Wells v. Savannah

Me. Justice Pecxh after making the above statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court. The contention on the part of .the plaintiffs in error is that, in the exercise of the taxing power granted it by the legislature,the common council of the city adopted the ordinance of May, 1878, and in providing therein for the taxation of the leased lots it thereby impaired the obligation of the contract existing between the city and the holders of that class of property, among whom are the plaintiffs in error, and the ordinance is therefore to that extent void. This contract they say is evidenced, first, by the ordinance of 1790 and the deeds executed in pursuance of its provisions; also by the minutes of the common council of the city and by subsequent proceedings- of the common council; by the statements of the city officials at the time when some of the sales of the -property were made; by the reports of the officials, mayors of the'city and committees of the common council; by the actual omission for a hundred . years — from 1790 to 1890- — to tax these lots; also by ordinances similar to that of 1790 for the sale of lots, passed subsequently to that year, and by the deeds executed pursuant to such ordinances, which, it is admitted, were in substance similar to those executed under the ordinance of 1790. Taking all the foregoing .evidence into consideration, including the ordinance of 1790 and the deeds executed under it, we are unable to see that any contract of exemption has been proved. The payment of taxes on account of property otherwise liable to taxation can only be avoided by clear proof of a valid ■ contract of exemption from such payment and the validity of such contract presupposes a good consideration therefor. If the property be in its nature taxable the contract exempting it from taxation must, as we have said, be clearly proved. It will not be inferred from facts which do not- lead irresistibly and necessarily to' the existence, of the contract. The facts proved-must show either a contract expressed -in terms, or else it must be implied from facts which leave no room for doubt *540 that such was the intention of the parties and that a valid consideration existed for tho contract. If there be anj^ doubt on these matters, the contract has not been proven and the exemption does not exist. • -This has been many times decided by this court. Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527, 573; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 146, and cases cited. The different annual ordinances for taxation passed by the common council, exempting from taxation thereunder the leased lots, were but exemptions for the year in which the ordinánce was passed, and there can be no plausible claim urged that they, one or all, constituted any contract for exemption beyond the time of each specific ordinance. The statements of officials when lots wore sold, that they were not taxable, did not constitute a contract. The lots had not in fact been taxed at the time of these statements and had been annually exempted from taxation, and the statements amounted to no more than opinions of officials as to what would be done in the future. There is no evidence that they had the least power to speak for or to bind the corporation in this behalf. The reports of committees that the lots were not taxable are of the same character — merely the opinions'of officials upon a question of la1*, and not in the nature of a contract. TJpon this question of proof of a contract we quote what was said by the Supreme Court of Georgia in this case upon the last review, through Mr. Justice Lewis (107 Ga. 1): “ Was such a contract shown in the present case ? With the view of determining whether or not there was, we have naturally looked to the official action taken by the governing body of the city, either in its ordinances or resolutions providing for the plan upon which the sales were, to be made and the consequences and effect thereof, or in its deed of conveyance to the purchaser. Upon examining the various ordinances set out in the record we fail to find any reference whatever- to the matter of exempting this property from taxation, and instead of finding any stipulation to that effect in the form-of deed invariably made, by the city to the various purchasers there appears a clause directly negativing the idea that the city ever intended to grant a perpetual exemption of this property *541 from'the burden of taxation. In each instance it was recited in the deed given to 'the purchaser that the conveyance of the city was made and the rights of the purchaser thereunder were ■conferred ‘ subject' only to such assessments and burthens as shall be in common with other lotholders in the said city.’ The term ‘ assessment ’ is often used as a synonym of ‘ taxes.’ Indeed, one of the definitions.of this term given by Webster is' ‘a tax.’- But even if this.word, as used in the deed, does not necessarily refer to taxation, the word £ burthen,’ which is also therein employed, is certainly sufficiently comprehensive to include municipal taxes. Taken all together, the language adopted is clearly broad enough to embrace every burden then existing or which might thereafter be lawfully imposed upon other landowners in the .city. The deed was signed by .both' .’parties. ‘ Here, then, is a specific written agreement made between the parties to the contract relating’ to the sale of property by the city-, whereby it is expressly declared that the. property shall be held by the purchaser (and, of course, by his assigns) subject to any burden which might be borne in common by the holders of- other lots in the city, necessarily including that of municipal taxation. “ Plaintiffs .in error contend, however, that the contract they insist upon is evidenced sufficiently by the conduct of the mu- • nicipal officers at the time the sales by the city took place. It was shown that when lots were put up for sale the city marshal publicly announcéd- that they Would not be subject to city taxes’; that.this was generally understood by the city at large, and that for nearly a hundred years after these sales first be..gan the municipal authorities failed to tax the lands, and in . various ordinances afterwards passed these ground-rent lands were exempted. The effect of . these ordinances was merely to . grant an exemption from taxes for the particular years to which they related. Mere .nonuser by a government of its power , to levy a tax, .it matters not for how long it continued, can never be ’ construed in.to. a forfeiture of the power. This question was directly, passed upon by thjs court whén the case was herb •beforé.’ Ns to this point, Chief Justice Bleckley said:' ‘ Whatever the expectation' of purchasers or the unbroken' practice of *542 the city hitherto may have been, the mandate of the constitution of 1877 is to tax all property, save that expressly exempted by the ’legislature under constitutional authority, if any is taxed. That this mandate may have heretofore been disregarded is no reason why it should not be obeyed now.’ ' “ There is an absolute want of any testimony in the -record showing that the mayor and aldermen of the city of Savannah, by ordinance, resolution or official action of any sort, ever authorized the marshal to make the public announcement above referred to in offering for sale the city’s property. . . . Besides all this, we fail to find in the record any testimony showing that these particular plaintiffs or any of their predecessors in title bought any of the lots in question under the impression that the same would be exempt from taxes. Indeed, it is not shown that any of these lots were purchased at a sale at which the marshal made such an announcement as that above referred to. The evidence simply goes to the extent of showing what was his custom in this particular and what was the general impression of the public in regard to the matter. For aught that appears, those who actually bought at these sales were fully advised as to the truth with reference thereto, if not prior to the sale, at least before they complied with their bids and accepted the city’s conveyance of the lots purchased by them.” ¥e think the opinion correctly states the facts and the law relating to them. Looking specially at the contents of the deeds executed under the ordinance of 1790, which were signed by both parties, the city and the purchasers, we find that the provision under which the purchasers took, the title and by which they were thereafter peaceably and quietly to have possession of the lots was by positive agreement, “ subject to all such assessments and burthens as might be in common with other lotholders in. the city.” Plaintiffs in error endeavor to give to the word “ assessments,” contained in the deeds from the city, its more modern meaning of a peculiar kind of tax levied upon lands specially benefited by improvements which are to be paid for by such assessments. *543 The fact is notorious that a century ago special assessments of that kind upon the lands benefited were not usual in this country, and at that time the word was used as synonymous with “ rates or taxes,” generally. Thus, in a statute passed by the legislature of Georgia in the year 1787, to be found in Watkins’ Digest of the Laws of Georgia, 1755-1790, at page 354, it was provided in the fourth section, in speaking of the city of Savannah and the hamlets thereof, “ that it shall and may be lawful for the said wardens, or a majority of them, yearly and every year, or oftener, if occasion may require, to make, lay and assess one or more rate or rates, assessment or assessments, upon all or every person or persons who do or shall inhabit, hold, use or occupy, possess or enjoy any lot, ground, house or place, . . . within the limits of the town of Savannah or hamlets as aforesaid, for raising such sum or sums of money as the said wardens, or a majority of them, shall in their discretion judge necessary for and towards canning this act into execution ; and in case of refusal or neglect to pay such rate and assessment, the same shall be levied and recovered in manner as hereinafter directed.” Here is an instance of the use of the word “ assessment ” at