(PC) Pitts v. Matevousian

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 EDGAR NELSON PITTS, 1:19-cv-01029-NONE-GSA-PC 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 13 vs. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTON AND/OR TEMPORARY 14 ANDRE MATEVOUSIAN, et al., RESRAINING ORDER BE DENIED (ECF No. 17.) 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 FOURTEEN (14) DAYS [18] 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Edgar Nelson Pitts (“Plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil 21 rights action pursuant to Bivens vs. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff filed 22 the Complaint commencing this action on July 29, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) On January 27, 2020, 23 Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, which is 24 now before the court. (ECF No. 17.) 25 II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 26 Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has 27 personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See 28 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one 1 “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of 2 summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served 3 must appear to defend.). Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court 4 jurisdiction over prison officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 , 491– 5 93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction 6 is limited to the parties in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is 7 proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969 . The court may not attempt 8 to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, [9] 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 , 38 S.Ct. 65 , 62 L.Ed. 260 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 , 727-28 10 (9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F.Supp. 953 , 961 11 (M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster v. 12 Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 , 13 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545 , 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give 14 only the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) 15 an injunction binds only “the parties to the action,” their “officers, agents, servants, employees, 16 and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in active concert or participation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 65(d)(2)(A)-(C). 18 A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 19 may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 20 moving party “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 21 to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 22 The substantive purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction 23 hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable 24 loss of rights prior to judgment. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto 25 Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 , 94 S.Ct. 1113 , 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). But the legal standard 26 that applies to a motion for a TRO is the same as a motion for a preliminary injunction. See 27 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832 , 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). [28] 1 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 2 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted); Epona v. Cty. of Ventura, [3] 876 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 4 establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 5 the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 6 injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction 7 may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation 8 omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 9 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, [10] 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(1)(A) of the 12 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly 13 drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 14 least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Section 3626(a)(2) 15 also places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to 16 inmates. “Section 3626(a) therefore operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 17 federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators – no longer may courts 18 grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 19 minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 21 Plaintiff requests a court order requiring Correctional Officers O. Lancaster, Boze, and 22 Anderson to return his personal property to him. Plaintiff alleges that these officers confiscated 23 his property out of retaliation on December 4, 2019. Plaintiff asserts that he needs these 24 documents to prepare for upcoming proceedings. 25 The court lacks jurisdiction to provide Plaintiff with the order he seeks because the order 26 would not remedy any of the claims against the defendants named in this case, who are: Andre 27 Matevousian (Warden), Frederick Frandle (Hearing Administrator), or Doe #1 (unknown 28 psychologist). This case was filed against defendants Matevousian, Frandle, and Doe #1 based 1 on events occurring prior to July 29, 2019 at USP-Atwater; however, Plaintiff is requesting a 2 court order compelling Correctional Officers Lancaster, Boze, and Anderson to return his 3 personal property to him. Because such an order would not remedy any of the claims in this case, 4 the court lacks jurisdiction to issue the order sought by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s motion must be 5 denied. 6 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for 8 a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, filed on January 27, 2020, be 9 DENIED. 10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 11 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(l). Within fourteen 12 (14) days after the date of service of these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 13 written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to 14 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 15 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 16 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391 , 1394 17 (9th Cir. 1991)). [18] IT IS SO ORDERED. [19] 20 Dated: June 27, 2020 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE