Demario Jones v. Federal Express Corporation

Js [7] Ginited States District Court ° Central District of California [10] 11 | DEMARIO JONES, Case No. 2:19-cv-08429 ODW(JCx) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1S v. REMAND AND DENYING AS 14 | FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, | MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS [22] 15 || et al.; 25] 16 Defendants. 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Demario Jones seeks to remand this action to Los Angeles Cour 19 || Superior Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Mot. to Remand (“Mot.’ 20 || ECF No. 22.) Jones argues that Defendants Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx’ 21]; FedEx Corporate Services; Michael Caron (“Caron”) (erroneously named (“Micha 22 || Carona”)); and Sandra Garcia Mead (“Garcia Mead”) (collectively, (“Defendants’ 23 || failed to establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 , because Caron ai 24 || Garcia Mead destroy complete diversity. For the reasons discussed below, the Cot 25 || GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (“Motion”) (ECF No. 22) and therefor 26 || DENIES as moot Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25).! [27] 28 || | After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deems t matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Jones’s claims arise from the termination of his employment. (See First A 3} Compl. (“FAC”) 33-34, ECF No. 16.) Jones filed this action in Los Ange | County Superior Court alleging against all Defendants: (1) racial discrimination 5 || violation of California Government Code section 12940 et seq.; (2) retaliation 6 || violation of California Government Code section 12940 et seq.; (3) ‘failure to prev: 7 || discrimination and retaliation in violation of California Government Code secti 8 | 12940 et seq.; and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Notice 9 || Removal (“Notice”) 3, ECF No. 1.) Jones also alleges two causes of action agai: 10 | individual Defendants Caron and Garcia Mead for (5) intentional infliction 11 | emotional distress (“ITED”); and (6) defamation. (Notice 3.) Jones is a citizen 12 | California (FAC § 9); while, FedEx and FedEx Corporate Services are both citizens 13 | Delaware and Tennessee (Notice 5); and Caron and Garcia Mead are each citizens 14 California. (Notice 6.) 15 Jones alleges he was hired in August 2005 as a handler, and eventual 16 | promoted to customer service agent (“CSA”). (FAC {J 16-17.) Jones alleges that 17 || his over ten years at FedEx, he was a hard worker in one of the busiest locations a 18 || never reported for disciplinary action. (FAC 16-17.) 19 Jones, an African American, alleges that he experienced continuous rac’ 20 || discrimination between August 2014 and August 2017. (FAC § 18.) He claims tt 21 || Caron made racists remarks directed at him and treated him disparately from | 22 || White colleagues. (FAC {J 18-28.) Jones specifically alleges Caron: (1) claimed | 23 || was the “master of this place”; (2) stated Jones would “scare” or “frighten” custome 24 | when wearing the company issued jacket with the hood up but never made su 25 | comments to other colleagues; (3) forced Jones to work the hardest and heavie 26 || assignments, without rotating between other CSAs—as was company policy— 27 | allowing him to have an assistant, as other White employees had; and (4) prevent 28 | Jones from taking breaks on site, wearing earrings, leaving tattoos exposed, ar 1 | growing his hair out, although such behavior was tolerated for White and Hispat 2 || employees. (FAC §J 18-28.) Jones further alleges that he was terminated as a res 3 | of racial discrimination. (FAC 34.) 4 On August 15, 2019, Jones commenced this action in Los Angeles Cour 5 Superior Court. (Notice 2-3.) Defendants removed the action to this Court | 6 | September 30, 2019, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 13 : 7 | (Notice 1.) On October 15, 2019, Jones filed the instant motion to remand the actic 8 || (Mot.) 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matt 11 | jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. U. 12 | Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U. 13 | 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if t 14 | federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ( 15 | But courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction, at 16 || “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of remov 17 || in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). TI 18 || party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Durham 19 | Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2 20 || at 566). 21 Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action presents a feder 22 || question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 , or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 133 . 23 | A defendant may remove a case from a state court to a federal court pursuant to tt 24 || federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 , on the basis of federal question or diversi 25 || jurisdiction. To exercise diversity jurisdiction, a federal court must find comple 26 | diversity of citizenship among the adverse parties, and the amount in controversy mu 27 || exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a). [28] 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 This case turns on the existence of complete diversity. Defendants argue tl 3 | Caron and Garcia Mead, California citizens, were fraudulently joined for the purpc || of destroying diversity, and should therefore be disregarded. (Notice 6—7.) 5 “[O]ne exception to the requirement of complete diversity is where a nc 6 || diverse defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.’” Morris v. Princess Cruises, In 7 || 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). “Fraudulent joinder is a term of art and does r 8 | implicate a plaintiffs subjective intent.” Rangel v. Bridgestone Retail □□□□□□□□□ LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing McCabe v. General Fo 10 || Corp., 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1987)). When a plaintiff “fails to state a cause 11 || action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settl 12 | rules of the state,” fraudulent joinder exists. Jd. Consequently, a defendant “must | 13 || more than show that the complaint at the time of removal fails to state a claim agait 14 || the non-diverse defendant.” Padilla v. AT & T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 11 . 15 || (C.D. Cal. 2009). Instead, the defendant must demonstrate “there is no possibility tt 16 | the plaintiff could prevail on any cause of action it brought against the non-diver 17 | defendant.” Jd. (emphasis added); see Macey v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 220 18 | Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“If there is a non-fanciful possibility th 19 || plaintiff can state a claim under California law against the non-diverse defendants □□ 20 || court must remand.”). 21 Furthermore, a defendant must prove fraudulent joinder through clear a1 22 || convincing evidence. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 120 23 || 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). This may be done by “piercing the pleading” to consid 24 || summary judgment-type evidence like affidavits and depositions. Morris, 236 F.3d 1068 . Still, any ambiguity of law should be resolved in favor of the plainti: 26 || Hamilton Materials, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1206. 27 Here, Defendants argue that claims for IIED occurring within the employme 28 | context are preempted by the California Workers’ Compensation Act. (Opp’n to Mc 1 | “Opp’n”) 12-13, ECF No. 29.) Generally, “claims for emotional distress caused the employer’s conduct causing distress such as ‘discharge, demotion, discipline 3 || criticism’ are preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act, even when 1 4 | employer’s acts causing the distress are intentional or outrageous.” Onelum v. Bi 5 |} Buy Stores L.P., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Cal. Lab. Code 6 | 3601(a) (“[T]he right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of tl 7 || division is . . . the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against a 8 || other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or | 9 | employment... .”) 10 However, “a claim is not barred by Workers’ Compensation Act when: (i) t 11 | employer’s conduct contravenes public policy, or (ii) the employer’s conduct excee 12 | the boundaries of the inherent risks of the employer-employee relationship.” Walk 13 | v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, No. LA:CV-15-0124-1JA-KASx, 2015 WL 1375294 14 |} at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2015). 15 Consequently, courts have routinely found discrimination to exceed t 16 | boundaries of inherent risks associated with the employer-employee relationship. 17|| Walker, plaintiff was severely injured on the job and claimed IIED against h 18 | managers for refusing to provide work accommodating her disability. Walker, 20. 19} WL 13752943 at *1-2. Defendants’ argued that the ITED claims were preempted | 20 || the Workers’ Compensation Act; however, the court disagreed, emphasizing that ‘ 21 || finding that discrimination is a risk inherent in the employer-employee relationsh 22 | would be problematic given the efforts made over the past several decades 23 || eliminate such conduct from the workplace.” Jd. at *5; see also Barsell v. Urbc 24 || Outfitters, Inc., No. CV-09-02604-MMM-RZx, 2009 WL 1916495 , at *4 (C.D. Cz 25 || July 1, 2009) (“Because this claim is based on allegations of disability discriminatio 26 || there is a non-fanciful possibility that the workers’ compensation exclusivi 27 || provisions do not bar [Plaintiff’s] claim.’’) [28] 1 Clearly, Jones’s allegations against Caron concerning his earrings, hairsty 2 || and tattoos are managerial decisions that would fall under the Workers’ Compensati 3 | Act exclusive remedy provision. Onelum, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 . However, Jone 4} allegations that Caron made racially charged statements, prevented Jones from havi 5 || an assistant when White employees were permitted one, and consistently assign 6 || Jones the toughest jobs without rotating between other CSAs demonstrate potentia 7 || discriminatory conduct. See Macias v. Levy Premium Foodservices Ltd. P’ship, } 8 || 2:14-CV-09220-SVW-PLA, 2015 WL 12747900 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 20] 9 | (IED claim arising from discriminatory statements based on plaintiffs race and s 10 || not preempted by Workers’ Compensation Act.) Thus, because discrimination is no 11 || risk inherent in the employer-employee relationship, there is a non-fanciful possibil 12 || Jones may have a claim for IED based on the allegedly discriminatory misconduct 13 || Caron in the workplace. Walker, 2015 WL 13752943 at *5. 14 Defendants additionally ague that Jones’s allegations are insufficient to supp 15 an ITED claim against Caron and Garcia Mead. (Opp’n 13.) Specifically, th 16 | contend that Jones failed to allege conduct that is extreme or outrageous. (Opp’n 14 17 California allows recovery for IIED claims based on conduct “so extreme a 18 || outrageous as to go beyond all possible bound of decency and to be regarded 19 || atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Onelum, 948 F. Supp. | 20}, at 1053. In Onelum, plaintiffs allegations that defendant-employer mocked | 21 | Nigerian accent and regularly threatened to terminate him was sufficient to ple 22 || extreme and outrageous behavior for his IED claim. Jd. Here, Jones similarly alleg 23 || instances in which Caron made racially insensitive comments targeting his Afric: 24 | American ethnicity, which may be sufficient to plead the extreme and outrageo 25 || element of an IIED claim. (FAC 9{ 18-23.) 26 Furthermore, defendants carry the burden of establishing that a plaintiff cou 27 || not cure the deficiencies in his Complaint by amending it. Rangel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 28 | 1033. Thus, even if Jones’s Complaint failed to sufficiently state a claim for IIE] 1 | Defendants have not met their burden of establishing that Jones is unable to amend | 2 || complaint to include additional facts that properly state a claim. Thus, the Court fir 3 || that Jones may bring an ITED claim against Caron, destroying diversity. According 4 | the Court GRANTS the motion to remand on this basis.” 5 Vv. CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Jones’s Motion 7 || Remand and DENIES as moot Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 22, 2. 8 | This action shall be remanded to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, 111 No: 9 || Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case. [10] 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. [12] 13 February 4, 2020 XN , 14 ’ 6 OTIS D. WRIGHT, I UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [27] 28 || ? Since the Court finds that the IED claim destroys diversity, it declines to assess whether Jone: Defamation claim is adequately raised.