(PC) Nieto v. Gordon

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JOHN M. NIETO, Case No. 1:20-cv-00291-JLT-CDB (PC) Plaintiff, 12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 13 WARDEN GORDON, et al., FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 Defendants. (Doc. 47) [15] FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE [16] 17 Plaintiff John M. Nieto, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed 18 this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Defendants York, Diaz-Navarro, Marchese, 19 James, Gonzalez, Rivero, Vera, Baeza, and Vargas have filed a motion for summary judgment 20 (Doc. 52), to which Plaintiff filed no opposition despite two orders of the Court directing 21 Plaintiff to file a response (Docs. 56, 60. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that 22 summary judgment be granted in Defendants’ favor. 23 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 24 This matter proceeds on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) on the following 25 claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Correctional Officers (“COs”) 26 York, Diaz-Navarro, Marchese, James, Gonzalez, Rivero, Rodriguez, Vera, Analis,1 and Baeza; [28] 1 (2) an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against COs Vargas and Reyes2; and (3) an 2 Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against James. (Docs. 12, 15, 17.) 3 On June 8, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”) arguing that 4 Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies; there are no genuine issues of material fact 5 and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; the excessive force and failure to protect 6 claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and Defendants are entitled to 7 qualified immunity. (Doc. 52.) Defendants provided the appropriate warning under Rand v. 8 Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 , 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), advising Plaintiff of the requirements 9 of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 260. (Doc. 52-22.). 10 On July 21, 2022, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the MSJ within 30 days with 11 the filing of an opposition or statement of non-opposition. (Doc. 56). Instead, on August 11, 12 2022, Plaintiff filed a document titled, “TO RESPONSE ON (GSA) MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 ALSO TO WHOM THE COURT CONCERNS.” (Doc. 59.) The pleading is incomprehensible. 14 Construing the pleading liberally, Plaintiff indicates that he filed a 602 complaint and exhausted 15 administrative remedies. (Id. at 1.) He alleges his legal mail was intentionally trashed or lost, and 16 files on his computer, including his medical files that recorded years of abuse, were “erazed 17 [sic].” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also appears to allege that he was involuntarily injected with vaccines. 18 (Id.) 19 The Court did not construe Plaintiff’s filing as a response to the MSJ. On August 18, 20 2022, the Court entered a second order directing Plaintiff to file, within thirty days, a response in 21 opposition or a notice of non-opposition to the MSJ in accordance with Local Rule 260(b). (Doc. 22 60.) The Court advised: “If Plaintiff fails to comply, the Court will issue findings and 23 recommendations determining the motion without further notice to or input from Plaintiff.” (Id. 24 at 2.) After Plaintiff failed to file a response as ordered, on September 19, 2022, Defendants filed 25 a notice of Plaintiff’s failure to oppose their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 61.) 26 Thereafter, Plaintiff filed three notices of change of address. (Docs. 62, 64, 65.) None of 27 the Court’s filings were returned as undeliverable. Accordingly, the Court presumes that Plaintiff [28] 1 received Defendants’ MSJ and orders directing him to respond to the motion, and Plaintiff has 2 elected not to oppose entry of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. 3 I. LEGAL STANDARDS 4 A. Summary Judgment 5 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 6 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue 8 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 322–23 (1986). The moving party may 9 accomplish this by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving 10 party’s case. Id. Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot 11 produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim that must be proven at trial. Id.; 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 13 non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 14 322–23. 15 If the moving party meets this initial showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party 16 to establish “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., [17] 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The non-moving party cannot simply rely on the pleadings and 18 conclusory allegations in an affidavit. Lujan v. Nat’1 Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); 19 see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 . “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 20 trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. 21 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, when deciding a motion 22 for summary judgment, the court must view any inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a 23 light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 24 The Ninth Circuit has “held consistently that courts should construe liberally motion 25 papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules 26 strictly.” Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thomas v. Ponder, 611 27 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)). While prisoners are relieved from strict compliance, they still 28 must “identify or submit some competent evidence” to support their claims. Id. Plaintiff’s 1 verified complaint may serve as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if based on 2 personal knowledge and specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 3 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 5 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought 6 with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ], or any other Federal law, by a 7 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 8 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative 9 remedies is mandatory, and “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 10 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in 11 accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to 12 bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion 13 requirement applies to all inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 , 532 14 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, 15 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 16 The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which means that “the prisoner must complete 17 the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including 18 deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88, 93 . The 19 rules that must be followed, in other words, “are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison 20 grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to 21 comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system . . . , but it is the prison’s 22 requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. The 23 exhaustion requirement allows prison officials to have an opportunity to resolve disputes before 24 the filing of a court action against them. Id. at 204. 25 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that the 26 defendant must plead and prove. Id. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of producing 27 evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; summary judgment is appropriate only if the 28 undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff failed 1 to exhaust. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). On a motion for summary 2 judgment, the defendant bears the initial burden of proving (1) the existence of an available 3 administrative remedy, and (2) the plaintiff failed to exhaust that remedy. Id. at 1172 . If the 4 defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the prisoner to present evidence showing 5 “that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 6 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. (citation omitted). A prisoner may 7 not file a complaint raising non-exhausted claims. Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th 8 Cir. 2010). 9 The ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the defendant. Albino, 747 F.3d at 10 1172. “If a motion for summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to 11 exhaustion should be decided by the judge.” Id. at 1170 . If the court finds that remedies were not 12 available, the prisoner exhausted available remedies, or the failure to exhaust available remedies 13 should be excused, the case proceeds to the merits. Id. at 1131. 14 C. CDCR Grievance Process 15 Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants have met their initial burden of showing that an 16 available administrative remedy exists. The California Department of Corrections and 17 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has an administrative grievance system for prisoners to appeal a 18 policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or staff having an adverse 19 effect on prisoner health, safety, or welfare. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1 (a) (2017). 3 20 Compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires California state prisoners to utilize CDCR’s 21 grievance process to exhaust their claims prior to filing a lawsuit in court. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, [22] 623 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 8586 . 23 From 2018 to 2020, the years relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, California regulations 24 required that inmates pursue administrative grievances through three levels of review in order to 25 exhaust their administrative remedies. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1 (b) (2018), 3084.7(d)(3) 26 (2018) (repealed June 1, 2020). To exhaust properly, the prisoner must submit to the appeals [27] 3 Effective June 1, 2020, the new rules are set out in Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3480–3486. For [28] purposes of these findings and recommendations, all citations refer to the version of the regulations 1 coordinator a CDCR form 602 (“602”), inmate appeal, describing the specific issue under appeal 2 and the relief requested, and supporting documents. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2 (a), 3 3084.3. The first appeal is screened for routine processing. Id. §§ 3084.4(b)(1). Appeals alleging 4 staff misconduct constitute an exception to the regular appeal process. Id. § 3084.9(i). If an 5 appeal is accepted as a staff complaint, the first level of review is bypassed. Id. § 3084.7(a)(3). If 6 the prisoner is dissatisfied with the departmental response, then he may seek a second level of 7 administrative review. Id. § 3084.7(b). If the matter is not resolved at the second level, then he 8 may seek a third level of review. Id. § 3084.7(c). “The third level of review exhausts 9 administrative remedies.” Id. § 3084.7(d)(3). 10 II. UNDERLYING FACTS 11 A. Introduction 12 In accordance with Local Rule 260(a), Defendants submitted a statement of undisputed 13 facts in support of their MSJ. (Doc. 52-2.) Plaintiff failed to file a response in opposition to 14 Defendants’ motion; reproduce Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts (“SUF”) and deny 15 those that are disputed; or file a statement of disputed facts. See L.R. 260(b); see also Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 56(c). Because Plaintiff failed to address Defendants’ assertions of fact properly, the 17 Court considers the Defendant’s version of the facts undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). 