Scanlon v. Curtis International, Ltd.

[5] 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [8] 9 ROMAN SCANLON, on behalf of himself, No. 1:19-cv-00937-NONE-SKO the general public, and those similarly 10 situated, 11 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL 12 v. (Doc. 44) 13 CURTIS INTERNATIONAL, LTD., 14 Defendant. [15] 16 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Roman Scanlon’s motion to compel, filed June 17 18, 2020 (“Motion to Compel”). (Doc. 44.) Plaintiff and Defendant Curtis International, Ltd. 18 (“Curtis”) filed their “Joint Statement” directed to the Motion to Compel, as required by this 19 Court’s Local Rule 251, on July 15, 2020. (Doc. 47.) The Court reviewed the parties’ papers and 20 all supporting material and found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant 21 to Local Rule 230(g). The hearing set for July 22, 2020, was therefore vacated. (Doc. 48.) 22 Having considered the parties’ briefing, and for the reasons set forth below, the Motion to 23 Compel will be granted in part, subject to the limitations set forth below. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff Roman Scanlon initiated this action by filing a class action complaint on May 3, 26 2019, against Defendants Curtis and Technicolor SA in the Merced County Superior Court. (Doc. 27 1-4.) Based upon his allegation that Defendants misrepresented to him and others similarly [28] 1 situated that they were purchasing digital home theater projectors with specific brightness ratings, 2 Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: 1) fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation; 2) breach of 3 contract1; 3) violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 4 1750, et seq.; 4) violation of California’s False Advertising Law, California Business & 5 Professions Code § 17500, et seq.; 5) negligent misrepresentation; 6) unjust enrichment2; and 7) 6 unfair, unlawful, and/or deceptive trade practices, California Business & Professions Code § 7 17200, et seq. (Doc. 1-4 at 2.) Plaintiff seeks on behalf of himself and others similarly situated 8 compensatory damages, punitive damages, restitution, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. (Id. 9 at 28–30.) Defendants timely removed the case to this federal court on July 9, 2019, pursuant to [10] 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 . (Doc. 1 at 2.) 11 In the operative complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: Defendant Curtis manufactures 12 and distributes consumer electronics, which defendant Curtis sells under the “RCA” trademark 13 through a licensing agreement with Technicolor SA.3 (Doc. 1-4 ¶ 27.) Curtis has marketed and 14 sold projectors that purportedly have a brightness of 2,000 lumens4 or more. (Id. ¶ 29.) Curtis 15 induced Plaintiff and others similarly situated to purchase RCA-brand home-theater projector 16 models (i) RPJ116; (ii) RPJ129; and (iii) RPJ136 (collectively, the “Accused Products”) by 17 misrepresenting the projectors’ lumens ratings as higher than their actual lumens output. (Id. ¶¶ 18 2, 5, 6, 35–36.) According to Plaintiff: “Had Plaintiff and those similarly situated been adequately 19 informed and not intentionally deceived by [Curtis], he would have acted differently by, without 20 limitation, not purchasing (or paying less for) the [Accused Products].” (Id. ¶ 73.) Plaintiff seeks 21 to assert claims on behalf of a proposed class defined as “[a]ll persons, natural or otherwise, who, 22 while residing in California, purchased an [Accused Product].” (Id. ¶ 53.) 23 Plaintiff moves to compel Curtis to amend its discovery responses and to produce [24] 1 The caption page of Plaintiff’s complaint includes a breach of contract claim. (Doc. 1-4 at 2.) However, the body 25 of the complaint contains no allegations in support of a breach of contract claim. (See generally Doc. No. 1-4.) 2 Plaintiff has previously voluntarily dismissed his unjust enrichment claim. (See Docs. 19–21.) 26 3 On October 10, 2019, Defendant Technicolor SA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. (See Doc. 18.) The Court granted the motion with leave to amend. (See Doc. 41.) On 27 June 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice indicating he would not be amending his complaint (Doc. 45), and Defendant Technicolor SA was dismissed on June 25, 2020 (Doc. 46). 28 4 “Lumens” is a measure of brightness or “light intensity.” (See generally Doc. 1-4; Doc. No. 47 at 2, 5.) 1 documents and information responsive to its first set of discovery requests, comprised of requests 2 for production and specially prepared interrogatories to which Curtis has responded with only 3 objections. (Doc. 44; Doc. 47 at 2–3; Doc. 47-4; Doc. 47-5; Doc. 47-7; Doc. 47-8.) 4 Curtis responds that it will serve amended responses and begin its document production 5 upon the resolution of only two issues. (Doc. 47 at 4 (“While Plaintiff characterizes its Motion to 6 Compel as concerning a large-scale discovery dispute, in reality, there are only two issues left for 7 the Court to resolve.”).) The first is that, according to Curtis, the phrase “output luminance” as 8 used in Plaintiff’s discovery requests is “vague and ambiguous such that Curtis cannot reasonably 9 determine Plaintiff’s intended meaning of that phrase.” (Doc. 47 at 8; Doc. 47; Doc. 47-4 at 22, 10 25, 28.) The second issue is Curtis’s position that Plaintiff’s defined terms “PRODUCT,” 11 “CUSTOMER,” and “YOU” are “overly broad and disproportionate to any alleged need that 12 Plaintiff could demonstrate in this lawsuit” because they are not limited to California, the 13 “geographic scope of this lawsuit.” (Id. at 11, 13, 14; Doc. 47-4 at 4, 5, 6, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45; Doc. 14 47-5 at 4, 6, 7.