Stewart v. Department of Consumer Affairs of California

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 SELENE FUMIE STEWART, Case No. 21-cv-07674-EMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 10 DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER Docket No. 16 AFFAIRS OF CALIFORNIA, et al., — 11 — Defendants. — 12 — — 13 — 14 On January 20, 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and 15 entered judgment. Docket Nos. 14. 15. On January 27, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration 16 of the Court’s dismissal order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and L.R. 7-9. Docket No. 16. 17 Because the Court has already entered judgment in this case, Plaintiff’s motion is construed under 18 the applicable legal standards as a motion for amendment or alteration of judgment or relief from 19 final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b). 20 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 21 I. LEGAL STANDARD 22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a judgment may be altered or amended only 23 where “the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear 24 error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in 25 controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255 , 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Rule 59(e) 26 is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of 27 judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks 1 overcome a “high hurdle” to obtain relief under Rule 59(e)). It “may not be used to relitigate old 2 matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of 3 judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 , 485 n.5 (2008) (quotation marks 4 omitted). Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) similarly requires new evidence or 5 extraordinary circumstances, and is to be “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 6 manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 7 from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Harvest v. Castro, 531 8 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008). 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the Court’s order dismissing her amended complaint 11 with prejudice because the Court allegedly made “several mistakes.” Docket No. 16 (“Motion”) at 12 1. 13 First, Plaintiff argues that the Department of Consumer Affairs denied her application for 14 reinstatement of her nursing license on May 13, 2019 without a hearing in violation of due 15 process. Id. Plaintiff contends that, contrary to the Court’s reasoning that she failed to allege a 16 violation of due process, she specifically alleged that she was scheduled for a hearing on May 16, 17 2019 but was issued a denial before the hearing occurred. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends Defendant 18 would “not have scheduled this hearing if [she] was not entitled to a hearing at this time.” Id. 19 Plaintiff argues that her allegation that the hearing was cancelled sufficiently states a claim for a 20 due process violation. Id. 21 Plaintiff’s argument, however, fails to identify “clear error” or that the Court’s “initial 22 decision was manifestly unjust.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Indeed, the Court considered 23 and rejected precisely the argument that Plaintiff now advances in support of her request for 24 reconsideration: 25 That Plaintiff was not given a hearing for her third application for reinstatement of her nursing license does not automatically mean she 26 was denied due process. The essence of procedural due process is that “individuals whose property interests are at stake are entitled to 27 ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard.’” Dusenbery v. United significant property interest.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 1 Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (emphasis added). Where there is no practical way to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, a post2 deprivation hearing provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner will suffice to satisfy the requirements of due 3 process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981) overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). — 4 — Due process, however, does not categorically impose any such 5 hearing requirement for subsequent procedures after an individual has already been provided with at least one pre- or post-deprivation 6 hearing, as Plaintiff concedes she was provided with here. “Precisely what procedures the Due Process Clause requires in any given case 7 is a function of context.” See Brewster v. Board of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified School Dist., 149 F.3d 971 , 983 (9th Cir. 1998). 8 Plaintiff takes issue with the way the hearings regarding revocation her license proceeded in 2009 and 2011. But Plaintiff’s claims 9 arising from those incidents are time-barred. The only incident upon which Plaintiff may state a claim is the denial of her third 10 application for reinstatement of her nursing license in October 2020. The Court is not aware of any authority holding that due process 11 entitles an individual to a hearing on their third attempt seeking reinstatement of a property interest for which they were already 12 provided a pre- or post-deprivation hearing. Cf. Franceschi v. Yee, 887 F.3d 927, 935 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court has held 13 that a driver's license can be revoked without a pre-revocation hearing.”); Jones v. City of Modesto, 408 F. Supp. 2d 935, 953 (E.D. 14 Cal. 2005 ) ([T]the court cannot find a pre-deprivation hearing was required before Plaintiff's message therapist license could be 15 suspended.”). Plaintiff’s allegation that she was not provided with a hearing regarding her third application for reinstatement of her 16 nursing license, on its own, without any additional allegations of deficiencies in the reinstatement application process, is insufficient 17 to state a claim for violation of procedural due process. 18 Docket No. 14 (“Order”) at 5-6. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument does not provide a basis to alter its 19 decision. Baker, 554 U.S. at 485 n.5 (Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to 20 raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”). 21 Second, Plaintiff summarizes allegations of alleged misconduct that occurred between 22 2007 and 2009, and argues that the Court mistakenly stated that “the allegations were new.” 23 Motion at 5 (citing Order at 2:17-2:19). But, in fact, the portion of the Order to which Plaintiff 24 refers as a mistake is the Order’s summary of Plaintiff’s allegations, which quotes from Plaintiff’s 25 complaint that “new allegations” were brought against her by Defendant. Order at 2 (quoting 26 Docket No. 13 at 3). Regardless, as the Court has repeatedly explained, Plaintiff’s claims arising 27 from incidents between 2007 and 2009 are time-barred. Order at 4; Docket No. 10 at 2-3. The 1 Finally, third, Plaintiff argues that the appointment of the Administrative Law Judge who 2 presided over the revocation of her nursing license violates the Constitution. Motion at 11. 3 Again, the Court previously considered and rejected this very argument. Order at 6-7. Thus, 4 alteration of the judgment is also unwarranted on this ground. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 485 n.5. 5 Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, construed as a motion to alter, amend or seek 6 relief from judgment pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b), is denied. For the same reasons, 7 Plaintiff’s motion does not meet the standard for reconsideration set forth in L.R. 7-9. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 10 This order disposes of Docket No. 16. — 11 — 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. — 13 — 14 Dated: January 31, 2022 — 15 — 16 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN 17 United States District Judge — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 —