Avila v. JBL Cleaning Services LLC

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Minerva Avila, No. CV-23-00398-PHX-DJH 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 JBL Cleaning Services LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. [14] 15 Plaintiff Minerva Avila (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Motion for Entry of Default 16 Judgment (Doc. 16) against Defendant JBL Cleaning Services, LLC (“Defendant JBL”), 17 Defendant Jose Barajas, and Defendant Jane Doe Barajas II (collectively the “Defaulting 18 Defendants”). Defendant Bryan Barajas and Defendant Jane Doe Barajas are also named 19 parties to this case. The Defaulting Defendants were served with the Complaint, Summons, 20 and this Motion; however, they have not answered or otherwise appeared to defend this 21 action. The Court must decide whether default judgment is proper under 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. For the following reasons, the Court will grant 23 Plaintiff’s Motion. 24 I. Background 25 Defendant JBL is a limited liability company that provides commercial cleaning 26 services to buildings in the Phoenix Metropolitan Area. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 11–12). Defendants 27 Jose Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas II are husband and wife who own and manage 28 Defendant JBL. (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges she worked for the Defaulting Defendants 1 for approximately 14 weeks as a “cleaning technician or custodian.” (Id. at ¶ 35–36, 51). 2 Plaintiff brings claims against the Defaulting Defendants under the Fair Labor Standard 3 Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), the Arizona Minimum Wage Act, A.R.S. § 23-363 4 et seq. (“AMWA”), and the Arizona Wage Act, A.R.S. § 23-350 et seq. (“AWA”). 5 (Id. at ¶¶ 85–107). 6 Below is an overview of the underlying allegations as well as the procedural history 7 of the present action. 8 A. The Underlying Allegations 9 Plaintiff states she began working for the Defaulting Defendants on 10 October 31, 2022, and received an hourly wage rate of $14 per hour. (Id. at ¶¶ 35–37). 11 Plaintiff alleges the Defaulting Defendants are “employers” for the purposes of the FLSA. 12 (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 17). Plaintiff further alleges that, rather than classifying her as an employee 13 for the purposes of the FLSA, the Defaulting Defendants misclassified her as an 14 independent contractor. (Id. at ¶¶ 40–44). 15 Plaintiff represents that she worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek during her 16 employment at the Defaulting Defendants’ request. (Id. at ¶ 58). Specifically, Plaintiff 17 alleges she worked 55 hours in a given workweek. (Id. at ¶ 57). Plaintiff states she 18 discontinued her employment with the Defaulting Defendants on February 10, 2023, due 19 to their alleged nonpayment of wages. Plaintiff also maintains that the Defaulting 20 Defendants did not pay her for her final 2 workweeks, which consisted of 84 hours. 21 (Id. at ¶¶ 46–51, 61). 22 B. The Present Action 23 After her resignation, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) on March 8, 2023, 24 bringing the following claims against the Defaulting Defendants: [25] - Count One for failure to pay overtime under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 26 § 207, seeking unpaid overtime wages and an additional, equal amount in liquidated damages under 29 § U.S.C. 216 (id. at ¶¶ 85– 27 92); [28] - Count Two for failure to pay minimum wage under the FLSA, 29 1 U.S.C. § 206 (a), seeking unpaid minimum wages and an additional, equal amount in liquidated damages under 29 § U.S.C. 216 [2] (id. at ¶¶ 93–97); [3] - Count Three for failure to pay minimum wage under the AMWA, [4] A.R.S. § 23-363, seeking unpaid minimum wages and an additional, 5 amount equal to twice the underpaid damages under A.R.S. § 23364(G) (id. at ¶¶ 98–102); [6] - Count Four for failure to pay wages due under the AWA, A.R.S. § 237 350, seeking treble unpaid wages under A.R.S. § 23-355 (id. 8 at ¶¶ 102–107). [9] Plaintiff also seeks pre and post judgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (Id. at ¶¶ 92, [10] 97, 102, 107). [11] On March, 2023, Plaintiff, via an Arizona process server, personally served the [12] Complaint and Summons on each of the Defaulting Defendants at 2005 North 103rd Ave. [13] #1108, Avondale, AZ 85392. (Docs. 6; 7; 8).1 The Defaulting Defendants did not file an [14] answer or otherwise appear in this action. [15] On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff moved for the Clerk of Court to enter default against [16] Defendant JBL, Defendant Jose Barajas, and Defendant Jane Doe Barajas—who has not [17] been served. (See Doc. 10). Due to this error, the Clerk of Court entered an amended entry [18] of default as to Defendant JBL and Defendant Jose Barajas only under Rule 55(a).2 [19] (See Docs. 14; 15). The Clerk of Court later entered default against Defendant Jane Doe [20] Barajas II under Rule 55(a) upon Plaintiff’s request. (Docs. 12; 13). Plaintiff has since [21] filed the pending Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Doc. 16), which she served [22] electronically and by mail to the Defaulting Defendants’ Arizona addresses. (Id. at 13). [23] The Defaulting Defendants did not respond and the time to do so has passed. LRCiv. 7.2. [24] 25 1 However, the docket does not reflect any service efforts by Plaintiff on Defendants Bryan Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas. The Court will therefore order Plaintiff to either (1) show 26 cause why Defendants Bryan Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas should not be dismissed from this matter due to lack of service; or (2) file a notice of voluntary dismissal as to these 27 Defendants. 28 2 Unless where otherwise noted, all Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 II. Legal Standard 2 Once a party’s default has been entered, the district court has discretion to grant 3 default judgment against that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 4 F.2d 1089 , 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who 5 has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into 6 its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707 , 712 7 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 Once a court finds jurisdiction, it must consider: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to 9 the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the 10 complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 11 concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the 12 strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 13 merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 , 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). In applying the Eitel 14 factors, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of 15 damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557 , 560 (9th Cir. 16 1977). 17 III. Discussion 18 The Court will first assess whether it has jurisdiction over this matter before 19 evaluating the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment under the Eitel factors. 20 A. Jurisdiction 21 The Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Counts One and Two 22 because they arise under the FLSA. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 85–97); see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing 23 that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims arising under federal law). This lends 24 the Court supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Counts Three and Four because those 25 state law claims are “part of the same case or controversy[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). The 26 Court also has personal jurisdiction over the Defaulting Defendants because Plaintiff’s 27 claims arise from the Defaulting Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with federal and 28 state employment laws during the course of their business activities in Maricopa, Arizona. 1 (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10–84); see Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th. Cir. 2015). 2 B. Eitel Factors 3 Having found jurisdiction over the case and parties, the Court will proceed to assess 4 the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment under the Eitel factors. 5 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 6 The Defaulting Defendants have not responded or otherwise appeared in this action. 7 Thus, without an entry of default judgment, Plaintiff’s damages would remain unrelieved. 8 The first factor therefore favors default judgment. See Constr. Laborers Tr. Funds for S. 9 California Admin. Co. v. Anzalone Masonry, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 10 2018). 11 2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claim and Sufficiency of Complaint 12 “Under an Eitel analysis, the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the 13 sufficiency of the complaint are often analyzed together.” Dr. JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. 14 Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The second and third Eitel factors 15 favor default judgment where the complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief upon which 16 the plaintiff may recover. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386 , 1388–89 (9th Cir. 17 1978)); Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 18 “Upon entry of default, the facts alleged to establish liability are binding upon the 19 defaulting party.” Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388 . “However, it follows from this that facts 20 which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, or claims which are not 21 well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.” Id. 22 Plaintiff brings claims for unpaid wages and overtime wages under the FLSA, 23 AWA, and AMWA. The Court will examine each claim in turn. 24 a. FLSA Claims 25 The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees a minimum wage for any time 26 spent working during the workweek as well as additional compensation for any time spent 27 in excess of a forty hour workweek. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 (a), 207(a). The FLSA defines 28 an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” Id. § 203(e)(1). It further 1 defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 2 employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d). An employee can gain protection 3 under the FLSA through (1) enterprise coverage if her employer has an annual gross 4 volume of sales or business done that is greater than $500,000; or (2) individual coverage 5 if the employee is “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 6 Id. §§ 203(s)(1)(A); see also Zorich v. Long Beach Fire Dep’t & Ambulance Serv., Inc., [7] 118 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1997). An individual can be subject to liability under the FLSA 8 as an employer if they “exercise[] control over the nature and structure of the employment 9 relationship, or economic control over the relationship.” Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087 , 10 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). 11 Plaintiff represents that Defendant JBL is “an enterprise engaged in commerce that 12 had annual gross sales of at least $500,000.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 29). Plaintiff also alleged that 13 the individual Defaulting Defendants—Jose Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas II—were 14 owners and managers of Defendant JBL, controlled Plaintiff’s work schedule, had the 15 authority to hire and fire employees, and supervised Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 42–44). Thus, 16 Plaintiff has demonstrated that she is an employee and each of the Defaulting Defendants 17 are employers under the FLSA. 18 To bring an FLSA claim for unpaid minimum wages, a plaintiff must “allege facts 19 showing that there was a given week in which he was entitled to but denied minimum 20 wages[.]” Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc. 771 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2014). To bring 21 an FLSA claim for unpaid overtime wages, a plaintiff must allege at least one workweek 22 in which she worked in excess of forty hours and were not paid overtime wages. Id. at 646 . 23 Plaintiff claims the Defaulting Defendants did not compensate her for her final 2 24 workweeks. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 46–51, 61). She also claims she “worked approximately 55 25 hours in a given workweek” and the “[Defaulting] Defendants did not pay [her] one and 26 one-half times her regular rate of pay for time spent working in excess of 40 hours in a 27 given workweek during her employment[.]” (Id. at ¶¶ 57–59). When accepting these 28 allegation as true, Plaintiff has stated plausible claims against the Defaulting Defendants 1 for unpaid overtime and minimum wages under the FLSA. 2 b. AMWA Claim 3 The AMWA establishes the minimum wage an employer must pay an employee in 4 Arizona. See A.R.S. § 23-363. Like the FLSA, the AMWA defines an “employee” as “any 5 person who is or was employed by an employer.” Id. § 23-362(A). It further defines an 6 “employer” as “any corporation proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, limited liability 7 company, trust, association, political subdivision of the state, [and] individual or other 8 entity acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 9 Id. § 23-362(B) (emphasis added). 10 Plaintiff alleges Defendant JBL is a limited liability corporation and Defendants 11 Jose Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas II are individuals that act in Defendant JBL’s interest. 12 (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 16). So, each Defaulting Defendant can be held liable under the AMWA 13 as employers. Because Plaintiff has alleged the Defaulting Defendants failed to 14 compensate her for the hours she worked during her last 2 weeks of employment, Plaintiff 15 has shown that the Defaulting Defendants violated the AMWA. (Id. at ¶¶ 46–51, 61). 16 c. AWA Claim 17 The AWA requires “[e]ach employer, on each of the regular paydays, shall pay to 18 the employees all wages due to the employees up to that date[.]” A.R.S. § 23-351(C). 19 Similar to the AMWA and the FLSA, the AWA defines an “employee” as “any person who 20 performs services for an employer under a contract of employment either made in this state 21 or to be performed wholly or partly within this state.” A.R.S. § 23-350(2). However, the 22 AWA limits the term “employer” to include “any individual, partnership, association, joint 23 stock company, trust or corporation, the administrator or executor of the estate of a 24 deceased individual or the receiver, trustee or successor of any of such persons employing 25 any person.” A.R.S. § 23-350(3). Unlike the FLSA and the AMWA, the AWA “does 26 not . . . authorize individual liability against the owners, officers, and directors of a 27 corporate employer in a case where the claim is for the employer’s wholesale failure to pay 28 wages.” Rosen v. Fasttrak Foods LLC, 2021 WL 2981590 , at *5 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2021). 1 The facts alleged by Plaintiff demonstrate that she was employed by the Defaulting 2 Defendants for purposes of the AWA, and that the Defaulting Defendants failed to pay her 3 for the hours she worked during her last 2 weeks of employment. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 46–51, 61). 4 However, due to the AWA’s narrow definition of an employer, Defendants Jose Barajas 5 and Jane Doe Barajas II are excluded from individual liability under Count Four. Plaintiff 6 has thus stated a plausible claim for unpaid wages under the AWA against Defendant JBL 7 only. 8 To summarize, Plaintiff has shown that all Defaulting Defendants collectively 9 violated the FLSA and AMWA, and Defendant JBL violated the AWA. The second and 10 third Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment in this manner. 11 3. Sum of Money at Stake 12 Regarding the fourth factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in 13 relation to the seriousness of a defendant’s conduct. See Pepsico, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 . 14 “If the sum of money at stake is completely disproportionate or inappropriate, default 15 judgment is disfavored.” Gemmel v. Systemhouse, Inc., 2008 WL 65604 , at *4 (D. Ariz. 16 Jan. 3, 2008). A district court has “wide latitude” in determining the amount of damages 17 to award upon default judgment. James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (9th Cir. 1993). 18 Plaintiff seeks the unpaid overtime wages, unpaid minimum wages, and liquidated 19 damages she is owed under the FLSA and AMWA. She also seeks trebled unpaid wages 20 damages under the AWA. Plaintiff asserts she is entitled to a total of $6,104 in damages, 21 exclusive of reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 16 at 5–6, 8–10). The Court finds this 22 requested amount is reasonable and proportional to the Defaulting Defendants’ failure to 23 pay wages and applicable overtime wages under federal and state law. See infra Section 24 III.C. 25 4. Potential Disputes of Material Fact 26 The time has passed for the Defaulting Defendants to dispute the Complaint’s 27 allegations. At this stage, the allegations are taken as true. See Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. 28 Therefore, the possibility of dispute is low. This fifth Eitel factor favors entering default 1 judgment. 2 5. Excusable Neglect 3 The Defaulting Defendant was served with the Complaint, Summons, and Plaintiff’s 4 Motion for Default Judgment at 2005 North 103rd Ave., #1108, Avondale, AZ 85392. 5 (Docs. 6; 7; 8; 16 at 13). There is no indication that the Defaulting Defendants’ failure to 6 defend this action is due to excusable neglect. Therefore, the sixth factor favors entering 7 default judgment. 8 6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 9 The Court is unable to reach the merits of this case because the Defaulting 10 Defendant has failed to plead or otherwise defend this action. Therefore, this final factor 11 weighs against granting default judgment. 12 Overall, majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment. 13 The Court will therefore grant Plaintiff’s Motion and enter judgment accordingly. 14 C. Damages Analysis 15 Having found that entry of default judgment is proper, the Court must determine the 16 extent of Plaintiff’s entitled damages. In contrast to the other allegations in a complaint, 17 allegations pertaining to damages are not automatically taken as true. TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 18 826 F.2d at 917–18. “The plaintiff is required to provide evidence of its damages, and the 19 damages sought must not be different in kind or amount from those set forth in the 20 complaint.” Amini Innovation Corp. v. KTY Int’l Mktg., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (C.D. 21 Cal. 2011 ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). This is so a defendant may know from the complaint 22 what the potential award may be, and the defendant may then decide whether a response is 23 worthwhile. See e.g., Silge v. Merz, 510 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (limiting damages 24 in a default judgment award to what is “specified in the [complaint’s] ‘demand for 25 judgment’. . . ensures that a defendant who is considering default can look at the damages 26 clause, satisfy himself that he is willing to suffer judgment in that amount, and then default 27 without the need to hire a lawyer”). “To recover damages after securing a default 28 judgment, a plaintiff must prove the relief [she] seek[s] through testimony or written 1 affidavit.” Yelp, Inc. v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1082 , 1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2014). “The 2 Court may enter a default judgment without a damages hearing when . . . ‘the amount 3 claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation.’” Capitol Specialty Ins. 4 Corp. v. Chaldean LLC, 2022 WL 2953062 , at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2022) (quoting HTS, 5 Inc. v. Boley, 954 F. Supp. 2d 927, 947 (D. Ariz. 2013)); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154 , 6 1161 (9th Cir. 1981). 7 1. Statutory Damages Under the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA 8 During Plaintiff’s final 2 weeks of employment with the Defaulting Defendants in 9 2023, the applicable federal minimum wage was $7.25 per hour, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a)(1)(C), 10 and the applicable state minimum wage was $13.85 per hour, A.R.S. § 23-363(B).3 When 11 an employer is found liable under the FLSA for failure to pay minimum and overtime 12 wages, the employee is entitled to “unpaid minimum wages, [] unpaid overtime 13 compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” [14] 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) (emphasis added). Double damages are the norm, and single damages 15 are the exception. See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts shall 16 also allow “a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” [17] 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). Similarly, when an employer is found liable under the AMWA for 18 failure to pay minimum wages, the employee is entitled to “the balance of the 19 wages . . . including interest thereon, and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid 20 wages . . . . A prevailing plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs 21 of suit.” A.R.S. § 23-364(G) (emphasis added). Likewise, when an employer is found 22 liable under the AWA for failure to pay wages, “the employee may recover . . . an amount 23 that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.” Id. § 23-355(A) (emphasis added). 24 Plaintiff has submitted a sworn affidavit detailing her hours worked and resulting 25 wages. (Doc. 16-1). Plaintiff represents her employment with the Defaulting Defendants 26 lasted for approximately 14 weeks, during which her regular pay rate was $14 per hour and 27 her overtime premium was $7 per hour. (Id. at ¶¶ 5–6, 10). Plaintiff estimates she worked 28 3 See Industrial Commission of Arizona, https://www.azica.gov/divisions/labordepartment (last visited Feb. 17, 2024). 1 a total of 184 hours without overtime pay (comprised of 15 excess hours per week during 2 her first 12 workweeks and 4 excess hours during her final 2 workweeks) and 84 hours 3 without any minimum pay during her final 2 workweeks in 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 12–15). These 4 allegations are consistent with those in the Complaint. (Compare Doc. 16-1 with Doc. 1). 5 Plaintiff calculates her unpaid minimum wage damages under each statute as 6 follows: [7] - $609 ($7.25 multiplied by 84 hours) in unpaid federal minimum 8 wages under the FLSA, plus doubled liquidated damages for a total of $1,218.00; [9] - $1,163.40 ($13.85 multiplied by 84 hours) in unpaid Arizona [10] minimum wages under the AMWA, plus statutory trebling of 11 damages for a total of $3,490.20; and 12 - $1,176 ($14 multiplied by 84 hours) in unpaid wages under the AWA, 13 plus statutory trebling of damages for a total of $3,528.00. [14] (Doc. 16 at 5–6, 8–10). Plaintiff does not seek to stack her unpaid minimum wage [15] damages. (Id. at 9). See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 , (1980) [16] (“[C]ourts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual”); see also Acosta v. [17] Pindernation Holdings LLC, 2023 WL 3951222 , at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 1, 2023), report [18] and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3951211 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2023) (finding no [19] basis to authorize stacked awards under the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA). Plaintiff states [20] the larger trebled AWA award for $3,528.00 “engulfs” her smaller minimum wage [21] damages under the AMWA, which in turn “engulfs” her smaller minimum wage damages [22] under the FLSA. (Doc. 16 at 9). Plaintiff further calculates her unpaid overtime wages [23] under the FLSA as $1,288 ($7 multiplied by 184 hours) plus doubled liquidated damages [24] for a total of $2,576.00. (Id. at 5–6, 8–10). [25] 2. Plaintiff’s Request for Damages is Adequately Supported [26] Plaintiff requests an award against Defendant JBL for $6,104.00, which is [27] comprised of the $3,528.00 total unpaid minimum wage damages under the AWA plus the [28] $2,576.00 total unpaid overtime wage damages under the FLSA. (Id. at 10). Of that 1 $6,104.00 amount, Plaintiff requests an award holding the Defaulting Defendants jointly 2 and severally liable for $6,066.20, which is comprised of the $3,490.20 total unpaid 3 minimum wage damages under the AMWA plus the $2,576.00 total unpaid overtime wage 4 damages owed under the FLSA. (Id.) Plaintiff requests that these amounts be augmented 5 further by post judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 . (Id. at 11–12). Plaintiff also 6 seeks leave to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.) 7 The Court concludes that the damages requested by Plaintiff are provided for by 8 statute and adequately supported by the calculations in her Motion for Default Judgment 9 and supporting affidavit. Plaintiff’s calculations are also consistent with the Court’s 10 finding that all Defaulting Defendants can be held joint and severally liable under the FLSA 11 and AMWA, but only Defendant JBL can be held liable under the AWA. See supra Section 12 III.B(2). So, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s requested damages in the amount of $6,104.00 13 against Defendant JBL, with $6,066.20 of that amount being held jointly and severally 14 against all the Defaulting Defendants. The Court will also award post-judgment interest, 15 and allow Plaintiff to seek an award of attorneys’ fees in accordance with Local Rule of 16 Civil Procedure 54.2. 17 Accordingly, 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Minerva Avila’s Motion for Entry of 19 Default Judgment (Doc. 16) is GRANTED. There being no just reason for delay, the Clerk 20 of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 21 as follows: judgment in favor of Plaintiff Minerva Avila in the amount of $37.80 against 22 Defendant JBL Cleaning Services, LLC; and judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount 23 of $6,066.20 against all three Defendants JBL Cleaning Services, LLC, Jose Barajas, and 24 Jane Doe Barajas II, jointly and severally. These amounts shall be subject to post-judgment 25 interest at the applicable federal rate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a). 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that Plaintiff may file a motion for costs and 27 attorneys’ fees in accordance with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2 within fourteen days 28 of the entry of this Order. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 7 days, Plaintiff shall either (1) show 2 || cause why Defendants Bryan Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas should not be dismissed from || this matter due to lack of service; or (2) file a notice of voluntary dismissal as to these 4|| defendants. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Clerk of Court shall dismiss Defendants Bryan 5 || Barajas and Jane Doe Barajas from this action without further order of this Court. 6 Dated this 29th day of February, 2024. [7] 8 Do we 7 norable'Dian¢g/4. Hunfetewa 10 United States District Fudge [28] - 13-