Hunter Tellez v. Proiettii

[5] 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [7] EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [8] 9 SHEILA-JO HUNTER TELLEZ, Case No. 1:24-cv-00408-KES-SKO 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BE 11 v. D AI MS EM NIS DS ED WITHOUT LEAVE TO [12] DONALD J. PROIETTII, (Doc. 1) [13] Defendant. TWENTY-ONE DAY DEADLINE 14 _____________________________________/ [15] 16 Plaintiff Sheila-Jo Hunter Tellez (“Plaintiff”) proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this 17 action. (Docs. 1, 3.) The complaint, filed on April 5, 2024, names as Defendant Donald J. Proietti, 18 Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Merced (“Judge Proietti”).1 (Doc. 1 at 2.) 19 Plaintiff challenges the issuance of orders against her by Judge Proietti during a probate action that 20 established a decedent’s estate’s claim of ownership to property and directed its transfer to that 21 estate. (Id. at 3, 4–9.) 22 The Court concludes that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claims and recommends 23 dismissal without leave to amend. 24 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 25 Where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (Doc. 3), the Court is required to screen 26 each case and dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, 27 or the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or [28] 1 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). 2 If the Court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the 3 extent the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 4 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 5 The Court’s screening of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) is governed by the 6 following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim 7 for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable 8 legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff 9 must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant 10 fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil 11 v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193 , 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795 , 798 12 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 14 In the statement of claim, Plaintiff states that orders issued by Judge Proietti against her 15 during a probate case in which she appeared as an in pro per respondent and that established the 16 Estate of Robert Alan Hunter’s claim of ownership to property and directed its transfer to the Estate 17 are in “violation of Article 3 and the 14th Amendment of the United States, making it [sic] a lawful 18 NULLITY.” (Doc. 1 at 3, 4–9.) Plaintiff requests that the Court “declare the orders a [n]ullity, 19 having [n]o government force of law.” (Id. at 3.) 20 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 21 A. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 22 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court has no jurisdiction to review errors 23 allegedly committed by state courts. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“The 24 jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.”); District of Columbia Court of 25 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (“[A] United States District Court has no authority 26 to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.”). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 27 forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury 28 caused by a state court judgment, and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” 1 Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 , 2 531-32 (2011)). “The purpose of the Doctrine is to protect state court judgments from collateral 3 federal attack. Because district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, 4 they must decline jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence called upon to review the state court 5 decision.’” Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) 6 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). 7 To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, a district court first must 8 determine whether the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision. Noel v. 9 Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). A de facto appeal exists when “a federal plaintiff asserts 10 as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court 11 judgment based on that decision.” Id. at 1164 . If “a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de 12 facto appeal, . . . that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is ‘inextricably 13 intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is 14 brought.” Id. at 1158 . “Simply put, ‘the United States District Court, as a court of original 15 jurisdiction, has no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial 16 proceedings.’” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Worldwide 17 Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986)). 18 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when a state court judgment is not made by the 19 highest state court, Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218 , 221 (9th Cir. 1994), or 20 when a state court order is not final, Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 893 n.3. It also applies 21 when a plaintiff’s challenge to the state court’s actions involves federal constitutional issues. 22 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483–84. 23 Here, Plaintiff essentially seeks an order overturning the adverse decisions of Judge Proietti 24 establishing an estate’s claim of ownership to property and directing its transfer to the estate. (Doc. 25 1 at 3, 4–9.) She asserts as a legal wrong the allegedly erroneous state court orders and seeks relief 26 from those decisions. Plaintiff’s claim is plainly a de facto appeal of Judge Proietti’s rulings, and 27 the issues raised in this action are “inextricably intertwined” with Judge Proietti’s orders from which 28 the forbidden de facto appeal is taken. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction 1 over this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the complaint should be dismissed. 2 B. Judge Proietti is Entitled to Immunity 3 Even if the Rooker-Feldman did not preclude this action, Plaintiff’s action against Judge 4 Proietti would be subject to dismissal. It is well established that judges are absolutely immune from 5 civil suits for acts performed in their judicial capacities. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 6 U.S. 429 , 435 & n.10 (1993); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 , 11–12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 7 U.S. 349, 357-60 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). “[I]t is a general 8 principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in 9 exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without 10 apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872). 11 Absolute judicial immunity applies “however erroneous the act may have been, and however 12 injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240 , 13 1244 (9th Cir. 1996). Absolute judicial immunity applies not only to suits for damages, but also “to 14 actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief.” Mullis v. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of 15 Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 Plaintiff alleges that Judge Proietti’s orders violate the U.S. Constitution and are therefore a 17 “nullity.” (Doc. 1 at 3.) There are only two situations in which a judicial officer will not be entitled 18 to judicial immunity. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions 19 not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial 20 in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12 (internal 21 citations omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that “the factors determining whether an act by a 22 judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally 23 performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge 24 in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. 25 Here, Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Proietti is based solely on acts performed in his judicial 26 capacity: Plaintiff complains about the orders establishing the Estate of Robert Alan Hunter’s claim 27 of ownership to property and directing its transfer to the Estate that are signed by Judge Proietti and 28 attached to the complaint. Moreover, there are no facts alleged that Judge Proietti’s acts were taken 1 in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Rather, it appears the acts complained of, i.e., the issuance 2 of the adverse orders, were taken during the course of a probate case in Merced County Superior 3 Court in which Plaintiff appeared in pro per as a respondent. (See Doc. 1 at 4–9.) 4 Accordingly, Judge Proietti is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and Plaintiff’s claim 5 against him must be dismissed. 6 C. Leave to Amend is Not Recommended 7 The undersigned is mindful that, in general, a pro se litigant in a civil rights action should 8 be given “notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint” and provided with an opportunity to 9 amend the complaint to overcome such deficiencies. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132 , 1135–36 10 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, however, the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured and amendment 11 would be futile. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th 12 Cir. 2011); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (leave to amend is not appropriate 13 when “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”) (internal quotation 14 marks omitted); Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083 , 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“there is no 15 need to prolong the litigation” when “basic flaw” in pleading cannot be cured by amendment). 16 For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be 17 dismissed, without leave to amend. 18 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 19 Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed, without leave to amend; and 21 2. The Clerk of Court be instructed to close the case. 22 These findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States district judge 23 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within twenty-one 24 (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 25 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 26 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the [28] 1 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834 , 2 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). [3] IT IS SO ORDERED. [4] 5 Dated: April 22, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE