(PC) Felder v. Brewer

[7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 BOBBY DEWAYNE FELDER, Case No. 2:22-cv-01702-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER [13] v. DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO 14 RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE M. BREWER, et al., 15 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Defendants. 16 THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED [17] ECF No. 28 [18] OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN [19] DAYS [21] Plaintiff Bobby Dewayne Felder alleges that defendants Brewer and Steffensmeier used [22] excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants move for [23] summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the favorable termination rule. [24] ECF No. 28. Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition, ECF No. 29, and defendants have not [25] filed a reply. I recommend granting defendants’ motion. [1] 2 Background 3 Plaintiff, an inmate who was housed at Mule Creek State Prison, brings claims for 4 excessive force against correctional officers Brewer and Steffensmeier. Plaintiff alleged that on 5 March 1, 2022, while both defendants were escorting him to a program office, defendant Brewer 6 started squeezing his arm. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff demanded to know why Brewer was acting 7 that way, and when Brewer did not answer, plaintiff called Brewer “all sorts of names.” Id. 8 Defendants then removed plaintiff’s handcuffs and placed him in a holding cage. Id. While 9 plaintiff was in the cage, Brewer instructed plaintiff to undress for a search. Id. Plaintiff 10 responded “F-U” and demanded a sergeant instead. Id. After plaintiff refused to comply with 11 Brewer’s instructions again, Brewer instructed plaintiff to face the back of the cage. Id. Brewer 12 then pulled plaintiff out of the cage, “slammed [plaintiff] on the ground face first, then [plaintiff 13 felt] fist[s] hitting [him] in [his] head, face and upper torso area.” Id. He also felt a footstep on 14 his hip. Plaintiff alleges that because Brewer was punching him, Steffensmeier was necessarily 15 the one kicking him. Id. 16 Plaintiff was charged in a rule violation report (“RVR”) with battery on a peace officer 17 and a hearing was held on July 3, 2022. ECF No. 28-4 at 13. At the hearing, plaintiff pled not 18 guilty and offered this statement: “The Officer that said I hit him, my people called internal 19 affairs about him and hired an investigator to look into this . . . . He did this same exact thing to 20 eight other inmates at MCSP. I revoked the postponement so I could leave MCSP and get away 21 from him.” Id. at 15. 22 The hearing officer replied on the following evidence: 23 1. The Rules Violation Report authored on 03/27/2022 by Officer M. Brewer, in which they document attempting to place the subject [24] in handcuffs and observing the subject suddenly spin around to his 25 left and strike him (the Reporting Employee) in the face with his (the subject’s) fist. [26] 2. The Staff Narrative authored on 03/21/2022 by Officer D. 27 Rutledge, in which they document observing the subject turn [28] 1 abruptly to his left, step out of a Temporary Holding Cell and strike the Reporting Employee in the face with his right fist. [2] 3. The Staff Narrative authored on 03/21/2022 by Officer E. [3] Steffensmeier, in which they document observing the subject strike 4 the Reporting Employee in the face with his right fist. 5 4. The CDCR 7219 Medical Report of Injury completed on the Reporting Employee following the incident, which indicates that 6 they suffered bruising to their face. This injury is consistent with the Reporting Employee having been struck in the face by the [7] subject. 8 Id. at 16. The hearing officer found plaintiff guilty as charged. Id. at 15. Specifically, the officer 9 noted: [10] the subject’s act on March 21, 2022, at approximately 1746 hours, 11 of quickly turning to his left as the Reporting Employee was attempting to place him in handcuffs and striking the Reporting 12 Employee in the face with his (the subject’s) right fist, meets the standard required for a guilty finding of a violation of CCR, Title 13 15, Section 3005(d), Battery on a Peace Officer. The SHO determined that the documented observations of staff and the [14] supporting evidence (medical report indicating the Reporting 15 Employee suffered injuries consistent with getting punched in the face) outweigh the subject’s not guilty plea and the evidence 16 offered in his defense and support a finding that the subject willfully and unlawfully touched the Reporting Employee in a [17] harmful manner, and that the subject knew the Reporting Employee was a Peace Officer when he did so. As such, the subject’s [18] behavior meets the elements of the charged offense, and a finding 19 of guilty is therefore appropriate. 20 Id. at 16. The hearing officer assessed plaintiff 150 days loss of credit, which is consistent with 21 plaintiff’s CDCR credit calculation worksheet. Id. at 10-11; 16. 22 Plaintiff sat for a deposition. During it, he testified that when he was unhandcuffed in the 23 cage, Brewer directed him to turn around and face the back of the cage so that Brewer could 24 handcuff him. ECF No. 28-3 at 17. Plaintiff explained that Brewer opened the cage door, threw 25 plaintiff to the ground, and started punching him. Id. at 17-18. [26] Q: . . . So my question is, did you turn around and punch Officer 27 Brewer when he told you to cuff—or turn around, or did they come in and grab you and throw you on the ground? [28] 1 A: I didn’t punch him. And I remember everything, because I got beat up. [2] Q. But you remember specifically you did not turn around and [3] punch him? [4] A. I definitely didn’t. [5] Id. at 20. When plaintiff was asked about his version of events and the version of events in the [6] RVR, plaintiff conceded that both events could not have happened as reported. Id. at 23 (Plaintiff [7] testified that “[o]ne of the stories is the truth and one is a lie.”). [8] Legal Standard [9] A. Summary Judgment [10] Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material [11] fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington [12] Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207 , 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine [13] only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, [14] while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” [15] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computs., Inc., 818 16 F.2d 1422 , 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). [17] Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary [18] judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. [19] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765 , 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule [20] 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a [21] single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The same standards apply to [22] both a motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. 23 P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). [24] Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials [25] in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or [26] (2) argument showing either that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a [27] genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support [28] 1 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 2 materials in the record not cited by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026 , 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); see 4 also Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 5 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 6 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 7 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 8 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 9 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 10 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 11 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 12 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 13 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 ). The non-moving party must 14 “show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty 15 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to 16 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual 17 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 18 trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 19 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 20 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 21 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 22 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 23 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 24 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 25 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the non-moving 26 party. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred 27 Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). [28] 1 B. Favorable Termination Rule 2 “A state prisoner cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the ‘fact or duration of his 3 confinement,’ because such an action lies at the ‘core of habeas corpus.’” Simpson v. Thomas, [4] 528 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). 5 Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would 6 necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must first establish that 7 the underlying sentence or conviction has already been invalidated on appeal, by a habeas 8 petition, or terminated in his favor via some other similar proceeding. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 9 U.S. 487 -88 (1994). This “favorable termination” rule applies to prison disciplinary proceedings, 10 if those proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior credits. Edwards v. Balisok, [11] 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997) (holding that a claim for monetary and declaratory relief challenging 12 validity of procedures used to deprive prisoner of good-time credits is not cognizable under 13 § 1983). 14 Conversely, a § 1983 claim that will not necessarily invalidate the underlying disciplinary 15 action may proceed. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004) (discussing “the 16 mistaken view expressed in Circuit precedent that Heck applies categorically to all suits 17 challenging prison disciplinary proceedings”); see also Hooper v. Cnty. of San Diego, 629 F.3d 18 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fourth Amendment excessive force claim not Heck-barred because 19 “[a] holding in [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 case that the use of the dog was excessive force would not 20 negate the lawfulness of the initial arrest attempt, or negate the unlawfulness of [the plaintiff’s] 21 attempt to resist it”) (internal quotation omitted). 22 Analysis 23 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s excessive force claims are barred by Heck and Edwards. 24 Specifically, defendants contend that plaintiff’s excessive force claim is barred because it is 25 fundamentally inconsistent with his conviction for battery on a peace officer. ECF No. 28 at 7. 26 Additionally, they argue that plaintiff’s loss of 150 good-time credits have not been restored. Id. 27 at 8. Finally, they argue that plaintiff’s penalty extended his release date. Id. Plaintiff has filed a 28 statement of non-opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 29. 1 As an initial matter, there is no dispute that plaintiff’s guilty finding is valid or that 2 plaintiff’s release date was postponed due to the loss of credits. ECF No. 28-3 at 11; 27-29; cf. 3 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here . . . a successful § 1983 action 4 would not necessarily result in an earlier release from incarceration . . . the favorable termination 5 rule of Heck and Edwards does not apply.”). 6 The key issue is whether the events in the complaint and the events in the RVR were 7 wholly inconsistent with each other such that a finding in plaintiff’s favor would necessarily 8 imply the invalidity of the RVR conviction. Instructive on this issue is Hernandez v. Holman, 9 No. 17-cv-3946-SVW-GJS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94202 , (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2017). The 10 prisoner-plaintiff in that case alleged, among other things, that the defendant-officer punched the 11 plaintiff in the face after he made a derogatory comment towards the defendant. Id. at *4. In 12 contrast, the RVR found that the plaintiff made the same comment to the defendant; challenged 13 the defendant to fight; pulled away, lunged, and headbutted the defendant; and the defendant used 14 force to subdue the plaintiff. Id. at *13. The plaintiff was found guilty of battery on a peace 15 officer. Id. at *4. In assessing the validity of the plaintiff’s excessive force claim, the court found 16 the claim was Heck-barred because in order for the plaintiff’s version of events to be true, the 17 court would have necessarily found that the RVR conviction was invalid. Id. at *14-15. 18 Here, plaintiff’s version of events is directly at odds with the finding in the RVR. Plaintiff 19 testified that while he was unhandcuffed, Brewer took him out of the holding cage and hit him. 20 ECF No. 28-3 at 17-18. The RVR, however, found that when Brewer was attempting to handcuff 21 plaintiff, plaintiff turned and punched Brewer. ECF No. 28-4 at 16. Because plaintiff’s 22 allegations are necessarily at odds with the RVR’s finding that resulted in his conviction, I 23 recommend finding that his claim is barred. See Alexander v. Munguia, No. 2:21-cv-01390-KJM24 CKD (P), 2023 WL 5806986 , at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2023) (“If the allegations in the amended 25 complaint are accepted as true, then plaintiff cannot be guilty of assault on a peace officer 26 rendering his disciplinary conviction invalid.”); Burton v. Chenoweth, No. 14-cv-2331-KJN-P, [27] 2015 WL 7758476 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim was Heck [28] 1 | barred where the “Plaintiff's disciplinary conviction and his excessive force claim arise from the 2 || same incident, and the two versions of events are entirely inconsistent with one another”). 3 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of Court randomly assign a district 4 | judge to this matter. 5 Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 28, be granted. 7 2. Plaintiffs claims be dismissed under the favorable termination rule. 8 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 10 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(). Within fourteen days 11 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 12 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 13 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 14 | objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 15 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 16 || appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 17 | v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). [18] 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 ( q oy — Dated: _ May 14, 2024 q_—— 21 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE