Johnson v. Starbucks Corporation

[6] 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [9] 10 SCOTT JOHNSON, No. 2:18-cv-02956-JAM-AC 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY 13 STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a Washington Corporation; and 14 DOES 1-10, 15 Defendants. [16] 17 Before the court is Plaintiff Scott Johnson’s motion to stay 18 proceedings against Defendant Starbucks Corporation (“Starbucks”) 19 pending appeal of two related cases: Johnson v. Blackhawk 20 Centercal (3:17-cv-02454-WHA)(“Centercal”) and Nehemiah Kong v. 21 Mana Investment Company, LLC (8:18-cv-01615-DOC-DFM)(“Mana”). 22 Mot. to Stay (“Mot.”), ECF No. 12, 12-4, 12-5. Defendant opposed 23 Plaintiff’s motion and Plaintiff filed a reply. Opp’n, ECF No. 24 13; Reply, ECF No. 14. For the reasons set forth below, the 25 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.1 [26] 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for July 30, 2019. 1 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2 In November 2018, Plaintiff sued Starbucks seeking damages 3 and injunctive relief under the American with Disabilities Act 4 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 5 California Civil Code §§ 51-53; penalties under the Unruh Act; 6 and attorneys’ fees and costs. Compl. at 8:1-13, ECF No. 1. 7 Plaintiff alleges he encountered two unlawful barriers to access 8 at the Starbucks located at 6711 Madison Avenue in Fair Oaks, 9 California. Compl. at ¶¶ 2-7, 12. 10 Plaintiff alleges two violations of the 2010 ADA Standards 11 for Accessible Design, a transaction counter claim, and a 12 merchandise basket claim. First, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s 13 transaction counter violated the ADA standards because the 14 counter was crowded with merchandise and displays, and therefore 15 noncompliant with the clear-counter-width requirement under §§ 16 904.4 and 904.4.1. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17, 29-30. Plaintiff also 17 contends a merchandise basket on the floor blocked his counter 18 access, in violation of the required amount clear floor space 19 under § 305.3. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 31-32. 20 Plaintiff argues a stay would lead to an efficient 21 resolution of his claims because the cases pending before the 22 Ninth Circuit “involve the same statutory and regulatory 23 challenges” as this case. Mot. at 3:25-36. And because “there 24 [are] no factual dispute[s],” resolution of the cases on appeal 25 would resolve his current transaction counter claim. Id. 26 Plaintiff argues there is “no new factual information to be 27 uncovered” and there would be “no gain in litigation speed” if 28 his suit continued to judgment without a stay, as the parties 1 have been “unable to resolve the cases piecemeal” and “any result 2 reached in this case would ultimately be appealed by one side or 3 the other” pending resolution of Centercal and Mana. Id. at 104 12, Reply at 2:16-18, ECF No. 14. Plaintiff also argues the 5 issues can be bifurcated by a partial stay. Reply at 3:14-17. 6 Defendant argues a stay would unduly postpone resolution as 7 Plaintiff’s second claim, the merchandise basket claim, is not 8 addressed by the cases pending appeal. Defendant also argues a 9 stay would be unfairly prejudicial and cause needless delay as 10 Defendant may need to wait years for the resolution of the 11 counter issue before conducting discovery and moving for summary 12 judgment on the merchandise basket claim. Opp’n at 3:13-17, ECF 13 No. 13. Finally, Defendant argues a partial stay may result in 14 double recovery for Plaintiff. Id. at 3:20-15, 4:1-5. 15 OPINION 16 A. Legal Standard 17 A court’s decision to grant a stay is discretionary, 18 “dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Nken 19 v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 432 (2009). The movant bears the burden 20 of showing the circumstances justify a stay. Id. at 433-34 ; 21 see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). A court may stay 22 proceedings incidental to its power “to control the disposition 23 of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 24 itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., [25] 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 26 To determine if a stay should be granted, the court weighs 27 “the competing interests of the parties, considering: (1) the 28 possible damage that may result from the grant of a stay, (2) the 1 hardship or inequity a party may suffer in being required to go 2 forward with the case, and (3) the orderly course of 3 justice.” Wallis v. Centennial Ins. Co., No. 2:08-cv-02558 WBS, [4] 2012 WL 292982 , at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (citing CMAX, 5 Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). 6 While judicial economy is a factor, the decision to issue a 7 stay “does not hinge” on case management concerns alone. ASUSTek 8 Comput. Inc. v. Ricoh Co., No. 07-cv-01942 MHP, 2007 WL 4190689 , 9 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 ). 10 Moreover, if there is “‘even a fair possibility’ of harm to the 11 opposing party, the moving party ‘must make out a clear case of 12 hardship or inequity in being required to move forward.’” 13 Edwards v. Oportun, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 14 2016) (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 .) 15 As neither party argues damage would result from a stay, the 16 Court only examines hardship to the parties and the orderly 17 course of justice factors. [18] 19 B. Analysis 20 1. Hardship to the parties 21 Defendant argues because the instant case includes the 22 additional merchandise basket/floor clearance issue, the court 23 will have to adjudicate Plaintiff’s merchandise basket claim 24 regardless of the outcome in Blackhawk Centercal and Mana. Opp’n 25 at 3:8-9. In the interim, Defendant may wait years before 26 conducting discovery on the transaction counter issue. Id. at 27 3:12-15. Defendant correctly points out that a stay would 28 prevent the court from disposing of the issues “unrelated to 1 those on appeal” as the merchandise basket/floor barrier claim 2 would not be addressed by Mana or Centercal. See Dister v. 3 Apple-Bay E., Inc., No. 07-cv-01377 SBA, 2007 WL 4045429 , at *5 4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007). 5 Additionally, Defendant argues even a partial stay would 6 cause unnecessary delay and prejudice, because bifurcating the 7 claims could result in double recovery. The Unruh Civil Rights 8 Act provides for attorney’s fees and a statutory minimum of 9 $4,000 per visit, regardless of how many architectural barriers a 10 plaintiff encounters during each visit. Defendant maintains if 11 the Court grants a partial stay and Plaintiff ultimately prevails 12 on both of his claims, Plaintiff could recover double the fine. 13 Opp’n at 4:2-5. 14 On the other hand, Plaintiff would suffer little hardship 15 from proceeding with his case. Because the merchandise basket 16 claim remains regardless of the outcome of the cases pending 17 appeal, the parties are still tasked with conducting discovery on 18 that claim. In fact, the scope of discovery could extend beyond 19 the merchandise basket claim, as Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 20 additional violations may exist and seeks for all barriers to be 21 remedied. Compl. ¶ 26. 22 The hardship factor does not favor issuing a stay in this 23 case. As in Dister, a stay here “would require both parties to 24 simply sit and wait for months on the sidelines of their own 25 action . . . [foreclosing] any possibility of the parties 26 resolving their dispute in a timely fashion or of the Court 27 disposing of issues unrelated to those on appeal . . .” No. 0728 cv-01377 SBA, 2007 WL 4045429 , at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007). 1 Moreover, a partial stay would prejudice Defendant if bifurcation 2 resulted in double recovery. 3 2. Orderly course of justice 4 Under the orderly course of justice factor, the question 5 before the Court is simple: would a stay simplify or complicate 6 the case at hand? The orderly course of justice is “measured in 7 terms of the simplifying or complicating issues, proof, and 8 questions of law which could be expected to result from a 9 stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 10 2005). 11 Plaintiff argues a stay would simplify the resolution of 12 this case because “the entirety of the dispute is based on the 13 interpretation of statutory law, an ADAAG section, and the level 14 of deference to be given to a DOJ interpretation of those laws.” 15 Mot. at 4:17-20, ECF No. 12. The Supreme Court recently issued a 16 decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, a case that Plaintiff contends 17 “modif[ies] the way courts are instructed to apply agency 18 interpretations of regulations and statutes.” Reply at 3:3-9, 19 ECF No. 14. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that, post20 Kisor, the Ninth Circuit may give less deference to the 21 Department of Justice’s interpretation of the ADA standards. For 22 support, Plaintiff attaches Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., 3:17-cv23 02454 (N.D. Cal. 2019). ECF No. 12-2, Exh. A. In Johnson, the 24 DOJ filed an amicus brief interpreting the ADA guidelines on the 25 countertop issue. The court denied Plaintiff’s motion for 26 summary judgment, finding that “[a]s interpreted by the DOJ, and 27 as held herein, the inquiry into whether a sales or service 28 counter satisfied Section 904.4.1’s length requirement turns on 1 the length of the counter as built, not on the length of the 2 ‘clear’ counter space.” Id. 3 But Plaintiff’s argument that new authority may affect the 4 amount of deference due to DOJ’s interpretation of the ADA 5 guidelines does not create a novel issue of law for which the 6 district court must wait for the Ninth Circuit to interpret. 7 Kisor did not overrule Auer or Seminole Rock deference. Rather, 8 Kisor limited the deference afforded to an agency’s 9 interpretation of its own guidelines. Before Kisor, courts were 10 required to “give an agency’s interpretation of its own 11 regulations controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 12 inconsistent with the regulation.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 13 2400, 2415 (2019). See also Turtle Island Restoration Network v. 14 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2017) 15 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 16 regulation is controlling unless “‘plainly erroneous or 17 inconsistent with the regulation,’ or where there are grounds to 18 believe that the interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s 19 fair and considered judgment of the matter in question’”). 20 Under Kisor, deference to the agency’s interpretation (here, the 21 ADA guidelines) is given if the agency’s regulation is genuinely 22 ambiguous and if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Id. 23 If the regulation is not ambiguous, then the “regulation then 24 must mean what it means—and the court must give it effect, as the 25 court would any law.” 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019). 26 Kisor’s guidance is clear. Should the Department of Justice 27 file an amicus brief interpreting the accessibility guidelines in 28 this case for either the transaction counter claim or the 1 merchandise basket claim, the district court will assess how much 2 deference to afford the agency’s interpretation. But the case is 3 not yet at that juncture; it may never be. Moreover, at this 4 stage, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s merchandise basket claim 5 | will also trigger an interpretation of the accessibility 6 guidelines. Therefore, bifurcating the claims would result in 7 additional delay. Ordering a full or partial stay would 8 unnecessarily complicate the resolution of this case. [9] 10 TIT.ORDER 11 On balance, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 12 circumstances justify a stay. The Court therefore DENIES 13 Plaintiff’s motion to stay. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: August 26, 2019 16 ke Me 7 Geren aaa pebrsacr 00k