18 The following summary of facts are derived from Defendants’ statement of disputed facts, which 19 are supported by declarations of witnesses.4 20 B. Statement of Undisputed Facts 21 On the date of the incident at issue, January 29, 2018, Plaintiff was incarcerated at 22 California State Prison-Corcoran (“Corcoran”). On November 16, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred 23 to California State Prison-Sacramento (“Sacramento”), where he is currently housed. 24 On January 29, 2018, York was providing coverage outside of the 3B Clinic when 25 Plaintiff suddenly and without warning approached York and began punching him. York used his 26 arms to protect his face, then York grabbed Plaintiff’s shoulders and pushed Plaintiff away from [27] 28 4 For simplicity’s sake, the Court will cite to the relevant paragraphs of the SUF, without 1 him, causing Plaintiff to strike a fence. Plaintiff returned and ran toward York, who kicked 2 Plaintiff away. When Plaintiff returned and continued to strike York, Yorker grabbed Plaintiff 3 and forced him toward the clinic door. Other staff arrived to assist. 4 York was bleeding from his neck and was transported to the Correctional Treatment 5 Center (“CTC”) for treatment. Given the severity of his injuries, Plaintiff was then transported to 6 Adventist Medical Center in Hanford, California. Plaintiff had stabbed York in the neck, chin, 7 and right hand with an “inmate manufactured weapon.”5 York also sustained injury to the left knee. 8 COs Navarro-Diaz witnessed the attack on York and ordered Plaintiff to get down. 9 Navarro-Diaz used a baton to strike Plaintiff twice in the thigh. Plaintiff then attacked Navarro10 Diaz by punching him on both sides of the head. After Navarro-Diaz fell to the ground, he was 11 transported to CTC for further medical evaluation. Medical staff at CTC determined that he 12 required further medical treatment from an outside hospital, and Navarro-Diaz was also 13 transported to Adventist Medical Center. 14 CO Baeza also responded and was able to force Plaintiff to the ground, but Plaintiff 15 resisted and struck Baeza in the chest and ribs with his elbow. CO DaLuz deployed a burst of 16 pepper spray, and Baeza gained control of Plaintiff’s upper body. Baeza did not receive 17 immediate medical attention, but he later went to an outside hospital for treatment. He suffered 18 fractured ribs from Plaintiff’s assault, and he required seven months of physical therapy. 19 Lieutenant Gonzalez responded to the scene and witnessed Plaintiff’s attack on Navarro20 Diaz and the pepper spray blast. When Plaintiff fell to the floor, Gonzalez was able to force 21 Plaintiff’s legs together and maintain control of him. CO Marchese arrived at the scene and 22 placed a spit mask over Plaintiff’s head and applied restraints on Plaintiff’s ankles without 23 incident. COs Vera and Tapia escorted Plaintiff to the gym and placed him in the holding cell, 24 also without incident. 25 CO Vargas and Licensed Vocational Nurse James were not involved in the incident. 26 Lieutenant Rivero, the Incident Commander, ensured that injured staff were treated and [27] 5 There were two inmate manufactured weapons recovered from the scene. They each consisted [28] of two metal rods, four to five inches in length, sharpened to a point and held together with rubber bands 1 decontaminated. He went to the holding cell to follow up on Plaintiff. Rivero reviewed Plaintiff’s 2 medical evaluation, which noted Plaintiff had no serious bodily injury and had been 3 decontaminated with a fan. Rivero was not involved in the incident. 4 Plaintiff was subdued, placed in a holding cell, and decontaminated for exposure to 5 pepper spray. He then was medically evaluated by Medical Technical Assistant Shew, who noted 6 Plaintiff was decontaminated from his exposure to pepper spray and had an active nosebleed and 7 abrasions/scratches to the top of the head and both knees. A few days later, Plaintiff complained 8 of rib pain, and chest x-rays revealed that he had fractured two ribs from the incident. 9 On January 30, 2018, Plaintiff was charged with a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for 10 attempted homicide of a peace officer. At the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty and 11 lost 360 days of good time credit. 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 A. Non-exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 14 Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to 15 him. In support, Defendants submit the declarations of B. Hendricks, Grievance Coordinator at 16 Sacramento, (Doc. 52-5); J. Mendez, Correctional Counselor II and Appeals Coordinator at 17 Corcoran, (Doc. 52-9); Howard E. Moseley, Associate Director of the Office of Appeals 18 (“OOA”) (Doc. 52-11). Exhibits attached to their declarations include Plaintiff’s grievances, 19 CDCR decisions, and search results of Plaintiff’s grievance appeals history. (Docs. 52-6, 52-10, 20 52-12.) 21 From the time of the incident on January 29, 2018, to the time Plaintiff filed his FAC on 22 June 18, 2020, Plaintiff submitted four inmate appeals at Sacramento. (SUF ¶ 92.) They were all 23 rejected, cancelled, or forwarded to Corcoran. (SUF ¶ 97.) During the same period, Plaintiff filed 24 eight inmate appeals at Corcoran. (SUF ¶ 98.) Each of these Corcoran appeals were rejected, 25 cancelled or forwarded to the relevant institution. (SUF ¶¶ 99-107.) In 2019, Plaintiff submitted 26 to the OOA two appeals regarding excessive force and suffocation relating to an event on 27 January 29, 2018, but they were both screened out because Plaintiff bypassed the lower levels of 28 review. (SUF ¶¶ 108-11.) The OOA received no other appeals by Plaintiff from January 29, 1 2018, to February 1, 2022. (SUF ¶ 112.) Plaintiff’s inmate appeals history indicates that he did 2 not exhaust administrative remedies for any of the grievances or appeals he filed from the date of 3 the underlying incident on January 29, 2018, and June 18, 2020, the date of filing of the FAC, 4 the operative complaint. 5 Defendants have met their burden to prove the existence of an available administrative 6 remedy and the failure of Plaintiff to exhaust that remedy. Plaintiff has not opposed the MSJ or 7 demonstrating the unavailability of the remedies. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary 8 judgment, (Doc. 52), could be granted for non-exhaustion of remedies and the case dismissed 9 without prejudice. However, as set forth below, the Court finds that the undisputed facts and 10 evidence prove Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and are entitled 11 to judgment as a matter of law. The Court recommends that the MSJ be granted on this basis. 12 B. Excessive Force 13 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 14 Const. amend. VIII. “It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the 15 conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” 16 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” 17 on prisoners “constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 , 319 18 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Being violently assaulted in prison is 19 simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” 20 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 21 A correctional officer engages in excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment if 22 he (1) uses excessive and unnecessary force under all the circumstances, and (2) “harms an 23 inmate for the very purpose of causing harm,” and not “as part of a good-faith effort to maintain 24 security.” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, “whenever prison 25 officials stand accused of using excessive physical force . . . the core judicial inquiry is . . . 26 whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 27 and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 , 6–7 (1992). In making this 28 determination, courts may consider “the need for application of force, the relationship between 1 that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible 2 officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. at 7 . 3 While a correctional officer may not use excessive force, officers may use some measure 4 of force if an inmate refuses a valid order. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 ; LeMarie v. Maass, 12 F.3d 5 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993). The appropriateness of the use of force is determined by the facts and 6 circumstances of each particular case. Michenfleder v. Summer, 860 F.2d 328, 335 (9th Cir. 7 1988). 8 In this instance, the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff attacked York, Navarro-Diaz, 9 and Baeza using his fists and a sharp weapon; he refused to comply with orders and resisted the 10 COs’ efforts to restrain him; the COs used the appropriate amount of force to protect themselves 11 and gain control over Plaintiff; and the COs did not apply force maliciously and sadistically for 12 the purpose of causing harm, but instead made a good-faith effort to maintain institutional safety. 13 Under the circumstances of the case, the force used by York, Navarro-Diaz, Baeza, and Gonzales 14 was reasonable and did not amount to excessive force. Marchese used no force when he placed 15 the leg restraints on Plaintiff, and Vera used no force when he took Plaintiff to the holding cell in 16 the gym. Rivero had no contact with Plaintiff. Vargas and James had no involvement in the 17 incident. 18 These undisputed facts establish that no excessive force was used against Plaintiff, and 19 Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s first claim. 20 C. Failure to Protect 21 Plaintiff asserts a failure to protect claim against Vargas and Reyes. “[A] prison official 22 can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to intervene” in another official’s use 23 of excessive force. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995). In a “failure-to24 protect” claim, a prisoner must show that a prison official’s act or omission (1) was objectively, 25 sufficiently serious, and (2) the official was subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate’s 26 health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 ; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 27 2005). 28 Vargas did not witness the incident, and because no excessive force was used, he cannot 1 | be held liable for a failure to protect or intervene. 2 D. Medical Indifference 3 Plaintiff asserts a medical indifference claim against James. However, the undisputed 4 | facts establish James was not involved in the January 29, 2018, incident (SUF 9] 76-77) and, 5 | thus, cannot be held liable for medical indifference in this case. 6 | IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion for 8 | summary judgment (Doc. 47) be GRANTED in whole. 9 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 10 || Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within fourteen 11 | (4) days from the date of service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file 12 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 13 | captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are 14 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 15 | on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 16 | 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 'S | Dated: _March 22, 2023 | br Pr 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE