Puckett v. County of Sacramento

[8] 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [11] 12 JEREMY PHILLIP PUCKETT, No. 2:22-cv-0350 KJM DB 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER 15 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 16 Defendants. [17] 18 On March 1, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to compel. (ECF No. 97.) On March 22, 2024, 19 the parties filed a Joint Statement re: Discovery Disagreement. (ECF No. 126.) Pursuant to 20 Local Rule 302(c)(1) this matter came before the undersigned on April 5, 2024, for hearing of 21 plaintiff’s motion to compel. (ECF No. 151.) Attorney Ryan Snyder appeared on behalf of 22 plaintiff, who was also present. Attorney John Whitefleet appeared on behalf of defendants. 23 After hearing oral argument, plaintiff’s motion was taken under submission. 24 I. Background 25 “A complaint guides the parties’ discovery[.]” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 26 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). As explained by the assigned District Judge, the complaint alleges 27 that plaintiff was incarcerated based on convictions for robbery and murder for roughly 20 years, 28 despite being factually innocent, as a result of defendants’ withholding or ignoring exonerating 1 evidence. (ECF No. 36 at 2.) The complaint also describes two similar instances in which 2 “Sheriff’s deputies committed similar constitutional violations in the form of evidence 3 suppression” and identifies “79 civil rights violations over seven years[.]” (Id. at 13-14.) 4 The complaint alleges that the “Sheriff’s Office has not disciplined officers who deprive 5 persons of their constitutional rights.” (Id. at 14.) The assigned District Judge has found that 6 these allegations support claims for Monell liability against the County of Sacramento, and the 7 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office based on a pattern of incidents in which Sheriff’s deputies 8 committed similar constitutional violations and the failure to discipline officers who deprived 9 persons of their constitutional rights. (Id. at 13-16.) The complaint’s allegations also support a 10 claim for Monell liability against the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office based on an 11 alleged failure to discipline prosecutors who committed Brady violations.1 (Id. at 16-17.) 12 II. Legal Authority 13 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 14 needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access 15 to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 16 of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to 17 be discoverable. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for 19 discovery purposes.” Scherer v. FCA US, LLC, 538 F.Supp.3d 1002 , 1004 (S.D. Cal. 2021). 20 And “[r]elevancy, for the purposes of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without 21 ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. 22 Cal. 2006 ). “If relevance is in doubt, courts should err on the side of permissive discovery.” 23 Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 24 In evaluating proportionality, the court looks to “the importance of the issues at stake in 25 the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 26 parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden [27] 28 1 “Brady requires the disclosure of impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” 1 or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2 party resisting discovery ‘has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and the 3 burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.’” Laub v. Horbaczewski, 331 4 F.R.D. 516, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281 , 283 5 (C.D. Cal. 1998)). 6 “[O]bjections should be plain enough and specific enough so that the court can understand 7 in what way the [requests] are alleged to be objectionable.” Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154 , 8 1160 (9th Cir. 1981). “[O]bjections not raised in a written response to discovery may not be 9 raised for the first time in a discovery motion.” O. L. v. City of El Monte, Case No. 2:20-cv-0797 10 RGK (JDEx), 2021 WL 926105 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021). “Similarly, objections asserted 11 in discovery responses but not raised in briefing on a discovery motion are also waived.” (Id.) 12 “District courts addressing discovery-related disputes in cases involving Monell claims 13 have routinely recognized that such claims often require a broad and substantial amount of 14 discovery that would not be involved if the plaintiff sued only the individuals directly involved in 15 the deprivation of his rights.” Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012 WL 6568242 , at *3 (N.D. 16 Ill. Dec. 17, 2012 ). The very nature of a Monell claim often necessarily implicates burdensome, 17 but not unduly burdensome, discovery. See Id. at *7 (“the fact that Monell claims implicate a 18 potentially large number of events taking place in an organization over a period of time, they 19 naturally, and necessarily require extensive and often burdensome discovery”). 20 “It is the longstanding practice in federal court that boilerplate objections and unsupported 21 privilege assertions, including assertions of the attorney-client privilege, the work product 22 doctrine, etc., are improper.” Bragel International, Inc. v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Case No. 23 CV 17-7414 RGK (SSx), 2018 WL 7890682 , at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018). “Instead, the 24 objecting party must show specifically how, despite the broad and liberal construction afforded 25 the federal discovery rules, each request is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, 26 burdensome or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of 27 the burden.” Fracasse v. People’s United Bank, Civ. No. 3:12CV670 (JCH) 2013 WL 6017332 , at 28 *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2013) (quotation and alteration omitted). And “one does nothing to 1 preserve [] privilege by simply setting forth a generalized, i.e., boilerplate, objection. If the 2 privilege is worth preserving, it is worth being identified in a privilege log-and the Federal Rules 3 require such.” Carmichael Lodge No. 2103, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of U.S. of 4 America v. Leonard, No. CIV S-07-2665 LKK GGH, 2009 WL 1118896 , at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5 23, 2009). 6 III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 7 The April 5, 2024 hearing is the latest continuation of defendants’—in the opinion of the 8 undersigned—unprecedented abuse and obstruction of discovery in this action. “The discovery 9 process in theory should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the district court.” Sali v. 10 Corona Regional Medical Center, 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). Because of this, it is 11 unusual for a case to come before the court for the hearing of more than one or two discovery 12 disputes. 13 In this action, on five prior occasions the undersigned heard a motion to compel brought 14 by plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 73, 77, 85, 112, 120.2) Defendants’ arguments in opposition have been a 15 barrage of vague, conclusory, unsupported, unintelligible, and/or unmeritorious objections, 16 including the assertion of objections and argument that had previously been waived and/or 17 previously rejected. The undersigned has spent considerable time at hearings and drafting written 18 orders explaining the specific deficiencies of defense counsel’s arguments in hopes that 19 defendants would seek a new course. See ECF Nos. 74, 80, 94, 119, 137. 20 Defendants have sought reconsideration of the undersigned’s orders, as is their right. 21 However, on April 4, 2024, the assigned District Judge issued an order denying the first three 22 motions for reconsideration filed by defendants. (ECF No. 150.) While the order was issued 23 after the parties briefed this motion, the undersigned hoped that defense counsel might seek to 24 withdraw opposition to the pending motion in light of the District Judge’s guidance. That defense 25 counsel might request a continuation of the April 5, 2024 hearing to consider the April 4, 2024 26 order of the assigned District Judge to determine if some or all of objections should be [27] 28 2 As of the writing of this order plaintiff has three additional motions to compel yet to be heard as 1 withdrawn. Or that defense counsel might file a request to withdraw some, or all, of the 2 objections asserted prior to the undersigned issuing this order. That did not happen. 3 Unfortunately, it appears defendants have elected to continue their pattern of obstruction 4 and abuse with the continued assertion of a panoply of unpreserved, unsupported, unmeritorious, 5 and/or unintelligible arguments. In granting plaintiff’s motion, the undersigned relies on and 6 incorporates the prior hearings and prior orders of this court which defense counsel seems 7 determined to ignore. (ECF Nos. ECF Nos. 73, 74, 77, 80, 85, 94, 112, 119, 120, 137, 150, 151.) 8 To this tome, the undersigned will add the following. Plaintiff’s motion seeks to compel 9 defendants’ response to plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics. (JS (ECF No. 126) at 1.) 10 “[T]he ‘general purpose’ of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is to ‘permit[ ] the examining party to 11 discover the [entity’s] position via a witness designated by the [entity] to testify on its behalf.’” 12 Estate of Thompson v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 291 F.R.D. 297, 303 (N.D. Iowa 2013) 13 (quoting Rosenruist–Gestao E Servicos LDA v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 511 F.3d 437 , 440 n. 2 (4th 14 Cir. 2007)). “[P]arties are entitled to test assertions in questioning witnesses during depositions, 15 and it is fundamental that parties may simultaneously utilize any or all of the discovery 16 mechanisms authorized by the rules.” Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 310 F.R.D. 439, 449 (N.D. 17 Cal. 2015 ) (quotation omitted); see also Kress v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, No. 2:08-cv18 0965 LKK AC, 2013 WL 2421704 , at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2013) (“there are strong reasons why 19 a party strategically selects to proceed by oral deposition rather than alternate means, including 20 the spontaneity of witness responses”). 21 When noticing a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, a party must “describe with reasonable 22 particularity the matters on which examination is requested.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). In 23 response, “the organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing 24 agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person 25 designated, the matters on which the person will testify.” Sigmund v. Starwood Urban Retail IV, 26 LLC, 236 F.R.D. 43, 44 (D. D.C. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)). One of the aims of 27 Rule 30(b)(6) is to prevent entities from using “their size and complexity to advantage by 28 ‘bandying’ their opponents with deposition witnesses who all disclaimed knowledge on the topics 1 the adversary wanted to investigate.” 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2103 (3d ed.) “Although 2 adequately preparing a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition can be burdensome, this is merely the result of 3 the concomitant obligation from the privilege of being able to use the [organizational] form in 4 order to conduct business.” Great American Ins. Co. of New York v. Vegas Const. Co., Inc., 251 5 F.R.D. 534 , 540 (D. Nev. 2008) (quotation omitted). 6 A. Sherif’s Office Topic 9 7 This topic concerns personnel records for named defendants, specifically records of 8 disciplinary actions or investigations. (JS (ECF No. 126) at 7.) Defendants’ written objection 9 asserted that this “category appears to be seeking production of documents,” which is absurd. 10 (Id.) Plaintiff’s request seeks testimony, which plaintiff confirms. (Id.) Defendants’ written 11 objection also asserted this topic was compound because there are “seven” named defendants, 12 which is also absurd.3 (Id.) Personnel records, including disciplinary actions or investigation, are 13 maintained, or not maintained, as a result of policies and procedures that should be uniform to all 14 employees. Defendants then asserted that these “defects preclude defendant from producing a 15 representative.” (Id.) Defendants final sentence reads “This request Defendant has insufficient 16 information to identify a representative.” (Id.) Obviously, one or more words is missing from 17 that sentence. 18 However, in the Joint Statement defense counsel asserts that this topic has “no relevance 19 to any claim or defense” as defendants have produced personnel records establishing there were 20 no disciplinary actions. (Id. at 9.) The undersigned has repeatedly advised defense counsel that 21 objections not raised in written response to a discovery order may not be raised in the briefing the 22 discovery motion. (ECF No. 137 at 8.) 23 Moreover, as noted by the assigned District Judge, this action concerns “allegations of 24 unconstitutional policies and training and many civil rights violations over many years.” (ECF 25 No. 150 at 5.) In this context, evidence concerning the lack of personnel records evidencing 26 disciplinary actions is as relevant as records establishing disciplinary actions. [27] 28 3 The topic lists six individuals, defendants Minter, Gregersen, Bayles, Bell, Maulsby, and Stan 1 Defendants also state “It is not clear and Plaintiff fails to articulate what about the records 2 is being sought.” (JS (ECF No. 126) at 9.) This single sentence is vague, conclusory, and not 3 supported by argument or authority. Defense counsel’s argument in opposition, both with respect 4 to this motion and prior motions, frequently engages in this practice. It is not proper to 5 haphazardly assert objections and argument. As noted above, defense counsel has the burden of 6 clarifying, explaining, and supporting objections. Laub, 331 F.R.D. at 521. 7 To the extent defendants are attempting to argue that the deposition topic is not reasonably 8 particular, that argument is without merit. The topic identifies that it will cover the “personnel 9 records,” including disciplinary actions or investigations, of six named defendants. (JS (ECF No. 10 126) at 7.) The topic is both specific and limited. This is even more true given defense counsel’s 11 representation that “there are no disciplinary action or investigations” with respect to the named 12 defendants. (Id. at 9.) 13 Moreover, courts have approved similarly worded, if not more broadly worded, deposition 14 topics. See generally Pipeline Productions, Inc. v. Madison Companies, LLC, CIVIL ACTION 15 No. 15-4890 KHV, 2019 WL 1940282 , at *5 (D. Kan. May 1, 2019) (permitting 30(b)(6) 16 deposition “about entities which defendants control”); Buie v. District of Columbia, 327 F.R.D. 1 , 17 8-10 (D. D.C. 2018) (permitting 30(b)(6) deposition about “scope of any training and supervision 18 that might have deterred sexual misconduct” by defendant officer and advising that terms should 19 be defined by “ordinary meaning”); Brown v. City of Atlanta, 284 F.Supp.3d 1326, 1341 (N.D. 20 Ga. 2018 ), vacated in part, appeal dismissed in part by Brown v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 778 21 Fed. Appx. 728 (11th Cir. 2019) (allowing 30(b)(6) deposition as to “policies and procedures of 22 the City pursuant to which the entry and search of plaintiff’s property was carried out, and 23 pursuant to which Plaintiff was arrested”); Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, 24 Inc., 236 F.R.D. 524, 528 (D. Kan. 2006) (deposition topic of “the preparation and filing” of 25 named patents and amendments reasonably particular); Alexander v. F.B.I., 186 F.R.D. 137 , 140 26 (D. D.C. 1998) (deposition topic on the computer systems known as “Big Brother” and/or White 27 House Office Database satisfied reasonable particularity). 28 //// 1 B. DA’s Topic 9 & Topic 10 2 These topics seeks testimony as to “personnel records for Majorie Durenberger,” and 3 “actual or potential discipline” of Marjorie Durenberger.4 (JS (ECF No. 126) at 9.) Defendants, 4 again, ask the court to provide the specificity and argument in support of its’ opposition by simply 5 seeking to “incorporate the law and discussions as to Sheriff’s Topic 9 above as if incorporated 6 herein.” (Id.) This is not proper, helpful, or sufficient, especially given the vague and conclusory 7 nature of the defendants “law and discussion as to Sherriff’s Topic 9.” 8 Defendants’ additional argument is that Durenberger “is not a party anymore” and that the 9 complaint does not “base the Monell claim on Ms. Durenberger[‘s] past conduct.” (Id.) What 10 precise objection defendants are attempting to assert with this argument—relevance, burden, 11 etc.—is unclear. However, that Durenberger is not a party anymore is apropos of nothing. As 12 explained by the assigned District Judge, plaintiff is proceeding on claims that the Sacramento 13 District Attorney’s Office failed to discipline prosecutors who committed Brady violations. (ECF 14 No. 36 at 16.) Deposition testimony by the entity defendant regarding disciplinary records and 15 actions involving the deputy district attorney who prosecuted plaintiff is relevant. 16 C. County Topic 9 & Topic 10 17 These topics concern personnel records and discipline as to six named defendants, as well 18 as former defendant Durenberger. (JS (ECF No. 126) at 10.) Defendants’ entire argument reads: 19 “Defendants incorporate the law and discussion as to Sheriff’s Topic 9 above as if incorporated 20 herein.” (Id.) As explained above, this argument is both insufficient and without merit. See 21 Laub, 331 F.R.D. at 521. The deposition topics are relevant, proportional, and reasonably 22 particular. See generally Pipeline Productions, Inc., 2019 WL 1940282 , at *5; Buie, 327 F.R.D. 23 at 8-10; Brown, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1341 ; Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528; 24 Alexander, 186 F.R.D. at 140 . 25 //// 26 //// [27] 28 4 Marjorie Durenberger was the deputy district attorney who prosecuted plaintiff. (ECF No. 36 at 1 D. County Topic 11 2 This topic concerns the inclusion or potential inclusion of named defendants on a “Brady 3 List.” (JS (ECF No. 126) at 11.) Yet again, “Defendants incorporate the law and discussion as to 4 Sheriff’s Topic 9 above as if incorporated herein.” (Id.) Again, that is insufficient and without 5 merit for the reasons stated above. 6 Defendants add the argument that “there are no allegations that these defendants testified 7 in the underlying criminal case,” and that the “application of a ‘Brady list’ is not the same type of 8 ‘Brady violation’ that is alleged in the case.” (Id.) Again, what specific objection defendants are 9 attempting to assert is not stated. Moreover, this action concerns allegations that the defendants 10 failed to discipline those who committed Brady violations. (ECF No. 36 at 14-17.) This 11 deposition topic is relevant, proportional, and reasonably particular. See generally Pipeline 12 Productions, Inc., 2019 WL 1940282 , at *5; Buie, 327 F.R.D. at 8-10; Brown, 284 F.Supp.3d at 13 1341; Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528; Alexander, 186 F.R.D. at 140 . 14 E. County Topic 13 15 This topic concerns Brady violations by entity defendant’s employees between January 1, 16 1990 and December 31, 2005. (JS (ECF No. 126) at 12.) Again, defendants “incorporate the law 17 and discussion as to Sheriff’s Topic 9 above” and again this is insufficient and without merit. 18 (Id.) 19 To this defendants add the argument that there “are no allegations that the County . . . 20 have (sic) any role in law enforcement, investigating or prosecuting crimes.” (Id. at 13-14.) 21 Again, defense counsel’s statement is apropos of nothing and without any explicit reference to an 22 identified objection. Defense counsel then asks a series of questions vaguely asserting that this 23 topic is “redundant” or is “looking for statistics,” before asserting that it is not “reasonably 24 defined, nor proportional to the needs of the case[.]” (Id. at 14.) 25 A party objecting to discovery on the grounds of proportionality 26 still bears the burden of making a specific objection and showing that the discovery fails the proportionality calculation mandated by Rule 27 26(b) by coming forward with specific information to address – insofar as that information is available to it – the importance of the 28 issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 1 relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 2 burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. [3] 4 Carr v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 312 F.R.D. 459, 468 (N.D. Tex. 5 2015); see also First American Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Business Technology, Inc., CIVIL 6 ACTION NO. 15-638, 2017 WL 2267149 , at *1 (E.D. La. May 24, 2017) (“defendant has offered 7 nothing sufficient to support or establish its objections on grounds of disproportionality”); In re 8 Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016) (“The 9 Advisory Committee Note makes clear, however, that the amendment does not place the burden 10 of proving proportionality on the party seeking discovery.”). Here, defendants do not even 11 attempt a showing. 12 Moreover, a central issue in this action is plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants failed 13 to discipline employees involved in Brady violations. Considering the importance of the issues at 14 stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, 15 the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 16 burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, the undersigned finds 17 plaintiff’s discovery to be both relevant and proportional to the needs of this case. The 18 undersigned also finds this deposition topic to be reasonably particular. See generally Pipeline 19 Productions, Inc., 2019 WL 1940282 , at *5; Buie, 327 F.R.D. at 8-10; Brown, 284 F.Supp.3d at 20 1341; Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528; Alexander, 186 F.R.D. at 140 . 21 F. Sherriff’s Office Topic 8 22 This topic concerns plaintiff’s habeas petitions. (JS (ECF No. 126) at 18.) Again 23 defendants “incorporation the law and discussion as to Sherriff’s Topic 9 above as if incorporated 24 herein.” (Id.) As stated many times above, this is insufficient and without merit. See Laub, 331 25 F.R.D. at 521. Defendants also argue that this topic is not reasonably particular. (Id.) Again, the 26 undersigned finds this deposition topic to be reasonably particular. See generally Pipeline 27 Productions, Inc., 2019 WL 1940282 , at *5; Buie, 327 F.R.D. at 8-10; Brown, 284 F.Supp.3d at 28 1341; Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528; Alexander, 186 F.R.D. at 140 . 1 Defendants conclude with the vague assertion that “Such is not reasonably proportional,” while 2 failing to discuss the proportionality calculation. (JS (ECF No. 126) at 19.) 3 G. DA’s Office Topic 4 4 This topic seeks to depose the District Attorney’s Office on the Dvorsky Investigation.5 5 (Id.) Defendants repeat their reliance on defendants’ insufficient and unmeritorious discussion of 6 Sheriff’s Topic 9. (Id.) As well as the assertion that the topic is “vague.” (Id.) “Defendants seek 7 guidance from the court” with respect to this and other deposition topics. (Id.) Because defense 8 counsel makes no attempt to elaborate as to what is unclear about this request, it is difficult for 9 the undersigned to offer guidance. The Dvorsky investigation should be something defendants 10 can readily identify as to time, those involved, their actions, the results, etc. The investigation 11 into someone’s death is not something that is vague, boundless, lacking in definition, etc. 12 The undersigned would encourage defense counsel to apply common sense and the usual 13 meaning to this, and all, discovery requests. See Avantax Wealth Management, Inc. v. Marriott 14 Hotel Services, Inc., Case No. 3:21-cv-0810, 2022 WL 18638754 , at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 15 2022) (“The Court finds no ambiguity in either the term ‘event’ or ‘any event to the Annual 16 Conference.’ Rather, the Court finds a remarkable inability or unwillingness on Marriott’s part to 17 use common sense in responding to discovery, including to give words their ordinary and plain 18 meaning, as well as a lack of regard for the requirements of the discovery rules regarding proper 19 objections to discovery requests.”). 20 The undersigned finds this deposition topic to be relevant, proportional, and reasonably 21 particular. See generally Pipeline Productions, Inc., 2019 WL 1940282 , at *5; Buie, 327 F.R.D. 22 at 8-10; Brown, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1341 ; Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528; 23 Alexander, 186 F.R.D. at 140 . 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// [27] 5 Angela Dvorsky died around the time of the events at issue and the complaint alleges that the 28 “investigation into Dvorsky’s death led Detective to hundreds of pages of evidence exonerating 1 H. DA’s Office Topic 5 2 This topic seeks to depose the District Attorney’s Office on the Galati Investigation.6 (JS 3 (ECF No. 126) at 19.) Defendants repeat their argument as to Topic 4 above. The undersigned 4 directs defendants to the discussion of that topic as to why their arguments fail. 5 I. DA’s Office Topic 6 6 This topic concerns the prosecution of plaintiff for robbery and murder. (Id. at 19.) 7 Defendants repeat their reliance on defendants’ arguments with respect to Sheriff’s Topic 9. (Id.) 8 In addition to being insufficient and without merit, it strains credibility to argue that the topic of 9 plaintiff’s prosecution for crimes that he was innocent of—an issue at the heart of this entire 10 action—is somehow not relevant, not proportional, burdensome, vague, etc. 11 Defendants also offer—again apropos of nothing—that this topic is “curious” because 12 “Plaintiff knows Marjorie Durenberger was the prosecuting DDA on the case,” so the “obvious 13 source of information would be from Marjorie Durenberger.” (Id. at 19-20.) The undersigned 14 finds nothing curious about plaintiff’s attempt to lawfully obtain evidence to support his claims. 15 Neither does the law. See Naini v. King Cnty. Public Hospital District No. 2, CASE NO. C1916 0886 JCC, 2019 WL 6877927 , at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2019) (“Even if an individual could 17 testify about the topics in a Rule 30(b)(6) notice, a 30(b)(6) deposition is not necessarily 18 cumulative.”); DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Systems Corp., No. 08 C 1531, 2011 WL 117048 , at 19 *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (“The fact that other persons with discoverable information were 20 deposed or will be deposed does not relieve Desotech of its obligations under Rule 30(b)(6). 21 Desotech’s argument fails to take into account the purpose of Rule 30(b)(6). A deposition of an 22 individual is not the equivalent of a deposition of an organization under Rule 30(b)(6).”). 23 J. DA’s Office Topic 7 24 This topic concerns plaintiff’s conviction for the robbery and murder of Anthony Galati. 25 (JS (ECF No. 126) at 20.) Defendants’ argument is repetitive of Topic 6 above and is rejected for 26 the same reasons. 27 //// [28] 1 K. DA’s Office Topic 8 2 This topic concerns plaintiff’s habeas petitions. (Id.) Defendants repeat the reliance on 3 Sheriff’s Topic No. 9 and repeat the arguments in opposition to County Topic 8. (Id.) The 4 undersigned has already explained above why those arguments are without merit. 5 L. DA’s Office Topic 24 6 This topic concerns communications between the District Attorney’s Office and plaintiff’s 7 legal counsel prior to plaintiff’s sentencing on March 14, 2022. (Id.) Defendants’ argument in 8 opposition is, yet again, simply a vague and conclusory repetition of reliance on arguments 9 previously asserted and rejected above. (Id. at 21.) 10 M. County Topics 4-8 11 These topics concerns the Dvorsky Investigation, the Galati investigation, plaintiff’s 12 prosecution, plaintiff’s conviction, and plaintiff’s habeas petitions. (Id. at 21-22.) Again, 13 defendants rely on the unmeritorious arguments addressed above. (Id. at 23.) 14 IV. Defendants’ Request for a Protective Order 15 At the end of the parties’ Joint Statement, defendants insert a vague and conclusory 16 request for a protective order. (Id. at 23-24.) “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to 17 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 18 expense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “Rule 26(c), setting forth grounds for protective orders, was 19 enacted as a safeguard for the protection of parties and witnesses in view of the broad discovery 20 rights authorized in Rule 26(b).” U.S. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 666 F.2d 364 , 21 368-69 (9th Cir. 1982). The party seeking to limit discovery through a protective order must 22 show “good cause” for the protective order. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39 , 40 23 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 24 “A party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to 25 protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” 26 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); see also In re 27 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 28 party opposing disclosure has the burden of proving ‘good cause,’ which requires a showing ‘that 1 specific prejudice or harm will result’ if the protective order is not granted.”). “‘Broad allegations 2 of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 3 26(c) test.’” Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) 4 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1986)). 5 Here, defendants argue simply that they “would be harmed in requiring to expend 6 additional defense costs on matters only tangentially and vaguely related to the issues in this case, 7 or are so vague that if forced to produce on such little information would end up wasting all 8 parties’ time[.]” (Joint Statement (ECF No. 126) at 24.) Defendants’ argument is a broad 9 allegation of harm, unsubstantiated by a specific example or articulated reasoning. See generally 10 NuCal Foods, Inc. v. Quality Egg LLC, No. CIV S-10-3105 KJM CKD, 2012 WL 6629573 , at *2 11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (“The party requesting a protective order must demonstrate specific 12 facts that support the request, rendering conclusory or speculative statements about the need for a 13 protective order and the harm which will be suffered without one insufficient.”). 14 This ruling should come as no surprise to defendants. Defense counsel asserted this same 15 argument, largely verbatim, in a Joint Statement filed on January 19, 2024. (ECF No. 68 at 1316 14.) The undersigned explained why this argument was without merit in an order issued on 17 February 5, 2024. (ECF No. 74.) Defense counsel’s decision to ignore that order and repeat this 18 same argument is puzzling. In doing so, he caused unnecessary expenditure of time and resources 19 by plaintiff and the court. Again, defendants’ obstruction and abuse of discover is unprecedented 20 in cases coming before the undersigned. 21 V. Sanctions 22 The parties are well aware that sanctions are contemplated with respect to this motion 23 given that the undersigned has already ordered general briefing on the topic. (ECF No. 105.) 24 Now that plaintiff’s motion will be granted, the undersigned will order specific briefing to allow 25 for a full accounting of plaintiff’s costs and an appropriate calculation of sanctions. 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, in the undersigned’s prior orders, at prior 3 | hearings, and at the April 5, 2024 hearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 4 1. Plaintiff's March 1, 2024 motion to compel (ECF No. 97) is granted; 5 2. Defendants shall produce responsive discovery within seven days of the date of this 6 | order; 7 3. Within seven days of the date of this order plaintiff shall file a brief addressing the 8 | award of monetary sanctions; 9 4. Within seven days of the date of the filing of plaintiffs brief, defendants shall file an 10 | opposition or statement of non-opposition to the award of monetary sanctions; and 11 5. Within seven days thereafter plaintiff may file a reply. 12 | Dated: April 16, 2024 [14] 15 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE [20] 21 | pDLB:6 9 DB/orders/orders.civil/puckett0350.oah.0405