Harper v. Charter Communications, LLC

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- [11] 12 LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 13 PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and on behalf of all others 14 similarly situated and all ORDER aggrieved employees, [15] Plaintiffs, [16] v. [17] CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, [18] Defendant. [20] ----oo0oo---- [21] Plaintiffs Lionel Harper and Daniel Sinclair move for [22] partial summary judgment on various alleged violations of the [23] California Labor Code. (Mot. (Docket No. 360).) The violations [24] relate to plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful calculation, deduction, [25] and payment of commission wages (Claim 5); and claim for failure [26] to provide timely and complete copies of employment records [27] (Claim 8). Harper also requests that the court determine that he [28] 1 is an “aggrieved employee” pursuant to his Private Attorneys 2 General Act (“PAGA”) claim (Claim 10). 3 A. Unlawful Calculation, Deduction, and Payment of Commission Wages (Claim 5) [4] 5 Harper alleges that defendant violated Labor Code 6 Sections 2751, 204, 221, 223, and 224 by improperly calculating, 7 documenting, deducting, and withholding payment of his commission 8 wages. (See Mot. at 15-27.) 9 Defendant previously moved for partial summary judgment 10 on this claim, requesting that the court find that defendant did 11 not violate any of the above Labor Code provisions. (See 12 generally Order (Docket No. 111).) The court denied that motion 13 as to every one of these alleged violations because “the 14 testimony and declarations of the parties are in direct conflict” 15 regarding whether Harper knowingly agreed to the terms of 16 defendant’s commission plan in the first place. (See Order at 17 26-27 (§ 2751(b)); 29-30 (§ 204); 32-33 (§§ 221, 224); 34 (§ 18 223).) The court concluded that this direct conflict in the 19 evidence precluded summary judgment for defendant on alleged 20 violations of Sections 2751, 204, 221, 223, and 224. (See id.) 21 Notwithstanding the three years that have passed since 22 the court’s initial summary judgment order, neither party brings 23 any materially new evidence on this threshold issue. Even though 24 the court now views the record in the light most favorable to 25 defendant, the same conflict remains, and the same conclusion 26 results: there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 27 whether Harper knowingly agreed to the terms of defendant’s 28 commission plan in the first place. Accordingly, the court 1 cannot conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff prevails on any 2 of the alleged violations of Sections 27511, 204, 221, 223, and 3 224. 4 B. Failure to Provide Timely and Complete Copies of Employment Records (Claim 8) [5] 6 Harper also alleges that defendant failed to timely 7 provide wage statements and personnel files in violation of Labor 8 Code §§ 226(b)-(c) and 1198.5(a)-(c). (See Mot. at 11-15.) 9 Sinclair joins as to alleged violations under Section 1198.5. 10 1. Section 226(b)-(c): Timely Production of Wage Statements [11] 12 The court previously denied defendant’s request for 13 summary judgment on Section 226(b)-(c) because there were genuine 14 issues of material fact on whether (1) plaintiffs’ requests to 15 inspect and receive copies of their wage statements were 16 reasonable, and (2) the timing of defendant’s production of 17 Harper’s wage statements fully satisfied § 226(b). (See Order at 18 50-51.) 19 Neither party provides any new material facts to 20 augment the record. Viewing the record now in the light most 21 favorable to defendant, the court still concludes that genuine 22 issues of material fact remain regarding when plaintiff first 23 made a “reasonable request” due to (1) the form of Mr. [24] 1 Harper moves for summary judgment on violations of both [25] subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2751. Previously, the court 26 only considered violations of subsection (b). However the predicate issue of whether plaintiffs knowingly entered into the 27 commission agreement at issue applies squarely to alleged violations of Section 2751(a) as well. [28] 1 Soderstrom’s initial June 4, 2018 request, and (2) Harper’s and 2 Mr. Soderstrom’s conflicting representations to defendant on 3 whether Mr. Soderstrom was in fact Harper’s representative. 4 2. Section 1198.5(a)-(c): Timely and Complete Production of Personnel Records [5] 6 The court previously denied summary judgment for 7 defendant regarding Section 1198.5 because “personnel records” 8 are expansively defined to encompass things such as corrective 9 action reports, letters related to termination, and commission 10 plan documents, which defendant produced after the statutory 11 deadline to do so had passed. (See Order at 49.) 12 However, on February 26, 2024, defendant paid Harper 13 and Sinclair $750 each as statutory penalties owed under Labor 14 Code Section 1198.5(a)-(c). (Docket No. 377-3 ¶ 3.) Defendant 15 argues that this moots plaintiffs’ individual claim. (See Opp’n 16 (Docket No. 377) at 2 n.1.) The court agrees. While plaintiffs 17 argue otherwise because they have not received costs and fees 18 (see Reply (Docket No. 381) at 9), Section 1198.5(k) identifies 19 $750 in statutory penalties as the sole remedy available to 20 plaintiffs.2 See Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136 , 1145 21 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim becomes moot once the plaintiff 22 actually receives all of the relief to which he or she is 23 entitled on the claim.”). 24 Accordingly, the court will not grant summary judgment 25 to plaintiff on this claim. [26] 2 Compare Lab. Code § 1198.5(l), which provides for costs 27 and reasonable attorney’s fees were plaintiffs to instead bring an injunctive action seeking compliance with the Labor Code. [28] nee nnn en nn OE IN EIEIO IED OE 1 Cc. PAGA Aggrieved Employee 2 Harper also requests that the court confirm his 3 standing to sue under PAGA by declaring him an “aggrieved 4 employee” pursuant to the statute. (See generally Mot.) 5 Pursuant to its discretion, the court declines to do so at this 6 time. See West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., No. CIS040438 WBS GGH, [7] 2006 WL 355214 , at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (district courts 8 have discretion on considering summary judgment motions pre-class 9 certification; motion addressing only scope of damages found 10 “premature” (citing Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th 11 Cir. 1984))). Harper identifies no binding authority compelling 12 the court to do otherwise. Neither does he offer good reasons 13 | why “it will be prudent to decide a PAGA plaintiff’s aggrieved 14 status first” in this present case, at summary judgment. (See 15 | Reply at 7.) Neither can the court discern any. 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 17 | partial summary judgment (Docket No. 360) be, and the same hereby 18 is, DENIED. 19 Dated: March 19, 2024 . « blew A bh be WILLIAM B. SHUBB 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE