(PC) Evans v. Flores

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JAMAL EVANS, Case No. 1:22-cv-00170-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS CASE1 14 R. FLORES, JOSTRUNDEA, AND R. GODWIN, FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD [15] Defendants. (Doc. No. 10) [17] 18 Pending before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is Plaintiff’s First 19 Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 10, “FAC”). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 20 recommends that the district court dismiss the First Amended Complaint because it fails to state 21 any cognizable constitutional claim and any future attempts to amend appear futile. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 Plaintiff commenced this action while in prison and is subject to the Prison Litigation 24 Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen any complaint that seeks 25 relief against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon 26 any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the Court to identify any cognizable claims and [27] 1This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1)(B) and Eastern District of 28 California Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon 2 which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 3 such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 4 At the screening stage, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 5 construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 6 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 7 2003). A court does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or 8 unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 9 1981). Critical to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual 10 basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 11 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint include “a short and 12 plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 13 Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient 14 factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 15 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, [16] 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not 17 sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 . Although detailed factual allegations are not 19 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 20 statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required 21 to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 22 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 23 If an otherwise deficient pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, the pro 24 se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. 25 See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of 26 Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the Court to advise a pro se 27 litigant on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as 28 impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1 1131 n.13. 2 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING 3 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed his initial civil rights complaint under 42 4 U.S.C. § 1983 . (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). The Complaint alleged that Defendant Flores, a 5 correctional officer at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), lied in an incident report regarding a 6 riot that occurred at KVSP. (Id. at 3, 12-14). Flores mistakenly identified Plaintiff as one of the 7 inmates who was involved in the altercation, which resulted in Plaintiff being found guilty of a 8 rule violation report (“RVR”). (Id.). As a result, Plaintiff was denied a transfer closer to his 9 loved ones. (Id. at 3). The initial Complaint also appeared to allege a separate due process 10 violation based on the denial of Plaintiff’s transfer. (Id. at 4, 6). The Court screened the initial 11 Complaint and determined it failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim. (Doc. No. 9). The 12 Court appraised Plaintiff of the relevant law and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity, inter alia, to 13 file an amended complaint. (Id. at 6). 14 On June 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The incidents 15 giving rise to the FAC are the same as those giving rise to the initial Complaint. Indeed, the FAC 16 is almost identical to Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. The FAC repeats the allegation that Defendant 17 Flores wrongly identified Plaintiff as having participated in the riot and therefore submitted a 18 false incident report. (Doc. No. 10 at 2-4). As a result, Plaintiff suffered a RVR and was denied a 19 transfer to an “I.O.P. Program Level III Institution” closer to family and loved ones. (Id. at 3). 20 As relief, Plaintiff requests that his requested transfer be granted and his wrongly charged 21 RVR be dismissed. (Id. at 5). 22 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 23 A. No Claim Stated as to False RVR 24 The filing of a false disciplinary report by a prison official against a prisoner is not a per 25 se violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Muhammad v. Rubia, 2010 WL 1260425 , 26 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) (“[A] prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from 27 being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected 28 liberty interest. If a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 1 allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983.”) (internal citation omitted)), 2 aff’d 453 F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2011); Harper v. Costa, 2009 WL 1684599 , at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 3 June 16, 2009) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue in a published 4 opinion, district courts throughout California . . . have determined that a prisoner’s allegation that 5 prison officials issued a false disciplinary charge against him fails to state a cognizable claim for 6 relief under § 1983.”), aff’d 393 F. App’x 488 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Scott v. Johnson, 2022 7 WL 17082491 , at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8 425759 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2023), appeal dismissed sub nom. Scott v. Chau, No. 23-15420, 2023 9 WL 4105433 (9th Cir. June 2, 2023); Richardson v. Tuman, 2019 WL 669569 , at *6 (E.D. Cal. 10 Feb. 19, 2019); See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Lee v. Whitten, 2012 WL 11 4468420, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (only in cases where a sufficiently substantial liberty interest is at 12 stake must the court evaluate whether prison disciplinary process comported with minimum 13 procedural due process requirements). Thus, “the fact that a prisoner may have been innocent of 14 disciplinary charges brought against him and incorrectly held in administrative segregation does 15 not raise a due process issue. The Constitution demands due process, not error-free decision16 making.” Jones v. Woodward, 2015 WL 1014257 , *2 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Ricker v. Leapley, [17] 25 F.3d 1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994)). 18 There are only two ways for an inmate who alleges he has been subjected to a false 19 disciplinary report to state a cognizable civil rights claim: (1) when the prisoner alleges that the 20 false disciplinary report was filed in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutional right; and (2) 21 when the prisoner alleges that he or she was not afforded procedural due process in a proceeding 22 concerning a false report. Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts that the RVR was filed in 23 retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of a constitutional right or that he was not afforded a procedural 24 due process hearing on the RVR. Thus, even if the disciplinary report filed by Defendant Flores 25 charging Plaintiff with fighting was false, it does not state a standalone constitutional claim. 26 B. No Claim Stated as to Failure to Transfer 27 The FAC also asserts a constitutional violation based upon the failure to transfer Plaintiff 28 to a Level III facility. As an initial matter, the FAC does not specify which Defendants, if any, 1 were involved in decision not to transfer him. A complaint must plead sufficient factual detail to 2 allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 3 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . A court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 4 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624 . 5 While an inmate can state a claim concerning his transfer if the transfer was done for 6 unconstitutional reasons, such as retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, or for 7 religious, political, or racial discriminatory reasons, here the FAC fails to provide any such facts 8 as to the basis upon which Plaintiff believes he was wrongly denied a transfer to a Level III 9 facility. Liberally construed, the FAC attributes the denial of Plaintiff’s transfer to the RVR 10 finding that Plaintiff participated in a riot. Correctional officials’ reliance on a RVR is a 11 legitimate reason to deny Plaintiff a transfer and does not give rise to a constitutional claim. See 12 Sierra v. Thompson, 2021 WL 3864590 , at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2021), report and 13 recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4925393 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2021) (rejecting plaintiff’s 14 claim of retaliation to deny transfer and finding committee’s decision not to transfer plaintiff 15 based, in part, on RVR valid reason to deny transfer). 16 Indeed, as a rule, prisoners have no expectation they will remain in any facility during 17 their confinement, and prison officials have broad authority to transfer prisoners from one facility 18 to another. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1983); see also Meachum v. Fano, [19] 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). To the extent Plaintiff predicates his transfer claim on the basis that he 20 was improperly classified due to the RVR, it is well settled that prisoners have no constitutional 21 right to a particular classification status, even if the classification status results in a loss of 22 privileges. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 , 88 n. 9 (1976) (expressly rejecting claim that prisoner 23 classification and rehabilitative programs invoked due process protections); Hernandez v. 24 Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (agreeing that inmate had no constitutional right to 25 classification status and further finding no independent right under state law). This is because 26 decisions regarding an inmate’s classification level or where to house inmates are at the core of 27 prison administrators’ expertise. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (citing Meachum, 427 28 U.S. at 225); see also Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the 1 FAC does not state a cognizable constitutional violation based on the denial of Plaintiff’s 2 requested transfer. 3 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 4 Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his initial Complaint. 5 (See Doc. No. 9). In its prior screening order, the Court instructed Plaintiff on the applicable law 6 and pleading requirements. Despite affording Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the deficiencies, 7 the FAC fails to adequately state any plausible § 1983 claim and in fact repeats almost verbatim 8 the allegations made in Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. The undersigned finds it would be futile to 9 permit Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint; and, thus recommends that the district 10 court dismiss the FAC without further leave to amend. McKinney v. Baca, 250 F. App’x 781 (9th 11 Cir. 2007) citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting discretion to 12 deny leave to amend is particularly broad where court has afforded plaintiff one or more 13 opportunities to amend his complaint); see also Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 14 1991) (A district court can deny leave “where the amendment would be futile . . . or where the 15 amended complaint would be subject to dismissal”). 16 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 17 The Clerk of Court shall assign this case to a district judge for consideration of this 18 Findings and Recommendation. 19 It is further RECOMMENDED: 20 The First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 10) be dismissed under § 1915A for failure to 21 state a claim and the action be dismissed. 22 //// 23 //// 24 NOTICE TO PARTIES 25 These findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States district judge 26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 27 days after being served with the findings and recommendation, a party may file written objections 28 with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 1 | and Recommendation.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 2 | may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th 3 | Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). [4] > | Dated: _ July 27.2023 Mile. □□□ foareA Zacks 6 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE