PersonalWeb Technologies LLC v. EMC Corporation

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION — 7 — PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Case No. 5:13-cv-01317-EJD — 8 — Plaintiff, 9 Re: Dkt. No. 361 v. — 10 — GOOGLE LLC, et al., — 11 — Defendants. — 12 — 13 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Case No. 5:13-cv-01356-EJD Plaintiff, 14 Re: Dkt. No. 85 v. — 15 — FACEBOOK INC., — 16 — 17 Defendant. Case No. 5:13-cv-01358-EJD 18 PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES LLC, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 78 19 Plaintiffs, 20 v. 21 EMC CO RPORATION, et al., ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 22 Defendants. PLEADINGS — 23 — Plaintiff PersonalWeb Technologies LLC owns a family of patents that claim methods for — 24 — reliably identifying, locating, and processing data in a computer network. Plaintiff alleges that — 25 — Defendants infringed three of these patents. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s patents are invalid — 26 — pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 . The Court finds this motion suitable for consideration without oral — 27 — 1 argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the Parties’ papers, the Court 2 GRANTS Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Background 5 Plaintiff argues that Defendants (collectively or separately) infringed U.S. Patent No. (“the 6 ’310 patent”), No. 6,415,280 (“the ’280 patent”), and No. 7,949,662 (“the ’662 patent”). The three 7 patents at issue are part of a larger family of patents that Plaintiff calls the “True Name” patents. 8 The patents are aimed at combatting the problems of data storage on larger networks. As 9 computer networking and storage systems evolve, files can be divided and stored across different 10 devices in dispersed locations. This created problems—different users can unknowingly give 11 identical names to identical files. The inventors of the “True Name” patents patented a solution; 12 they developed a system that replaces conventional file names with unique content-based 13 identifiers. This is done by applying a “hash function” (a mathematical algorithm) to the data in 14 each file. For instance, as described in the ’310 patent, an item’s unique content creates a unique 15 identifier. A myriad of data items can be used to create the unique identifier, which ensures 16 duplicate copies are not created. See, e.g., ’310 patent, (2:18–21) (“[A] data item may be the 17 contents of a file, a portion of a file, a page in memory, an object in an object-oriented program, a 18 digital message, a digital scanned image, a part of a video or audio signal, or any other entity 19 which can be represented by a sequence of bits.”). The three patents acknowledge that the “True 20 Name,” i.e. the assigned identifier, is intended for use with “existing” operating systems and 21 “standard” data-management processes. Id. (6:26). 22 The ’310 Patent. The ’310 patent explains a method and apparatus for creating a unique 23 data-identifier for each file based on the content of the data item. The identifier is independent of 24 the data item’s user-defined name/location, which helps ensure duplicate copies are not created. 25 The identifier for a particular data item is created by applying a cryptographic hash function to the 26 data claim. The output of the hash function is the content-based identifier or “True Name,” which 27 is “virtually guaranteed” to be unique to the data item. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., — 1 — 917 F.3d 1376 , 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The system uses the content-based identifier to 2 determine whether a particular data item is present on the system. And, when the data item’s 3 contents are changed, the content-based identifier is also changed. The identifiers are then used to 4 determine if access to a data item is licensed or authorized. See, e.g., ’310 patent (claims 24, 81, 5 86). 6 Five claims of the ’310 patent are at issue. Plaintiff contends Defendant EMC/VMware 7 infringed claims 24 and 31 of the patent. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Google/YouTube, 8 Facebook, and EMC/VMware infringed claims 81, 82, and 86 of the patent. The relevant claims 9 of the ’310 patent are as follows: 10 24. A computer-implemented method implemented at least in part by hardware comprising one or more processors, the method comprising: — 11 — (a) using a processor, receiving at a first computer from a second computer, a request 12 regarding a particular data item, said request including at least a content-dependent name for the particular data item, the content-dependent name being based, at least in part, on at 13 least a function of the data in the particular data item, wherein the data used by the function to determine the content-dependent name comprises at least some of the contents of the 14 particular data item, wherein the function that was used comprises a message digest function or a hash function, and wherein two identical data items will have the same 15 content-dependent name; and 16 (b) in response to said request: (i) causing the content-dependent name of the particular data item to be compared 17 to a plurality of values; 18 (ii) hardware in combination with software determining whether or not access to the particular data item is unauthorized based on whether the content-dependent 19 name of the particular data item corresponds to at least one of said plurality of values, and — 20 — (iii) based on said determining in step (ii), not allowing the particular data item to 21 be provided to or accessed by the second computer if it is determined that access to the particular data item is not authorized. — 22 — 31. The method of claim 211 wherein, for each particular data item of the plurality of data — 23 — — 24 — 1 Claim 21 claims: — 25 — A computer-implemented method implemented at least in part by hardware comprising one or 26 more processors, the method comprising: 27 (a) obtaining a list of content-dependent names, one for each of a plurality of data items, wherein, for each particular data item of the plurality of data items, the corresponding content-dependent items, the corresponding content-dependent name for that particular data item was based 1 on a function of all of the contents of that particular data item. 2 81. A device operable in a network of computers, the device comprising hardware including at least one processor and memory, to: — 3 — (a) receive, at said device, from another device in the network, a content-based identifier 4 for a particular sequence of bits, the content-based identifier being based at least in part on a function of at least some of the particular sequence of bits, wherein the function 5 comprises a message digest function or a hash function, and wherein two identical sequences of bits will have the same content-based identifier, and to — 6 — (b) compare the content-based identifier of the particular sequence of bits to a plurality of 7 values; and to 8 (c) selectively allow said particular sequence of bits to be provided to or accessed by other devices depending on whether or not said content-dependent identifier corresponds to one 9 of the plurality of values. 10 82. The device of claim 81 wherein the particular sequence of bits represent data selected from the group comprising: a file, a portion of a file, a page in memory, a digital message, 11 a portion of a digital message, a digital image, a portion of a digital image, a video signal, a portion of a video signal, an audio signal, a portion of an audio signal, a Software 12 product, and a portion of a software product. 13 86. A device operable in a network of computers, the device comprising hardware, including at least one processor and memory, to: — 14 — (a) receive at said device, from another device in the network, a digital identifier for a 15 particular sequence of bits, the digital identifier being based, at least in part, on a given function of at least some of the bits in the particular sequence of bits, wherein the given 16 function comprises a message digest function or a hash function, and wherein two identical sequences of bits will have the same digital identifier; and — 17 — (b) selectively allow the particular sequence of bits to be provided to or accessed by other 18 devices in the system, based at least in part on whether or not the digital identifier for the particular sequence of bits corresponds to a value in a plurality of values, each of the — 19 — — 20 — name for that particular data item is based at least in part on a function of at least Some of the 21 contents of the particular data item, wherein the function comprises a message digest function or a hash function, and wherein two identical data items have the same content-dependent name on the 22 list of content dependent names; 23 (b) receiving at a first location, and from a second location distinct from said first location, a content-dependent identifier corresponding to a particular data item, said content-dependent 24 identifier being based at least in part on at least some of the contents of the particular data item; 25 (c) at said first location, by a processor, in combination with software, determining, based at least in part on said content-dependent identifier for said particular data item, and using said list of 26 content-dependent names, whether a requestor may access the particular data item; and 27 (d) based on said determining in (c), if it is determined that the requestor may not access the particular data item, causing access to the particular data item to be denied. plurality of values being based, at least in part, on the given function of at least some of the 1 bits in a corresponding sequence of bits. 2 The ’280 Patent. The ’280 patent addresses a method of identifying and requesting data 3 in a network using content-based identifiers. Specifically, it covers a situation where data items 4 are distributed across a network of servers and some of the data items are cached (stored) versions 5 from a source server. The content delivery network (“CDN”) determines a “True Name,” i.e. a 6 content-dependent identifier, for a particular data item (as in the ’310 patent). In response to a 7 request for a particular data item, the CDN provides the particular data item from one of the 8 servers in the network of servers. 9 Four claims of the ’280 patent are at issue. Plaintiff contends Defendants Facebook, 10 Google, and YouTube infringed claims 15 and 16. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Facebook infringed 11 claims 31 and 31. The relevant claims of the ’280 patent are as follows: 12 15. A method as in claim 102 further comprising: 13 resolving the request for the particular data file based on a measure of availability of at least one of the servers. — 14 — 16. A method as in claim 15 wherein the measure of availability is based on one or more 15 of: 16 (a) a measurement of bandwidth to the Server; 17 (b) a measurement of a cost of a connection to the server, and 18 (c) a measurement of a reliability of a connection to the SCWC. 19 31. A content delivery method, comprising: — 20 — — 21 — 2 Claim 10 claims: — 22 — A content delivery method, comprising: — 23 — distributing a set of data files across a network of servers; — 24 — determining a data identifier for a particular data file, the data identifier being determined using a 25 given function of the data, wherein said data used by the given function to determine the data identifier comprises the contents of the particular data file; and — 26 — in response to a request for the particular data file, the request including at least the data identifier 27 of the particular data file, providing the particular data file from a given one of the servers of the network of servers, said providing being based on the data identifier of the particular data file. distributing a set of data files across a network of servers, — 1 — determining an MD5 hash of the contents of a particular data file; and — 2 — in response to a request for the particular data file, the request including at least the MD5 3 hash of the particular data file, providing the particular data file from a given one of the Servers of the network of Servers, Said providing being based on the MD5 hash of the 4 particular data file. 5 32. A method as in claim 31 further comprising: resolving the request for the particular data file based on a measure of availability of at least one of the servers. — 6 — The ’662 Patent. The ’662 patent addresses the de-duplication of data in a data7 processing system. The invention describes systems and methods for deleting a particular copy of — 8 — a data item when at least one other copy of the copy of the data item is available. The presence of — 9 — another copy of the data item is determined based on a content-dependent identifier for the data — 10 — item, which is calculated using the methods described in the ’310 and ’280 patents. A duplicate — 11 — copy may be deleted if it is determined another copy exists elsewhere on another processor in the — 12 — system. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Google/YouTube infringed claim 33 of the ’662 patent. — 13 — The relevant claim is: — 14 — 33. A file system comprising: — 15 — (i) a plurality of servers to store file data as segments; and — 16 — (ii) first data that includes file identifiers for files for which the file data are stored as 17 segments; and 18 (iii) second data that maps the file identifiers to the segments to which the file identifiers correspond; and — 19 — (iv) location data that identifies which of the plurality of servers stores which of the 20 segments; and 21 (v) a table including file identifiers for files in the file system, said table including a corresponding status for at least some of the files in the file system, — 22 — (vi) at least one computer comprising hardware in combi nation with software and 23 connected to the plurality of servers, the at least one computer programmed: 24 (A) to receive a request to delete a particular data item in the file system; 25 (B) to ascertain, in response to said request, a digital data item identifier corresponding to said particular data item, said particular data item consisting of an arbitrary sequence 26 of bits consisting of a sequence of non-overlapping segments, each of said segments in said sequence being stored on multiple servers of the plurality of servers in the file 27 system, said digital data item identifier being based at least in part on a given function of the data comprising the particular data item, said given function comprising a hash 1 function; 2 (C) to update an entry in said table corresponding to said particular data item to reflect deletion of said particular data item in the file system, said entry including at least said 3 digital data item identifier of said particular data item. 4 B. Procedural History 5 In late 2013, after Plaintiff filed actions against Defendants in the Eastern District of 6 Texas, Judge Davis issued a claim construction order. Dkt. 178 (5:13-cv-01317-EJD). In the 7 order, Judge Davis construed terms in the claims at issue as follows: 8 1. Data items: “sequence of bits” 9 2. Data files: “a named data item(s)” 10 3. Substantially unique identifier, Data identifier, True Name, Digital identifier, Data item 11 identifier: “an identity for a data item generated by processing all of the data in the data 12 item, and only the data in the data item, through an algorithm that makes the identifier 13 substantially unique” 14 Id. at 47. 15 The cases were subsequently transferred to the Northern District of California. Before 16 transfer, EMC and VMware filed a series of petitions for inter partes review (“IPR”) with the 17 Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) challenging the validity of the ’280 and ’662 patents. 18 The IPRs also challenged the validity of the ’791, ’539, ’544, and ’096 patents, which are relevant 19 to this case because these patents have identical specifications and priority dates to the three True 20 Name patents at issue. The PTAB found in six separate decisions that it was known in the prior 21 art to use content-based identifiers, based on “hashes” of data items, for the kinds of data22 management tasks that Plaintiff claims. The PTAB determined many claims in the “True Name” 23 patents were not novel and were thus invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 . The PTAB determined: — 24 — 1. Claims 1–4, 29–33, and 41 of the ’791 patent were invalid because the prior art 25 (Woodhill’s backup procedures) already disclosed a method for detecting and avoiding duplicate binary object identifiers. See Declaration of Marissa A. Lalli in Support of 26 Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Lalli Decl.”), Ex. A at 39. The PTAB thus invalidated the claims in the’791 patent that patented a method of using 27 content-based identifiers to identify and access data items because Woodhill already outlined a method of using a binary hash3 algorithm to calculate a binary object identifier — 1 — from the “content of the data” instead of “from an external or arbitrary source.” Id. at 15 . 2 Like Plaintiff’s claimed method, the identifier “changes when the contents of the binary object changes.” Id. at 16 . — 3 — 2. Claims 36 and 38 of the ’280 patent were invalid because the prior art (Woodhill’s self4 auditing procedure) disclosed a method of using content-based identifiers to identify and request a data item based on the “hash of contents” of the data item. Id., Ex. B at 17. As — 5 — noted by Defendants’ expert, Dr. Clark, such an “operation was routine because it was old 6 and well-known to identify and request objects using their identifiers.” Id. 7 3. Claim 30 of the ’662 patent was invalid because the prior art (Kantor’s method of identifying duplicate files) disclosed a method of using content-based identifiers, based on 8 hash functions, to identify duplicate files. Id., Ex. C at 9, 11, 15. — 9 — 4. Claims 10 and 21 of the ’539 patent were invalid because prior art (Langer) already 10 disclosed a method of accessing files in a network of computers. Id., Ex. D at 20. Langer already disclosed a method of calculating a unique identifier for a file using an MD5 hash 11 function on the contents of the component file, rather than the file’s location. Id. 12 5. Claim 1 of the ’544 patent was invalid because prior art (Woodhill) already disclosed a system for distributed storage management on a computer network system using binary — 13 — object identifiers. Id., Ex. E at 14. Claim 1 was invalid because it claimed a method of 14 using content-based identifiers to compare files, which was already anticipated by Woodhill. Id. at 22 . — 15 — The Federal Circuit affirmed these PTAB decisions. Id., Ex. G. Accordingly, there is no — 16 — dispute that it was known in the art to use content-based identifiers, based on “hashes” of data — 17 — items, for data-management in multi-server computer networks. — 18 — Apple (who is not a Defendant in this action) filed a separate IPR challenging the ’310 — 19 — patent. The PTAB held the asserted claims unpatentable as not novel. The Federal Circuit, — 20 — however, reversed the PTAB’s findings and accepted Plaintiff’s argument that the prior art (the — 21 — Woodhill system) did not inherently disclose comparing one content-based identifier with a — 22 — plurality of identifiers. PersonalWeb, 917 F.3d at 1382–83. Rather, the prior art only disclosed a — 23 — one-to-one comparison. Id. at 1382 . Thus, Plaintiff could claim a method of comparing one — 24 — content-based identifier with multiple identifiers without violating 35 U.S.C. § 102 . — 25 — — 26 — 27 3 The True Name patents use the terms “hash” and “message digest” interchangeably. ’310 (40:12). “Message digest” functions (like MD5) are a type of hash function. 12:43–46). 1 While the Federal Circuit held that the claims in the ’310 patent were novel, the court 2 acknowledged that many claims in Plaintiff’s True Name patents were invalid since the prior art 3 disclosed a system for (1) using content-based identifiers, (2) calculated using the contents of a 4 data item,4 (3) which are stored with certain other information, in a binary object identification 5 record, (4) to perform file-management functions, like backing-up files or restoring systems, (5) 6 which check to see if binary objects have changed since the system’s most recent backup, and (6) 7 control access to data items stored in a repository by granting authorization to digital works via a 8 “digital ticket” that identifies whether a user is entitled access to a file. PersonalWeb Techs. v. 9 Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 10 Defendants now argue that the asserted claims of the ’310, ’280, and ’662 “True Name” 11 patents are abstract and not eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 . Defendants’ 12 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Mot.”), Dkt. 361; see also Reply in Support of 13 Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Reply”), Dkt. 364. Plaintiff argues in 14 opposition that the asserted claims are not abstract and are protected under Section 101. Plaintiff’s 15 Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Opp.”), Dkt. 362. Because 16 Section 101 challenges are not available in IPRs, the True Patents’ eligibility on this ground has 17 not yet been decided. Neptune Generics, LLC v. Eli Lilly & Co., 921 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 18 2019); 35 U.S.C. § 311 (b) (stating that in an IPR, a petitioner is limited to grounds that “could be 19 raised under section 102 or 103”). The Court now decides whether the asserted claims are 20 protected by Section 101. 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 23 A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is a 24 “means to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint after an answer has been filed.” New.Net, — 25 — 26 4 Dr. Clark explained that content-based identifiers are created by “hashing” the contents of a data item so that identical items have the same identifier. Dr. Robert Dewar conceded in his deposition 27 that this concept was disclosed in the prior art that was the focus of the IPRs. Declaration of Marissa A. Lalli in Support of Reply (“Lalli Reply Decl.”), Ex. H at 136. 1 Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1115 (C.D. Cal.2004). The standard is functionally 2 identical to a motion to dismiss. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th 3 Cir. 1989). On a Rule 12(c) motion, disputed material facts preclude judgment. Hal Roach 4 Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1990) (“Judgment on 5 the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that 6 no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 7 law.”). In deciding such a motion, the Court may consider the pleadings, documents incorporated 8 by reference in the pleadings, and matters of judicial notice. Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor 9 Co., 189 F.3d 971 , 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When considering a motion for judgment on the 10 pleadings, this court may consider facts that ‘are contained in materials of which the court may 11 take judicial notice.’” (citation omitted)).5 12 B. Conversion 13 Plaintiff argues the Court should convert Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 14 pleadings into one for summary judgment. This would allow the Court to consider the 15 concurrently filed Declaration of Dr. Samuel Russ, Ph.D. Defendants object and argue, in the 16 alternative, that if the Court converts the motion into one for summary judgment, it should defer 17 deciding the motion until Defendants can depose Plaintiff’s expert, present their own evidence, 18 and brief an argument under the summary judgment standard. Reply at 15 n.11. 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that a motion for judgment on the 20 pleadings may be filed “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial[.]” 21 “Conversion to summary judgment is generally not appropriate where . . . only the nonmoving 22 party has introduced evidentiary exhibits in response to . . . a motion for judgment on the 23 pleadings.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 2016 WL 4373698 , at *4 24 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2016) (collecting cases). Generally, a district court should give parties notice of 25 its intent to convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. — 26 — 27 5 The IPR materials cited by Defendants and Plaintiff are subject to judicial notice. See Atlas IP LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 1719545 , at *1 n.1. 1 James v. Poole, 2013 WL 132492 , at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013). 2 Plaintiff argues that, in the interest of fairness and timing, the lengthy duration of the 3 litigation and the fact that discovery is nearly closed support converting Defendants’ motion into 4 one for summary judgment. Opp. at 9. In Plaintiff’s view, the Court should not sanction 5 Defendants’ “tactical” use of a Rule 12(c) motion. Opp. at 10–11. Plaintiff also argues that 6 because genuine issues of material fact exist, judgment on the pleadings is improper. 7 Defendants object to conversion and contend that Plaintiff’s use Dr. Russ to “manufacture 8 a factual dispute.” Reply at 14, 15. They point to the fact that despite the length of litigation, Dr. 9 Russ has never been involved in the case. Defendants also argue Dr. Russ’s declaration does not 10 create a genuine issue of material fact because the declaration is directly contrary to multiple 11 PTAB findings and Federal Circuit rulings. Hence, the purported disputes are not genuine and do 12 not preclude a Rule 12(c) motion. 13 The Court declines to convert the motion into one for summary judgment. Conversion to 14 summary judgment is generally not appropriate when, as here, only the nonmoving party has 15 introduced evidentiary exhibits in response to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Two16 Way Media Ltd., 2016 WL 4373698 at *4. Only Plaintiff, the nonmovant, has introduced 17 evidence not subject to judicial notice. Furthermore, conversion is only appropriate where a party 18 has notice. See James, 2013 WL 132492 at *2. Here, Defendants did not have notice of 19 conversion. At a joint conference, the Court instructed Defendants to file a joint motion for 20 judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff neither objected to this nor indicated it intended to convert 21 the motion into one for summary judgment. See Transcript of Proceedings, Dkt. 133 (parties only 22 discussed a Rule 12(c) motion with the Court). Reneging on this discussion and converting the 23 motion into one for summary judgment would produce waste—the Court would have wasted its 24 time in discussing a Rule 12(c) motion with the Parties and Defendants would have wasted their 25 time preparing Rule 12(c) briefing. See Reply at 15 n.11. 26 Plaintiff’s timeliness argument is unconvincing. The fact that these cases have been 27 pending for nearly six years is obviated by the multiple IPRs and Federal Circuit appeals. Indeed, 1 once these IPRs and appeals concluded, Defendants immediately filed their Rule 12(c) motion. 2 See Richter, 2018 WL 6728515 at *6. Given this timeline and the fact that no trial date is set, the 3 motion was filed “early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(C). The motion is thus 4 timely. The Court thus fails to see how Rule 12(c) is being “tactically used” when Defendants 5 brought the motion at the earliest opportunity. 6 Finally, to the extent factual disputes exist, neither the summary judgment nor motion for 7 judgment on the pleadings standard allow this Court to find for Defendants. Accordingly, 8 Plaintiff’s request for conversion is DENIED and Dr. Russ’s declaration will not be used. 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that may contain underlying 11 issues of fact. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see 12 also Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Hence, when the 13 “basic character of the claimed subject matter is readily ascertainable from the face of the patent,” 14 courts may determine patent eligibility at the motion for judgment on the pleadings stage. See 15 Internet Patents Corp. v. Gen. Auto. Ins. Servs., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1268 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 16 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 , the scope of patentable subject matter includes “any new and 17 useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 18 improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that this provision contains an 19 important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 20 patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 , 216 (2014) (quotation marks 21 and citation omitted). These three exceptions are “the basic tools of scientific and technological 22 work” and monopolization of these tools “might tend to impede innovation more than it would 23 tend to promote it, thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws.” Id. (quotation marks 24 and citation omitted). 25 In three recent cases, the Supreme Court has established a legal framework for determining 26 if an exception applies. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 27 Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Alice Corp., 573 U.S. 208 . As elaborated in 1 Alice, the § 101 eligibility inquiry proceeds in two steps. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–18. First, 2 the court determines whether the patent(s) at issue are directed to an abstract idea, law of nature, 3 or natural phenomenon. Id. at 217. If the court determines the patent(s) do not cover an excepted 4 subject matter, the inquiry ends. Id. If, however, the patent(s) do focus on one of these categories, 5 the court proceeds to the second step, where it determines if “the elements of each claim both 6 individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ . . . ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent7 eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 78 ). If the claims fail to 8 provide this “inventive concept,” the patent is ineligible. Id. at 217–18. 9 Accordingly, the Court must first decide whether the three True Name patents at issue 10 cover an excepted subject-matter, i.e. an abstract concept, and, if yes, whether an “inventive 11 concept” exists. 12 A. Alice/Mayo Step One 13 1. Foundational Background 14 At step one of the Alice framework, the Court “look[s] at the focus of the claimed advance 15 over the prior art to determine if the claim’s character as a whole is directed to excluded subject 16 matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 17 Courts must be careful not to overgeneralize claims otherwise “all inventions can be reduced to 18 underlying principles of nature.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 , 189 n.12 (1981). On the other 19 hand, the judicial inquiry should root out “creative drafting efforts” designed to “monopolize” the 20 abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “In cases involving software innovations, this inquiry 21 often turns on whether the claims focus on ‘the specific asserted improvement in computer 22 capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are 23 invoked merely as a tool.’” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat System, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 24 2018) (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 , 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 25 Merely stating an “improved result” to an otherwise abstract idea is insufficient; the patent must 26 recite a “specific means or method that solves a problem in an existing technological process.” 27 Koninkliijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143 , 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 1 Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is what problem the patent claims to solve and whether the 2 patent specifically asserts a method to make improvements. 3 Four recent Federal Circuit cases, which Plaintiff relies on, illustrate the Alice step one 4 inquiry. In Enfish, the court held that a software patent covering a “self-referential database” did 5 not constitute an abstract idea. 822 F.3d at 1337–38. There, unlike the prior model of “relational 6 databases,” which generated multiple and separate data-tables for each entity, the plaintiff’s 7 patents claimed a self-referential model that allowed all of the information in a database to be 8 contained and displayed in a single table. Id. at 1330, 1337 . Thus, the patents sought to improve a 9 concrete software-specific inefficiency that had existed in referential databases. This made the 10 patents different from cases like Alice where a patent-holder simply wanted to add conventional 11 computer components to well-known business practices. Id. at 1338 . Because the self-referential 12 table was a specific type of data structure distinct from the abstract idea of improving the way a 13 computer stores and retrieves data in memory, the patent was not so sweeping that “general14 purpose computer components” could be added “post-hoc to a fundamental economic practice or 15 mathematical equation.” Id. at 1339 ; cf. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (noting that the judicial inquiry 16 should root out creative drafting designed to monopolize an abstract idea). 17 In McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., the court held that the patent was 18 not abstract because the claims were limited to rules with specific characteristics. 837 F.3d 1299 , 19 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There, the patent at issue claimed a method of using a computer to 20 automate conventional activity. Specifically, the patent covered a method of accurately and 21 realistically syncing lip and facial expressions in animated characters. Id.at 1314. Previously, this 22 could only be produced by human animators. Id. It did this through an “ordered combination of 23 claimed steps, using unconventional rules that relate subsequences of phonemes, timings, and 24 morph weight sets.” Id. at 1302–03. The court focused its analysis on the specific rules claimed 25 in the patent—as in Enfish, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules to resolve 26 a specific ineffiency, thereby obviating the fear that the patent covered an “entire abstract idea” 27 and could preempt all innovation in the field. See id. at 1314–15 (noting patent’s rules ensured 1 “future alternative discoveries were not foreclosed”). 2 In Finjan, the court held the patent was not abstract because the patent addressed a 3 software-based innovation prescribed by specific steps. 879 F.3d at 1303–06. There, the patent at 4 issue was directed to a method of providing computer security by scanning a downloadable 5 program and attaching results of that scan to the downloadable in the form of a “security profile.” — 6 — Id. at 1303 . This operation is distinguished from traditional, “code-matching” virus scans that are 7 limited to recognizing the presence of previously-identified viruses. Id. at 1304 . The claimed 8 method thus “constitute[d] an improvement in computer functionality.” Id. Much like in Enfish, 9 the virus improvement constituted a “non-abstract improvement to computer technology” because 10 it addressed a specific inefficiency, namely it “employ[ed] a new kind of file that enable[d] a 11 computer security system to do things it could not do before.” Id. at 1305 . And, much like 12 McRO, the claims recited specific steps and thus claimed more than “a mere result.” Id.; see also 13 Koninkliijke KPN N.V v. Gemalto M2M GmbH., 942 F.3d 1143 , 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding, 14 like in Finjan, claimed invention not abstract because it “employ[ed] a new way of generating 15 check data” (emphasis added)). 16 Contrast these cases with In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607 17 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There, the patent at issue related to an “apparatus for recording of a digital 18 image, communicating the digital image from the recording device to a storage device, and [] 19 administering the digital image in the storage device.” Id. at 609 . The claims were directed to 20 storing and organizing digital photos. Id. The court determined that the patent covered an abstract 21 idea because it did not claim any new technology or use of such technology. Id. at 612 . Instead, it 22 “describe[d] the system and methods in purely functional terms” and failed to provide “any 23 technical details for the tangible components.” Id. The claims were “simply directed to the 24 abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner.” Id. at 613 . Thus, 25 the patent, unlike the aforementioned cases, was abstract because the patent covered the 26 conventional application of known ideas. Indeed, the patent failed to describe any type of method 27 for improving software functionality or solving a specific technological problem. Id. at 613 . 1 These cases stand for four principles: first, when claims recite purely functional language 2 and use conventional technology in a typical manner, the claims are not patent eligible. See Elec. 3 Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s 4 holding that patent was abstract because claims only focused on the combination of “abstract-idea 5 processes” without adding any “particular assertedly inventive technology” or processes). Second, 6 and relatedly, claims that merely recite steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical 7 algorithms, without more, are abstract mental processes. See TLI, 823 F.3d at 613 (holding that 8 claims were abstract because they simply recited the abstract ideas of “classifying and storing 9 digital images in an organized manner”). Third, as Finjan and Enfish show, eligibility requires 10 some fixed subject-matter with fixed parameters. See Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305–06 (holding patent 11 was not abstract because it claimed a specific way to accomplish specific result). Finally, a result, 12 even if innovative, is not patentable. Id. at 1305 (collecting cases). Only the specific steps that 13 accomplish an innovative result are patentable. Id. These four principles reaffirm that preemption 14 is at the heart of the Mayo/Alice analysis. By constraining patentability, courts aim to balance 15 innovation and monopolization. 16 Accordingly, at step one, the inquiry must be: what a patent is “directed to?” This ensures 17 that the patent seeks to resolve a specific problem through specific means, thus ensuring the field 18 is not completely occupied and creativity is not preempted. 19 2. The ’380, ’280, and ’662 Patents Are Directed to an Abstract Idea 20 The claims in the True Name patents at issue are directed to: 21 1. ’310 patent: using a known, content-based identifier to control access to data. 22 2. ’280 patent: retrieving and delivering copies of data items across a network of servers. 23 3. ’662 patent: identifying copies of identical data items in a network of servers based on the 24 data’s unique content-based identifier and deleting one of the duplicate data copies. 25 The Parties do not dispute this. See Opp. at 14, 24. Hence, the True Name patents, 26 broadly construed, focus on the idea of using content-based identifiers to manage data in a 27 computer system. 1 Even accepting this, Plaintiff argues that the True Name patents are not abstract. First, 2 Plaintiff contends the claims are not abstract because “[n]othing like this existed at the time.” 3 Opp. at 14. Alternatively, Plaintiff contends the patents cover a specific improvement in data4 management, namely a method that identifies any variable sequence of bits within a network, 5 based on the data file’s content, to more efficiently locate, access, and de-duplicate data in a 6 network . Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues the claims do not simply recite a desired result, they 7 “explain how [it] is done.” Id. at 15. 8 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s assessment. The three patents are all directed to the 9 same abstract three-step process: (1) using a content-based identifier generated from a “hash or 10 message digest function,” (2) comparing that content-based identifier against something else, i.e. 11 another content-based identifier or a request for data; and (3) providing access to, denying access 12 to, or deleting data. Collection, comparison, and access to information are abstract concepts. See 13 Elec. Power Grp., 820 F.3d at 1353–54; see also Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells 14 Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding claims ineligible under 15 Section 101 because they were drawn to abstract and well-known ideas of “1) collecting data, 2) 16 recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a 17 memory”). As Enfish, Finjan, and McRO, show above, fundamental concepts may not be 18 claimed; only the steps which go beyond the abstract concept are patent eligible. 19 Here, the patents claim the fundamental concept itself—they claim a method of accessing, 20 storing, and deleting data in a multi-computer network system. And, the patents are not aimed at 21 addressing a specific problem within data-management. Rather, they are aimed at generally 22 making data-management more efficient. As an example, in Enfish the Federal Circuit held that 23 the claim at issue was patentable under Section 101 because it focused on a specific 24 improvement—the self-referential table—that helped computers better store and retrieve data. 25 Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335 . The patent thus did not cover general data storage improvements; it 26 covered the specific method claimed to create a self-referential table. This helped ensure the 27 entire field of data storage and retrieval was not preempted, therefore maintaining the balance 1 between monopolization and innovation. 2 Likewise, in KPN, the Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims were patent eligible 3 because they were focused on clear, specific improvements to existing computer functions. 942 4 F.3d at 1153. There, the claimed invention was a system to “check data” to ensure that there were 5 not “systematic errors” with data transmission. Id. at 1145. The patent proposed adding 6 variability to the calculation of the check data by switching around bits in the data block or using 7 different algorithms. Id. at 1146. This, the court determined, was patentable because the patent 8 claimed only the specific steps of using a new “check data” system and thus only sought to solve a 9 specific problem within the check-data field. Id. at 1153. Hence, the patent was not directed at 10 data processing and transmission generally. 11 At step one, the Court broadly construes a patent’s purpose and asks what problem does 12 the patent seek to resolve? Using broad brushes, a commonality can be gleaned from each patent 13 discussed in the aforementioned cases. In each case, the patent-holder patented a new and specific 14 method to resolve a problem. For example: (1) in Enfish, a new type of table was claimed; (2) In 15 KPN, a new “check data” method was claimed; (3) in McRO, a new way to sync an anima 16 character’s facial expressions and speech was claimed; and (4) in Finjan, a new file-scanning 17 system was claimed. In contrast, here, no “new” system is claimed. The patents are generally 18 aimed at making data-storage in multi-computer networks easier and more efficient. Unlike 19 Enfish, McRO, KPN, and Finjan, the True Name patents do not claim a “new way” of storing, 20 accessing, or naming files. Indeed, the True Name patents cannot, and do not, claim the process 21 for generating a data-based identifier.6 Rather, they claim the process of “applying” such 22 identifiers to perform “particularly-recited data management operations.” Opp. at 15. But, 23 claiming the “application” of a well-known hashing technique to the abstract concept of data 24 management does not render the idea non-abstract. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (“[L]imiting an 25 abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components [does] not make the — 26 — — 27 — 6 As noted above, this is prior art. See supra I.B. 1 concept unpatentable.”); see also Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014 , 2 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding claims directed to “(1) receiving identity data from a device with a 3 request for access to resources; (2) confirming the authenticity of the identity data associated with 4 that device; (3) determining whether the device identified is authorized to access the resources 5 requested; and (4) if authorized, permitting access to the requested resources” abstract because 6 claimed abstract idea of “providing restricted access to resources”). 7 For instance, in Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., the court held that 8 the claims “determining user information for a user” and “generating a user identifier from the 9 determined user information” were unpatentable. 319 F. Supp. 3d. 818, 822 (E.D. Va. 2018). The 10 disputed claims in Bridge & Post covered “swapping a changeable identifier with an unchangeable 11 one” and using the identifier to implement targeted marketing. Id. at 824–25. But targeted 12 marketing and using “an unchangeable identifier” are abstract ideas. Id. at 825; see also Secured 13 Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“There is no 14 description of how the unique identifier is generated . . . .”). Hence, applying abstract ideas to a 15 specific concept does not render them non-abstract. Bridge & Post, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 825. 16 Here, as in Bridge & Post, Plaintiff neither claims they invented the content-based 17 identifier nor that their invention is computer-specific. Indeed, Plaintiff cannot argue either of 18 these things—the content-based identifier is prior art and Plaintiff has sought to broadly enforce 19 the True Name patents. See supra I.B.; Mot. at 4 n.4. As shown in Defendants’ briefing, the True 20 Name patents have been asserted across a wide array of technologies like content-delivery 21 networks, peer-to-peer music swapping, cloud storage and web applications. Id. This confirms 22 that, broadly construed, the claims are directed at “generating, transmitting, receiving, and storing” 23 data and are not directed at improving computer functionality in some concrete way. See Visual 24 Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e must . . . ask 25 whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed 26 to an abstract idea.”). Therefore, the claims are directed to the “basic concept” of data 27 management, which is sufficient to fall under Alice step 1. See TLI, 823 F.3d at 613 (holding 1 claims directed to collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected set, and storing the 2 recognized data in memory were a “well-established basic concept”). 3 Finally, the Court notes Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff is “computerizing” a 4 conventional process known in the art. Opp. at 15. Defendants argue that the concept claimed in 5 the True Name patents is derivative of other data-management systems like the Dewey Decimal 6 and Library of Congress Classification systems. Reply at 10. For example, librarians often locate 7 books based on a “call system” where they assign books unique identifiers based on call numbers, 8 which change dependent on a book’s volume, etc. Using a “master call list,” a librarian can 9 compare the call numbers to see if multiple copies of the same text exist and purge books 10 accordingly. Hence, Defendants argue that the True Name patents cover this well-known concept, 11 except applied to computers. See OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63 (limiting abstract ideas to a 12 particular environment does not make the claims less abstract in Alice step one). 13 In OpenTV, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., the court held that the patent was abstract because it could 14 not pass the “pen and paper test.” 2015 WL 1535328 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015). There, one 15 could use a pen, paper, and her own brain to perform the claimed steps of the patent. Id. The fact 16 that the claims could be done without modern technology showed the patents were directed at 17 “abstract ideas.” Id. Failing the “pen and paper test” indicates that a patent applies to an abstract 18 concept, which means the patent-holder can monopolize entire fields of thought, thus hampering 19 innovation. Here, as in OpenTV, the problem of how to store, organize, and access data is not new 20 (see Dewey Decimal system). Hence, the purported solutions claimed in the True Name patents 21 are not a uniquely technological problem and thus do not create solutions to computer-centric 22 problems like the patents in Enfish, McRO, KPN, and Finjan. Accordingly, the Court holds the 23 three True Name patents abstract under Alice step 1 and proceeds to step 2. 24 B. Alice/Mayo Step Two 25 At step two, the court examines the elements of the claims, both individually and “as an 26 ordered combination” to determine if they contain an “inventive step” sufficient to “transform” the 27 claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citing Mayo, 556 1 U.S. at 78–79). Step two is satisfied when the claim limitations “involve more than performance 2 of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” 3 Content Extraction, 778 F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). “If a claim’s only 4 ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood 5 techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract 6 idea.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 , 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2018). After 7 identifying an ineligible concept at step one, the court asks at step two: “What else is there in the 8 claims?” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78 . 9 The question of whether a claim element or combination is well-understood, routine, and 10 conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact and thus any fact that is 11 pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 12 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Notably, “[t]he mere fact that 13 something is disclosed in a piece of prior art . . . does not mean it was well-understood, routine, 14 and conventional.” Id. at 1369 ; but see Va. Innovation Scis. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 227 F. 15 Supp. 3d 582, 599 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“That is not to say that the §§ 102 and 103 analyses are 16 completely irrelevant to the eligibility question.”); Reply at 10–11 (arguing that PTAB decisions 17 invalidating claims based on novelty are persuasive); see also supra I.B. at 9 (discussing prior art). 18 The ’310 patent teaches the use of a “processor,” “network of servers,” data transfer, data 19 “comparison,” and data access/restriction, based on a data item’s “content-based digital identifier,” 20 which comprises a “message digest function or a hash function.” ’310 patent (claims 24, 31, 81, 21 82, and 86); see id. (claim 81) (discussing the use of a device comprising a “processor and 22 memory” in a network of computers and data comparison). The ’280 patent teaches the use 23 “requesting” a data file based on a network’s availability, which is determined by “measurement 24 of” either the server, the cost of a connection to the server, or the reliability of a connection to the 25 server, whereby data is delivered based on an “MD5 hash of the contents of a particular data file.” 26 ’280 patent (claims 15, 16, 31, and 32); see id. (claim 31) (discussing a content delivery method 27 where files are distributed across a network of servers where the request and receipt of a data file 1 is based on the file’s MD5 hash). Finally, the ’662 patent teaches the use marking duplicate files 2 for deletion across a “plurality of servers” whereby location data, i.e. a data item’s unique content3 based identifier, is used to determine duplicate files. ’662 patent (claim 33). 4 Plaintiff argues that the Court cannot decide patent eligibility at this stage because a factual 5 dispute exists about what is routine and conventional in the art. Opp. at 20–21. Plaintiff further 6 argues that Defendants have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a person of ordinary 7 skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have deemed the “ordered combinations” of elements in each 8 claim to be “well-understood, routine, or conventional.” Id. at 21. Specifically, Plaintiff argues 9 that the specifications disclose numerous “improvements” over the prior art like: (1) ensuring a 10 system only stores one copy of any data item; (2) using data-identifiers to provide access to data 11 while simultaneously using the identifier to ensure only appropriate persons access the data file; 12 and (3) verifying that requested data is the correct data using only the data identifier. Opp. at 25– 13 27. This, Plaintiff’s argue, shows that the patents claim an inventive use of hash functions and 14 thus recite unconventional features that provide benefits over conventional prior art. Id. at 25 15 (citing Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“New uses of 16 old products or processes are indeed patentable subject matter.”)). 17 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff; the asserted claims fail to provide an inventive concept. 18 The relevant inquiry is “not whether the claimed invention as a whole is unconventional or non19 routine.” BSG, 899 F.3d at 1290 . Rather, the court assesses “whether the claim limitations other 20 than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, 21 routine, and conventional.” Id. (emphasis added). No “inventive concept” exists when an abstract 22 idea is used in a conventional way. Id. at 1290–91. 23 A “hash identifier” uses extracted data to identify a specific data-file—it is a “generic and 24 routine concept that does not transform the claims to a patent eligible application of the abstract 25 idea.” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364 , 1375 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 26 2017). Concepts like “comparing,” “restricting access,” and “de-duplicating” data are well-known 27 and conventional functions of computers and data-management systems, as are “processors” and 1 “computer networks.” See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“But what petitioner characterizes as 2 specific hardware—a ‘data processing system’ with a ‘communications controller’ and ‘data 3 storage unit,’ . . . is purely functional and generic. Nearly every computer will include a 4 ‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, 5 storage, and transmission functions.”); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 6 F.3d 1314 , 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding generic computer components like “interface,” 7 “network,” and “database” do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); buySAFE, Inc. v. 8 Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the 9 information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); 10 TLI, 823 F.3d at 611 , 614–15 (holding that when claims use functional language and conventional 11 technology, like a phone receiving data, extracting information from that data, and storing images, 12 claims are not patent eligible); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 13 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Requiring the use of a ‘software’ ‘brain’ ‘tasked with tailoring 14 information and providing it to the user’ provides no additional limitation beyond applying an 15 abstract idea, restricted to the Internet, on a generic computer.”); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. 16 InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We may assume that the techniques 17 claimed are groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant, but that is not enough for eligibility.” 18 (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 19 There is, in short, nothing “inventive” about any claim details, individually or in 20 combination, that are not themselves abstract ideas. The claims are directed at “standard file 21 management” functions. ’310 (6:28). Using a generic hash function, a server system, or a 22 computer does not render these claims non-abstract; the claims are still directed to the abstract 23 ideas of receiving, storing, deleting, and controlling access to data. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1290– 24 91. Hence, none of the hardware recited by the claims “offers a meaningful limitation beyond 25 generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment.’” Alice, 573 26 U.S. at 226 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11). Allowing the three True Name patents to survive 27 Section 101 would allow Plaintiff to monopolize the entire field of data-storage. Cf. id. at 226–27 1 (“The concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not like a nose of wax which may be 2 turned and twisted in any direction.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, 3 because the asserted claims’ steps do nothing more than apply a well-known hashing concept to 4 || data-storage, the ’310, ’280, and ’662 patents are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and 5 fail under Section 101. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 8 pleadings and holds the *310, ’280, and ’662 patents invalid for failure to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101 . 9 Since this is a legal issue and amendment would be futile, leave to amend would be denied. In any 10 || event, such leave was not requested. The Clerk shall close the file and a judgment in favor of 11 Defendants shall follow. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: January 29, 2020 United States District Jud ee — 16 — — 17 — Z 18 — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — 28 Case No.: 5:13-cv-01317-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS