Wynn v. Harley Marine Services Inc.

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 BRYAN WYNN, Case No. 19-cv-00596-JD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. [9] Re: Dkt. No. 25 10 HARLEY MARINE SERVICES INC., et al., Defendants. [12] 13 Plaintiff Bryan Wynn has sued defendants Harley Marine Services, Inc., and Starlight 14 Marine Services, Inc., under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 , for injuries he suffered while 15 working on the tugboat M/V Ahbra Franco as Chief Engineer.1 Dkt. No. 1. Wynn alleges claims 16 for negligence and unseaworthiness, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants 17 have moved for summary judgment in their favor on all the claims and on the availability of 18 punitive damages. Dkt. No. 25. 19 The Court has detailed in other orders the standards applicable to a motion for summary 20 judgment. See, e.g., Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, 293 F. Supp. 3d 980, 988-89 (N.D. Cal. 21 2017), aff’d, 932 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2019). These well-established standards apply in full here. 22 The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed. 23 Summary judgment is denied on the Jones Act claims. As the parties’ briefs amply 24 establish, the negligence and unseaworthiness claims entail “a panoply of genuine disputes of 25 material fact that will require a trial, and an opportunity to evaluate witness credibility, to properly [26] 1 Two updates are needed: (1) defendants recently changed their name to “Centerline Logistics [27] Corporation,” Dkt. No. 30; and (2) the complaint used an outdated citation for the Jones Act, 46 1 resolve.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 17-CV-00039-JD, 2018 WL 6040192 , at 2 *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018). Defendants say the tugboat was safely operated and seaworthy. 3 Plaintiffs say it was not. The parties have tendered conflicting evidence. These are quintessential 4 disputes of material facts for the jury to decide. 5 That is all the more true here because summary judgment is disfavored in Jones Act cases. 6 The negligence standard for personal injury actions brought under the Jones Act is substantially 7 lower than in regular tort actions. See Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 8 1981). The elements of a Jones Act negligence claim are “duty, breach, notice and causation.” 9 Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. P’ship, 111 F.3d 658 , 662 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended 10 (June 5, 1997). Defendants do not dispute that they had a legal duty to provide Wynn with a 11 reasonably “safe place to work,” id., and argue mainly that they did not breach the duty. But even 12 defendants concede that there is conflicting evidence about whether an experienced captain or an 13 inexperienced trainee was operating the tugboat when Wynn was injured. Dkt. No. 25 at 6 n.1; 14 Dkt. No. 27 at 2. Wynn has provided evidence that he was not notified that a trainee would be at 15 the helm, or that “there was a risk of a significant hard collision.” Dkt. No. 26-2 ¶¶ 5, 7. There is 16 also conflicting evidence about whether the tugboat was travelling at an unreasonably high speed 17 when it contacted the other vessel, and if so, whether this was a foreseeable result of the trainee’s 18 lack of experience. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 26-1, Exh. A at ECF pp. 16-17 (Cadiz deposition); Dkt. 19 No. 26-2 ¶¶ 3-4, 6 (Wynn Decl.). Viewing this evidence as a whole and in the light most 20 favorable to Wynn, a reasonable juror could find that defendants breached their duty to provide a 21 reasonably safe working environment. 22 For the remaining elements, defendants do not argue that they lacked notice of any safety 23 risks, and only obliquely dispute causation by suggesting that Wynn’s injuries resulted from his 24 failure to brace himself while putting his pants on. This too is “generally a question of fact for the 25 jury.” Lies, 641 F.2d at 770 ; see also Crowley Marine Servs., Inc. v. Maritrans, Inc., 530 F.3d 26 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008) (allocation of fault is a “fact-intensive decision”). The Jones Act 27 applies a “featherweight” causation standard to negligence claims that “allows a seaman to survive 1 see also Lies, 641 F.2d at 771 (summary judgment inappropriate under Jones Act if “the 2 conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury” 3 (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957))). The evidence 4 already discussed easily clears this threshold. It is also worth noting that Wynn has assured the 5 Court that, after “forty years of experience in the maritime industry,” he knows how to put on his 6 pants at sea. Dkt. No. 26-2 ¶ 5. 7 So too for the unseaworthiness claim. “Unseaworthiness” is a term of art in maritime law. 8 Wynn is required to prove only that his injuries were caused by a physical or other “defect” that 9 prevented the tugboat from being “reasonably fit for its intended use,” even if only temporarily. 10 Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 664. 11 It is undisputed that the tugboat had “Shibata” fenders rather than tire fenders. See, e.g., 12 Dkt. No. 26-1, Exh. B at ECF p. 32 (Sheldon deposition). Wynn has proffered expert testimony 13 from Captain Reginald McKamie, Sr., that tire fenders would have been more effective at 14 reducing impacts with other vessels, particularly if the tugboat was being operated by someone 15 relatively inexperienced. See Dkt. No. 26-3 ¶ 6-7 (McKamie Decl.). This evidence is enough for 16 a reasonable jury to find that the tugboat Wynn was serving on was not well-suited to safely 17 perform its intended task -- pushing other boats -- for at least the temporary period that it was 18 being operated by someone without sufficient experience. 19 Defendants’ cursory stab at excluding Captain McKamie’s opinions under Federal Rule of 20 Evidence 702 is not well taken. They acknowledge that he “might qualify as an expert” in some 21 areas of maritime practice, but say he lacks the “experience, training, and education” to opine on 22 the fender system, and that he never personally inspected the tugboat. Dkt. No. 27 at 4. What that 23 training and experience might be, defendants leave unsaid. It is undisputed that Captain McKamie 24 has 49 years of maritime experience that include serving “on various merchant and navy vessels,” 25 and working as an advisor to the United States Coast Guard on “issues of maritime safety.” Dkt. 26 No. 26-3 ¶¶ 3, 10. He was familiar with the record in this case and with general maritime safety 27 standards when preparing his opinions. See id. ¶ 2. That is enough for the Court to consider them. 1 Summary judgment is granted for defendants on the prayer for punitive damages. Punitive 2 || damages are unavailable for negligence claims brought under the Jones Act. Kopczynski v. The 3 Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1984). After Wynn filed suit, the Supreme Court held that 4 || the same is true for unseaworthiness claims, reversing the Ninth Circuit. See Dutra Grp. v. 5 Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2278 (2019). Wynn now concedes that he cannot recover punitive 6 || damages. See Dkt. No. 26 at 17. 7 CONCLUSION 8 Summary judgment is granted for defendants on the issue of punitive damages. It is 9 denied in all other respects. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: December 11, 2020 [12] 4 JAMES PONATO 5 United States District Judge [16] = 17 Z 18