 5 April 2021. (Id. at 19–21). 6 Gina and Stephen also own a 2015 Silverado that is registered in Wyoming and has 7 Wyoming license plates. (Id. at 10, 14). According to Gina and Stephen, they drove the 8 2015 Silverado to the Arizona Vacation Home in November 2019 and it remained there 9 until the Collision occurred. (Doc. 27-1 at 21). Gina and Stephen permitted their children 10 to drive the 2015 Silverado while it was in Arizona. (Id. at 22). Specifically, Avery was 11 permitted to drive the 2015 Silverado from Arizona to California on the day of the 12 Collision. (Id. at 24). 13 B. The Collision 14 Gina and Stephen had paid for Avery’s flight to Arizona in February 2021. 15 (Doc. 27-1 at 24). Plaintiff and Avery were involved in the Collision on 16 February 22, 2021, while Avery was using Gina and Stephen’s 2015 Silverado with their 17 permission. (Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 14–18). The Collision occurred while Avery “passed through 18 Arizona on her way to visit a friend in Palm Springs, California.” (Doc. 27-1 at 10, 14). 19 Plaintiff alleges Avery was “inattentive, failed to control her speed, failed to control her 20 vehicle, and failed to make her left turn from the proper lane and lane position causing a 21 collision with [Plaintiff’s] motorcycle.” (Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 20). 22 C. The Present Action 23 Plaintiff brings claims against Avery under A.R.S. §§ 28-701(A), 28-751(2), 2824 754(A), negligence, and negligence per se. (Id. at ¶¶ 21–26). She pursues recovery of 25 medical expenses, general and economic damages. (Id. at ¶ A–F). Plaintiff also seeks to 26 hold Gina and Stephen vicariously liable for Avery’s actions under the family purpose 27 doctrine. (Docs. 1-3 at ¶ 14–18; 27 at 2). 28 / / / 1 II. Legal Standard 2 A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over all defendants. 3 Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. 4 v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990)). A defendant may 5 move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). 6 When a defendant does so, “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of 7 jurisdictional facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990); see Pebble 8 Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Doe v. Unocal, 248 9 F.3d 915 , 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). “In resolving a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court may 10 consider evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits and other materials submitted 11 on the motion.” Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int’l, LLC, 198 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (S.D. 12 Cal. 2016 ) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 123 (2014)). “[C]onflicts 13 between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] 14 favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” 15 AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Pebble 16 Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154 . 17 “Where . . . there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the 18 district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Dole Food Co. v. 19 Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). Arizona exerts personal jurisdiction to the 20 “maximum extent permitted by the Arizona Constitution and the United States 21 Constitution.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); see also A. Uberti and C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 22 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1995). Therefore, the analysis of personal jurisdiction under Arizona 23 law and federal law are the same. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 24 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the Due Process Clause, “[a]lthough a nonresident’s 25 physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the 26 nonresident generally must have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance 27 of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walden 28 v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 1 The personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right and “there are a ‘variety 2 of legal arrangements’ by which a litigant may give ‘express or implied consent to 3 the personal jurisdiction of the court.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 472 4 n. 14 (1985). Additionally, a court may assert general or specific jurisdiction over the 5 nonresident defendant. Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). General 6 jurisdiction exists when the defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the 7 forum state, whereas specific jurisdiction exists when the controversy arises from or is 8 related to the defendant’s specific contact with the forum state. See Helicopteros 9 Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). The “mere fact that [a 10 defendant’s] conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does not 11 suffice to authorize jurisdiction.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 291 . Where neither general nor 12 specific jurisdiction exists, the court must dismiss the defendant under Rule 12(b)(2). 13 III. Discussion 14 The Court must decide whether it has personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen. 15 The parties do not dispute that the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction because Gina 16 and Stephen are residents of Wyoming. (Doc. 27 at 8–9). Gina and Stephen argue personal 17 jurisdiction cannot be established solely under the family purpose doctrine. They further 18 contend they do not maintain sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona to create specific 19 personal jurisdiction. 20 Plaintiff argues Gina and Stephen consented to this Court’s jurisdiction under the 21 Arizona Nonresident Responsibility Act, A.R.S. § 28-2321 et seq., because they are liable 22 under the family purpose doctrine. She further asserts they maintain sufficient minimum 23 contacts with the forum by owning their Arizona Vacation Home, furnishing a vehicle to 24 use in Arizona, and directing Avery’s travel into Arizona. The Court will assess personal 25 jurisdiction first under the family purpose doctrine, then under the Arizona Nonresident 26 Responsibility Act, and conclude with the minimum contacts test. 27 A. Personal Jurisdiction Under Arizona’s Family Purpose Doctrine 28 First, Gina and Stephen argue the family purpose doctrine serves the basis for 1 liability only, not personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 27 at 6–7) (citing Griffith v. Raper, 2009 2 WL 10709721 , at *2 (D. W. Vir. Feb. 6, 2009). Under Arizona’s family purpose doctrine, 3 “a head of household who furnishes or maintains a vehicle for the use, pleasure, and 4 convenience of the family is liable for the negligence of family members who have the 5 general authority to drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes.” Brown v. 6 Stogsdill, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see also Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 7 380 (Ariz. 2011). However, “[t]he family purpose doctrine is substantive law that ascribes 8 liability; it does not, and cannot, create personal jurisdiction over non-residents” on the 9 basis of a non-resident defendant’s negligent driving in the forum state. Griffith, 2009 WL 10 10709721 at *2. A court must first find that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts 11 with the forum before determining liability under the family purpose doctrine. See id. at 12 *2 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978)). 13 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Avery is Gina and Stephen’s daughter, that Gina or 14 Stephen is the “head of family,” and that Avery was using the 2015 Silverado with Gina 15 and Stephen’s express or implied permission for a family purpose at the time of the 16 Collision. (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 12–18). Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently claims that Gina and Stephen 17 are vicariously liable for Avery’s actions under the family purpose doctrine. However, the 18 Court agrees with Gina and Stephen’s invocation of Griffith v. Raper. (See Doc. 27 at 7). 19 Plaintiff cannot rely on the family purpose doctrine alone to confer personal jurisdiction 20 over Gina and Stephen and must first establish they have minimum contacts with the forum. 21 See Griffith, 2009 WL 10709721 at *2; see also Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 . 22 B. Personal Jurisdiction Under Arizona’s Nonresident Responsibility Act 23 Second, the parties disagree on the role that a nonresident motorist act plays in a 24 court’s jurisdictional analysis. Arizona enacted its own version of a nonresident motorist 25 act, which is titled the Nonresident Responsibility Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff argues Gina 26 and Stephen consented to this Court’s jurisdiction under the Act when they authorized 27 Avery to operate their vehicle on Arizona’s public highways. (Doc. 28 at 5–8). Gina and 28 Stephen argue that this is an insufficient legal arrangement to constitute consent to 1 jurisdiction of this Court. (Doc. 29 at 3). 2 The Act creates various registration and licensing privileges for nonresidents who 3 use Arizona’s interstate highways. See A.R.S. §§ 28-2321–24, 28-3152. One way a 4 nonresident accepts the privileges provided by the Act is when the nonresident’s motor 5 vehicle “is operated on a public highway with the owner’s express or implied permission 6 under circumstances that render a resident motor vehicle owner liable for damages to 7 person or property caused by the operation.” A.R.S. § 28-2326(A)(3). Acceptance results 8 in “the appointment of the director2 by the nonresident” to accept services of process in 9 proceedings that arise from a collision involving: (1) the nonresident; or (2) “the 10 nonresident’s agent or any other person operating a motor vehicle owned by the 11 nonresident with the nonresident’s express or implied permission on a public highway.” 12 A.R.S. § 28-2326(B). 13 When viewing the alleged facts in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must, Gina and 14 Stephen accepted the Act’s privileges because Avery drove their 2015 Silverado on 15 Arizona’s public highways with their permission and this led to the Collision with Plaintiff. 16 (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 12–18). Plaintiff relies exclusively on nonbinding, out of state authorities3 to 17 argue acceptance under the Act results in Gina and Stephen consenting to the Court’s 18 jurisdiction. (Doc. 28 at 6). Gina and Stephen oppose, arguing that “just because an 19 Arizona statute provides a means in which a nonresident can be served a lawsuit, it does 20 not mean that this Court automatically has jurisdiction over that nonresident.” (Doc. 29 at 21 3). 22 The Court finds King v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. instructive. 632 F.3d 570 23 (9th Cir. 2011). There, the Ninth Circuit examined a Montana appointment statute to 24 determine whether it established personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporations. Id. 25 at 577–578. According to Montana’s interpretation of its statutory scheme, “the 26 2 “‘Director’ means the director of the department of transportation.” A.R.S. § 28-101(23). 27 3 Plaintiff cites to the following authorities: Andrews v. Joseph Cohen & Sons, 45 F.Supp. 732 (S.D. Tex. 1941); Hargett v. Reed, 382 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. App. 1989); McCard v. 28 Wright, 317 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. App. 1984). (See Doc. 28 at 6). 1 appointment of an agent for the service of process in Montana does not confer personal 2 jurisdiction over the [defendants].” Id. at 578. The Ninth Circuit followed Montana’s 3 interpretation to conclude the defendants were “not amenable to suit in that state simply 4 because they appointed the [state commissioner] as their agent for service of process.” Id. 5 Arizona recognizes similar principles: [6] Because the modern doctrine of specific jurisdiction amply ensures that a 7 state has jurisdiction when a [defendant’s] conduct allegedly causes harm in that state, there is no need to base personal jurisdiction solely upon a murky 8 implication of consent to suit—for all purposes and in all cases—from the 9 bare appointment of an agent for service. We therefore agree with those decisions holding that registration statutes do not imply consent to general 10 jurisdiction. [11] Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LeMaire, 395 P.3d 1116, 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). The Arizona [12] appellate court explained that although “registration and appointment may form the basis [13] for a finding that a [defendant] has established minimum contacts with the forum state[,] [14] minimum contacts are not enough to create jurisdiction over cases having no substantive [15] connection to the forum.” Id. [16] Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Nonresident Responsibility Act ignores these [17] principles. Gina and Stephen may have accepted the Act’s privileges, but their [18] appointment of an agent for service of process under the Act, standing alone, does not [19] subject them to this Court’s jurisdiction. Id. The Court must proceed to determine whether [20] Gina and Stephen have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum for the purpose of [21] specific personal jurisdiction. [22] C. Specific Jurisdiction Under the Minimum Contacts Test [23] To determine whether specific personal jurisdiction has been established, courts in [24] the Ninth Circuit apply a three-prong “minimum contacts” test: [25] 26 (1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform 27 some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 28 conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 1 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and [2] 3 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. [4] 5 Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142. A plaintiff must satisfy both of the first two prongs to establish 6 personal jurisdiction. Id. A defendant bears the burden on the third prong. See Axiom 7 Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064 , 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2017). 8 1. Prong One of the Minimum Contacts Test 9 Under the first prong of the minimum contacts test, the Ninth Circuit has established 10 separate inquiries depending on whether the nature of the claims at issue arise from a 11 contract or alleged tortious conduct. See Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142. Plaintiff alleges a tort 12 claims against Avery, Gina, and Stephen. (Doc. 1-3 at 4–5). Thus, the Court will apply 13 the “purposeful direction” inquiry to determine whether the first prong of the minimum 14 contacts test is met. Id. 15 The purposeful direction inquiry “requires that the defendant . . . (1) committed an 16 intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant 17 knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111. Actions 18 may be directed at the forum state even if they occurred elsewhere, id., but “random, 19 fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” are insufficient to create the requisite connection with 20 the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 . Moreover, to hold a person’s “glancing 21 presence” or “temporary visits to a State a[s] bas[e]s for the assertion of in personam 22 jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the future would make a mockery of the 23 limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kulko v. 24 Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 , 92–93 (1978). 25 Here, Plaintiff argues Gina and Stephen purposely directed activities to the forum 26 when they (1) purchased their Arizona Vacation Home, (2) furnished Avery a vehicle to 27 drive in Arizona, and (3) directed Avery’s travel into Arizona. The Court will discuss each 28 activity in turn. 1 a. Owning a Vacation Home in Arizona [2] First, the fact that Gina and Stephen own their Arizona Vacation Home is [3] insufficient to confer jurisdiction. See De La Torre v. Merck Enterprises, Inc., 2007 WL 4 9724454, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2007) (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Telstar [5] Const. Co., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 917, 929 (D. Ariz. 2003)). [6] b. Furnishing a Vehicle to Another in Arizona [7] Second, the fact that Gina and Stephen lent their 2015 Silverado to Avery to use [8] Arizona is an insufficient basis of specific jurisdiction. Plaintiff relies exclusively on [9] nonbinding authorities to argue that “numerous Courts around the country” have found [10] personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when it furnishes a vehicle for another’s use in the [11] forum. (Doc. 28 at 10–12).4 Gina and Stephen assert that the majority of Plaintiff’s [12] supporting authorities are distinguishable because they involve nonresident defendants [13] who “lent their vehicles to other people who lived out of state for those people’s [14] continuous, long-term use in the state where they resided.” (Doc. 29 at 8). [15] The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s supporting authorities are distinct from the case at [16] hand. See Progressive, 2022 WL 2438427 , at *2 (the nonresident defendant allowed the [17] driver to use their co-owned vehicle while the driver lived in North Carolina, and the [18] accident occurred in North Carolina); see Stevenson v. Brosdal, 813 So.2d at 1047 (the [19] nonresident defendant allowed the drivers to use his vehicle in Florida while the drivers [20] lived in Florida, and the accident occurred in Florida); see In Hart v. Bates, 897 F.Supp. at [21] 713–14 (the nonresident defendant allowed the drivers to use his vehicle in Pennsylvania [22] while the drivers lived in Pennsylvania, and the accident occurred in Pennsylvania). For [23] example, in Stevenson, the court noted the nonresident defendant “specifically knew [the [24] drivers] were living and driving the vehicle in Florida at the time of the accident” and that [25] took the case “out of the realm of mere foreseeability and into the realm of sufficient [26] 27 4 Plaintiff cites to the following authorities: Progressive American Ins. Co. v. De Pinto, 2022 WL 2438427 (W.D.N.C. July 5, 2022); Stevenson v. Brosdal, 813 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 28 Dist. Ct. App. 2002); See In Hart v. Bates, 897 F.Supp. 710 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Tavoularis v. Womer, 462 A.2d 110 (N.H. 1983). (See Doc. 28 at 10–12). 1 minimum contacts.” Stevenson, 813 So.2d at 1048 . 2 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Avery lives in Arizona. Gina and Stephen 3 authorized Avery to use their vehicle in Arizona for the casual, isolated purpose of driving 4 it to Palm Springs. (Doc. 27-1 at 10, 14, 24). These facts more aptly reflect the kind of 5 “glancing presence” that is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Kulko, 436 U.S. 6 at 92; see also Stroman v. Brown, 476 A.2d 874, 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) 7 (concluding that the nonresident defendant “did not purposefully avail himself of 8 conducting activities in Pennsylvania by casually giving his wife permission to drive his 9 automobile there on her personal business”) (emphasis added). 10 Plaintiff also relies on Tavoularis to argue it was foreseeable that Gina and 11 Stephen’s loaning of their vehicle to Avery would likely cause harm to the forum. 462 12 A.2d 110 (N.H. 1983). There, the court found “it was reasonably foreseeable that the 13 [nonresident] defendant would be sued in [the forum] for negligently entrusting an 14 automobile to [the driver]” because he allegedly knew the driver did not have a valid 15 license. Id. at 428. Plaintiff here does not allege that Gina and Stephen negligently 16 entrusted the 2015 Silverado to Avery. Plaintiff only asserts Gina and Stephen are liable 17 under the family purpose doctrine. Thus, there are no facts showing Gina and Stephen 18 knew that lending Avery a vehicle to use for less than a day in Arizona would likely cause 19 harm to the forum state. 20 c. Directing Another’s Travel through Arizona 21 Last, the fact that Gina and Stephen purchased Avery a plane ticket to Arizona is 22 insufficient to establish minimum contacts with the forum. Although they purposely 23 directed Avery’s travel through Arizona, this is a kind of “temporary visit[] to a State” that 24 is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 . [25] 2. Prong Two of the Minimum Contacts Test [26] The Court need not consider prong two because Plaintiff fails to meet prong one of [27] the minimum contacts test. Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142 (“The plaintiff bears the burden of [28] satisfying the first two prongs of the test.”). The inquiry therefore ends here. IV. Conclusion 2 In sum, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). It is undisputed that the Court lacks general 4|| jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen because they are residents of Wyoming. Plaintiff 5 || cannot rely on Arizona’s family purpose doctrine or Nonresident Responsibility Act to 6 || establish personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen because those legal authorities 7 || concern liability and service only. Nor has Plaintiff shown that Gina and Stephen maintain 8 || sufficient minimum contacts with the forum for the purpose of specific jurisdiction. 9 Accordingly, 10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that specially appearing Defendants Gina Pate Pierce 11 || and Stephen R. Pierce’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to dismiss Defendants Gina Pate Pierce and Stephen R. Pierce from this 13 |} action. 14 Dated this 4th day of May, 2023. 15 oC. . fe _ \Le 16 norable’ Diang/4. Hunfetewa 17 United States District Judge [28] -ll-