Beaver v. County of Butte

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- [11] 12 CLARENCE BEAVER and JOSEPH No. 2:20-cv-00279 WBS DB STILWELL, [13] Plaintiffs, 14 ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [15] COUNTY OF BUTTE; BUTTE COUNTY 16 SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SHERIFF KORY L. HONEA, in his individual 17 capacity; DEPUTY PEREZ, in his individual capacity; DEPUTY 18 WALBERG, in his individual capacity; SERGEANT J. BEHLKE, in 19 his individual capacity; CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS JOHN DOE 20 1-10; WELLPATH, LLC; CALIFORNIA FORENSIC MEDICAL GROUP, [21] Defendants. [23] ----oo0oo---- [24] Plaintiffs Clarence Beaver and Joseph Stilwell brought [25] this action against defendants County of Butte (“the County”); [26] the Butte County Sheriff’s Office; Sheriff Kory L. Honea; Deputy [27] Esteban Perez; Deputy Chadwick Walberg; Sergeant Jason Behlke; [28] 1 Wellpath, LLC; and California Forensic Medical Group 2 (collectively, “defendants”) alleging negligence and violation of 3 their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 4 1983.1 (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 21).) 5 Before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 6 (Docket No. 29-1.) 7 I. Factual and Procedural History 8 In early 2019, plaintiff Beaver was an inmate at the 9 Butte County Jail and plaintiff Stilwell was a pretrial detainee 10 there. (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisp. Facts at ¶ 1 11 (“Resp.”) (Docket No. 37-2); SAC at ¶¶ 6-7.) Both were housed in 12 G-Pod, a dormitory-style housing unit for inmates classified as 13 requiring medium-security housing. (Resp. at ¶¶ 2-3.) 14 On February 6, 2019, Antonio Hernandez was booked into 15 the jail on charges of felony domestic violence. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 16 Hernandez went through the jail’s initial inmate classification 17 process upon admission. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.) The process entails an 18 interview by a classification officer and completion of a 19 worksheet, the results of which are processed by an algorithm to 20 yield a score indicating whether the inmate should be placed in 21 minimum-, medium-, or maximum-security housing. (Id.) The 22 interviewing officer may then deviate from that assignment based 23 on his subjective assessment during the interview. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 24 The algorithm assigned Hernandez the minimum score 25 necessary to designate him as requiring maximum-security housing; [26] 1 Defendants Wellpath, LLC and California Forensic 27 Medical Group have since been dismissed from the case pursuant to a stipulation by the parties. (Docket Nos. 35-36.) [28] 1 however, based on Hernandez’s demeanor during the interview, lack 2 of a history of fighting or discipline in jail, and work history, 3 the officer overrode that designation and instead classified him 4 as requiring medium-security housing. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-14.)2 That 5 decision was reviewed and approved of by another classification 6 officer and by a supervisory sergeant. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17.) 7 After being initially assigned to the L-Pod housing 8 unit, Hernandez requested to be reassigned to J-Pod. (Id. at 9 ¶ 18.) However, after reporting that he feared for his safety 10 there and sought to be placed on suicide watch because of 11 anxiety, Hernandez was evaluated and moved to a single-occupancy 12 cell for two weeks pursuant to the jail’s suicide prevention 13 protocol. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-21.) While there, he was frequently 14 assessed and underwent weekly classification reviews, and after 15 two weeks the reviewing officer concluded that, based on the lack 16 of recent incidents, Hernandez could be moved back into the 17 general population, again in medium-security housing. (Id. at 18 ¶¶ 20-24.) On February 25, the following day, pursuant to that 19 decision officers attempted to move Hernandez into M-Pod, but 20 Hernandez refused to be housed there for reasons he would not 21 explain. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-29.) Hernandez was then reassigned to G22 Pod, another medium-security housing unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 30-31.) 23 Beaver testified that in the following days before 24 March 7, Hernandez did not threaten him or other inmates and was 25 not involved in any physical altercations. (Id. at ¶ 33.) [26] 2 Hernandez’s inmate records also indicated that he had 27 reported having bipolar disorder, experiencing mood swings, and a desire to speak to a mental health professional. (Id. at ¶¶ 1128 14; Pls.’ Ex. B at 6, 55 (Docket No. 38-1).) 1 However, Beaver and Stilwell believed that Hernandez had issues 2 with his mental health, and on one occasion Stilwell heard 3 Hernandez muttering to himself about hurting people; Stilwell 4 testified that he believed he alerted a correctional officer to 5 this, though he could not recall whom or when. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33, 6 35-36; Stilwell Depo. at 41:9-14 (Docket No. 38-3).) Prior to 7 March 7, 2019, defendants Perez, Wahlberg, and Behlke all either 8 had not encountered Hernandez or had not experienced any 9 incidents with him, and two other correctional officers have 10 given similar testimony. (Resp. at ¶¶ 39-43.) The only item in 11 Hernandez’s classification file documenting disobedience or other 12 misbehavior was regarding his refusal to remain in M-Pod on 13 February 25. (Id. at ¶ 38.) 14 During the early morning hours of March 7, 2019, Perez 15 was on duty at the observation and control tower for the floor 16 that included G-Pod. (Id. at ¶ 44.) At approximately 2:55:22 17 a.m., Perez saw Hernandez in G-Pod’s day room walking toward the 18 bunk area. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-47.) Perez testified that the policy 19 after lights-out allows inmates to be in the day room until 11:30 20 p.m., and that ordinarily, if Perez saw an inmate “just walking 21 around” or loitering in the day room after that time, Perez would 22 instruct him via intercom to return to his bunk. (Id. at ¶¶ 4823 50.) Perez also testified that it was common for inmates to go 24 into the day room throughout the night to retrieve possessions 25 they had left there. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Perez did not say anything 26 to Hernandez via the intercom on this occasion. (Perez Depo. at 27 20:10-12 (Docket No. 38-5 at 5).) 28 When Perez saw Hernandez, Perez was observing G-Pod 1 through the glass window in the observation tower, rather than 2 via a video feed accessible on a monitor in the tower. (Resp. at 3 ¶¶ 52-53.) Perez could have activated the video feed, which 4 would have required him to look away from Hernandez and navigate 5 through three or four menus on a control panel, but he did not. 6 (Id. at ¶¶ 53-54.) Perez’s direct view of G-Pod was darker than 7 it appeared on the video feed, and Perez did not see anything in 8 Hernandez’s hand as he walked toward the bunks. (Id. at ¶¶ 559 56.) Perez lost sight of Hernandez as Hernandez entered the bunk 10 area, which was darker than the day room, and next noticed a 11 “scuffling of individuals” among the bunks. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-58.)3 12 Within a few seconds Perez reported a physical 13 altercation in G-Pod via radio, and the lights soon turned on in 14 the unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-60.) Within around 30 seconds of 15 Perez’s call, correctional officers began entering G-Pod; eight 16 officers responded in total, including Behlke and Walberg. (Id. 17 at ¶¶ 61, 66-67.) Officers observed Stilwell on the ground, 18 bleeding, and Beaver on his bunk holding a sheet to his face, 19 which was also bleeding. (Id. at ¶¶ 68-69.) Beaver and Stilwell 20 stated that Hernandez had assaulted them, and Hernandez was 21 quickly restrained; video later revealed that Hernandez had 22 beaten plaintiffs with a broom head and using his fist. (Id. at 23 ¶¶ 68-70, 73.) Nurses assessed plaintiffs’ injuries within a few [24] 3 Although Perez temporarily lost sight of Hernandez, he [25] testified that he did not turn his attention away from G-Pod until after the incident concluded. (Id. at ¶ 65.) Prior to [26] observing Hernandez walking toward the bunks, Perez had been 27 reviewing a piece of outgoing inmate mail, a regular part of his night shift duties that he performed while intermittently looking 28 up to monitor the housing units. (Id. at ¶¶ 62-64.) 1 minutes and had plaintiffs sent to a hospital for treatment. 2 (Id. at ¶ 71.) Hernandez was handcuffed and taken to an 3 interview room. (Id. at ¶ 75.) 4 In March of 2019, the Butte County Sheriff’s Office was 5 party to a stipulated consent decree setting forth procedures to 6 avoid overcrowding in the jail, including by requiring the jail 7 to maintain an Own Recognizance Program through which it followed 8 detailed guidelines in determining the order in which to release 9 inmates. (Id. at ¶¶ 91-96.) The consent decree requires that 10 both the overall jail population and each housing unit not exceed 11 maximum capacity at any time. (Id. at ¶ 99.) It further 12 requires that each inmate be provided a bed “in the appropriate 13 classification.” (Id. at ¶ 98.) It allows the Sheriff to re14 house inmates, to avoid having to release others because of unit 15 population limits, “so long as any inmate so re-housed i[s] 16 placed in a housing unit consistent with said inmate’s 17 classification.” (Id. at ¶¶ 98-100.) 18 In 2015, Sheriff Honea submitted a letter to the Butte 19 County Board of Supervisors requesting funding for a new jail, 20 stating in part: 21 The jail currently has an inmate population in which nearly half the detainees (48.4%) require high22 security housing. The jail, however, currently only contains 31 cells which can accommodate this inmate 23 population. The other housing in the facility includes double-occupancy cells and dormitory 24 beds/bunks. Only 18.5% (111) of inmates are classified as requiring minimum security dormitory 25 housing beds. In contrast, the jail is configured with 421 dormitory-style beds which account for 68.6% 26 of available housing. This stark difference in inmate security classifications compared to the type of 27 custody beds contained in the jail not only complicates classification decisions, but places the 28 safety of inmates, staff, and visitors at higher risk. 1 (Pls.’ Ex. A at 6-7 (Docket No. 38).) 2 II. Legal Standard 3 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 4 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 5 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 56 (a). A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome 7 of the suit under the governing law,” and a genuine issue is one 8 that could permit a reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict 9 in the non-moving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 10 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the 11 initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 12 material fact and may satisfy this burden by presenting evidence 13 that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s 14 case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 322-23 15 (1986). Alternatively, the movant may demonstrate that the non16 moving party cannot provide evidence to support an essential 17 element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at 18 trial. Id. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to 19 set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue 20 for trial. See id. at 324 . Any inferences drawn from the 21 underlying facts must, however, be viewed in the light most 22 favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. 23 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 24 III. Discussion 25 In the operative complaint, plaintiffs assert five 26 claims against defendants: (1) negligent supervision, training, 27 hiring, and retention against the County and Sheriff Honea; 28 (2) municipal liability against the County, Honea, and the 1 Sheriff’s Office; (3) deliberate indifference against Perez, 2 Walberg, and Behlke; (4) denial of adequate medical care4; and 3 (5) negligence against all County defendants. (SAC at ¶¶ 21-41.) 4 The court will begin with plaintiffs’ federal claims. 5 A. Federal Claims Against Individual Officers 6 In response to plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference 7 claim, defendants Perez, Walberg, and Behlke assert the defense 8 of qualified immunity. (Mot. at 23-24.) In actions under 42 9 U.S.C. § 1983 , the defense of qualified immunity “protects 10 government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as 11 their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 12 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 13 known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 14 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “In 15 determining whether a state official is entitled to qualified 16 immunity in the context of summary judgment, [courts] consider 17 (1) whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 18 the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a 19 constitutional right and (2) whether that right was ‘clearly 20 established at the time of the violation.’” Sandoval v. Cnty. of 21 San Diego, 985 F.3d 657 , 671 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). 22 The court has discretion to decide which prong to 23 address first and, if analysis of one proves dispositive, the [24] 4 Because this claim primarily challenged acts and [25] omissions by Wellpath, LLC and California Forensic Medical Group, which have been dismissed as defendants from this case, [26] plaintiffs do not oppose summary judgment as to this claim. (See 27 Opp. at 17 (Docket No. 37).) The court will therefore grant summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ claim for denial 28 of medical care. 1 court need not analyze the other. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 . 2 Here, the court will exercise its discretion to analyze the 3 second prong first: whether defendants’ conduct violated a 4 clearly established constitutional right. 5 1. Clearly Established Right 6 “A right is clearly established when it is 7 ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 8 understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Rivas9 Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 , 7 (2021) (quoting Mullenix 10 v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 , 11 (2015)). When determining whether a 11 right is clearly established, the court may not “define clearly 12 established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. 13 Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al14 Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Rather, “[t]his inquiry ‘must 15 be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not 16 as a broad general proposition.’” Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 17 8 (citation omitted); see White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 , 552 18 (2017) (“[T]he clearly established law at issue must be 19 particularized to the facts of the case.”). 20 The Eighth Amendment provides a right for incarcerated 21 individuals to be protected from violence at the hands of other 22 inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). The 23 Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides an analogous 24 right for pretrial detainees, given that they have not been 25 convicted of a crime and therefore do not fall within the ambit 26 of Eighth Amendment protections. See Castro v. Cnty. of Los 27 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 28 In opposing qualified immunity, plaintiffs argue that, 1 under Farmer and Castro, they “had a right to be safe and secure 2 pursuant to the Eighth Amendment” and that the 3 unconstitutionality of the Perez’s, Walberg’s, and Behlke’s 4 conduct was thus clearly established. (Opp. at 18 (Docket No. 5 37).) However, in so doing they seek to “define clearly 6 established law at a high level of generality,” rather than “in 7 light of the specific context of the case,” which the Supreme 8 Court has repeatedly directed courts not to do. Kisela, 138 S. 9 Ct. at 1152; Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 8. Rather, for 10 qualified immunity to be overcome, existing case law must have 11 identified a constitutional violation in circumstances 12 sufficiently similar to those in this case that defendants here 13 would have been on notice that their conduct was unlawful. 14 Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 674. Plaintiffs have not shown this is the 15 case. 16 At oral argument, when asked which prior court 17 decisions would have best put defendants on notice that their 18 conduct was unconstitutional, counsel for plaintiffs pointed to 19 Farmer. There, the plaintiff, a transgender woman, was placed in 20 the general population of a penitentiary for male prisoners. 21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829-30 . The Court noted that “penitentiaries 22 are typically higher security facilities that house more 23 troublesome prisoners than federal correctional institutes.” Id. 24 at 830. Within two weeks, the plaintiff was beaten and raped by 25 another inmate in her cell. Id. She brought a claim against 26 various federal prison officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown 27 Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging the 28 defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm she 1 would face based on their knowledge “that the penitentiary had a 2 violent environment and a history of inmate assaults” and that 3 plaintiff, “who ‘project[ed] feminine characteristics,’ would be 4 particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by [other] inmates.” 5 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831 . 6 In Farmer, the Court merely clarified the meaning of 7 “deliberate indifference” in the Eighth Amendment context and 8 remanded for further proceedings in light of that clarification; 9 it did not hold that defendants’ conduct in fact amounted to a 10 constitutional violation. See id. at 832-49 . Even if it had, 11 because of the significant differences between Farmer and this 12 case, Farmer could not have put defendants here on notice that 13 their conduct was unconstitutional. Specifically, plaintiffs 14 here have not pointed to a noteworthy history of violent assaults 15 within the jail’s medium-security housing or argued that they had 16 characteristics that made them especially vulnerable to assault. 17 Accordingly, Farmer did not clearly establish the 18 unconstitutionality of defendants’ conduct in this case. 19 In Castro, the other case plaintiffs point to in 20 challenging qualified immunity, the plaintiff, who was highly 21 intoxicated, was placed in a sobering cell at a police station, 22 where a second, “combative” arrestee was then also placed. 23 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1065 . After the second arrestee entered the 24 cell, the plaintiff pounded on the window on the door for a full 25 minute to attract an officer’s attention, but none came even 26 though one was seated at a desk nearby. Id. at 1065, 1073 . 27 Twenty minutes later, an unpaid volunteer assigned to monitor the 28 cell noticed the second arrestee inappropriately touching the 1 plaintiff and reported it to an officer, who went to check on the 2 plaintiff six minutes later and found him severely beaten. Id. 3 at 1065. The court concluded that the defendants’ conduct was 4 objectively unreasonable given that the defendants knew the 5 plaintiff “was too intoxicated to care for himself,” knew the 6 second arrestee “was enraged and combative,” knew “the jail’s 7 policies forbade placing the two together in the same cell in 8 those circumstances,” failed to respond to the plaintiff pounding 9 on the cell door, and delegated safety checks to a volunteer. [10] Id. at 1073 . 11 Here, prior to the attack itself, the undisputed facts 12 show that neither Perez, Walberg, nor Behlke had received any 13 indication that Hernandez posed a threat to other inmates. 14 Although in their opposition plaintiffs emphasize that defendants 15 were aware that Hernandez had “mental issues” and had asked to be 16 placed on suicide prevention protocol, at most this would have 17 suggested that he was a danger to himself, rather than to others. 18 Nor do the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable 19 to plaintiffs, indicate that these defendants failed to quickly 20 respond once the existence of a threat to plaintiffs became 21 apparent: Perez radioed for help within seconds of seeing signs 22 of a conflict, and Walberg and Behlke arrived within thirty to 23 sixty seconds of Perez’s call. And although plaintiffs argue 24 that Perez failed to adequately monitor them by virtue of the 25 fact that he was reviewing inmate mail while on watch duty, 26 Perez’s deposition testimony shows that he was in fact watching 27 Hernandez during the leadup to the encounter. These facts stand 28 in contrast to Castro, where law enforcement officials neglected 1 to check on the plaintiff for at least twenty minutes, were 2 oblivious to his clear attempts to get their attention, and had 3 delegated responsibility for monitoring him to a volunteer. 4 In sum, these circumstances are not sufficiently 5 similar to those in Castro for that decision to have put 6 defendants on notice that their conduct violated plaintiffs’ 7 constitutional rights in this case. Nor has this court been able 8 to identify any other Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent 9 finding a constitutional violation in circumstances closer to 10 these. Accordingly, the unconstitutionality of the individual 11 defendants’ conduct was not clearly established, meaning they are 12 entitled to qualified immunity. The motion for summary judgment 13 will therefore be granted as to plaintiffs’ claims for deliberate 14 indifference against defendants Perez, Walberg, and Behlke. 15 B. Municipal Liability 16 Plaintiffs allege that the County, the Sheriff’s 17 Office, and Honea “had a policy and practice of neglecting inmate 18 health and safety, by allowing the inmates all to be herded into 19 a single space indiscriminately, as though they were cattle, 20 without any consideration as to the level of danger posed by the 21 mental health conditions of any of the inmates.” (SAC at ¶ 26.) 22 In their opposition, they explain that the policy is elucidated 23 by Honea’s 2015 letter to the Board of Supervisors, in which he 24 stated that a lack of sufficient housing at the jail to house all 25 prisoners in accordance with their security classifications 26 “complicates classification decisions” and “places the safety of 27 inmates . . . at higher risk.” (Opp. at 12, 19-20.) In other 28 words, they argue that the jail’s policy of adhering to the 1 consent decree under these circumstances, thereby preventing it 2 from “provid[ing] housing accommodations . . . appropriate for 3 each individual inmate with known physical and/or mental 4 conditions,” led to the attack plaintiffs experienced. (See id.) 5 To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a 6 plaintiff must allege “(1) that he possessed a constitutional 7 right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 8 policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ 9 to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy 10 is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” 11 Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 12 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 , 389-91 13 (1989)). “‘Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where -- 14 and only where -- a deliberate choice to follow a course of 15 action is made from among various alternatives’ by [municipal] 16 policymakers.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (quoting Pembaur v. City 17 of Cincinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 18 The “first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under 19 § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link 20 between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged 21 constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 385. 22 As an initial matter, to the extent plaintiffs’ claim 23 posits that defendants’ adherence to an enforceable consent 24 decree itself constitutes an unlawful policy, plaintiffs do not 25 explain how such adherence constitutes “a deliberate choice . . . 26 from among various alternatives,” given that defendants are 27 legally bound to abide by the consent decree’s terms. Id. at 28 389. It is not apparent, nor do plaintiffs suggest, what 1 “alternatives” to adherence in fact exist. 2 Plaintiffs relatedly argue that, pursuant to this 3 policy, defendants routinely place inmates in housing of a 4 different security class than that for which they have been 5 classified. (See Opp. at 12, 19-20.) However, even assuming the 6 evidence supports the existence of such a practice, plaintiffs 7 fail to demonstrate how it in fact caused them to be attacked by 8 Hernandez. Pursuant to the jail’s inmate classification 9 procedures, upon admission Hernandez was classified as requiring 10 medium-security housing. Plaintiffs had been likewise 11 classified, and G-Pod -- the housing unit into which plaintiffs 12 and Hernandez had all been assigned -- was a medium-security 13 housing unit. (Resp. at ¶ 3.) There is therefore no showing 14 that Hernandez was placed in a housing unit of a lower security 15 level than his classification called for, as would be necessary 16 to show that defendants’ decisions regarding his placement 17 conformed to the alleged unconstitutional policy. It cannot be 18 the case that a policy of placing inmates in lower-security 19 housing than their classifications called for caused plaintiffs’ 20 injuries where such a policy was not actually carried out in 21 Hernandez’s case. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 . 22 Further, insofar as plaintiffs argue the alleged policy 23 entailed a failure to place inmates identified as having mental 24 health issues posing a risk to others in segregated housing, (see 25 Opp. at 20 (contending that the jail had “no room . . . to 26 accommodate someone like Antonio Hernandez who they knew had 27 mental health issues” and that he “c[ould] not be accommodated 28 for his special needs”)), they have not shown that Hernandez was 1 so identified or that the jail’s screening measures were 2 inadequate. The undisputed evidence shows that Hernandez 3 reported to jail staff that he wished to be put on suicide watch 4 and that this was promptly done, resulting in him being placed in 5 protective custody for two weeks, where he received frequent 6 mental health assessments and weekly classification reviews. 7 Plaintiffs identify no deficiency in these procedures that, if 8 corrected, would have demonstrated to jail officials that 9 Hernandez posed a threat to other inmates and that medium10 security housing was no longer suitable for him.5 11 Finally, plaintiffs note that Honea’s 2015 letter to 12 the Board of Supervisors suggests that, because of insufficient 13 cells specifically designed to serve as “high-security housing,” 14 many inmates who fall into this category are instead assigned to 15 more abundant dormitory-style beds, which the letter indicates 16 are designed to accommodate inmates classified as requiring 17 minimum-security housing. (See Opp. at 19-20.) However, the [18] 19 5 Although plaintiffs emphasize that Hernandez was temporarily placed in an interview room, rather than in 20 administrative segregation, after he refused to be housed in MPod, they do not show that Hernandez would have been housed in [21] administrative segregation on the day of the attack but for this 22 lack of space. Nor do they show that any systemic failure of the jail’s mental health evaluation process led it to erroneously 23 conclude that administrative segregation was not required in Hernandez’s case. 24 Further, even if Stilwell reported that Hernandez was muttering statements to himself suggesting he wanted to hurt [25] others -- Stilwell testified that he believed he reported this to jail officials, though he could not remember who (Stilwell Depo. [26] at 41:9-14) -- this alone is insufficient to create a triable 27 issue of fact as to whether the jail had mental health evaluation policies evincing deliberate indifference to the risk mentally 28 unwell inmates posed to others. 1 letter does not indicate whether dormitory housing beds are 2 likewise suitable for medium-security housing, or whether that 3 level of security requires some other type of housing 4 arrangement. Accordingly, it is not clear that medium-security 5 inmates have, as a matter of jail policy, been placed in 6 insufficiently secure housing. 7 More importantly, even assuming the jail’s housing 8 practices and conformity with the consent decree could have 9 caused medium-security inmates to be placed in insufficiently 10 restrictive minimum-security housing, the undisputed evidence 11 does not present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 12 this practice “amounts to deliberate indifference” to safety 13 risks it presents. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 . Honea’s letter 14 itself demonstrates that he actively petitioned the legislature 15 for a new facility that would remedy the housing insufficiencies 16 he identified, (see Opp. at 20 (describing Honea as “sounding the 17 alarm” by submitting the letter)), and the fact that he was 18 apparently unsuccessful does not mean his consequent reliance on 19 the existing facility constituted deliberate indifference. See 20 Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (municipal liability requires a 21 “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from among 22 various alternatives”); cf. also Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 23 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (in § 1983 actions 24 seeking damages, courts consider lack of resources available to 25 defendants in evaluating whether practices or decisions 26 demonstrate deliberate indifference, given that whether 27 officials’ conduct may be so characterized “depends on the 28 constraints facing [them]”) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 1 294, 302 (1991)). 2 For the foregoing reasons, viewing the evidence in the 3 light most favorable to plaintiffs, plaintiffs have failed to 4 present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 5 County, the Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Honea maintained an 6 unconstitutional policy or custom that caused plaintiffs’ 7 injuries. Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment to 8 defendants on this claim. 9 C. Negligence Claims 10 Because the court will grant summary judgment for 11 defendants on plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court no longer has 12 federal question jurisdiction, and there is no suggestion that 13 there is diversity jurisdiction in this case. Federal courts 14 have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 15 related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 16 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 17 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). A 18 district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 19 . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which 20 it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c). 21 In determining whether to retain jurisdiction over 22 state law claims when all federal claims have been eliminated 23 before trial, courts balance factors of judicial economy, 24 convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 25 Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 , 350 n.7 (1988). Here, these factors weigh 26 in favor of retention inasmuch as this case has now been pending 27 in this court for over two years, and the court has already 28 adjudicated prior motions. Accordingly, to remand the remaining 1 claims to state court would be a poor use of judicial resources 2 and inconvenient to the parties who have spent considerable time 3 litigating in this court. The court will therefore retain 4 jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims. 5 In those claims, plaintiffs have alleged negligence 6 against the County defendants, including against Honea and the 7 County under a theory of negligent supervision, training, hiring, 8 and retention. (SAC at ¶¶ 21-24, 36-41.) As defendants have 9 noted, however, and as discussed at oral argument, public 10 entities in California are not liable for injuries they or their 11 employees cause, whether through acts or omissions, except as 12 otherwise provided by statute. Cal. Gov. Code § 815 . “[D]irect 13 tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific 14 statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some 15 specific duty of care . . . .” Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. 16 Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1183 (2003). “Otherwise, the general 17 rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by 18 the routine application of general tort principles.” Id. 19 (citations omitted). Because neither plaintiffs nor the court 20 have identified a California statute providing for liability 21 against the County or the Sheriff’s Office under these 22 circumstances, summary judgment will be granted for these 23 defendants on plaintiffs’ negligence claims. 24 On the other hand, defendants have identified no 25 statutory basis on which to bar plaintiffs’ negligence claims as 26 against the individual defendants. Whether a defendant is 27 negligent under California law is ordinarily a question of fact. 28 Peri v. L.A. Junction Ry., 22 Cal. 2d 111, 120 (1943); Huang v. ene ne non nn nn nn nnn nnn ne on nO ND 1 The Bicycle Casino, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 5th 329, 344 (2d Dist. 2 2016) (breach of duty and causation are issues for trier of fact) 3 (citations omitted); Nichols v. Keller, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1672 , 4 1687 (Sth Dist. 1993) (“Like breach of duty, causation also is 5 ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary 6 judgment.”). Here, as the court explained at oral argument, 7 | plaintiffs’ claims for negligence against the individual 8 defendants are highly fact-bound, making adjudication of those 9 | claims inappropriate on summary judgment. Given the factual 10 issues present in this case, summary judgment on these claims 11 | will be denied. 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 13 summary judgment (Docket No. 29-1) be, and the same hereby is, 14 GRANTED on plaintiffs’ federal claims under § 1983. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion be, and 16 the same hereby is, GRANTED on plaintiffs’ claims for negligence 17 as against defendants Butte County and Butte County Sheriff’s 18 | Office, and DENIED in all other respects.® 19 | Dated: April 21, 2022 A . ak. 20 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE [25] 26 6s Because the court does not rely on the contents of the 27 documents attached to defendants’ request for judicial notice (Docket No. 29-25) in deciding this motion, the request is DENIED 28 | AS MOOT.