Quezada v. State of California

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JOSE MIGUEL QUEZADA, No. 1:20-cv-00959-DAD-SAB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., (Doc. No. 20) 15 Defendants. [17] 18 This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendants on August 13, 19 2021. (Doc. No. 20.) Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency 20 posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants’ motion was taken under submission on the 21 papers. (Doc. No. 21.) For the reasons explained below, the court will grant the pending motion 22 to dismiss, in part. 23 BACKGROUND 24 This civil rights action arises from an incident that allegedly occurred on June 26, 2019, in 25 which plaintiff Jose Miguel Quezada, a former inmate of California Department of Corrections 26 (“CDCR”) who was incarcerated at all relevant times at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), was 27 allegedly beaten, kicked, and smashed on the ground by defendant correctional officers R. 28 Morales and J. Swanson. (Doc. No. 15 at 4–5.) 1 On June 14, 2021, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss certain claims in 2 plaintiff’s original complaint and granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to cure the 3 deficiencies the court had identified therein. (Doc. No. 13.) On July 2, 2021, plaintiff filed the 4 operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) naming the following defendants: the State of 5 California (“State”), the CDCR, correctional officers R. Morales, J. Swanson, and DOES 1–20 6 (unknown correctional officers working at KVSP as employees of the State and CDCR). In his 7 FAC, plaintiff asserts the following eight causes of action: (1) a claim against defendants 8 Morales and Swanson for assault and battery; (2) a claim under California Civil Code § 52.1, the 9 California Bane Act, against defendants Morales and Swanson; (3) a claim against defendants 10 Morales and Swanson for excessive use of force in violation of Article 1 Section 17 of the 11 California Constitution; (4) a § 1983 claim against defendants Morales and Swanson for 12 excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (5) a claim 13 against defendants DOES 1–10 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in 14 violation of Article 1 Section 17 of the California Constitution; (6) a § 1983 claim against 15 defendants DOES 1–10 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the 16 Eighth Amendment; (7) a claim of negligent failure to train, supervise, and/or discipline against 17 defendants CDCR, the State, and DOES 11–20; and (8) a claim of negligent retention against 18 defendants CDCR, the State, and DOES 11–20. (Doc. No. 15.) 19 On August 13, 2021, defendants State, CDCR, Morales, and Swanson filed a motion to 20 dismiss plaintiff’s third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims. (Doc. No. 20-1.) On September 21 7, 2021, plaintiff filed an opposition to the pending motion to dismiss and on September 14, 2021, 22 defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 22, 23.) 23 LEGAL STANDARD 24 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 25 is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 26 2001). A dismissal may be warranted where there is “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 27 absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 28 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim for relief must contain “a short and plain 1 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 2 Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege 3 “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, [4] 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual 5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 6 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 7 In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 8 court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 9 most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 10 United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the court need not assume the truth 11 of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 12 F.2d 638 , 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, 13 “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, [14] 556 U.S. at 678 . A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a 15 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ; see also 16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 17 mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the 18 plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 19 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 20 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 21 ANALYSIS 22 First, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims against defendants 23 State and CDCR because they are immune from liability under the California Government Code. 24 (Doc. No. 20-1 at 11.) Plaintiff concedes that these claims should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 22 at 25 11–12) (“In consideration of the Court’s judicial resources, Plaintiff concedes that the State and 26 CDCR are immune with regard to the common law tort causes of action.”). Plaintiff requests that 27 the court grant him leave to amend his FAC to withdraw these claims and to “add the statutory 28 claim for violation of section 845.6 of the [California] [G]overnment [C]ode” for failure to take 1 reasonable action to summon medical care for a prisoner in need of immediate medical care. (Id. 2 at 12–13.) In their reply, defendants agree that plaintiff should be granted leave to file a second 3 amended complaint for this purpose. (Doc. No. 7.) Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ 4 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims for negligence against defendants CDCR 5 and the State, without leave to amend those claims. However, the court will grant plaintiff’s 6 unopposed request for leave to file a second amended complaint to add a statutory claim under 7 California Government Code § 845.6. 8 Second, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s third and fifth claims for injunctive and 9 declaratory relief, arguing that plaintiff’s FAC suffers from the same deficiencies identified by 10 the court in its prior order, in which plaintiff was cautioned that “conclusory claims to injunctive 11 and/or declaratory relief—without descriptions of the particular relief sought and supporting 12 factual allegations to demonstrate that he is entitled to that relief under applicable law—are not 13 sufficient to state a cognizable claim.” (Doc. No. 20-1 at 12) (quoting Doc. No. 13 at 10.) 14 Defendants emphasize that because “[p]laintiff is no longer incarcerated in state prison, and there 15 are no factual allegations demonstrating any reasonable expectation of Plaintiff returning to state 16 prison,” his “release from CDCR custody renders his prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief 17 moot, as these forms of relief would have no impact on him.” (Id. at 12–13.) The court agrees. 18 See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that a prisoner’s claims for 19 injunctive relief were mooted by the prisoner’s transfer to a different prison because he did not 20 demonstrate a reasonable expectation of returning to the prison at which his claims arose); United 21 States v. State of Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Declaratory relief should be 22 denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in 23 issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced 24 by the parties.”). In his opposition, plaintiff does not address his claims for injunctive relief or 25 defendants’ arguments in this regard, apparently conceding that he failed in his FAC to 26 sufficiently allege that he is entitled to injunctive relief. See Contreras v. Esper, No. 2:14-cv27 01282-KJM-KJN, 2018 WL 1503678 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2018) (citing Carvalho v. Equifax 28 Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff who makes a claim . . . in his 1 complaint[] but fails to raise the issue in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss . . . has 2 effectively abandoned his claim . . .”); Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 3 2014) (collecting cases and finding that abandonment of a claim warrants dismissal without leave 4 to amend or with prejudice)). Plaintiff does contend, however, that declaratory relief is 5 appropriate to prevent “ongoing abuses” and “ongoing constitutional violations.” (Doc. No. 22 at 6 13.) Yet plaintiff’s allegations in this regard do not show that he is subject to any ongoing abuse 7 or violation, and thus a declaratory judgment would have no impact on him. See Giraldo v. Dep’t 8 of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 257 (2008) (affirming dismissal of declaratory relief 9 claims as moot because “[i]t is clear that upon plaintiff’s parole she was no longer under the 10 physical control of CDCR, and the challenged conduct no longer applied to her”). Accordingly, 11 the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s third and fifth claims for injunctive 12 and declaratory relief under Article 1 Section 17 of the California Constitution, without leave to 13 amend. 14 Third, and finally, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 15 claims against the DOE defendants because plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts attributing 16 conduct to individual DOE defendants and because proceeding against DOE defendants is 17 disfavored in the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 13–14.) Defendants contend that the court 18 should dismiss defendants DOES 1–20 from this action, “without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking 19 leave to amend the complaint should the identities of such Defendants become known to him.” 20 (Doc. No. 20-1 at 13–14.) In his opposition, plaintiff counters that dismissing the DOE 21 defendants at this early stage of the litigation would be an abuse of the court’s discretion because 22 plaintiff should first have the opportunity to ascertain the identities of the defendants through 23 discovery. (Doc. No. 22 at 14.) In reply, defendants urge the court to grant their motion as to the 24 DOE defendants notwithstanding plaintiff’s arguments because dismissal of the DOE defendants, 25 without prejudice, would not deprive plaintiff of the opportunity to conduct discovery and to 26 amend his complaint to name defendants that become known to him through that discovery. 27 (Doc. No. 23 at 5–6.) As for plaintiff’s fifth claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against 28 DOES 1–10, the court has already concluded that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 1 and will dismiss this claim as to the DOE defendants without leave to amend as well. See 2 Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 3 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that dismissal of claims against unknown DOE defendants 4 is appropriate, even if discovery would enable plaintiff to identify the defendants, where the 5 claims “would be dismissed on other grounds”)). As for plaintiff’s sixth claim brought only 6 against DOES 1–10 and plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims against DOES 11–20, the court 7 declines to dismiss the DOE defendants at this stage of the litigation. See Powe v. Nevada, No. 8 2:17-cv-00470-JAD-GWF, 2019 WL 918982 , at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2019) (“Although the use 9 of the ‘Doe’ placeholder to identify a defendant is not favored, flexibility is allowed in some 10 cases where the identity of the parties will not be known prior to filing a complaint but can 11 subsequently be determined through discovery.”). If plaintiff fails to identify the unknown 12 defendants through discovery and seek leave to amend his complaint to name those defendants, 13 then the court will consider dismissing the DOE defendants. See Merancio v. Smith & Nephew, 14 Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00807-DAD-EPG, 2017 WL 2257124 , at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2017) 15 (dismissing DOE defendants sua sponte because “plaintiffs have identified no additional 16 defendants and discovery in this action is now closed”). 17 CONCLUSION 18 For all of the reasons set forth above: 19 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 20) is granted, in part; 20 a. Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims against defendants State of California 21 and California Department of Corrections are dismissed, without leave to 22 amend; 23 b. Plaintiff’s third and fifth claims are dismissed, without leave to amend; 24 2. Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a second amended complaint to add a claim 25 under California Government Code § 845.6 against defendants State of California 26 and California Department of Corrections is granted; 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 3. Any second amended complaint that plaintiff may elect to file in this action, 2 consistent with the leave to amend granted by the court in this order, shall be filed 3 within twenty-one (21) days after the issuance of this order;' and 4 4. In the event no second amended complaint is filed, defendants shall file their 5 answer to the remaining causes of action within fourteen (14) days of the date by 6 which any second amended complaint had to be filed. 7 | ORDERED. 8 /) oO g@ Dated: _ November 29, 2021 eee tT 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [24] 1 og plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he is reminded that Local Rule 220 requires that 26 | an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 27 | Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiffs file an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in any amended complaint, as in 28 | an original complaint, each claim must be sufficiently alleged.