Ruffin v. San Francisco Sheriffs Department

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 SHAWN P RUFFIN, Case No. 20-cv-08239-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 10 10 SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, et al., — 11 — Defendants. — 12 — 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at San Francisco County Jail, has filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983 . His amended complaint (Dkt. No. 10) is now before the Court for review under 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915A. 16 DISCUSSION 17 A. Standard of Review 18 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 21 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 23 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 24 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 27 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 1 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 2 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 677–78 (2009). 3 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 4 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 6 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 7 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 8 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 9 B. Procedural History 10 The initial complaint named as a defendant the “San Francisco Sheriff’s Dept. & official 11 capacity” and alluded to many other unnamed defendants. Dkt. No. 1. The initial complaint 12 alleged that various San Francisco deputies had subjected Plaintiff to illegal actions since April 16, 13 2020, and continuing until at least August 15, 2020. See generally Dkt. No. 1. The Court 14 dismissed the complaint with leave to amend because it suffered from numerous deficiencies, 15 including but not limited to (1) failure to allege a violation of either federal law or of the federal 16 Constitution; (2) failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) which allows for defendants to be 17 joined in an action if their alleged illegal acts arose out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 18 series of transactions or occurrences, and shared a common question of law or fact; (3) failing to 19 proffer factual allegations that were sufficiently specific so as to raise a right to relief above the 20 speculative level; and (4) failing to identify defendants by name. 21 C. Amended Complaint 22 The amended complaint names as defendants the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department 23 (“SFSD”) in its official capacity, Lt. Daggs, Sgt. Leonardini, classification deputy Loufas, deputy 24 Jacowitz, and senior deputy Mikovich. Dkt. No. 10 at 1-2. 25 The amended complaint appears to make the following factual allegations about two 26 separate incidents. 27 On May 12, 2020, defendant Leonardini put Plaintiff in confinement without Plaintiff 1 hearing be held within a certain time frame. Defendant Jacowitz attempted to cover up defendant 2 Leonardini’s mistake by “illegally” issuing incident report number 09001012. On May 16, 2020, 3 defendant Mikovich kept Plaintiff “illegally” in confinement by issuing a “loss of rights” 4 disposition. Because of these actions, Plaintiff was kept “illegally” in confinement from May 15, 5 2020 to May 23, 2020, without being adjudicated at all. Incident report no. 09001027 was issued 6 while he was in confinement, extending his “illegal” stay in confinement from May 24, 2020 to 7 May 27, 2020. After the confinement pursuant to incident report no. 09001027 ended, defendant 8 Loufas held Plaintiff “illegally” in confinement until June 5, 2020. Plaintiff was transferred to an 9 administrative segregation unit. Prior to this transfer, defendant Loufas showed “‘evil motive with 10 intent’ to cause [Plaintiff] ‘mental suffering and emotional distress.’” Dkt. No. 10 at 2-3. 11 On April 10, 2020, deputies Truong and James placed Plaintiff in Cell No. 5. Cell No. 5 12 violated institutional policy and standards in that rust was protruding off the bed, dark brown 13 stains that were likely feces were on the walls and floors, and the sink was not working. Cell No. 14 5 was sprayed for COVID-19 a couple hours prior to Plaintiff’s placement in the cell. Plaintiff 15 was in that cell for approximately two or three hours. Deputy Troung violated prison regulations 16 when he placed Plaintiff in Cell No. 5 and/or moved him to administrative segregation without 17 consent from the senior committee, which is proof of Deputy Troung’s evil intent to cause 18 Plaintiff great bodily harm or to kill him. Further proof of the evil intent can be found in incident 19 report no. 09001027. Captain Murphy and Davis “clearly” are accomplices to cover up this illegal 20 act. Dkt. No. 10 at 6-7. 21 Plaintiff alleges that both the continued “illegal” placement in “confinement” without 22 adjudication and the placement in Cell No. 5 violated the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth 23 Amendment. 24 D. Dismissal with Leave to Amend 25 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims are hard to understand. It is unclear what Plaintiff 26 means by “confinement” or by “adjudication,” or why incident report no. 9001012 is relevant. 27 The Court presumes that Plaintiff is arguing that his rights under the Eighth Amendment and Due 1 because his placement in administrative segregation violated state regulations and was done 2 without first issuing a disciplinary finding, and because Cell No. 5 was not institutionally cleared 3 to house an inmate and was both unsanitary and unsafe. The amended complaint suffers from 4 numerous deficiencies which the Court identifies below. 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The amended complaint again fails to proffer factual allegations 6 sufficient to a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. 7 Plaintiff’s allegations are, again, vague and conclusory. While the amended complaint identifies 8 dates and individuals, it continues to rely on conclusory “defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me” 9 accusations which, as a matter of law, fail to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Ashcroft, 556 10 U.S. 662 , 677–78 (2009). Conclusory statements that a defendant acted illegally or with evil 11 intent or motive, or that actions violated the Eighth Amendment are insufficient to state cognizable 12 claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The amended complaint appears to again violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 20(a)(2). Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) provides that all persons “may be joined in one action as 15 defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative 16 with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 17 occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the 18 action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The upshot of these rules is that “multiple claims against a 19 single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim 20 B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). It is unclear how the 21 April 10, 2020 placement in Cell 5 is related to the May 12, 2020 placement in confinement 22 without adjudication. These two claims appear to arise out of different occurrences and do not 23 appear to share a common question of fact. Plaintiff needs to choose the claims he wants to 24 pursue in this action that meet the joinder requirements. In this action, he should only pursue the 25 acts that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and 26 share a common question of law or fact. Plaintiff should bring separate actions to seek relief for 27 the claims arising out of separate incidents. 1 confinement without adjudication and in violation of state regulations, and that Plaintiff was 2 briefly placed in a cell which violated institutional standards and policy and was unsanitary and 3 unsafe, fail to state cognizable due process claims. 4 The violation of state administrative regulations, without more, does not give rise to a 5 deprivation of a protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 481–84 (1995). 6 State regulations that merely provide procedural requirements, even if mandatory, cannot form the 7 basis of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th 8 Cir. 1993). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely 9 related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally 10 protected liberty interest, provided that (1) prison officials are narrowly restricted by state statutes 11 or regulations to impose the specific deprivation at play, and (2) the liberty in question is one of 12 “real substance.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477–87. A liberty interest of “real substance” generally will 13 be limited to freedom from (1) restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the 14 inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will 15 inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. Whether a restraint is “atypical and 16 significant” under Sandin requires case-by-case consideration. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 , 17 860 (9th Cir. 2003). Typically, a court should consider the following factors: “1) whether the 18 challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative 19 segregation and protective custody,’ and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 20 2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 21 action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence.” Id. at 861 . While a prisoner 22 is entitled to due process protections prior to placement in administrative segregation, due process 23 requires only that prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time 24 after the prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons for 25 considering segregation, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 26 F.2d 1080 , 1100–01 (9th Cir. 1986) overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 27 U.S. 472 (1995) (internal citations and footnote omitted). “[In the context of placement in 1 charges, representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a 2 written decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation.” Id. 3 The amended complaint’s claim that Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation 4 without adjudication and in violation of a state regulation requiring an investigatory hearing within 5 72 hours him does not state a constitutionally cognizable due process claim. In the context of 6 administrative segregation, the Due Process Clause only requires that the hearing be held, and 7 notice given, within a reasonable time; it does not require compliance with state regulations. See 8 Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100–01; ); see, e.g., Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718-19 (9th Cir. 9 2007) (holding state regulations governing security classification of prisoners and prison 10 placement did not give rise to protected liberty interest under Sandin). The amended complaint 11 states that Plaintiff was informed of the reasons for the administrative segregation within four days 12 and there is no allegation that Plaintiff was denied an informal nonadversary hearing with respect 13 to the segregation or denied an opportunity to present his views. The Court will dismiss this due 14 process claim with leave to amend to correct the identified deficiency, if Plaintiff can truthfully do 15 so. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (if court determines pleading could be 16 cured by allegation of other facts, pro se litigant entitled to opportunity to amend complaint before 17 dismissal of action). Plaintiff is cautioned that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 18 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a cognizable cause of 19 action, and that the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 20 allegation. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 . 21 Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied due process in connection with his brief placement in 22 Cell No. 5 also fails to state a cognizable Due Process claim. Even if the conditions in Cell No. 5 23 constituted an atypical and significant hardship, the placement was too brief to implicate the Due 24 Process Clause. Compare Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (placement in disciplinary segregation for 25 thirty days did not constitute atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context), and 26 Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (placement in disciplinary segregation for 27 fourteen days did not constitute atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context), 1 facility, where inmates are not eligible for parole consideration, imposes an atypical and 2 significant hardship within correctional context). In addition, Plaintiff’s claim regarding his 3 placement in Cell No. 5 is properly brought as an Eighth Amendment claim, not a due process 4 claim. A prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment does 5 not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1093 6 (rejecting inmate’s attempt to “parlay” his Eighth Amendment right into a due process right 7 because, among other things, doing so would imply that some “amount of process can justify 8 subjecting a prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment”). Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied due 9 process in connection with his brief placement in Cell No. 5 is therefore DISMISSED with 10 prejudice. 11 Eighth Amendment. Both Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED with 12 prejudice. 13 In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment imposes 14 duties on officials, who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as food, 15 clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 16 825, 832 (1994); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 , 199-200 17 (1989). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only if two requirements are met: (1) the 18 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses 19 a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Although the Eighth Amendment 20 protects against cruel and unusual punishment, this does not mean that federal courts can or should 21 interfere whenever prisoners are inconvenienced or suffer de minimis injuries. See, e.g., Hudson 22 v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (Eighth Amendment excludes from constitutional 23 recognition de minimis uses of force); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (9th 24 Cir.), amended 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995) (temporary placement in safety cell that was dirty and 25 smelled bad did not constitute infliction of pain within meaning of Eighth Amendment). 26 The failure to provide Plaintiff with an adjudication prior to placement in administrative 27 segregation, or within seventy-two hours of such placement, is not, objectively, a sufficiently 1 guilt, prior to placement in administrative segregation if such a right exists, does not arise from the 2 Eighth Amendment. 3 The temporary two to three hour placement in Cell No. 5 was too brief to constitute an 4 Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Anderson, 45 F.3d at 1313-15 (temporary placement in 5 safety cell that was “dark, scary, and smelled bad” with toilet “encrusted with excrement and 6 urine” for between one and a half hours to overnight did not violate the Eighth Amendment). 7 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 10 1. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the following claims: the due process claim 11 arising out Plaintiff’s placement in Cell No. 5 and both Eighth Amendment claims. 12 2. The Court DISMISSES with leave to amend the due process claim arising out 13 Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation 14 3. The amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to address the 15 deficiencies identified above. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff 16 shall file a second amended complaint that addresses the identified deficiencies. The second 17 amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order, Case No. C 18 20-08239 HSG (PR) and the words “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. If 19 using the court form complaint, Plaintiff must answer all the questions on the form in order for the 20 action to proceed. The second amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to 21 any prior pleading because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaints. 22 See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Because an amended complaint 23 completely replaces the previous complaints, Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the prior 24 complaint by reference. Id. at 1262 . Plaintiff must address the deficiencies identified above. 25 Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order in the time provided will 26 result in dismissal of this action without further notice to Plaintiff. The Clerk shall include two 27 copies of the court’s complaint form with a copy of this order to Plaintiff. 1 Dated: 3/22/2021 | | / ° HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 3 United States District Judge — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — — 8 — — 9 — — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — Z 18 — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —