Plasse v. Ford

[8] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [9] EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [11] MAURICE JOHN PLASSE, III and No. 2:17-cv-01136-TLN-JDP 12 JEANNIE LYNN PLASSE, 13 Plaintiffs, ORDER [14] v. [15] LYNLEY FORD and DOES 3 through 50, [16] inclusive, [17] Defendants, [18] 19 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Maurice John Plasse, III (“John Plasse”)1 and 20 Jeannie Lynn Plasse’s (“Jeannie Plasse”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion to Sever Claims and 21 Dismiss the First and Second Causes of Action. (ECF No. 47.) Defendant Lynley Ford 22 (“Defendant”) opposes the motion. (ECF No. 58.) Plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF No. 60.) For the 23 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ motion. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// [27] 1 Plaintiffs refer to Mr. Plasse by his middle name. (ECF No. 7 at 3.) [28] 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Amador County Superior Court on April 24, 2017. (ECF 3 No. 1 at 5.) Defendant removed the action to this Court on May 30, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) 4 Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 26, 2017. (ECF No. 7.) 5 Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to real property in Amador County known as the Plasse and Digitale 6 Ranches. (Id.) As to the Digitale Ranch, Plaintiffs allege Defendant leased 100% of the property 7 to Jim and Bobbi Laughton while only holding a 25% interest in the property as a tenant in 8 common with Plaintiffs, who own a 75% interest. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the 9 Digitale Ranch and cancel any existing lease agreement between Defendant and the Laughtons. 10 (Id. at 3.) As to the Plasse Ranch, owned in part by John Plasse, Plaintiffs allege Defendant 11 asserts a prescriptive right to use the Plasse Ranch for access to the Digitale Ranch and to use 12 corrals located on the Plasse Ranch. (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiffs seek to quiet title in the Plasse Ranch 13 against Defendant’s allegedly inferior interests and to cancel a 1998 agreement between the then14 owners of the Plasse Ranch and the Digitale Ranch, which granted an access easement across the 15 Plasse Ranch to the then-owners of the Digitale Ranch. (Id. at 4.) 16 On July 17, 2017, Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim to partition the Digitale 17 Ranch among Plaintiffs and Defendant. (ECF No. 9.) On September 3, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the 18 instant motion to (1) dismiss the first and second causes of action and (2) sever their remaining 19 claims from Defendant’s counterclaim. (ECF No. 47.) The Court will address each in turn. 20 II. ANALYSIS 21 A. Motion to Dismiss First and Second Causes of Action 22 i. Standard of Law 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 41(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to seek voluntary 24 dismissal of an action by court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The Plaintiff may seek to dismiss 25 some or all of its claims under Rule 41. Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F. 3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 26 1997) (citing Concha v. London, 62 F. 3d 1493, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The Ninth Circuit has 27 long held that the decision to grant a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to the 28 sound discretion of the [court].” Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 679 F. 2d 143 , 1 145 (9th Cir. 1982). “A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 2 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” 3 Smith v. Lenches, 263 F. 3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). The dismissal is ordinarily without 4 prejudice. Concha, 62 F. 3d at 1506 . “Such a dismissal leaves the parties as though no action 5 had been brought.” Id. 6 ii. Analysis 7 Plaintiffs argue their first and second causes of action should be dismissed as moot 8 because Defendant and Jim Laughton have disclaimed the leasehold interest in the Digitale 9 Ranch, which formed the basis of those claims. (ECF No. 47 at 3 n.1.) Defendant does not 10 oppose dismissal of Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action, though Defendant contends the 11 claims should be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 58 at 8.) 12 Because Defendant and Jim Laughton have disclaimed any leasehold interest in the 13 Digitale Ranch, no controversy now exists over the leasehold interest in the Digitale Ranch. 14 Therefore, the first and second causes of action are moot. See RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke 15 Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 413 , 433 (2020), review denied (Feb. 10, 2021) (finding 16 “cause of action for quiet title was moot” because “there was no longer an ‘active controversy’”). 17 Furthermore, the Court finds no evidence of prejudice against Defendant. Defendant 18 agrees Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as moot but contends the claims should be 19 dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 58 at 8.) Defendant’s desire for the peace of mind of 20 knowing that Plaintiffs cannot file another lawsuit on the same grounds is insufficient to 21 overcome the ordinary practice of granting voluntary dismissals without prejudice. See Hamilton, [22] 679 F. 2d at 145 (“[I]t is clear that the mere inconvenience of defending another lawsuit does not 23 constitute plain legal prejudice.”). 24 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Claims One and Two without prejudice. 25 B. Motion to Sever 26 i. Standard of Law 27 Rule 21 permits a court to “sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. A court 28 has broad discretion in determining whether to sever claims under Rule 21. Brunet v. United Gas 1 Pipeline Co., 15 F. 3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994). “There is no established test in the Ninth Circuit 2 for when a district court should exercise its broad discretion to sever a claim under Rule 21.” 3 Arcure v. Cal. Dep’t of Develop. Servs., No. 1:13-cv-00541-LJO-BAM, 2014 WL 346612 , at *6 4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014). “Claims may be severable under Rule 21 if they arise from different 5 factual situations or pose different legal questions.” Khanna v. State Bar of Cal., No. C-07-2587 6 EMC, 2007 WL 2288116 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007). Claims may also be severed “if it will 7 serve the ends of justice and further the prompt and efficient disposition of litigation.” Id. 8 (citation omitted). “Fairness is a critical consideration in determining whether severance is 9 appropriate,” and therefore it must be determined whether any party would suffer prejudice. 10 Pena v. McArthur, 889 F. Supp. 403, 407 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (citation omitted). 11 In determining whether to sever a claim, a court may consider the following: “(1) whether 12 the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present some 13 common questions of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would 14 be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether 15 different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims.” SEC v. Leslie, 16 No. C 07-3444, 2010 WL 2991038 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (citation omitted). 17 ii. Analysis 18 a. Same Transaction or Occurrence 19 Plaintiffs assert the remaining claims in the FAC and Defendant’s counterclaim do not 20 arise from the same transaction or occurrence. (ECF No. 47 at 5.) The remaining claims in the 21 FAC seek to quiet title to nonpossessory interests in the Plasse Ranch appurtenant to the Digitale 22 Ranch or claimed by Defendant, a cotenant of the Digitale Ranch. (ECF No. 7 at 3–5.) These 23 adverse interests are therefore related to the Digitale Ranch, which is the subject of Defendant’s 24 partition counterclaim. As such, the remaining claims in the FAC and Defendant’s counterclaim 25 arise from the same transaction or occurrence because they share similar factual backgrounds. Cf. 26 Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F. 3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he ‘same transaction’ requirement, 27 refers to similarity in the factual background of a claim.”). 28 The first factor weighs in favor of denying severance. 1 b. Common Questions of Law and Fact 2 Defendant’s partition counterclaim implicates the nonpossessory interests Defendant 3 allegedly claims in the Plasse Ranch. California law requires the rights of all parties in the 4 subject property be determined before the partition of said property. Summers v. Superior Court, [5] 24 Cal. App. 5th 138 , 142–43 (2018) (discussing the sequence established by Cal. Code Civ. P. § 6 872.720(a)); Demetris v. Demetris, 125 Cal. App. 2d 440 , 444–45 (1954) (“In a suit for partition 7 it is a general rule that all equities and conflicting claims existing between the parties and arising 8 out of their relation to the property to be partitioned may be adjusted.”) (internal quotations and 9 citations omitted). This includes nonpossessory interests in or appurtenant to the property to be 10 partitioned. See Cal. Civ. Code § 807 (providing for the partitioning of servitudes). Not only do 11 the remaining claims and counterclaim involve overlapping legal questions, but they also involve 12 the same parties and the same properties. See Hernandez v. San Jose, No. 16-cv-03957-LHK, [13] 2017 WL 2081236 , at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims in 14 the FAC and Defendant’s counterclaim share common questions of law and fact. 15 The second factor weighs in favor of denying severance. 16 c. Facilitation of Settlement or Judicial Economy 17 Plaintiffs contend what is most important to them “is that this action be scheduled for trial 18 in some manner so that the subject property may be partitioned in kind as soon as possible.” 19 (ECF No. 60 at 3.) Severing the remaining FAC claims and the counterclaim will not serve this 20 goal. Trying the intertwined partition and quiet title actions together would avoid the delay 21 inherent in Plaintiffs’ request to sever and stay the counterclaim. 22 The third factor weighs in favor of denying severance. 23 d. Prejudice 24 The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that their complaint must be adjudicated first, and in a 25 separate action, “so that the condition and appurtenant rights of the Digitale Ranch are fully and 26 completely known prior to its partition” else “the total value of the Digitale [Ranch] might be 27 suppressed in a third-party sale or would otherwise not be completely known if the [Ranch] were 28 to be partitioned in kind.” (ECF No. 47 at 4, 7.) However, as stated above, California law 1 requires the adjudication of all rights in the subject property before court-ordered partition, 2 whether in kind or by sale. Summers, 24 Cal. App. 5th at 142–43; Bacon v. Wahrhaftig, 97 Cal. 3 App. 599, 603 (1950) (“No partition can be had until the interests of all the parties have been 4 ascertained and settled by a trial.”) (citation omitted). Thus, California law ensures the parties 5 will not suffer prejudice if the FAC claims and counterclaim remain joined.2 6 The fourth factor weighs in favor of denying severance. 7 e. Similarity Between Witnesses and Documentary Proof 8 Because the partition action requires the interests appurtenant to the Digitale Ranch to be 9 determined before partition, the parties will likely rely on the same witnesses and documentary 10 proof as in Plaintiffs’ quiet title action concerning those interests. Even if additional witnesses 11 are necessary to value the property before sale or division, the substantial overlap weighs in favor 12 of denying severance. See Hernandez, 2017 WL 2081236 , at *11 (granting severance when the 13 claims relied on “entirely different witnesses and documentary proof”) (emphasis added). 14 In sum, because none of the factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court DENIES 15 Plaintiffs’ motion for severance.3 16 III. CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 18 Plaintiffs’ motion. (ECF No. 47.) Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action are DISMISSED 19 without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED in all other respects. The parties shall file a 20 joint status report proposing dates and deadlines moving forward within thirty days of this Order. 21 /// 22 /// [23] 24 2 Curiously, Plaintiffs object to the sequencing required by California law, claiming it is procedural and therefore should not be followed in federal court. (ECF No. 60 at 2.) Such an [25] objection seems to be at odds with Plaintiffs’ interests in that California law prevents the prejudice Plaintiffs fear. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court in the instant motion [26] that there is a better alternative to applying California law in this property dispute. [27] 3 The Court need not and does not determine whether a stay of the counterclaim in a 28 separate action is appropriate as severance will not be granted. 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 | Dated: August 31, 2021 3 /) 4 “ ! thu 5 Troy L. Nuhlep 6 United States District Judge