(PC) Hunt v. Diaz

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 MARK HUNT, ) Case No.: 1:19-cv-00504-DAD-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 13 v. ) TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RESOLUTION OF PLAINTIFF’S CRIMINAL 14 D. DIAZ, et al., ) CASE AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION ) 15 Defendants. ) (ECF No. 52) ) 16 ) ) 17 ) 18 Plaintiff Mark Hunt is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 20 Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of 21 Plaintiff’s criminal case and disciplinary action, filed September 15, 2020. Accordingly, Defendants’ 22 motion to stay is deemed submitted for review. 23 I. 24 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 25 This action is proceeding against Defendants Diaz, Solorio, Brainard, Reyes, and Velasquez 26 for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff alleges that on 27 May 16, 2018, when Plaintiff went to the 5:00 p.m. medication line, he was attacked by D. Diaz and 28 A. Velasquez. Velasquez used her baton to hit Plaintiff while D. Diaz attacked Plaintiff non-stop 1 while stating racial slurs and because of his “IEX”1 status. Numerous other officers were responding 2 to the radio code and officers G. Solorio and K. Reyes arrived to assist in the attack which was ordered 3 by sergeant J. Brainard. When Plaintiff attempted to get away, Solorio pulled out his pepper spray and 4 sprayed everybody while Reyes was assisting Diaz punch and kick Plaintiff as he was on the ground. 5 When Plaintiff attempted to get up, Solorio slammed Plaintiff back to the ground, while Velasquez 6 continued to hit Plaintiff with her baton. 7 On March 2, 2020, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint. (ECF No. 30.) 8 After an unsuccessful settlement conference, the Court issued the discovery and scheduling 9 order on August 11, 2020. (ECF No. 49.) 10 On September 15, 2020, Defendants filed the instant motion to stay the proceedings pending 11 Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution and prison disciplinary proceedings. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff filed an 12 opposition on October 19, 2020. (ECF No. 58.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion shall 13 be granted. 14 II. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. Request for Judicial Notice 17 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) Docket 18 Sheet for People of the State of California v. Mark Hunt, Kings County Superior Court Case No. 1919 CM-0598; (2) Criminal Complaint filed in People of the State of California v. Mark Hunt, Kings 20 County Superior Court Case No. 19-CV-0598; (3) CDCR 128B Informational Chrono, reflecting 21 Kings County District Attorney’s Office’s decision to prosecute; and (4) CDCR 115 Rules Violation 22 Report (RVR Log No. 5027404), reflecting Plaintiff was charged with committing battery causing 23 serious injury on Defendant Diaz on May 16, 2018, and reflecting Plaintiff’s decision to postpone the 24 RVR disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome of his criminal case. (ECF No. 52-1, Exs. A-D.) 25 /// [27] 1 “IEX” refers to inmate exhibitionist masturbation. [28] 1 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits the Court to take judicial notice at any time. A 2 judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally 3 known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready 4 determination by resort to sources who accuracy reasonably cannot be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 5 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice of facts related to the case before it. Amphibious Partners, 6 LLC v. Redman, 534 F.3d 1357, 1361-1362 (10th Cir. 2008) (district court was entitled to take 7 judicial notice of its memorandum of order and judgment from previous case involving same parties). 8 This Court may judicially notice the records and filing of other court proceedings. Tellabs, Inc. v. 9 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801 , 802 10 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, a court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public 11 record, including papers filed with the court and the records of state agencies and administrative 12 bodies. Disabled Rights Action Comm. V. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861 , 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 13 2004); Lundquist v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 394 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1242-42 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that court 14 may take judicial notice of records and reports of administrative bodies). 15 Because the Court may take judicial notice of public records, including duly recorded 16 documents under Rule 201(b)(2), Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the above-mentioned 17 documents is granted. 18 B. Motion to Stay 19 The district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to 20 control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis v. North American 21 Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). A stay is discretionary and the “party requesting a stay bears the 22 burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 23 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009). “Generally, stays should not be indefinite in nature.” Dependable Highway 24 Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059 , 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2007). If a stay is especially long 25 or its term is indefinite, a greater showing is required to justify it. Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116 , 1119 26 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court should “balance the length of any stay against the strength of the 27 justification given for it.” Id. 28 /// 1 “The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome 2 of criminal proceedings.” Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 “In the absence of substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, [simultaneous] parallel 4 [civil and criminal] proceedings are unobjectionable under our jurisprudence.” Id. “Nevertheless, a 5 court may decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings ...‘when the interests of justice seem[ ] to 6 require such action.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). 7 1. Same Nucleus of Facts 8 When a civil plaintiff brings claims under § 1983 that are “related to rulings that will likely be 9 made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial,” it is “common practice” for the court “to stay the civil 10 action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 11 384, 393-94 (2007); see also Fed. Saving & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 12 1989). 13 When determining whether a stay is appropriate, courts look to whether the criminal 14 defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights may be implicated by the civil proceedings. Keating, 45 F.3d at 15 324 (citing Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 902 ). Courts also consider (1) the interest of the plaintiff in 16 proceeding with the litigation and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the 17 convenience of the court and the efficient use of judicial resources; (3) the interests of third parties; 18 and (4) the interests of the public. Keating, 45 F.3d at 324-25 . 19 Here, the civil rights action implicates Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights. The facts and 20 circumstances underlying Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution for battery on officer Diaz substantially 21 overlap with the excessive force claims at issue in this case. Both cases involve the May 16, 2018 22 incident between Plaintiff and the Defendant officers. Thus, if this case proceeds, Defendants will 23 seek discovery from Plaintiff, and he will be required to respond under oath. The discovery will 24 involve Plaintiff’s alleged misconduct on May 16, 2018. Thus, there exists a substantial risk of 25 prejudice to Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights. Furthermore, if Plaintiff invokes his Fifth 26 Amendment rights it may impede Defendants’ discovery. Jones v. Conte, No. C045312S1, 2005 WL 27 1287017, at *1 (N.D. Apr. 19, 2005) (finding that a stay of the civil case involving defendant in 28 criminal action was appropriate “because [i]f discovery moves forward, [the] defendant will be faced 1 with the difficult choice between asserting [his] right against self-incrimination, thereby inviting 2 prejudice in the civil case, or waiving those rights, thereby courting liability in the civil case.”) 3 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 4 Likewise, the other Keating factors also support a stay. Any prejudice to Plaintiff is minimal 5 given that both proceedings involve the similar facts and witnesses, and it is unlikely that evidence 6 will be lost or memories will fade with passage of time. McCormick v. Rexroth, No. C 09-4188 JT, [7] 2010 WL 934242 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010). In addition, the public interest weights in favor of 8 a stay because “[t]he public has an interest in ‘ensuring that the criminal process is not subverted’ by 9 ongoing civil cases.” Douglas v. United States, No. C 03-4518, 2006 WL 2038375 , at *6 (N.D. Cal. 10 July 17, 2006). 11 Furthermore, if a stay is not granted the defenses available may be limited. If the Court in the 12 criminal action considers Plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding the May 16, 2018 incident, such 13 findings may be binding in this Court. Additionally, Plaintiff’s prison disciplinary proceedings 14 cannot be completed until after the criminal action is resolved and Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights 15 are no longer implicated. Until resolution of both proceedings, it is unclear whether certain defenses 16 are available, such as, a Heck bar or issue preclusion. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (noting that 17 the question of whether a section 1983 action is barred by Heck is more difficult to answer where the 18 plaintiff is facing charges of resisting arrest or similar conduct arising from the same incident he is 19 claiming excessive force, a stay may be appropriate until such time as the underlying criminal 20 proceedings are conducted. “If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil action 21 would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, 22 absent some other bar to suit.”) (citation omitted); see also Vivas v. Cty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 1523 1912-VAP (DTBx), 2016 WL 9001020 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (staying excessive force case 24 where criminal prosecution for resisting arrest was pending). 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 Judicial efficiency also favors imposition of a stay because Plaintiff’s criminal action and 2 prison disciplinary action involve many of the same facts.2 Accordingly, the Court will stay this 3 action until Plaintiff’s criminal and disciplinary charges have been resolved. 4 2. Younger Abstention 5 Absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts may not interfere with ongoing state 6 criminal proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 , 43–54 (1971); Sprint Communications, Inc. 7 v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013). A court may consider sua sponte whether Younger abstention 8 should be invoked at any point in the litigation. H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th 9 Cir. 2000). Abstention is proper regardless of whether the applicant seeks declaratory relief, 10 injunctive relief, or damages. See Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (“When a state 11 criminal prosecution has begun, the Younger rule directly bars a declaratory judgment action” as well 12 as a section 1983 action for declaratory relief and damages “where such an action would have a 13 substantially disruptive effect upon ongoing state criminal proceedings.”); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 14 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Younger abstention applies to actions for damages as it does 15 to declaratory and injunctive relief). 16 A court may apply a stay under Younger when: “(1) the state court proceedings are ongoing; 17 (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an 18 adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims.” Escobar v. LASD Male Doe, No. CV-1719 7352-DSF (SP), 2017 WL 7050642 , at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics 20 Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)). 21 Even if a stay is not warranted under the former analysis, a stay is warranted under Younger. 22 Here, Plaintiff’s criminal case is ongoing and implicates the State of California’s important interest in 23 ensuring the integrity of its criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) 24 (“the States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is [26] 2 Plaintiff argues that because the Court previously denied his request to stay the action pending the criminal proceedings, 27 the Court should also deny Defendants’ request to stay. However, the mere fact that the Court previously denied Plaintiff’s request to stay does not foreclose the Court from reviewing and granting a stay based on the information and [28] 1 || one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable 2 || types of relief.”). Indeed, Plaintiff may raise constitutional issues in the state proceedings. See 3 || Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (“a federal court should assume that state procedures 4 || will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.”). In 5 || addition, Plaintiff is seeking damages in this civil action. Accordingly, it is clear that principles of 6 || judicial comity authorize the Court to stay this action until Plaintiffs criminal proceedings have 7 || concluded. 8 Il. 9 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 10 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 11 1. The instant action is stayed pending resolution of Plaintiffs criminal case and prison 12 disciplinary proceedings; and 13 2. Defendants shall file a status report within ninety (90) days from the date of service □□□ 14 this order, and every sixty (60) days thereafter, addressing the status of the proceeding 15 until the proceedings are resolved. [16] 17 ||IT IS SO ORDERED. A (Se _ 18 |! Dated: _ October 29, 2020 OF 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE