Amerson v. Yavapai County Board of Supervisors

1 WO JL [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Ronald M. Amerson, No. CV-23-08069-PCT-MTL (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER [12] Yavapai County Board of Supervisors, et 13 al., 14 Defendants. [15] 16 On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff Ronald M. Amerson filed a pro se Complaint (Doc. 1-3 17 at 3-9) in the Superior Court of Yavapai County, Arizona, against numerous Defendants, 18 including the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors and the Yavapai County Sheriff’s 19 Office. On April 13, 2023, Defendant Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office filed a Notice of 20 Removal (Doc. 1) and removed the case to this Court. On April 19, 2023, Defendants 21 Yavapai County Board of Supervisors and Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office filed a Motion 22 to Dismiss (Doc. 3) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 In a May 18, 23 2023 Order, the Court determined removal was proper and directed Plaintiff to serve or 24 seek a waiver of service for each unserved Defendant. (Doc. 5.) Subsequently, the Court 25 dismissed all Defendants, except the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors and the 26 Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, for failure to serve. (Doc. 11.) [28] 1 Although Defendants refer to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they do not present any argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case. 1 Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond to Defendants’ 2 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6), and he filed a Response (Doc. 12) opposing the Motion. 3 Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 13). The Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and 4 will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. 5 I. Complaint 6 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 14, 2022, Defendant Yavapai 7 County Sheriff’s Office (“YCSO”) detained Plaintiff against his will and transported him 8 from his residence without cause or permission. Plaintiff claims YCSO inflicted mental 9 distress/intentional infliction of emotional distress and harm by falsely imprisoning, 10 arresting, and kidnapping him. Plaintiff asserts YCSO also failed to provide medical 11 treatment for a laceration on his right hand and treatment for his chronic breathing 12 problems. Plaintiff further alleges that YCSO denied him his prescribed Zoloft, which 13 caused him “great and permanent damage,” and assigned Plaintiff to an upper-level cell 14 despite his difficulty walking. As his injury, Plaintiff claims he suffered “physical shaking” 15 due to the failure to provide him Zoloft, permanent fears and anxiety, physical trauma to 16 his knee and hip, and loss of pleasure and enjoyment.2 17 Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on a “state-created danger” 18 theory. He also asserts state-law claims of kidnapping, false imprisonment, slander, 19 defamation of character, and medical malpractice. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in the 20 amount of $150,000,000.00. 21 II. Legal Standards 22 Dismissal of a complaint, or any claim within it, for failure to state a claim under 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable 24 legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 25 Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 26 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In determining [27] 28 2 It is unclear whether Plaintiff was charged with any crime or how long he was in the custody of the YCSO. 1 whether a complaint states a claim under this standard, the allegations in the complaint are 2 taken as true and the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 3 Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007). 4 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 5 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). But “[s]pecific facts are not 6 necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is 7 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal 8 quotation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim that is 9 “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Bell Atlantic Corp. 10 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 11 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 12 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . Where the plaintiff 13 is a pro se litigant, the court must “construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the 14 petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 15 (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 , 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). 16 III. Discussion 17 A. Parties’ Contentions 18 In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that the Complaint does not comply 19 with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office 20 is a non-jural entity under federal and state law, Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible Monell 21 claim against the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors, and the Yavapai County Board of 22 Supervisors cannot be held vicariously liable for Plaintiff’s state-law claims based on the 23 alleged conduct of YCSO personnel. 24 In his Response, Plaintiff argues that because this Court “accept[ed] and 25 transferr[ed] this case” from state court to this Court, the Court has “acknowledged 26 jurisdiction.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “acknowledged” jurisdiction and his 27 Fourteenth Amendment claim by removing the case to this Court because “[h]ad there been 28 no claim, the request to dismiss would have taken place in the prior court/jurisdiction.” 1 Plaintiff contends he has stated multiple claims for which relief can be granted, and YCSO 2 has denied him access to any records, including video, body camera footage, audio records, 3 transcriptions, “written or other evidence,” and documents under the Freedom of 4 Information Act. Plaintiff argues that YCSO has claimed the information cannot be 5 released because “this is an ongoing investigation,” but according to Plaintiff, “this is an 6 attempt to deny [him] access to proof of these wrongdoings.” 7 B. Federal Claims 8 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 9 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 10 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 11 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278 , 12 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 13 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 14 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 , 37115 72, 377 (1976). 16 1. Defendant YCSO 17 Defendant YCSO is not a proper defendant because it is a “non-jural entity.” 18 Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Braillard v. Maricopa 19 County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)). In Arizona, the responsibility of 20 operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff. See Ariz. Rev. 21 Stat. §§ 11-441(A)(5), 31-101. A sheriff’s office is simply an administrative creation of 22 the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties and is not a “person” 23 amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. The Court will dismiss Defendant YCSO. 24 2. Defendant Yavapai County Board of Supervisors 25 “A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was 26 inflicted by its employees or agents.” Long v. County of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th 27 Cir. 2006). The actions of individuals may support municipal liability only if the 28 employees were acting pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality. Botello 1 v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2005). A § 1983 claim against a municipal 2 defendant “cannot succeed as a matter of law” unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the 3 municipal defendant maintains a policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged injury; 4 and (2) explains how such policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sadoski v. 5 Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant 6 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that 7 Defendant Yavapai County Board of Supervisors maintained a specific policy or custom 8 that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights and has failed to 9 explain how his injuries were caused by any municipal policy or custom. Thus, the Court 10 will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Yavapai County Board of Supervisors. 11 C. State-Law Claims 12 The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 13 over Plaintiff’s state-law claims because Plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed. 14 See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may decline to exercise 15 supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims 16 over which it has original jurisdiction.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3))); Gini v. Las 17 Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (when federal law claims 18 are eliminated before trial, the court generally should decline jurisdiction over state law 19 claims and dismiss them without prejudice); see San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los 20 Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting court need not provide reasons for 21 declining supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(3)). Thus, the Court will dismiss 22 Plaintiff’s state-law claims. 23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and 24 will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. 25 IV. Leave to Amend 26 Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the 27 deficiencies outlined above. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document 28 that it is the “First Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or 1 rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by 2 reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count. 3 A first amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, [4] 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 5 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint 6 as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 . Any cause of action that was raised in the 7 original Complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice 8 is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 9 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 10 If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements 11 telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name 12 of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to 13 do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of 14 Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of 15 that Defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377 . 16 Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a Defendant. If 17 Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific 18 injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for 19 failure to state a claim. Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of 20 Defendants has violated a constitutional right are not acceptable and will be 21 dismissed. 22 If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he should be aware that “[f]alse arrest, a 23 species of false imprisonment, is the detention of a person without his consent and without 24 lawful authority.” Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1064 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting 25 Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)), aff’d sub nom. Stapley 26 v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Arizona law, false imprisonment and 27 false arrest consist of non-consensual detention of a person “without lawful authority.” 28 Slade v. City of Phx., 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975). “Reflective of the fact that false 1 imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once 2 the victim becomes held pursuant to such process—when, for example, he is bound over 3 by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) 4 (emphasis in original). 5 To state a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that defendants made 6 the arrest without probable cause or other justification. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 7 F.3d 1086 , 1097 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had 8 knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient 9 to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a 10 crime.’” Id. at 1097-98 (quoting Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th 11 Cir. 2012)); see also Edgerly v. City & County of S.F., 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) 12 (“To determine whether the Officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest, we 13 consider ‘whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the Officers’] 14 knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had 15 committed or was committing an offense.’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 , 91 16 (1964))). “[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable 17 cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the 18 arrest.” Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added). “If an officer has probable cause to 19 believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his 20 presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater 21 v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 22 “[A] claim for false arrest turns only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a 23 defendant, and . . . it is not relevant whether probable cause existed with respect to each 24 individual charge, or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the 25 time of arrest.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Price v. Roark, [26] 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Claims for false arrest focus on the validity of the 27 arrest, not on the validity of each individual charge made during the course of the arrest.”). 28 “Thus . . . ‘[i]f there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest 1 was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.’” Price, 256 F.3d at 2 369 (quoting Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Barry v. Fowler, [3] 902 F.2d 770 , 773 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (no unconstitutional seizure where police had 4 probable cause to arrest plaintiff for one offense, even if police lacked probable cause to 5 arrest for a second offense). 6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “claims for violations of the right 7 to adequate medical care ‘brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under 8 the Fourteenth Amendment’ must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference 9 standard.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 10 Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016)). To state a medical 11 care claim, a pretrial detainee must show 12 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 13 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable [14] available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable 15 official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the [16] defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such 17 measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. [18] Id. at 1125 . “With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively 19 unreasonable, a test that will necessarily ‘turn[] on the facts and circumstances of each 20 particular case.’” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 21 389, 397 (2015); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 22 The “‘mere lack of due care by a state official’ does not deprive an individual of 23 life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 24 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)). A plaintiff must “prove more 25 than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. 26 A mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison 27 officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 28 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). ITIS ORDERED: 2 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ 3 | Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3). 4 (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc.3) is granted. The 5 | Complaint (Doc. 1-3 at 3-9) is dismissed without prejudice. 6 (3) Within 30 days of the filing date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended 7 | complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in the Order. 8 (4) ‘If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice and without 10 | further notice to Plaintiff and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot. 11 Dated this 7th day of December, 2023. [12] WMichadl T. dibunde Michael T. Liburdi 15 United States District Judge