Construction Laborers Trust Funds For Southern California Administrative Company v. H and S Electric Inc.

[2] O [7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 CONSTRUCTION LABORERS TRUST ) Case No. CV 19-05347 DDP (Ex) FUNDS FOR SOUTHERN ) 12 CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE ) COMPANY, ) 13 ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiff, ) INTERVENE 14 ) v. ) [Dkt. 22] 15 ) H and S ELECTRIC INC., ) [16] Defendants. 17 __________________________ [18] 19 Presently before the court is a motion to intervene by 20 proposed Intervenor-Defendants Trustees of the Southern California 21 IBEW-NECA Pension Plan, and others.1 Defendant H and S Electric, 22 Inc., does not oppose the motion. Plaintiff does, however, oppose 23 intervention. Having considered the submissions of the parties and 24 heard oral argument, the court grants the motion and adopts the 25 following Order. 26 I. Background [28] 1 The proposed Intervenors are all trustees of various funds 1 Plaintiff administers various employee benefit plans 2 established and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security 3 Act (“ERISA”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, an electrical 4 contractor, is a party to various collective bargaining agreements 5 with district and local laborers unions. Under those agreements, 6 Plaintiff alleges, Defendant is obligated to make contributions to 7 the various laborers’ funds for all employee hours worked on tasks 8 covered by the agreements. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed 9 to make all of the required contribution payments. 10 Defendant contends that it does not owe any money to Plaintiff 11 because the contributions at issue were owed, and paid, to 12 different benefit plans pursuant to different agreements with 13 various iterations of the International Brotherhood of Electrical 14 Workers (“IBEW”) and the National Electrical Contractors 15 Association (“NECA”). (Answer ¶¶ 25-34.) 16 The trustees of the various IBEW-NECA funds now move to 17 intervene as Defendants in this case. 18 III. Discussion 19 A. Intervention as of Right 20 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, a court must allow 21 intervention by any movant who “claims an interest relating to the 22 property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is 23 so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter 24 impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, 25 unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. 26 R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). When analyzing a motion to intervene as of 27 right under Rule 24(a)(2), courts apply a four-part test: (1) the 28 motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a 1 “significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or 2 transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant 3 must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 4 practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that 5 interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately 6 represented by the parties to the action. Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. 7 Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 8 omitted). Courts, “guided primarily by practical considerations,” 9 construe this four-part test broadly in favor of intervenors. 10 United Staes ex rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 11 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation omitted). 12 Here, Intervenors contend that Plaintiff’s claims involve 13 hours worked by forty of Defendant’s employees. Intervenors 14 further assert that Defendant paid contributions to Intervenors for 15 work performed by thirty-six of those forty employees, and that 16 less than 2% of Plaintiff’s claims pertain to the remaining four 17 workers. Intervenors fear, in essence, that Plaintiff is pursuing 18 the same money that Defendant has already paid to Intervenors. 19 Should Plaintiff prevail, Intervenors argue, Defendant will likely 20 seek to recover from Intervenors amounts previously paid to 21 Intervenors. In light of Defendant’s Answer, these fears do not 22 appear speculative, and are further substantiated by evidence of 23 other, similar instances, in which Plaintiff sought delinquent 24 contributions from other employers and those employers subsequently 25 filed third party claims against Intervenors seeking refunds of 26 contributions previously paid to Intervenors. 27 An applicant has a “significant protectable interest” in an 28 action if (1) it asserts an interest that is protected under some law, and (2) there is a “relationship” between its legally protected interest and the plaintiff’s claims. Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that Intervenors have a legal interest in monies 5] they have already received from Defendant and, at least to some extent, already spent. It is less clear, however, whether 71 Plaintiff concedes that there is a “relationship” between Intervenors’ already-received monies and the allegedly delinquent contributions Plaintiff seeks from Defendant. Plaintiff, relying upon Donnelly, argues that Intervenors cannot satisfy the third element of the intervention as of right test - that the disposition 12] of the action may impair Intervenors’ ability to protect its interest -— because the element is satisfied “only if the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims actually will affect the applicant.” (Opposition at 5:16-17 (citing Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 410 )). The Donnelly court’s discussion, however, pertained not to the third, 17] “impair or impede” element, but rather to the second, “protectable 18] interest” element of the intervention test. As the court 19}/ explained, the “relationship” requirement of the “protectable interest” element is only satisfied if resolution of the claims 21} “actually will affect the applicant.” Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 410 . 22 Even considering Plaintiff’s “actual impairment” argument in the context of the second element, however, Intervenors have met their burden. This Court acknowledges that some courts have relied upon Donnelly to deny intervention as of right where a proposed intervenor has not shown a certainty that its interest will be 271 “actually impaired” by resolution of the existing litigation. See, 28i}e.g., Abbit v. ING USA Annuity, No. 13-CV-2310-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 1 } 6092592, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016). It is unclear, however, whether such emphasis on the phrase “actually impaired” is appropriate. In Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., for example, the Ninth Circuit explained that a proposed intervenor has a sufficient interest “where the .. . rights of the applicant may be affected by a proposed remedy,” and allowed intervention by 7 right where the proposed intervenors showed that they “could be bound by the court’s decree.” Forest Conservation Council, 9] 66 F.3d 1489 , 1495-6 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Even post-Donnelly, the Ninth Circuit has found a legally protectable interest sufficient to support intervention as of right where an intervenor showed that its interests “could be affected” by resolution of a pending dispute. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810 , 16] 820 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, a requirement that a proposed intervenor conclusively demonstrate that a resolution of the pending matter would, regardless of outcome, necessarily affect the intervenor’s interest would conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s guidance that this Court construe the four-part test broadly in favor of intervenors, with an emphasis on practical considerations. McGough, 967 F.2d at 1394 . Looking, then, to practical considerations, the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient 24] relationship between Plaintiff’s claims and Intervenor’s interests insofar as Plaintiff may be attempting to recover the same monies that have already been paid to Intervenors. [28] 1 “Generally, after determining that the applicant has a 2 protectable interest, courts have ‘little difficulty concluding’ 3 that the disposition of the case may affect such interest.” 4 Jackson v. Abercrombie, 282 F.R.D. 507, 517 (D. Haw. 2012) (quoting 5 Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir.2006)). Such 6 is the case here. Much of Plaintiff’s opposition is devoted to 7 arguments as to why Intervenors’ fears are unfounded, either 8 because Defendant might be contractually obligated to pay both 9 Intervenors and Plaintiff or because, for various reasons, any 10 attempts by Defendant to seek reimbursement from Intervenors might 11 ultimately prove unsuccessful. The court takes no position on the 12 merits of those arguments at this early stage. “[I]ntervention as 13 of right does not require an absolute certainty that a party’s 14 interests will be impaired . . . .” Citizens for Balanced Use v. 15 Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). “Rule 16 24(a) is invoked when the disposition of the action ‘may’ 17 practically impair a party’s ability to protect their interest in 18 the subject matter of the litigation.” Id. As discussed above, 19 Defendant takes the position that it owed and paid contributions to 20 Intervenors, and owed nothing to Plaintiff. Should Plaintiff 21 succeed in establishing that Defendant does indeed owe Plaintiff 22 money, Defendant may seek to recover amounts it paid to 23 Intervenors. Plaintiff’s efforts, therefore, may impede 24 Intervenors’ interests in retaining those funds. 25 For these reasons, Intevernors may intervene in this action as 26 of right. 27 B. Permissive Intervention [28] 1 Even where a proposed intervenor cannot satisfy the four-part 2 test under Rule 24(a)(2), courts may allow intervention by anyone 3 who “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 4 common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). 5 There is little doubt that Intervenors’ claim shares common 6 questions with Plaintiff’s claim, particularly in light of 7 Defendant’s contention that the contributions Plaintiff seeks were 8 owed to Intervenors, not to Plaintiff. 9 Plaintiff is correct that this Court is obligated to consider 10 whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 11 adjudication of Plaintiff’s rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). 12 The issues raised by Intervenors appear to overlap to a significant 13 degree with the defenses raised by Defendant, and are likely to be 14 litigated regardless of intervention. Thus, to the extent 15 intervention will cause any appreciable delay, there does not 16 appear to be any danger of undue delay. Thus, even if Intervenors 17 are not entitled to intervene as of right, this Court will allow 18 intervention as a matter of discretion. 19 IV. Conclusion 20 For the reasons stated above, the motion to intervene is 21 GRANTED. [23] 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. [26] 27 Dated: January 23, 2020 DEAN D. PREGERSON 28 United States District Judge