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged 17 matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, 18 the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to 19 the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the 20 importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 21 access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving 22 the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 23 benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that 24 reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” 25 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 , (1978). Relevancy should be “construed 26 ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought 27 has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 28 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)). 1 “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request 2 satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery 3 has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, 4 explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, No. 07cv200 JM (PCL), 2009 WL 5 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (citations omitted). Where, as here, the discovery is 6 sought prior to class certification, “[w]hether or not discovery will be permitted . . . lies within the 7 sound discretion of the trial court.” Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975). 8 See also Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 351 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Vinole v. Countrywide 9 Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009)). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. “Output Luminance” 12 According to Curtis, despite numerous requests, Plaintiff is “unwilling and unable” to 13 define “output luminance” as the phrase is used in his discovery requests, and in so doing fails to 14 comply with his requirement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1) to describe documents to be 15 produced with “reasonable particularity.” (Doc. 47 at 4, 34–35.) Curtis has previously proposed 16 that the phrase be defined in accordance with the ANSI5 standards, which Plaintiff rejected as an 17 “impermissibly narrow definition of the term.” (Id. at 22.) Curtis asserts that “Plaintiff’s steadfast 18 refusal, inability, and unwillingness to define what it means by ‘output luminance’ leaves [it] in 19 the dark,” such that it is unable to respond to discovery requests containing that phrase. (Id. at 35.) 20 Plaintiff previously suggested that Curtis “Google” the phrase, from which the 13,200 21 results would give Curtis a “good idea of what it means.” (Doc. 47 at 18.) In the parties’ Joint 22 Statement, however, Plaintiff is more specific: he states that “a good starting point” for the 23 definition of “output luminance” is the Wikipedia entry for “luminance,” which defines the term 24 as “a photometric measure of the luminous intensity per unit area of light travelling in a given 25 direction,” noting that this definition is “the kind of breadth of discovery that Plaintiff is entitled 26 to seek.” (Doc. 47 at 3. See id. at 22, 33. See also Doc. 47-11.) [27] 28 5 ANSI stands for American National Standards Institute. (See Doc. 47 at 5.) 1 The Court does not, and need not, decide whether the phrase output luminance is described 2 with “reasonable particularity” for Curtis to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. Fed. R. Civ. 3 P. 34 (b)(1). As Plaintiff has now provided a definition of the phrase that is acceptable to him, 4 specifically incorporating “a photometric measure of the luminous intensity per unit area of light 5 travelling in a given direction,” Curtis shall utilize this definition and amend its discovery 6 responses and produce responsive documents accordingly. 7 B. “Product,” “Customer,” and “Person” 8 Curtis asserts that the defined terms “PRODUCT,” “CUSTOMER,” and “PERSON” in 9 Plaintiff’s discovery requests are so broad that they “encompass—literally—any Accused Product 10 sold anywhere in the world in the past five years.”6 (Doc. 47 at 35. See also id. at 4 ) Curtis 11 instead proposes definitions of these terms that are limited to products and people located in 12 California, considering Plaintiff’s putative class is defined as all persons who purchased an 13 Accused Product while residing in California. (See id. at 14–15. See also Doc. 1-4 ¶ 53.) 14 Plaintiff counters that Curtis conflates the scope of Plaintiff’s claims with the scope of 15 discovery it is entitled to seek, and contends that the scope of discovery in this case includes 16 “Curtis’s policies, practices, and personnel with respect to the output luminance of any projector,” 17 even if that projector is sold outside of California. (See Doc. 47 at 3. See also id. at 3–4.) 18 1. “Product” 19 Plaintiff’s discovery requests define the term “PRODUCT” as “projectors sold under the 20 RCA brand name during the CLASS PERIOD7, including but not limited to the following model 21 numbers: RPJ104, RPJ116, RPJ-116+, RPJ116-B-PLUS, RPJ119, RPJ129, and RPJ136.” (Doc. 22 47-7 at 7; Doc. 47-8 at 8–9.) The Court rejects Curtis’s contention that this definition should be 23 limited to projectors sold in California. The imposition of such geographic limitation would be 24 excessively restrictive in that it would exclude relevant information and documents from [25] 26 6 Although Curtis identifies other definitions it suggests are “overly broad” (see, e.g., Doc. 47 at 9–10), the parties’ Joint Statement makes clear that their dispute centers around these three terms, which “commonly appear” in those 27 other definitions (see id.at 14–15, 36). 7 The “CLASS PERIOD” is “May 3, 2015 through the present.” (Doc. 47-7 at 3; Doc. 47-8 at 5. See also Doc. 47 at 28 9.) 1 discovery, e.g., information or documents evidencing Curtis’s inconsistent representations 2 regarding the projectors’ brightness ratings or its knowledge of the alleged falsity of its 3 representations. (See, e.g., Doc. 1-4 ¶¶ 66–67, 70, 103 and “Prayer for Relief” at 28.) 4 The Court observes, however, that the definition of “PRODUCT” as currently formulated 5 pertains to all of Curtis’s projectors sold under the RCA brand name from May 3, 2015, to present 6 and is in that sense overly broad. (See, e.g., Doc. 47-7 at 7 (“including, but not limited to, the 7 following model numbers . . . .”) (emphasis added). Other than the model numbers of projectors 8 specifically identified in the definition, to which Curtis apparently does not object, Plaintiff has 9 not articulated why discovery relating to Curtis’s other projector models would be relevant in this 10 case. Nor are any projectors other than those identified alleged to be at issue in this case. (See 11 Doc. 1-4 ¶ 5 (“This complaint concerns models RPJ116, RPJ129, and RPJ136.”).) Based on the 12 current record before this Court, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery relating to Curtis’s entire 13 projector line. See Ogden v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 620 , 626–27 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 14 (denying discovery into Bumble Bee’s entire product line where the plaintiff’s claims did not stem 15 from similar alleged misrepresentations). To ensure the discoverable information is proportional 16 to the needs of the case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the definition of “PRODUCT” shall be limited 17 to model numbers RPJ104, RPJ116, RPJ-116+, RPJ116-B-PLUS, RPJ119, RPJ129, and RPJ136. 18 2. “Customer” 19 The term “CUSTOMER” is defined in Plaintiff’s discovery requests as “ANY PERSON 20 who PURCHASED the PRODUCT at retail.” (Doc. 47-7 at 3; Doc. 47-8 at 5.) The term is used 21 in only two of Plaintiff’s discovery requests: (1) Document Request No. 60, which Plaintiff already 22 agreed to limit to California consumers, see Doc. 47 at 34 n.4; and (2) Document Request No. 56. 23 Document Request No. 56 seeks documents relating to communications to or from 24 “CUSTOMERS” or undefined “purchasers,” see Doc. 47-7 at 14, including, as Plaintiff points out, 25 complaints from customers outside of California, see Doc. 47 at 34 n.4. Such complaints are 26 relevant, at a minimum, to show what Curtis “knew or should have known at particular points in 27 time regarding any perceived problems” with its advertising of the Accused Products. See 28 Sanbrook v. Office Depot, No. C07-5938-RMW (PVT), 2009 WL 840019 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1 30, 2009). As with the definition of “PRODUCT,” imposing a geographic limitation on the term 2 “CUSTOMER” as it is used in Document Request No. 56 would result in the omission of relevant 3 documents. See id. 4 3. “Person” 5 Finally, Plaintiff’s discovery requests define the term “PERSON” as “ANY person, firm, 6 association, partnership, corporation, and or ANY other form of legal entity.” (Doc. 47-7 at 7; 7 Doc. 47-8 at 8.) Because the definition of “CUSTOMER” includes the term “PERSON,” any 8 limitation of the term “PERSON” to California consumers would apply equally to “CUSTOMER.” 9 As the Court has already rejected the imposition of such limitation to the term “CUSTOMER,” it 10 finds that imposing a geographic limitation on the term “PERSON” would be improper for the 11 same reasons. In addition, limiting “PERSON” to California consumers would render others of 12 Plaintiff’s definitions and discovery requests nonsensical. (See, e.g, Doc. 47-7 at 6 (definition of 13 “MANUFACTURER”); id. at 10 (Document Request No. 25).) 14 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 44) is GRANTED in 16 part, subject to the limitations set forth above. 17 Curtis shall serve its amended responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests within seven days 18 of the date of this order, as it has previously committed to do. (See Doc. 47 at 4.) With respect to 19 production, the Court declines to adopt Plaintiff’s proposal that Curtis produce the requested 20 discovery “within ten days” following entry of this order. (See id. at 34 .) Instead, the parties are 21 ORDERED to meet and confer to agree upon reasonable time frame and manner for production of 22 responsive information and documents, taking into account Curtis’s commitment to begin its 23 document production “as expeditiously as possible” following the date of this order. (See id. at 24 35, 36.) [25] IT IS SO ORDERED. [26] Sheila K. Oberto 27 Dated: July 29, 2020 /s/ 28 . 1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE