(UD)(PS) Singh v. Segovia

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 SURJIT SINGH, Case No. 2:21-cv-02160-TLN-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER 14 MARIA R. SEGOVIA, 15 Defendant. [16] 17 This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Maria R. Segovia’s (“Defendant”) 18 Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1–2.) For the reasons 19 set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as 20 moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, County of 21 Stanislaus, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 23 On June 24, 2021, Plaintiff Surjit Singh (“Plaintiff”) brought an action for unlawful 24 detainer against Defendant for possession of the real property known as 815 Allacante Drive, 25 Ceres, California, 95307 (“the Property”). (ECF No. 1 at 13.) On November 22, 2021, 26 Defendant filed a Notice of Removal removing this unlawful detainer action from the Stanislaus 27 County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 28 /// 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW [2] 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 3 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). “Removal is 4 proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 5 filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 6 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 7 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 8 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 9 determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 10 improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 11 v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 , as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 12 U.S. 974 (2005). 13 Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . The 14 “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 15 rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 16 the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386 . Federal 17 question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third18 party claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter 19 v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039 , 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . 21 Section 1332 states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 22 where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 23 costs, and is between — (1) citizens of different States.” Id. The burden of proving the amount 24 in controversy depends on the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank 25 Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994 , 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2007). When the complaint alleges damages less 26 than the jurisdictional requirement, the party seeking removal must prove the amount in 27 controversy with legal certainty. Id.; Rynearson v. Motricity, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1238 , 1240 28 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Defendant removed this action on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 3 (ECF No. 1 at 3–4.) The Court will address both grounds for federal jurisdiction in turn. 4 As to federal question jurisdiction, Defendant argues this case implicates her Fourteenth 5 Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 4.) Defendant also argues there is a federal question 6 “surrounding the construction of the Pooling and Service agreement.” (Id.) However, the 7 Complaint itself contains only a single claim for unlawful detainer. (Id. at 10–12.) The instant 8 Complaint therefore relies solely on California state law and does not state any claims under 9 federal law. Based on the well-pleaded complaint rule as articulated above, removal cannot be 10 based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim raising a federal question. 11 Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392 ; see also Vaden, 556 U.S. at 49 ; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 12 F.3d at 1042–43. Thus, while Defendant seems to contend in the notice of removal that Plaintiff 13 has violated the Fourteenth Amendment, this assertion relates only to an affirmative defense or 14 potential counterclaim, which cannot be considered in evaluating whether a federal question 15 appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60-62 . 16 As to diversity jurisdiction, Defendant asserts she is a California resident, and “Plaintiff 17 Quality Loan” is a citizen of a different state. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) However, Quality Loan is not 18 named as a party to this action. Defendant does not assert that the only named Plaintiff — Surjit 19 Singh — is a citizen of a different state. (See id.) Even assuming there is complete diversity of 20 citizenship, Defendant has not shown that the amount in controversy for this unlawful detainer 21 action exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 ; see also Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998–1000. 22 In sum, because the Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for unlawful 23 detainer, which arises solely under state law, this action does not arise under federal law. Further, 24 Defendant’s alternate argument as to diversity jurisdiction also fails because Defendant has not 25 shown that there is complete diversity or that the amount in controversy has been met. There 26 being no apparent grounds for federal jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand this case sua sponte 27 for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & 28 Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3 | 2)is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 4 | California, County of Stanislaus. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. [6] 7 DATED: November 23, 2021 ry /) 8 “ / bln 10 United States District Judge