Stuckey v. Trump

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [3] ANDRE KENNETH STUCKEY, 4 Case No. 19-cv-03688-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. [6] DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., [7] Defendants. [8] 9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), has filed 11 multiple cases in this Court, including this pro se civil rights action for monetary damages under 12 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The operative complaint is the 13 amended complaint, naming the following Defendants: the President of the United States of 14 America; the current and former United States Attorney Generals; the Federal Bureau of 15 Investigation (“FBI”) Director; the Supervising Special FBI Agent; and the Chief of the Special 16 Litigation Section of the Department of Justice. Dkt. 12. While not entirely clear, it appears that 17 Plaintiff is suing Defendants President Donald Trump and FBI Director Christopher Wray for 18 “introducing an signing into law several fiscal budgets that reduced federal funding for numerous 19 United States Department of Justice Accounts, including the FBI,” id. at 23-24,1 and he is suing 20 the remaining Defendants for failing to investigate various alleged civil rights violations at PBSP 21 (which are the topic of Plaintiff’s other pending civil rights cases before this Court), id. at 4-22. 22 Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 13. 23 For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims fail to state a 24 claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the amended complaint is not cognizable 25 under Bivens and is DISMISSED. [27] II. DISCUSSION [1] A. Standard of Review [2] Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek [3] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. [4] § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of [5] the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief [6] may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. [7] § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, [8] 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). [9] To state a claim under Bivens, and its progeny, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right [10] secured by the Constitution of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation [11] was committed by a federal actor. See Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (42 12 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens actions are identical save for replacement of state actor under section [13] 1983 by federal actor under Bivens).2 [14] B. Legal Claims [15] The Supreme Court recognized in Bivens that a private right of action may be implied from [16] the Constitution itself for allegations of constitutional violations made against federal employees [17] or their agents. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392-97 . Here, Plaintiff does not allege the deprivation of [18] a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Dkt. 12. The basis of [19] Plaintiff’s amended complaint arises out of Defendants Trump and Wray “signing into law fiscal [20] budgets that reduced federal funding” and the remaining Defendants’ failure to investigate to [21] various alleged civil rights violations at PBSP. See id. First, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s claim as [22] to Defendants Trump and Wray because Plaintiff fails to state a viable Bivens claim against them [23] merely based on their alleged actions of signing into law fiscal budgets, which do not amount to [24] official misconduct. Furthermore, because neither Defendant Trump nor Defendant Wray had any [26] 2 When reviewing a Bivens action for which there is no case on point, therefore, section 1983 cases are applied by analogy. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (no [27] distinctions for purposes of immunity between state officials sued under section 1983 and federal 1 personal involvement in Plaintiff’s remaining claims, Plaintiff cannot maintain such a Bivens 2 claim for damages against the either President or the FBI Director in their individual capacity. See 3 Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988) (Bivens action may be maintained 4 against a federal employee “in his or her individual capacity only, and not in his or her official 5 capacity”). As to Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants, “[t]here is . . . no 6 constitutional right to an investigation by government officials.” Stone v. Department of 7 Investigation of New York, 1992 WL 25202 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992) (citing Gomez v. Whitney, [8] 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Chapman v. Musich, 726 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1984). 9 There is “no instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as sufficient to 10 state a civil rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right involved.” 11 Gomez, 757 F.2d at 1006 . Thus, the Court finds that in the instant matter, Plaintiff’s allegations— 12 that the aforementioned remaining Defendants were under an obligation to investigate any alleged 13 civil rights violations at PBSP—fail to state a cognizable claim. 14 A claim is frivolous if it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or is clearly 15 lacking any factual basis. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Although a 16 complaint is not “frivolous” within the meaning of sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2) because it fails 17 to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 331 , 18 failure to state a claim is a separate basis for dismissal under sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2). A 19 dismissal as legally frivolous is proper only if the legal theory lacks an arguable basis, while under 20 Rule 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss a claim on a dispositive issue of law without regard to whether 21 it is based on an outlandish theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one. See id. at 324-28 . 22 Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2) accord judges the unusual power to pierce the veil of the 23 complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss as frivolous those claims whose factual contentions are 24 clearly baseless. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Examples are claims 25 describing fantastic or delusional scenarios with which federal district judges are all too familiar. 26 See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328 . To pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations means that a 27 court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to 1 this initial assessment of the plaintiff's factual allegations must be weighted in favor of the 2 || plaintiff. See id. A frivolousness determination cannot serve as a factfinding process for the 3 resolution of disputed facts. See id. A finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the 4 facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are 5 || judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them. See id. at 32—33. But the complaint may 6 || not be dismissed simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations unlikely or improbable. 7 See id. at 33. 8 Even applying the liberal interpretation standard afforded to pro se litigants, the Court 9 || finds that Plaintiffs allegations are presented in a conclusory manner, with no factual support 10 || given to substantiate the allegations, and that the claims are legally frivolous within the meaning 11 of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d) and Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 327 . In any event, as mentioned above, Plaintiff 12 || cannot sue the remaining Defendants based on a conclusory allegation of their failure to 13 investigate any alleged civil rights violations at PBSP. 14 || 1. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint is DISMISSED under the authority of a 16 || 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 3 17 The Clerk of the Court shall terminate any pending motions as moot and close the file. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: January 29, 2020 20 Loppont Haptilflccr— VONNE GONZALEZ ROGER: 21 United States District Judge