Seitz v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 JAMES EDWARD SEITZ, Case No. 20-cv-05442-DMR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 10 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF Re: Dkt. No. 23 TEAMSTERS, et al., — 11 — Defendants. — 12 — 13 Pro se Plaintiff James E. Seitz filed a complaint for breach of the duty of fair 14 representation against Defendants International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”), Teamsters 15 Local 986 (“Teamsters 986), and Chris Griswold. Defendants now move pursuant to Federal Rule 16 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. [Docket No. 23.] The court held a hearing 17 on December 10, 2020. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Seitz is employed by United Airlines (“United”) at San Francisco International Airport. 20 His employment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between his local 21 union, IBT, and United. Compl. 3 ¶ 1.1 His local union, Teamsters 986, “handle[s] the everyday 22 part of representing him.” Griswold, the Principal Officer of Teamsters 986, “is responsible for 23 carrying out the Teamsters mission.” Id. — 24 — — 25 — 1 Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of portions of the CBA at issue, including Article 19, which describes the grievance procedure. [Docket No. 23-1, Ex. A at 7-13.] Seitz does not — 26 — object. The court may consider the CBA without taking judicial notice of it, as the contents of the CBA are alleged in the complaint and Seitz does not object to its authenticity. See Branch v. — 27 — Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “documents whose contents are alleged in 1 Seitz alleges that on June 10, 2019, he filed a grievance regarding “the Industry Reset 2 calculation that is used to decide if [his] work group receives a raise.” Compl. 4 ¶ 2. Seitz and 3 shop steward Paul Burdick signed and submitted the grievance as the first step under the CBA. 4 Following ten days with no response, Burdick moved the grievance to the second step on June 20, 5 2019. Seitz made multiple attempts to learn the status of his grievance in August, September, and 6 December 2019. Compl. 4 ¶¶ 3-5. 7 On January 2, 2020, Seitz emailed Chief Union Steward Dale Mitchell asking for an 8 update on the status of the grievance. Compl. 4 ¶ 6; Compl. 10 (Jan. 2, 2020 email). On January 9 6, 2020, Mitchell told Seitz “the grievance was elevated to business agent level and they will get a 10 resolution by this week.” Id. at 4 ¶ 5. However, Burdick later told Seitz that “Mitchell had told 11 him the business agents were just going to close it out and not even look into it or have the 12 hearing.” Id. at 4 ¶ 6. 13 Seitz alleges that Mitchell sent him an email on January 24, 20202 stating that Mitchell, 14 Burdick, and three other individuals “had a meeting on June 25, 2019, and decided amongst 15 themselves to get rid of my grievance,” which Seitz alleges “is a violation of the grievance 16 procedures.” Compl. 5 ¶ 7. The January 21, 2020 email from Mitchell is attached to the 17 complaint. It states in relevant part: 18 On June 25, 2019, myself, Fred Wood, Javier Lectora, Mark Desangles and Paul Burdick had a meeting concerning your 19 grievance. We informed Paul that Article 19 [of the CBA] is not the correct process to address your concern. We also told Paul if he 20 needed assistants [sic] writing grievances that he could contact me. The Understanding was that Paul would inform you of our 21 conversations regarding your concern with LOA29, industry re-set. After this meeting was over, Paul informed myself and Fred that he 22 would be resigning as shop Steward. At no time did Paul tell us he would not bring the information discussed back to you. In spite of the 23 fact, the grievance was not valid, I will send you a close letter. — 24 — Compl. 13 (Jan. 21, 2020 email) (emphasis added). — 25 — — 26 — 2 The January 24, 2020 date alleged by Seitz in paragraph 7 appears to be a typographical error, as — 27 — the email attached to the complaint is dated January 21, 2020. See Compl. 5 ¶ 6; Compl. 12. This 1 On February 10, 2020, Mitchell sent Seitz a letter informing him that his “complaint/ 2 grievance was withdrawn,” that “[t]here was no violation of the collective bargain [sic] agreement 3 or [Letter of Agreement] #29,” and that “[t]his grievance will be closed out.” Compl. 5 ¶ 8; 4 Compl. 11 (Feb. 10, 2020 letter). 5 Seitz alleges that after receiving the February 10, 2020 letter from Mitchell, he “sent 6 multiple emails demanding the Teamsters follow the process,” but that “Teamsters never replied to 7 a single one.” Compl. 5 ¶ 9. He attached to the complaint what appear to be three emails or 8 excerpts from emails that Seitz sent to Mitchell. Compl. 12, 16. First, on February 24, 2020, Seitz 9 wrote that the union’s response to his grievance was “unacceptable and violates the collective 10 bargaining agreement.” He continued, “[m]y grievance needs to be processed correctly under the 11 collective bargaining agreement and this email is to serve as your notice to do so.” Compl. 12. 12 On March 19, 2020, Seitz sent another email noting that Mitchell had not responded to his 13 previous email. He wrote, “I want to proceed with the grievance process as it is laid out in the 14 CBA” and asked for a response in 30 days. Compl. 16. Finally, on May 28, 2020, Seitz wrote to 15 Mitchell that his email was “to serve as my final attempt to have you follow the terms of the 16 collective bargaining agreement, to enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and 17 to process my grievance according to the collective bargaining agreement.” He asked again for a 18 response within 30 days and wrote that if he did not receive a response, he “will be filing an action 19 in federal court for breach of the duty of fair representation.” Compl. 17-18. 20 On August 4, 2020, Seitz filed the instant complaint alleging a single claim for breach of 21 the duty of fair representation against Defendants pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 22 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Compl. 6. Defendants now move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the 23 complaint. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 26 the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 27 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 1 (per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal 2 theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to 3 relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 5 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual 6 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 7 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged 8 must demonstrate “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 9 a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing 10 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 11 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 12 2002). 13 As a general rule, a court may not consider “any material beyond the pleadings” when 14 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 15 However, “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record,’” id. at 689 (citing Mack 16 v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and may also consider “documents 17 whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 18 are not physically attached to the pleading,” without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 19 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 20 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1125-26. The court need not accept 21 as true allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. 22 Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). 23 “A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the 24 applicable statute of limitations . . . when the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the 25 complaint.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 26 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than 1 “where the petitioner is pro se,” courts have an obligation, “particularly in civil rights cases, to 2 construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. 3 Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 , 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). “However, a liberal interpretation of 4 a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 5 pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 6 III. ANALYSIS 7 Defendants argue that Seitz’s complaint is barred by the six-month statute of limitations 8 applicable to claims for breach of the duty of fair representation under the RLA. 9 The RLA “authorizes employees in the railroad and airline industries to select a union to 10 act as their exclusive representative for collective bargaining with their employer.” Beckington v. 11 Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2019). “As exclusive bargaining representative, the 12 union assumes a duty to ‘represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members during the 13 negotiation, administration, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.’” Id. at 597-98 14 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979)). A union breaches its duty 15 of fair representation “when its conduct is ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,’ as, for 16 example, when it ‘arbitrarily ignore[s] a meritorious grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunctory 17 fashion.’” Foust, 442 U.S. at 47 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 191 (1967)). 18 Employees “have a ‘judicially implied’ cause of action under the RLA against their union for 19 breaching its duty of fair representation.” Beckington, 926 F.3d at 600 (quoting Foust, 442 U.S. at 20 47). Claims for breach of the duty of fair representation under the RLA are subject to a six-month 21 statute of limitations. Kelly v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 896 F.2d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1990) 22 (holding RLA actions are subject to the six-month limitations period found in § 10b of the Labor 23 Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b)). 24 Defendants contend that the statute of limitations on Seitz’s duty of fair representation 25 claim began to run on January 21, 2020, the date that Mitchell informed him by email that the 26 grievance “was not valid.” Therefore, according to Defendants, Seitz’s lawsuit is time-barred 27 because any complaint was due by no later than July 21, 2020, but Seitz did not file his complaint 1 Seitz does not dispute that his claim is subject to a six-month statute of limitations. 2 However, he contends that his claim did not accrue until February 10, 2020, the date of Mitchell’s 3 letter informing him that his “complaint/grievance was withdrawn” and that the grievance “will be 4 closed out.” Opp’n 8-9. He argues that his August 4, 2020 complaint was timely, as it was filed 5 less than six months after the date of the “closeout letter.” Id. at 9 . 6 The statute of limitations on a duty of fair representation claim “generally begins to run 7 when an employee knows or should know of the alleged breach of duty of fair representation by a 8 union.” Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986); Allen v. United Food & 9 Commercial Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, 43 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1994) (claim 10 accrues “when the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the defendant’s wrongdoing and can 11 successfully maintain a suit in the district court.”); see Mediran v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 12 Aerospace Workers, 425 Fed. Appx. 550 , 551 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Galindo accrual rule 13 to breach of duty of fair representation claim brought under RLA). A duty of fair representation 14 claim based on a union’s “deci[sion] not to file a grievance . . . generally accrues when the 15 employee learns or should have learned of the union’s decision.” Galindo, 793 F.2d at 1509 . 16 Here, the statute of limitations on Seitz’s duty of fair representation claim began to run on 17 January 21, 2020 because that is the date that Seitz learned that the union “would not pursue a 18 grievance on his behalf.” See Harris v. Alumax Mill Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 19 1990) (holding that duty of fair representation claim accrued by the “date on which he was 20 informed by a Union representative that the Union would not pursue a grievance on his behalf.”). 21 On that date, Chief Union Steward Mitchell informed Seitz by email that the CBA’s grievance 22 procedure was “not the correct process to address [his] concern” and that “the grievance was not 23 valid.” This is a clear and unequivocal statement that the union was not going to pursue Seitz’s 24 grievance. Therefore, Seitz knew or should have known that the union would not pursue his 25 grievance upon receiving Mitchell’s January 21, 2020 email. See, e.g, Hill v. Ralphs Grocery Co., — 26 — 896 F. Supp. 1492, 1500 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that “it was clear that there was a potential 27 breach of duty claim” against union when union president told employees “[g]o ahead and sue 1 not necessary for a union to give final notice that it will not pursue a claim for the [fair 2 representation] claim to accrue.”). The February 10, 2020 letter merely confirmed what Seitz had 3 already been told on January 21: that the union had decided to close out his grievance. 4 As Seitz knew or should have known that the union would not pursue his grievance by 5 January 21, 2020, the six-month statute of limitations began to run on that date. In order for his 6 complaint to be timely, Seitz was required to file it on or before July 21, 2020. Seitz did not file 7 the complaint until August 4, 2020. Therefore, his lawsuit is untimely. 8 Seitz argues that even if his complaint is untimely, the doctrines of equitable estoppel and 9 tolling should apply to save it from being time-barred. Opp’n 9-11 (citing Socop-Gonzalez v. 10 I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds in Smith v. Davis, 953 11 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), and Lewis v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 826 F.2d 1310 , 12 1317 (3d Cir. 1987)). 13 “[E]quitable estoppel can be used to stop a limitations period from continuing to run after 14 it has already begun to run.” Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1184 (quotation marks and citation 15 omitted). “Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent concealment, halts the statute of limitations 16 when there is active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the 17 plaintiff’s claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 18 697, 706 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “There must be evidence of an 19 improper purpose by the defendant, or of the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge that its 20 conduct was deceptive.” Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 1987). 21 Further, “[t]he plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on the defendant’s misconduct in failing to 22 file in a timely manner and ‘must plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of 23 fraudulent concealment.’” Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 706-07. 24 In his opposition brief, Seitz argues that equitable estoppel applies because the union 25 “presented false information” to him about “the resolution to his grievance and knowingly kept 26 him out of the grievance process outlined in the CBA.” Opp’n 9. This is insufficient to establish 27 equitable estoppel because it merely recites the merits of Seitz’s complaint against the union. See, 1 Feb. 13, 2017) (holding that equitable estoppel did not apply where plaintiff failed to allege that 2 his union “engaged in fraudulent conduct ‘above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which [his] 3 claim is filed.” (quotation and citations omitted)). Seitz fails to allege any facts from which the 4 court could draw a reasonable inference that the union engaged in “affirmative misconduct” to 5 prevent Seitz from timely filing suit. See Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1184 . For example, Seitz 6 does not allege that Mitchell’s January 21, 2020 email or any other communication from the union 7 deterred him from filing suit in a timely manner. At the hearing, Seitz confirmed that Defendants 8 did not engage in any affirmative behavior after January 21, 2020 that caused him to delay filing 9 his lawsuit. Accordingly, the court concludes that the complaint does not allege facts to support a 10 theory of equitable estoppel. 11 At the hearing, Seitz offered an additional but equally invalid theory of equitable estoppel. 12 Seitz asserts that the union knew he had the right under the CBA to “go to arbitration on [his] 13 own.” He contends that the union’s failure to respond to the three emails he sent in February, 14 March and May 2020 constitutes wrongful or misleading conduct for purposes of equitable 15 estoppel. Put another way, Seitz argues that the union’s failure to respond to the emails he sent 16 after the union rejected his grievance amounts to concealment of information about his rights. 17 This argument is without merit, because Seitz does not allege that the union concealed material 18 facts of which he was unaware about how and when to pursue a timely claim. See Mukherjee v. 19 I.N.S., 793 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986) (“estoppel traditionally is available against a 20 nongovernmental party who has made a knowing false representation or concealment of material 21 facts to a party ignorant of the facts”). 22 Finally, Seitz argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled for the five months 23 during which he “attempted to resolve this issue . . . before proceeding to court.” He argues that 24 “[t]he statute of limitations can be considered tolled while the union member attempts to exhaust 25 all internal union appeal procedures.” Opp’n 10 (citing Lewis, 826 F.2d at 1317 ). In Lewis, the 26 plaintiff’s union agreed to an absentee policy with the employer without allowing union members 27 to vote on it. The union notified its members of this decision by letter dated July 15, 1985. 826 1 dismissed by the grievance committee on September 12, 1985 on the ground that “the case is 2 improper before the Committee.” Id. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the union and his 3 employer within six months of the denial of his grievance. The defendants argued that the 4 complaint was untimely because it was filed more than six months after the July 15, 1985 letter 5 stating that union members would not be allowed to vote on the absentee policy. Id. at 1317 . 6 Without deciding when the six-month statute of limitations had started to run on the plaintiff’s 7 claims, the Third Circuit held that “the statute of limitations does not begin to run [on LMRA 8 claims against a union and employer] while the union member undertakes to exhaust internal 9 union appeal procedures,” and that “[t]he time for suit should not begin to run until ‘the futility of 10 further appeals [becomes] apparent or should have become apparent.” 826 F.2d at 1317-18 . 11 Therefore, it remanded the case to the district court for a determination “of when the futility of 12 further appeals should have become apparent.” Id. at 1318 . 13 In this case, Seitz’s tolling argument is based on his continuing correspondence with 14 Mitchell after January 21, 2020 in which he complained about the union’s failure to pursue his 15 grievance. However, Seitz does not allege that these communications constitute any form of 16 “internal union appeal procedures.” Lewis is thus distinguishable from this case. Moreover, 17 Seitz’s argument appears to be foreclosed by Stone v. Writer’s Guild of America West, Inc., 101 18 F.3d 1312 , 1315 (9th Cir. 1996). In Stone, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the statute of limitations 19 [on a duty of fair representation claim] may be tolled ‘while an employee pursues intra-union 20 grievance procedures, even if those procedures are ultimately futile.’” Id. (quoting Galindo, 793 21 F.2d at 1510). However, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim as untimely because “the 22 averments of the complaint and the attachment to it established that he was not exhausting any 23 available administrative remedy during” the period in which the plaintiff sought to toll the statute 24 of limitations; instead, “he and the union were expressing disagreement about administrative 25 proceedings which had been exhausted” two years prior. Id. Further, the court noted that the 26 plaintiff’s collective bargaining agreement “provides for no subsequent administrative procedure 27 which [he] could have been pursuing.” Id. 1 was pursuing an intra-union procedure after he learned on January 21, 2020 that the union would 2 || not pursue his grievance. Accordingly, Seitz has failed to allege facts to support the application of 3 || tolling. 4 At the hearing, the court gave Seitz the opportunity to articulate any additional facts to 5 support his claim that his complaint was timely under the theories of equitable estoppel and 6 || equitable tolling. He was unable to do so. Accordingly, the court concludes that further 7 amendment would be futile and dismisses the complaint with prejudice.* 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Seitz’s complaint is 10 || dismissed with prejudice. KES DISTR □□□ b, ( SS CS 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. ORDERED" || Dated: December 22, 2020 Ss \" □ _ Ly — □ | Gearon 15 eA Ath. Mere ate Judge Ry a LS 16 eS OY Lp OY DISTRICS — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — 28 3 As the court concludes that Seitz’s complaint must be dismissed as untimely, it does not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments in favor of dismissal.