that time in relation to this very city as descriptive of a general tax upon the owners of property within the limits of the city, and to be expended for the general purposes of the corporation. We agree with Mr. Justice Lewis in his construction of this language contained in the deed. It is further objected in behalf of the plaintiffs in error that the condition that the land was to be subject to assessments, etc., was inserted in the deeds without the authority of the common council, and that the ordinance of 1790 providing for the sale of lots contained no such provision. We think the deeds are substantially in accord with that ordinance, and there is nothing therein inconsistent or at war with the insertion of such provision in the deed; it was but providing for one of the details connected with the sale, and there was an implied power under the ordinance to do so. In addition to that the purchasers took their deeds with such language contained in them, and having themselves signed the deeds they personally agreed to *544 the condition, and took their titles.subject .thereto. We do.not by this mean to intimate that the title would not have been equally subject to the condition contained in the deed by accepting the deed while not signing it; but in addition to the .acceptance there is the affirmative act of signing the instrument, and we think the language subjecting the lots to the same assess-' ments and burthens as were laid in common- with other lot-holders created a valid agreement, and made the lands subject to the same kind of- taxation as is levied upon other lots in the city. The covenant on the part of the city-that the purchasers should have peaceable and quiet possession, use, occupation and enjoyment of the lots upon payment of the rent as it became due is in nowise violated by the taxation Of. the lots in the hands of the purchasers or- their assigns. A covenant for quiet enjoyment would not under these circumstances include an exemption from taxation. The purchasers of these lots became to all intents and purposes their owners, as they had the right to .their possession, use and occupation forever upon payment of the rent, and they could assign or devise the same, and their assignees or devisees would take good title, and their heirs, would also take in case there was ho assignment or devise. They could also, at their discretion and on the payment of the money agreed upon, become owners in fee. ■ Although the city retained the right of reentry for nonpayment of rent, the character of the title conveyed to the purchasers and their heirs and assigns was not thereby so changed from an absolute fee that the property actually conveyed could not be assessed for the payment of city taxes. The interest of the purchasers .was capable of assessment for taxation, and their, right was in substance that of ownership. It bears no resem-. blanee to the case of an ordinary lease for years between landlord and tenant. ■ In reference to this subject, Mr. Chief Justice Bleckley, in his opinion in this case on its first appearance in the Supreme Court of -'Georgia, (87 Georgia, 397,) at page 399 eb seq., said : “ The value of property consists in its use, and he who owns the use forever, though it be on condition subsequent, is the true *545 owner of the property for the time being. This holds equally of a city lot or of all land in the world. Where taxation is ad valorem, values are. the ultimate objects of taxation, and they to whom the values belong should pay the taxés. Land sold or by a contract of bargain and sale demised forever subject to a perpetual rent, -is taxable as corporeal property; and in private hands the rent also, is taxable as an incorporeal here-ditament. The tax on the former is chargeable to the purchaser or perpetual tenant, and on the latter to the owner of the rent. The corporeal property in such case is at the direct risk of the purchaser; he alone sustains the losses of depreciation in value, and he alone takes the benefit of appreciation. ' The vendor risks only the fixed rent or the fixed purchase money, and neither of these will ever become more or less by anything which may happen to the premises. Only his security, not his property, will be affected thereby. It is to be assumed that the whole contract between the parties will be observed, not broken, and their true relation to the property' is to be determined on that assumption. Possession of real estate attended with an indefeasible right to occupy in perpetuity, and also with an indefeasible right to be clothed with the fee upon the voluntary payment of a fixed sum as purchase money, will constitute the purchaser the substantial owner of the property. So long as his possession, supplemented with these rights, continues, he is not a mere lessee but a purchaser admitted into possession on the faith of his contract; of purchase. Such were the contracts involved in the present case, and under them the purchasers have the actual possession and use of the premises, with the right to hold forever, on condition of paying up the purchase’ money whenever they, please, and until that time an annual ground rent due by quarterly instalments, the amount of which is fixed by contract, and is the equivalent of interest at a moderate rate jper annum on the unpaid purchase money. In all essential respects, so far as liability for taxes is concerned, these purchasers are in the position of ordinary purchasers in possession under a bond for title, and these last are chargeable with accruing taxes on lands so held. Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. *546 55. Not an iota of beneficial ownership in the city lots now in question abides in the municipality. The city but retained a qualified and wholly unproductive title as security for the purchase money and, until that shall be paid, as security also for the annually accruing compensation under the name of ground rents in lieu of interest on that money. If the municipal government held all the values in the city as trustee for the owners, or as security for purchase money, these values would be none the less taxable for that reason. The constitution of the State requires that taxes on property shall be ad valorem, and that when any part is taxed all shall be taxed which is subject for the time being to the taxing power in the given locality. This rule is wi thout exception. It prevails in Savannah. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Weed, 84 Ga. 683. The property in question is situate in that city, and, as already said, its beneficial ownership is not in the municipality, but in those who long ago purchased it from the city or who hold under such purchasers by succession to their title. Relatively to the question of taxation, it mates no substantial difference whether the estate or property or beneficial owners be classed as realty or personalty, whatever property of either kind belongs to them is ^taxable ad valorem. That the so-called ground-rent lots, as long as the conditions of sale are unbroken, are the property of the purchasers follows from what was decided by this court in Laurence v. The Mayor, 71 Ga. 392, and that case shows that, even after condition broken, the limit of the city’s rights would generally be to have all arrearages cleared and discharged, the surplus proceeds realized by a sale of the property being payable to the real owner. Our reasons for the conclusion at which we have arrived need not be further elaborated. The constitution is imperative that property is to be taxed ad valorem. The foundation principle of such a system is that those who own and enjoy values are to pay the taxes. The real owners of the money which these lots would now sell for on the market are the persons whom we have designated as owners, and it is upon the cash market value that taxes are assessable. If that value is any less, on account of the subjection of the property to ground *547 rents or unpaid purchase money, than it otherwise would be, the. fact would no doubt be taken into consideration in making the assessment. The market value, whatever that may be, is the proper basis. “2. There was no error, either of practice or decision, in denying the injunction. Whatever the expectation of the purchasers, or the unbroken practice of the city hitherto may have been, the mandate of the constitution of 1877 is to tax all property, save that expressly exempted by the legislature under constitutional authority, if any is taxed. That this mandate may have heretofore been disregarded, is no reason why it should not be obeyed now.” We think these views are a correct exposition of the law applicable herein. We find no element of estoppel in the case. As has been said, the statements of officials made at the time some of the sales may have been effected were nothing more than expressions of opinion, there being no evidence of any agreement on the part of the city or its duly authorized agents to exempt perpetually or at all these lots from taxation for city purposes. The ordinances and the deeds show the transaction and there is no estoppel arising from the language there used. On the contrary, there is evidence of an agreement to pay such taxes. Such an estate as was created by these deeds does not in our opinion come under the general rule which imposes on a landlord, when the lease is silent upon the subject, the payment of taxes chargeable upon the premises during the term of the lease. Where the purchaser holds real property for a term which may be in perpetuity, upon the condition of paying a certain ground rent, and where he is entitled to a deed conveying the fee at any time on the payment of certain money, he is more nearly described as an owner than he is as a lessee of such property, and he would be liable to pay the taxes imposed úpon the property upon the principle which is set forth in Sanderson v. City of Scranton, 105 Penn. St. 469, and Delaware &c. Railroad Company v. Sanderson, 109 Penn. St. 583. It is not necessary to decide this question, however, as the specific language *548 of tbe deed places the burden of paying the taxes on the purchaser and his grantees. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia was right, and must, therefore, be Affirmed.