Sacramento Homeless Union v. County of Sacramento

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 10 — 11 SACRAMENTO HOMELESS UNION, et No. 2:22-cv-01095-TLN-KJN al., — 12 — Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER v. — 14 — COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., — 15 — Defendants. — 16 — — 17 — 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Sacramento Homeless Union, Betty Rios, 19 Donta Williams, and Falisha Scott’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for a Temporary 20 Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 36.) The City and County of Sacramento filed 21 oppositions. (ECF Nos. 38, 41, 45.) Plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF No. 46.) For the reasons set 22 forth below, the Court MODIFIES and EXTENDS the existing injunction. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 A full recitation of the factual background of this case is set forth fully in the Court’s prior 3 order. (ECF No. 22.) In short, the instant case arises from Defendants’ alleged failure to 4 discharge their duties during Sacramento’s triple-digit heat wave to protect the unhoused, one of 5 society’s most vulnerable populations. (See ECF No. 1.) This case began on June 24, 2022, 6 when Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint and a motion for a TRO. (Id.) After setting a 7 briefing schedule and reviewing the parties’ filings, the Court granted in part and denied in part 8 Plaintiffs’ motion on July 29, 2022. (ECF No. 22.) The Court granted the motion only “with 9 respect to Plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the City and all of its officers, agents, servants, employees, 10 attorneys, and all persons under their direction and control, from clearing encampments belonging 11 to the unhoused.” (Id. at 23.) The preliminary injunction remained in effect for 28 days. (Id.) 12 Plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the preliminary injunction on August 24, 2022, based on the 13 weather forecast for the remaining summer months. (ECF No. 24.) The Court granted Plaintiffs’ 14 motion and extended the preliminary injunction through September 23, 2022. (ECF No. 33.) 15 On August 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for a TRO. (ECF No. 36.) On 16 August 3, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion. (ECF No. 39.) 17 More specifically, as with its order in the Summer of 2022, the Court granted the motion only 18 “with respect to Plaintiffs’ request to temporarily enjoin the City and all of its officers, agents, 19 servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons under their direction and control, from clearing 20 encampments belonging to the unhoused.” (Id. at 5.) The Court ordered the TRO to remain in 21 effect for fourteen days. (Id.) The Court also set a briefing schedule and ordered the parties to 22 file a joint statement regarding possible ways to narrow the injunction moving forward. (Id. at 6.) 23 The matter is now fully briefed. 24 II. STANDARD OF LAW 25 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 26 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 27 U.S. 7 , 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The 28 purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until 1 a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) 2 (emphasis added); see also Costa Mesa City Employee’s Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. 3 App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) (“The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final 4 determination following a trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt 5 Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo ante litem refers not simply to 6 any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last uncontested status which 7 preceded the pending controversy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In cases where the 8 movant seeks to alter the status quo, preliminary injunction is disfavored and a higher level of 9 scrutiny must apply. Schrier v. Univ. of Co., 427 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2005). Preliminary 10 injunction is not automatically denied simply because the movant seeks to alter the status quo, but 11 instead the movant must meet heightened scrutiny. Tom Doherty Associates, Inc. v. Saban 12 Entertainment, Inc., 60 F.3d 27 , 33–34 (2d Cir. 1995). 13 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 14 on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 15 [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 16 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test 17 to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 , 1135 18 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, a district court may 19 weigh the plaintiff's showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A 20 stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction 21 even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the 22 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 23 public interest.” Id. Plaintiff must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits 24 were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,” in order 25 to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35 (emphasis added). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 The Court summarized Plaintiffs’ arguments in its prior order and does not repeat those 3 arguments herein. (See ECF No. 39.) The City opposes the TRO on the following grounds: (1) 4 Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits on a Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger 5 claim; (2) Plaintiffs are not likely to suffer irreparable harm because their claims as to excessive 6 heat and its effects are overstated; (3) the balance of the equities does not tip in Plaintiffs’ favor 7 as the City must be able to protect critical infrastructure; and (4) the public interest is not served 8 because some encampments pose legitimate public safety concerns and health risks. (ECF No. 45 9 at 7.) The City also submitted various exhibits with its filings, which the Court has considered. 10 The Court will address the City’s arguments in turn.1 11 A. Likelihood of Success 12 The City argues Plaintiffs cannot show they are at greater risk of harm living at the Miller 13 Park Safe Ground (“Miller Park”), which offers various services and facilities to those who reside 14 there, as opposed to unsanctioned encampments.2 (Id. at 16–17.) In reply, Plaintiffs argue Miller 15 Park does not offer protection from the excessive heat as it sits on asphalt, in direct sun, and away 16 from large canopy shade trees. (ECF No. 46 at 3.) 17 The City’s arguments are unpersuasive. For the same reasons the Court discussed in its 18 prior orders, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence, at this stage, to demonstrate the City’s — 19 — 1 The County also filed an opposition. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiffs do not seek an injunction 20 against the County for clearing encampments — they only seek such relief against the City. (See ECF No. 36 at 15–16.) Plaintiffs sole claim against the County in the Complaint relates to the 21 County’s failure to open sufficient cooling centers. (ECF No. 1 at 15–16.) In the Summer of 2022, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief against the County as to the cooling — 22 — centers, and Plaintiffs did not renew that request in the instant motion. (See ECF No. 22.) 23 However, Plaintiffs now request for the first time in their reply that the Court extend the injunction relating to clearing encampments to the County. (ECF No. 46 at 8.) The Court 24 declines to do so based on the existing record. Because the injunction does not apply to the County, the Court need not and does not address the County’s opposition. — 25 — 2 The City also argues two district court cases the Court cited in its original order — — 26 — Jeremiah v. Sutter County and Cobine v. City of Eureka — are distinguishable from the instant 27 case. (ECF No. 45 at 14–16.) After considering this argument, the Court still finds sufficient evidence of state-created danger. See Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th 28 Cir. 2006). 1 clearing of encampments constitutes “affirmative conduct” that places unhoused individuals at an 2 increased risk of the “known and obvious danger” of exposure to extreme heat. (ECF No. 22 at 3 13–14; ECF No. 33 at 9.) The City indicates in the parties’ joint statement that it agrees to 4 provide more shade structures and tents that may provide more heat protection at Miller Park. 5 (ECF No. 47 at 3.) However, the available evidence suggests that, even though Miller Park offers 6 some facilities and services, the current structures and tents at Miller Park do not offer sufficient 7 protection from the heat. The parties do not discuss any alternative safe ground sites or housing 8 options available to unhoused individuals. Although the City indicates the City Council 9 authorized the City Manager to create new safe ground sites on August 1, 2023, it is unclear when 10 those sites will be available and whether they will offer more protection from the heat than 11 existing encampments. (ECF No. 45 at 6.) 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds a likelihood of success on the merits. 13 B. Irreparable Harm 14 The City next argues not all unhoused individuals are similarly situated, and thus, the 15 Court cannot assume that enjoining the City from clearing encampments will necessarily keep 16 unhoused individuals safer from excessive heat. (ECF No. 45 at 18.) The City also argues that 17 unlike Miller Park, certain encampments do not have drinking water or facilities. (Id. at 19.) In 18 reply, Plaintiffs argue Miller Park is not an adequate solution to the risks of harm related to 19 excessive heat. (ECF No. 46 at 3–4.) 20 Again, the City’s arguments are unpersuasive. For the same reasons discussed in its prior 21 orders, the Court concludes the weather forecast predicting excessive heat for the upcoming 22 weeks and Plaintiffs’ evidence detailing the risks of heat-related deaths and illnesses is sufficient 23 to show that irreparable harm will result in the absence of injunctive relief. (ECF No. 22 at 20– 24 21; ECF No. 33 at 10.) 25 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 26 Lastly, the City argues the balance of equities and public interest weigh against granting 27 an injunction because the City must be able to designate and protect critical infrastructure to 28 ensure public health and safety. (ECF No. 45 at 19–22.) The City also emphasizes that its 1 definition of critical infrastructure is narrower than the federal definition in that the City’s 2 definition applies only to government facilities with a history of prior disturbances (such as 3 schools, courthouses) or that provide life-saving services (such as police stations, fire stations, 4 and hospitals). (Id. at 21–22.) 5 As this Court has repeatedly stated, the City’s interest in clearing encampments during 6 extreme heat is far outweighed by Plaintiffs’ interest in the health and welfare of unhoused 7 individuals. (ECF No. 39 at 5.) However, in recognition that the existing TRO is broad, the 8 Court ordered the parties to file a joint statement regarding possible ways to narrow the scope of 9 any future injunctions to best balance the competing interests at play. (Id. at 6.) As an example, 10 the Court asked the parties to prioritize exceptions for critical infrastructure. (Id.) 11 The parties filed their joint statement on August 9, 2023. (ECF No. 47.) Although the 12 parties still disagree in many respects, they were able to present several points of agreement. 13 Based on the parties’ representations, the Court will modify the existing injunction to better 14 balance the equities and serve the public interest. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 For these reasons, the Court hereby MODIFIES and EXTENDS the injunction as follows: 17 1. The City and all of its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all 18 persons under its direction and control, are enjoined from clearing encampments 19 belonging to the unhoused, subject to the following exceptions: 20 a. Camp management, such as trash and debris clean-up, is permitted within 21 the following parameters: (1) items of personal/survival necessity 22 belonging to unhoused individuals cannot be cleared; and (2) the City may 23 clear and manage debris, vector, and safety issues of encampments. These 24 parameters should be interpreted narrowly. 25 b. Enforcement of the City’s sidewalk ordinance (Sacramento City Code 26 12.24) is permitted for all sidewalk obstructions blocking access leaving 27 less than four (4) feet of width. To the extent possible, unhoused 28 individuals should be given an opportunity to comply with the sidewalk enn nee II IIE IOI IIE EINE EIGER EEO 1 ordinance at their given location. 2 c. The City shall allow a representative from the Sacramento Homeless 3 Union, City staff, and other attendees as agreed to and approved by both 4 parties to tour Miller Park and its facilities. The frequency, length, and 5 scope of access must be reasonable. The parties agree to continue their 6 ongoing discussions regarding access to the Miller Park location. The City 7 has agreed to provide structures (e.g., pop-ups) over tents in areas with 8 little to no shade, and alternative tents, such as those made of canvas or 9 other materials that may provide more or better protection from the heat. 10 d. The City is permitted to enforce its critical infrastructure ordinance only as 11 to encampments within 500 feet of a school, as the City requested this 12 specific exception and Plaintiffs did not explicitly oppose the exception in 13 their reply. The parties did not prioritize or agree to other exceptions for 14 critical infrastructure, and the Court declines to carve out further 15 exceptions at this time. 16 The Court takes judicial notice of National Weather Service data, which state that the 17 | monthly highest maximum temperatures for the Sacramento area have historically occurred 18 | during the months of June, July, August, and September. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1); National 19 | Weather Service, Climate, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, available at 20 | https://www.weather.gov/wrh/Climate?wfo=sto (last visited Aug. 16, 2023). Similar to last 21 | year’s injunction, the injunction shall remain in effect through August 31, 2023. After the 22 | expiration of the injunction, Plaintiffs may once again seek to reinstate the injunction by filing a 23 | motion with this Court making a showing on all of the Winter prongs and providing greater detail 24 | about the weather forecast for the remainder of the summer months. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 | Date: August 16, 2023 () jf /) 27 “ Nan i) hashay 28 Unie Sates Dist