Hayes v. Rojas

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 CHARLES HAYES, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-01820-NONE-JLT ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE ACTION ) SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR CLAIM 13 v. ) SPLITTING ) 14 DEPUTY MARIO ROJAS, et al., ) 15 Defendants. ) ) 16 ) 17 On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff Charles Hayes filed a complaint against Kern County and Does 18 1 through 10. (Doc. 1, Hayes v. Kern County, Case No. 1:19-cv-01722-JLT) (“Hayes I”). Hayes I 19 brought four claims related to plaintiff allegedly being improperly held in custody based on an 20 erroneous identification after his arrest in Las Vegas and transfer to Kern County: (1) false arrest and 21 false imprisonment; (2) Monell claim; (3) negligence; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional 22 distress. (Id.) 23 The plaintiff has now filed a related case: Hayes v. Rojas, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-0182024 NONE-JLT (“Hayes II”). In Hayes II, the plaintiff names Deputy Mario Rojas, Jocelyn Marie, Connie 25 Jefferies, Deputy Rhonda Powell Boyles, Deputy Patrick Gilbert Klawitter, Deputy Christopher 26 Banks, and Sherriff Support Technician Brandy Hirrel. (Doc. 1.) Hayes II is based on the same 27 allegations of being improperly held in custody based on an erroneous identification and includes the 28 following claims: (1) false arrest and false imprisonment; (2) negligence; and (3) intentional infliction 1 of emotional distress. (Id.) 2 In Hayes I, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to include the defendants named in 3 Hayes II. (Doc. 18, Case No. 1:19-cv-01722-JLT.) The Court found that plaintiff had not been diligent 4 in seeking leave to amend, had not met the good cause requirement of Rule 16 and denied the motion 5 to amend on December 21, 2020. (Doc. 23.) The Court noted in that order that “Plaintiff clearly could 6 have filed a new lawsuit, but ignores that it would be subject to dismissal due to his failure to amend 7 in this case, constituting impermissible claim splitting.” (Hayes v. Kern County, Case No. 1:19-cv8 01722-JLT, citing Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684 , 688 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled 9 on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).) Just one week later, on December 10 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed Hayes II. (Doc. 1, Case No. 1:20-cv-01820-NONE-JLT.) 11 The complaint in Hayes II raises the question of whether the Hayes II action represents 12 impermissible claim splitting. The prohibition against claim splitting bars subsequent litigation 13 involving the same subject matter, Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 14 1052, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 2007), and is designed “to protect the defendant from being harassed by 15 repetitive actions based on the same claim.” Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 16 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1995). In assessing whether a suit is duplicative, Ninth Circuit case law looks to the 17 causes of action asserted, the relief sought, and the parties to the action. See Adams, 487 F.3d at 18 689. A suit is deemed duplicative if the claims, parties, and available relief do not vary significantly 19 between the two actions. Id. 20 The Ninth Circuit applies a “transaction” test to determine whether the causes of action in 21 successive suits are identical. Adams, 487 F.3d at 690. Four criteria are weighed in the transaction test: 22 (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same 23 evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus 24 of facts. 25 Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982). The last criteria, “whether 26 the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts,” is the most important. Id. at 1202 . 27 Applying the transaction test in Adams to determine whether the claims are closely related, all 28 four factors are met. Beginning with the fourth and most important factor, the two suits indisputably 1 arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts. The complaints in each action allege that plaintiff 2 was allegedly being improperly held in custody based on an erroneous identification after his arrest in 3 Las Vegas and transfer to Kern County. Because the two actions arise from the same transaction 4 nucleus of facts, substantially the same evidence would be presented in each action, thereby satisfying 5 the second factor. In both actions, Plaintiff would have to present evidence that he was held in custody 6 based on an erroneous identification. 7 As to the first factor, whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be 8 destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action, the court’s order in Hayes I denying leave 9 to amend would be rendered meaningless if Hayes II were permitted to go forward. The third factor is 10 also met. The two suits each allege false arrest and false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional 11 infliction of emotional distress.1 [12] 13 It is also worth noting that the filing of Hayes II appears to be an attempt to circumvent the 14 Court’s order denying leave to amend the complaint in Hayes I. However, under the doctrine of claim 15 splitting, a party is “not at liberty to split up his demand, and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only 16 a portion of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a 17 second suit, if the first fail.” Cook v. C.R. England, 2012 WL 2373258 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 18 2012) (quoting United States v. Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 125 (1894)). The ultimate objective 19 of the doctrine is to “protect the Defendant from being harassed by repetitive actions based on the 20 same claim” and “to promote judicial economy and convenience.” Id. (citing Clements, 69 F.3d at 21 328). Even though the County of Kern is not a named defendant in Hayes II, it is obligated to defend 22 and indemnify the defendant employees. Cal. Gov. Code § 995 . Thus, the real party in interest in 23 Hayes II is the County of Kern. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// [27] 28 1 Hayes I (Case No. 1:19-cv-01722-JLT), includes one additional cause of action for Monell liability, which is not included 1 In sum, it appears that the instant Hayes II action is duplicate of Hayes I. Therefore, Plaintiff is 2 ORDERED to show cause in writing, on or before January 12, 2021, why Hayes II should not be 3 dismissed as claim splitting and an end run around this Court’s denial of leave to amend. [4] 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: December 30, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE