Martin v. Muniz

[7] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [8] NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] GEORGE MARTIN, 11 Case No. 17-01690 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR [13] v. RECONSIDERATION; 14 ADDRESSING OTHER REQUESTS 15 W. MUNIZ, et al., 16 Defendants. (Docket Nos. 173, 174, 175) [18] Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed the instant pro se civil [19] rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , against prison [20] officials at the Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). The Court [21] granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Eighth [22] Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs [23] claim against them. Dkt. No. 169. Plaintiff has filed a motion [24] for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 [25] and 60(b)(1-6), Dkt. No. 175, along with exhibits in support, Dkt. [26] No. 175-1. [27] order (e.g., after dismissal or summary judgment motion), a [1] motion for reconsideration may be based either on Rule 59(e) [2] (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motion for [3] relief from judgment) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [4] See Am. Ironworks & Erectors v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 5 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). The denial of a motion for [6] reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is construed as a denial of relief [7] under Rule 60(b). Id. at 1255 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation [8] omitted) (en banc). [9] Motions for reconsideration should not be frequently made [10] or freely granted; they are not a substitute for appeal or a means [11] of attacking some perceived error of the court. See Twentieth [12] Century - Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th [13] Cir. 1981). “‘[T]he major grounds that justify reconsideration [14] involve an intervening change of controlling law, the availability [15] of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent [16] manifest injustice.’” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. [17] Hodel, 882 F.2d 364 , 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United [18] States v. Desert Gold Mining Co., 433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. [19] 1970)). [20] This action was based on Defendants’ treatment of [21] Plaintiff’s chronic pain related to certain longstanding injuries to [22] his neck and back, and the alleged failure to provide corrective [23] surgeries to address that pain. Dkt. No. 137 at 6. With regards to [24] this treatment, Plaintiff claimed the following; (1) in February [25] 2007, he was given the wrong blood pressure medicine and that [26] Defendant Tran was deliberately indifferent to him from 2007 [1] through 2015, and that he has been falsely labeled as a “non2 compliant” patient; (3) at some point in 2013, he was given [3] Tylenol with codeine but was later given a different drug which [4] tasted strange; (4) his extended release morphine was cancelled [5] in 2016 and replaced with “crush-float morphine” which is [6] inadequate; and (5) he was denied pain medication, a CAT scan, [7] and surgeries during 2016 and 2017. Dkt. No. 169 at 16. In [8] granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court [9] concluded that there was an absence of a genuine dispute of [10] material fact with respect to any of these Eighth Amendment [11] claims. Id. at 27. [12] The Court first considers Plaintiff’s motion for [13] reconisderation under Rule 59(e). A motion for reconsideration [14] under Rule 59(e) “‘should not be granted, absent highly unusual [15] circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly [16] discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an [17] intervening change in the law.’” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 18 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (en banc). [19] Evidence is not newly discovered for purposes of a Rule 59(e) [20] motion if it was available prior to the district court's ruling. See [21] Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) [22] (affirming district court’s denial of habeas petitioner's motion for [23] reconsideration where petitioner's evidence of exhaustion was not [24] “newly discovered” because petitioner was aware of such [25] evidence almost one year prior to the district court's denial of the [26] reconsideration when the question before it is a debatable one. [1] See McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1256 (district court did not abuse its [2] discretion in denying reconsideration where question whether it [3] could enter protective order in habeas action limiting Attorney [4] General’s use of documents from trial counsel’s file was [5] debatable). [6] Plaintiff’s major arguments are that the Court has failed to [7] be impartial in its ruling and that Defendant Bright’s declaration [8] is “perjured testimony.” Dkt. No. 175 at 4, 5. Plaintiff repeats [9] his assertions from his prior briefs that his pain issues stem from [10] a “wrongful surgery” from 2006. Id. at 9-11. He also contends [11] that there is evidence of his inability to consume crush-float [12] medication. Id. at 15-16. However, none of these assertions or [13] evidence establish grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). [14] Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d at 369 [15] n.5. First of all, Plaintiff does not allege any intervening change [16] of controlling law. Secondly, the documents Plaintiff submits in [17] support do not constitute “new evidence,” as they are largely [18] from his medical records which were available prior to the [19] district court's ruling, see Ybarra, 656 F.3d at 998 , and any “new” [20] information he provides is not relevant to the issues that have [21] been resolved. Dkt. No. 175-1. For example, Plaintiff insists that [22] Defendants were aware of his need for surgery, and that a letter [23] in a “Plata Class action inquiry” shows that he would be “cleared [24] for surgery.” Dkt. No. 175 at 2; Dkt. No. 175-1 at 12. However, [25] this Plata letter is dated October 19, 2011, which is [26] that Defendants denied him surgery during 2016 and 2017. As [1] the Court found, the only mention of surgery was in the medical [2] records submitted by Plaintiff from January 2017, when Dr. [3] Ramberg concluded that surgery was not a viable option to [4] alleviate Plaintiff’s chronic pain. Dkt. No. 169 at 22-23. [5] Plaintiff asserts in his motion that the Court improperly relied on [6] Dr. Ramberg’s report and that two other doctors had different [7] opinions. Dkt. No. 175 at 27. However, Dr. Ramberg’s report [8] was submitted by Plaintiff in support of his opposition, and the [9] other doctors’ reports he provides now are from 2007 and 2008, [10] which is 9-10 years before Plaintiff was allegedly denied surgery [11] in 2016 and 2017. Dkt. No. 175-1 at 22-23, 26-27. Furthermore, [12] Plaintiff’s assertions that Dr. Bright’s declaration is “perjured [13] testimony” and that the Court has failed to be impartial are [14] simply conclusory and is not supported by any evidence. A [15] review of Dr. Bright’s declaration shows that he simply [16] summarized the underlying medical records of Plaintiff, which [17] were attached to the declaration. Dkt. No. 167-1. Plaintiff does [18] not claim that Dr. Bright mischaracterized any of the records, but [19] rather he disagrees with the observations contained in the chart [20] notes.1 Plaintiff further offers only references to other chart notes [21] regarding recommendations for treatment that predate Dr. [22] Bright’s review by five to ten years. Lastly, Plaintiff’s lay [23] opinions that he should be provided with other pain medications [26] 1 The Court will address Plaintiff’s specific objections in the or surgery are not sufficient to attack the credibility of Dr. [1] Bright’s testimony or to create a triable issue of material fact. [2] Absent highly unusual circumstances, and Plaintiff pleads none, [3] the Court finds no other basis for granting the motion for [4] reconsideration where the Court’s decision was correct. See [5] McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1255. Accordingly, the amended motion [6] for reconsideration based on Rule 59(e) is DENIED. [7] The Court next considers the motion under Rule 60(b). Rule [8] 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the [9] following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or [10] excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due [11] diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a [12] new trial; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; [13] (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other reason [14] justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. ACandS [15] Inc., 5 F.3d 1255 , 1263 (9th Cir.1993). Rule 60(b)(6) is a [16] “catchall provision” that applies only when the reason for [17] granting relief is not covered by any of the other reasons set forth [18] in Rule 60. United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152 , 1157 [19] (9th Cir. 2005). “It has been used sparingly as an equitable [20] remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only [21] where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking [22] timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Id. [23] (internal quotations omitted). [24] Plaintiff has failed to establish any basis for reconsideration [25] under Rule 60(b). At most, his argument that Dr. Bright offered [26] by the adverse party.” The relevant inquiry is not whether [1] fraudulent conduct prejudiced the opposing party, but whether it [2] harmed the integrity of the judicial process. See United States v. [3] Sierra Pacific Indus., 862 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). [4] There must be an intentional, material misrepresentation that [5] goes to the central issue in the case and that affects the outcome [6] of the case. Id. Relief is available only where the fraud was not [7] known at the time of settlement or entry of judgment. Id. A [8] “mere discovery violation or non-disclosure does not rise to the [9] level of fraud on the court.” Id. at 1171 . “[A] long trail of small [10] misrepresentations--none of which constitutes fraud on the court [11] in isolation--could theoretically paint a picture of intentional, [12] material deception when viewed together” even if each individual [13] misrepresentations did not rise to the level of fraud on the court. [14] Id. at 1173 . [15] Here, Plaintiff points to parts of Dr. Bright’s declaration [16] which he asserts includes “perjured” statements. First, Plaintiff [17] asserts that Dr. Bright’s account of an incident where Plaintiff [18] was alleged to have run 10 feet is incorrect. Dkt. No. 175 at 12. [19] However, the Court did not merely rely on Dr. Bright’s [20] declaration but reviewed the supporting documentation by [21] medical staff reporting on the incident. Dkt. No. 169 at 5-6. [22] Accordingly, any alleged inconsistency by Dr. Bright in this [23] regard did not affect the outcome of the case. Plaintiff also [24] points to Dr. Bright’s statement that Plaintiff was belligerent [25] toward staff without identifying the specific staff member. Dkt. [26] outcome of the case because there was other evidence of [1] Plaintiff’s belligerence: Defendant Birdsong reported Plaintiff [2] was belligerent in March 2015, Dkt. No. 169 at 8; and Plaintiff [3] was belligerent while interacting with Dr. Carl Bourne, a [4] nonparty, whom Plaintiff called a “liar,” id. at 9. Plaintiff also [5] asserts that Dr. Bright offered “perjured testimony” when he [6] stated that there were no physical findings in Plaintiff’s medical [7] exams or imaging to support Plaintiff’s request for surgery. Dkt. [8] No. 175 at 18-19. Plaintiff asserts that the consultation notes [9] from Dr. Rahimifar from 2006 states otherwise. Id. at 19. [10] However, Plaintiff’s claim in this instant action was that [11] Defendants wrongly denied him surgery in 2016 and 2017: the [12] fact that Plaintiff needed surgery in 2006, which he did in fact [13] receive, does not establish that Dr. Bright’s statement over a [14] decade later was false. Based on the foregoing, the Court is not [15] persuaded that Dr. Bright’s declaration constates “fraud” such [16] that it harmed the integrity of the judicial process. See Sierra [17] Pacific Indus., 862 F.3d at 1168 . Accordingly, Plaintiff has [18] failed to establish that he is entitled to this equitable remedy [19] under Rule 60(b) to prevent manifest injustice. See Washington, [20] 394 F.3d at 1157 . [21] For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for [22] reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) is DENIED. [23] Dkt. No. 175. [24] Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to respond to the [25] court’s order is DENIED as moot. Dkt. No. 173. He also [26] 1 || motion is DENIED to filing it in the Ninth Circuit, if he chooses 2 || to appeal this matter. 3 Plaintiff's request that his motion for reconsideration be 4 || served on Defendants’ counsel is also DENIED as moot. Dkt. 5 No. 174. 6 This order terminates Docket Nos. 173, 174, and 175. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. || Dated: _ May 25,2021 __ hota Lun jrornuenl, 9 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 10 United States District Judge [12] Z 18 [24] 25 || PRO-SEWLACRI701690Martin deny.recon