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Delexstine Kendricks v. Collect Access, LLC
O
[77] United States District Court
[88] Central District of California
[1100] 1111 DELEXSTINE KENDRICKS, Case № 5:19-cv-01134-ODW (SHKx)
1122 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES [55] 1133 v.
1144 COLLECT ACCESS, LLC, et al.,
1155 Defendants.
[1166] 1177 I. INTRODUCTION 1188 Plaintiff Delexstine Kendricks initiated this action against Defendants Collect 1199 Access, LLC (“Collect”) and Zee Law Group, P.C. (“ZLG”) for allegedly violating 2200 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and the Rosenthal Fair Debt 2211 Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On January 26, 2021, 2222 the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Kendricks’s 2233 Complaint, sua sponte. Defendants now move for an award of attorneys’ fees under 2244 the FDCPA and RFDCPA. (Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (“Mot.”), ECF No. 55.) For 2255 the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.1
[2277] 2288 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Defendants have been attempting to collect a debt that Plaintiff Delexstine 3 Kendricks purportedly owes. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 20.) On January 3, 2018, Defendants 4 obtained a writ of execution from the state court to enforce a default judgment against 5 Kendricks. (Id. ¶ 29.) In that action, Kendricks filed a motion to quash service of 6 process, as well as an ex parte application to stay. On April 19, 2018, the state court 7 granted her ex parte application to stay enforcement of the judgment until the court 8 could hear her motion to quash service. (Id. ¶ 33.) 9 On May 31, 2018, the state court held a hearing on the motion to quash service, 10 which Kendricks and Defendants attended. (Id. ¶ 35.) In that hearing, the court 11 issued a minute order reflecting what had been discussed. (Id. ¶ 36; Defs.’ Req. for 12 Judicial Notice (“RJN”) ¶ 3, Ex. C (“Min. Order”), ECF No. 49-3.) The minute order 13 reflects, among other things, that the court set aside default and default judgment 14 against Kendricks, ordered Collect to serve new process upon Kendricks, and ordered 15 Collect to provide Kendricks with notice of the court’s ruling. (Compl. ¶¶ 35–36; see 16 Min. Order.) 17 The minute order also contained two seemingly conflicting instructions. First, 18 it stated, “THE COURT ORDERS . . . KENDRICKS TO FILE AN ANSWER TO 19 THE COMPLAINT WITH THE CLERKS OFFICE WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS.” 20 (Min. Order (emphasis added).) The minute order also included the following 21 instruction: “NEW SERVICE REQUIRED ON THE RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT 22 OF [DRI] ON DEFENDANT DELEXSTINE R KENDRICKS 30 DAYS TO 23 ANSWER.” (Id. (emphasis added).) On June 1, 2018, Defendants filed and served 24 Kendricks with a Notice of Ruling which communicated the twenty-day deadline 25 stated in the minute order. (See id.; Compl. ¶ 37; RJN ¶ 4, Ex. D.) Having received 26 no answer after twenty days, Defendants filed and served a request for entry of default 27 on June 21, 2018. (Compl. ¶ 41.) However, the state court denied the request and
[28] 1 noted that Kendricks had thirty days to respond to the complaint, not twenty. (Id. 2 ¶ 42.) 3 Based on the above, Kendricks filed a Complaint in this Court, claiming that 4 Defendants violated the FDCPA and RFDCPA by (1) sending Kendricks the Notice of 5 Ruling stating that she had twenty days to respond to the complaint instead of thirty 6 days, (id. ¶¶ 39–40), and (2) filing and serving the request for entry of default before 7 thirty days expired, (id. ¶¶ 43–47.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 9 No. 52.) The Court dismissed the action with prejudice, sua sponte, for reasons 10 independent of any arguments advanced by Defendants. (Id.) Defendants now 11 request attorneys’ fees. (Mot.) 12 III. LEGAL STANDARD 13 The FDCPA provides that a court may award attorneys’ fees only if a plaintiff’s 14 action was “brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” 15 U.S.C. 15 § 1692k(a)(3). The RFDCPA similarly provides that a court may award such fees if a 16 plaintiff’s action was brought in bad faith. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30 . Under the 17 FDCPA, the defendant bears the burden of showing, by more than a “conclusory 18 assertion,” that the plaintiff acted in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. 19 Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926 , 940–41 (9th Cir. 2007). As long as 20 a plaintiff’s claim is “‘minimally colorable,’ a district court does not abuse its 21 discretion in finding the suit was brought in good faith.” Fields v. Credit Mgmt. Sys., 22 No. EDCV 14-1853 JGB (SPx), 2016 WL 9088755 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016) 23 (quoting Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 940 ). 24 IV. DISCUSSION 25 Defendants contend that they are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees from 26 Kendricks and her counsel because they are the prevailing party under the FDCPA 27 and RFDCPA. (See Mot.) Defendants are incorrect.
[28] 1 First, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (k)(a)(3) does not authorize attorneys’ fees against a 2|| plaintiff's attorneys. Hyde v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1137 , 1140 3 || (9th Cir. 2009); see also Fields, 2016 WL 9088755 , at *2 (“Section 1692k(a)(3) only authorizes an award of fees against the plaintiff, not the plaintiff's attorneys.”). Thus, to the extent Defendants seek attorneys’ fees against Kendricks’s attorneys, their 6 || Motion is denied. 7 Second, Defendants fail to meet their burden to demonstrate beyond a 8 | conclusory assertion that Kendricks brought this case in bad faith and for the purpose 9 || of harassment. See Guerrero, 499 F.3d at 940 . Defendants fail to cite to a single case 10 || supporting their contention that Kendricks brought this case in bad faith or to harass— 11 || “[t]his alone is grounds to deny [their] motion.” See Fields, 2016 WL 9088755 , at *3. 12 | Defendants merely restate the relevant statutes and facts in the record. (See generally 13 | Mot.) Indeed, Defendants make only the conclusory assertion that because this Court “found that Kendricks failed to allege facts showing that Defendants engaged in 15 || conduct that is prohibited by the FDCPA or RFDCPA,” that Kendricks’s action was 16 || brought in bad faith or to harass. This will not do. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion 17 || is denied. 18 Vv. CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for 20 || Attorneys’ Fees. (ECF No. 55.)
[21] 22 IT IS SO ORDERED.
[23] 24 June 23, 2021 . 25 SB Yi, Tit 7 OTIS D. GHT, II 08 UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGE
