(PC) Eric O'Dell v. Cheryl Mims

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 ERIC O’DELL, Case No. 1:20-cv-00378-NONE-JLT (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED 13 v. COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY THE COURT 14 C. MIMS, et al., OF HIS DESIRE TO PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND COGNIZABLE 15 Defendants. 21-DAY DEADLINE [16] 17 Defendants removed this action from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. 18 (Doc. 1.) Defendants request that the Court screen Plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Id. at 3.) Because Plaintiff is a state prisoner seeking relief against a state 20 actor (see Doc. 1 at 17-24), screening is mandatory in this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 21 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request.1 22 Upon screening, the Court finds that Plaintiff states cognizable claims of deliberate 23 indifference to serious medical needs and intentional infliction of emotional distress against 24 Defendants Mims, and cognizable claims of medical negligence against Defendants Mims, Doe 25 #1, and Doe #2. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are not cognizable. Because Plaintiff may be able to 26 cure the deficiencies in his pleading, the Court grants him leave to file a second amended [27] 1 Plaintiff has also filed a motion to open discovery. (Doc. 8.) The Court will deny the motion as premature. 1 complaint. In the alternative, Plaintiff may file a notice that he wishes to proceed only on the 2 claims found cognizable and to dismiss all remaining claims and defendants. 3 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 6 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 7 frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should 9 dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to 10 support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 11 Cir. 1990). 12 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 13 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 14 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 15 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 16 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 18 plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 19 quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 21 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 22 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 23 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ). Factual allegations are accepted as 25 true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ). 26 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 27 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 1 Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 , 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil 2 rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” 3 Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251 , 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 4 marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe 5 I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 6 citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient to 7 state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” fall 8 short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 B. Linkage and Causation under Section 1983 [10] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other 11 federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. To state a claim under section 1983, a 12 plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the 13 deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 , 37314 75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 15 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 16 in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 17 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 18 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations2 21 Plaintiff’s claims stem from events that occurred while he was incarcerated at California 22 State Prison, Corcoran. (See Doc. 1 at 19-22.) On September 9, 2018, mental health staff at the 23 prison placed Plaintiff in a “mental health crisis bed.” (Id. at 19.) Mims was assigned to evaluate 24 Plaintiff’s mental health status as his “primary care clinician.” (Id.) Plaintiff discussed with Mims 25 on “numerous occasions” his safety concerns and loss of familial support, and he told her that he 26 “was tired of living.” (Id. at 20.) On September 18 or 19, 2018, Mims told Plaintiff that he would 27 be discharged, despite Plaintiff’s protests that “he was not ready and did not trust himself.” (Id.) 1 Plaintiff was discharged on September 20, 2018. Mims and her supervisor, Doe #1, decided not to 2 place Plaintiff in a mental health program after the discharge so that he could receive follow-up 3 care. (Id.) 4 On September 21, 2018, Doe #3, a correctional officer, found Plaintiff “blacked out with a 5 sheet around his neck in an attempted suicide.” (Id.) Doe #3 removed Plaintiff from his cell and 6 took him to see mental health staff. (Id.) Doe #2, a member of the mental health staff, then 7 interviewed Plaintiff. Once the interview was finished, Doe #2 told Doe #3 to take Plaintiff back 8 to his cell. (See id.) 9 On September 22, 2018, Doe #4, a correctional officer, found Plaintiff bleeding from his 10 wrist due to an apparent suicide attempt. (Id. at 21.) Doe #4 escorted Plaintiff to medical services, 11 where he received sutures on his wrist but was denied mental health treatment. (Id.) 12 On October 2 or 3, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to California Institution for Men. (Id.) 13 Upon arrival, Plaintiff was place in a mental health crisis unit. (See id.) Later, mental health staff 14 placed Plaintiff in a mental health program. (Id.) Plaintiff “has been making progress in resolving 15 his mental health” issues. (Id.) 16 B. Plaintiff’s Causes of Action 17 Based on the above, Plaintiff raises six causes of action: 18 Claim 1: Deliberate Indifference (Doc. 1 at 22) 19 Claim 2: Denial of Equal Protection (id.) 20 Claim 3: “Eighth Amendment Claims” (id. at 22-23) 21 Claim 4: Medical Malpractice (id. at 23) 22 Claim 5: Negligence (id.) 23 Claim 6: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (id.) 24 Although Plaintiff raises Claim 1 under the Fourteenth Amendment (id. at 22), and Claim 25 3 under the Eighth Amendment, the Court does not find any substantive difference between the 26 two. As explained more fully below, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is a 27 violation of the Eighth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth 1 Fourteenth Amendment “affords [Plaintiff] no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual 2 Punishments Clause” of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). 3 Therefore, the Court construes Claims 1 and 3 as one cause of action for deliberate indifference to 4 serious medical needs. 5 1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 6 “Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are ‘deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to 7 [a prisoner’s] serious medical needs.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is 9 manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in 10 intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 . “A medical 11 need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 12 infliction of pain.” Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A 13 prison official is deliberately indifferent to that need if he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive 14 risk to inmate health.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 15 The test for deliberate indifference is thus two-pronged and has objective and subjective 16 components. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish a 17 deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must first “show a serious medical need by 18 demonstrating that failure to treat [the] prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 19 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the 20 defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 21 citation omitted). 22 As to the first, objective prong, “[i]ndications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need 23 include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 24 worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 25 individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Colwell v. 26 Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 27 As to the second, subjective prong, deliberate indifference “describes a state of mind more 1 prisoner’s interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and citation 2 omitted). Deliberate indifference exists where a prison official “knows that [an] inmate[] face[s] a 3 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 4 abate it.” Id. at 847 . In medical cases, this requires showing, “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 5 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 6 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citation omitted). “A prisoner need not show his harm was 7 substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the 8 defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 9 2006) (citation omitted). 10 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 , 1060 11 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from 12 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but [he] ‘must 13 also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 ). “If a [prison official] 14 should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth 15 Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Plaintiff states a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Mims. 17 Plaintiff alleges that he informed Mims knew of his suicidal ideations, yet she discharged him 18 from the mental health crisis unit without providing him follow-up mental health care. (Doc. 1 at 19 19-20.) Plaintiff thus sufficiently alleges a failure to take reasonable measures to abate a known, 20 substantial risk of serious harm. Cf. Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) 21 (“[t]he requirements for constitutionally adequate mental health care …. are the same as those for 22 physical health care”). 23 Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim against the remaining defendants. With respect 24 to Doe #1, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant (along with Mims) decided not to place him in a 25 follow-up mental health program. (Doc. 1 at 20). However, Plaintiff does not provide facts that 26 establish Doe #1’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s condition. The same is true with respect to Doe #2. 27 Plaintiff alleges that Doe #2 interviewed him after a suicide attempt (id.), but he does state what 1 As explained above, to exhibit deliberate indifference, a defendant must actually know that a 2 substantial risk of serious harm exists. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 . 3 With respect to Doe #3, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant, upon finding Plaintiff blacked 4 out with a sheet around his neck, immediately took him to be interviewed by mental health staff. 5 (See Doc. 1 at 20.) After the interview, the defendant escorted Plaintiff back to his cell at the 6 direction of the mental health staff. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that Doe #4, upon seeing his wrist 7 bleeding, immediately took him to be examined by medical personnel. (See id.) None of these 8 allegations show that Doe #3 or Doe #4 purposefully failed to respond to Plaintiff’s medical 9 needs; they show the opposite. The defendants’ reliance on medical professionals also negates the 10 claim that they were deliberately indifferent. 11 Lastly, Plaintiff fails to link Defendants Harris and Ventis-Colon to his claims. As 12 explained in section II.B, supra, Plaintiff must show that each defendant’s actions or failures to 13 act caused the deprivation of which he complains. See Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743 (citation 14 omitted). Plaintiff, though, does not mention Harris or Ventis-Colon in his factual allegations. To 15 the extent that Plaintiff names either of the defendants because he holds a supervisory position, 16 the Court notes that section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor merely because his 17 subordinate has violated Plaintiff’s rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. To impose liability, 18 Plaintiff must allege specific misdeeds that each defendant committed, rather than the misdeeds 19 of those he supervised. See id. 20 2. Denial of Equal Protection 21 “The Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] requires the State to treat 22 all similarly situated people equally.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) 23 (citation omitted). To state an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must show that the defendants 24 acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a 25 protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 26 “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s 27 protected status.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis 1 “The first step in equal protection analysis is to identify the state’s classification of 2 groups.” Country Classic Dairies, Inc. v. State of Mont., Dep’t of Commerce Milk Control 3 Bureau, 847 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1988). “To accomplish this, a plaintiff can show that the law 4 is applied in a discriminatory manner or imposes different burdens on different classes of people.” 5 Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). 6 “The next step … [is] to determine the level of scrutiny.” Country Classic Dairies, 847 7 F.2d at 595. “Classifications based on race,” for example, “are subject to strict scrutiny,” 8 Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187 , whereas classifications based on gender are subject to “intermediate 9 scrutiny,” Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Classifications 10 not based on a “suspect” class like race or gender are subject to “rational-basis review.” Romer v. 11 Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citations 12 omitted). Under this standard, a classification must have a rational relationship to a legitimate 13 state interest in order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 . 14 If an action does not involve an identifiable class, a plaintiff may still establish an equal 15 protection claim if she “alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others 16 similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of 17 Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted); Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of 18 Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). 19 Plaintiff does not state a cognizable equal protection claim. Though he alleges that 20 Defendants treated him differently, “without reason,” from those who do not suffer from mental 21 health issues (Doc. 1 at 23), he provides no factual support for this claim. As explained in section 22 II.A, supra, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 23 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 24 3. State-Law Claims 25 a. Negligence and Medical Malpractice 26 “To state a claim of negligence under California law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) 27 defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; (3) damage or 1 Ransom v. Lee, No. 14-cv-0600-DSF-KK, 2017 WL 10525951 , at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (citing 2 Hair v. State of California, 2 Cal. App. 4th 321, 328 (Ct. App. 1991)). 3 Medical malpractice or medical negligence is simply the tort of negligence as applied to 4 health care providers rendering professional services. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5 . To state a 5 claim of medical negligence under California law, a plaintiff must allege: “‘(1) the duty of the 6 professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession 7 commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection 8 between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting 9 from the professional’s negligence.’” Machado v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilition, No. 10 12-cv-6501-JSC, 2013 WL 5800380 , at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Gami v. Mullikin Med. Ctr., [11] 18 Cal. App. 4th 870, 877 (1993)). 12 Plaintiff states cognizable medical negligence claims against Mims, Doe #1, and Doe #2. 13 Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Mims and Doe #1 breached their professional duties by 14 discharging him prematurely from the mental health crisis unit and failing to provide him follow15 up mental health care. Plaintiff attempted suicide the day after he was discharged. (Doc. 1 at 20.) 16 Plaintiff also alleges that Doe #2 violated “policies[ and] procedures” by denying him mental 17 health treatment, after he interviewed Plaintiff in response to the suicide attempt. (Id. at 20-21.) 18 Plaintiff attempted suicide a second time the following day. (Id. at 21.) Such allegations are 19 sufficient to state medical negligence claims that are plausible on their face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 20 at 678 (citation omitted). 21 Plaintiff does not state cognizable negligence claims against the defendant-correctional 22 officers. Plaintiff alleges that, after finding Plaintiff blacked out or bleeding, Doe #3 and Doe #4 23 immediately took him to be seen by mental health or medical staff. (See Doc. 1 at 20-21.) These 24 allegations do not show that the officers breached a legal duty of care. Plaintiff also does not 25 allege that he was harmed during or after the incident involving Doe #4. (See id. at 21 .) 26 For the same reasons provided in section III.B.1, supra, Plaintiff fails to link Harris and 27 Ventis-Colon to his negligence claims. Plaintiff provides no facts regarding these defendants; 1 b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 2 To state a claim for “intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: 3 (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless 4 disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 5 extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 6 the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Ransom, 2017 WL 10525951 , at *15 (citing Vasquez v. 7 Franklin Mgmt. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 819, 832 (Ct. App. 2013)). 8 The Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim of intentional infliction of 9 emotional distress (IIED) against Mims. As stated above, a defendant’s “reckless disregard of … 10 the probability that his conduct will cause [a plaintiff] severe emotional distress” may establish an 11 IIED claim. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 905 (1991). Thus, because Plaintiff 12 sufficiently alleges deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm—i.e., severe 13 emotional distress and resulting suicide attempts—he sufficiently alleges reckless disregard that 14 he would suffer such severe emotional distress. Cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 836-37 15 (1994) (“acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm 16 to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk”). 17 Plaintiff does not allege viable IIED claims against the remaining defendants. Though 18 Plaintiff alleges cognizable medical negligence claims against Doe #1 and #2, he does not provide 19 sufficient facts that detail what these defendants knew or should have known about his mental 20 state. Without such facts, Plaintiff cannot show that these defendants intentionally, or with 21 reckless disregard, caused him emotional distress. 22 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 23 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff states cognizable claims of 24 deliberate indifference and IIED against Mims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , plus cognizable 25 claims of medical negligence under state law against Mims, Doe #1, and Doe #2. The Court finds 26 that all remaining claims are not cognizable. Accordingly, the Court directs Plaintiff, within 21 27 days, to file a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein or, 1 to dismiss all remaining claims and defendants. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply 2 with this order, he shall file a motion seeking an extension within 21 days. 3 Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and 4 prior amendments. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, an amended 5 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 6 Local Rule 220. The Court provides Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a second amended 7 complaint to cure the deficiencies identified herein. However, he may not change the nature of 8 this suit by adding unrelated claims in an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 9 1. Plaintiff’s motion to open discovery (Doc. 8) is DENIED as premature; 10 2. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a second amended complaint; 11 3. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and, 12 4. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file one of the 13 following items: 14 a. a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order, or 15 b. a notice that he does not wish to file a second amended complaint and, instead, 16 wishes to (1) proceed only on the claims found cognizable in this order against 17 Defendants Mims, Doe #1, and Doe #2, (2) dismiss all remaining claims, and 18 (3) dismiss Defendants Harris, Ventis-Colon, Doe #3, and Doe #4. 19 If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this action 20 proceed only on the claims found cognizable herein and that all other claims and defendants 21 be dismissed with prejudice. [22] IT IS SO ORDERED. [23] 24 Dated: June 18, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE