Crone v. Tracy Unified School District

[5] 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [8] 9 CHRISTOPHER CRONE, No. 2:20-cv-01451-JAM-AC 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 12 TRACY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT and BRIAN STEPHENS, an 13 individual, 14 Defendants. [15] 16 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Brian 17 Stephens’ (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a 18 claim upon which relief can be granted. Mot. to Dismiss 19 (“Mot.”), ECF No. 7. Christopher Crone (“Plaintiff”) filed an 20 opposition to Defendant’s motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 10, to which 21 Defendant replied, Reply, ECF No. 11. After consideration of 22 the parties’ briefing on the motion and relevant legal 23 authority, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.1 24 /// 25 /// [26] 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for November 24, 2020. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Christopher Crone filed suit against the Tracy 3 Unified School District (“TUSD”) and its Superintendent Brian 4 Stephens following termination of his job as TUSD’s special 5 education director. First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 6 6. Plaintiff was hired as the District’s special education 7 director in November 2018 and was terminated in September 2019. 8 FAC ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges he was terminated in retaliation for 9 his advocacy on behalf of special education students, 10 particularly minority students and students with disabilities. 11 FAC ¶¶ 1, 16-18. 12 Plaintiff brings only one claim against Stephens for 13 violation of California Labor Code Section 1102.5. FAC ¶¶ 3414 38. Stephens seeks dismissal of this lone claim against him. 15 See Mot. [16] 17 II. OPINION 18 A. Legal Standard 19 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the complaint as not 20 alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. 21 Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 22 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 23 accepted as true, to state a claim to relied that is plausible 24 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Dismissal is 26 proper where there is no cognizable legal theory or insufficient 27 facts supporting a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. 28 Hinds Invs., L.P. v. Angiolo, 654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 B. Analysis 2 Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 3 relief because California Labor Code Section 1102.5 precludes 4 individual liability. Mot. at 4-5. Section 1102.5, which 5 prohibits retaliation against employees for whistleblowing, 6 provides in relevant part: 7 An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for 8 disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose 9 information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee 10 or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or 11 noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an 12 investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information 13 discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, 14 or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's 15 job duties. [16] Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5 (b). The statute was amended, effective 17 January 1, 2014, to include the addition of “or any person 18 acting on behalf of the employer” instead of referring solely to 19 “[a]n employer.” Id. Since the 2014 amendment, federal courts 20 predicting how state courts would decide the issue of individual 21 liability post-amendment have concluded that section 1102.5 does 22 not impose individual liability. See, e.g., Tillery v. Lollis, 23 No. 1:14-CV-02025-KJM, 2015 WL 4873111 , at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24 13, 2015) (after extensive review of the legislative history and 25 pertinent caselaw, dismissing individual supervisors from the 26 plaintiff’s section 1102.5 claim); Toranto v. Jaffurs, 297 27 F.Supp.3d 1073, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (granting motion to dismiss 28 section 1102.5 claim brought against an individual defendant); 1 United States ex rel. Lupo v. Quality Assurance Servs., Inc., [2] 242 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1030 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (dismissing individual 3 defendants from section 1102.5 claim). This Court, too, in 4 Bales v. County of El Dorado explicitly found that “section 5 1102.5 does not impose individual liability.” No. 2:18-cv6 01714-JAM-DB, 2018 WL 4558235 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2018). 7 In Bales, the plaintiff sued her supervisor at the Public 8 Defenders’ Office for retaliatory termination in violation of 9 Section 1102.5. 2018 WL 4558235 , at *1. The defendant 10 supervisor moved to dismiss, arguing, as Defendant Stephens does 11 here, that Section 1102.5 precludes individual liability. Id. 12 In opposition, the Bales plaintiff made almost identical 13 arguments to the ones Plaintiff now makes, insisting the plain 14 language of the amended Section 1102.5 provides for individual 15 liability. Id. at *2 . This Court squarely rejected plaintiff’s 16 arguments in Bales, instead following Judge Mueller’s extensive 17 analysis in Tillery and dismissing plaintiff’s claim against her 18 supervisor with prejudice. Id. at *2-3 . 19 Here, Plaintiff does not dispute the clear holdings of 20 Bales and Tillery that Section 1102.5 precludes individual 21 liability. See Opp’n at 4. Instead, Plaintiff appears to ask 22 this Court to reconsider its analysis in Bales and Judge 23 Mueller’s analysis in Tillery. Id. at 4-5 . But, Plaintiff has 24 not provided the Court with any compelling reason to do so. 25 Plaintiff has not presented any intervening caselaw since Bales 26 in support of his position. Nor has Plaintiff made any arguments 27 that the Bales plaintiff did not already make and consequently 28 that this Court did not already reject. Therefore, this Court eee eee OE IEE 1 | finds no reason to revisit Bales. 2 Because a claim under Section 1102.5 cannot be brought 3 against an individual, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 4 Stephens fails as a matter of law. 5 Cc. Leave to Amend 6 The Court need not grant leave to amend where amendment 7 would be futile. Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 8 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006). Because this Court once again 9 finds that Section 1102.5 precludes individual liability, 10 amendment would be futile. Accordingly, dismissal with 11 prejudice is appropriate. [12] 13 Til. ORDER 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 15 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated: December 7, 2020 18 ke Me 19 teiren staves odermacr 7008