LeMoon v. California Forensic Medical Group, Inc.

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 TERESA LEMOON, Case No. 20-cv-02552-PJH 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 10 CALIFORNIA FORENSIC MEDICAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT GROUP, INC., et al., 11 Re: Dkt. Nos. 132, 133, 134 Defendants. [13] 14 Before the court is the parties’ supplemental briefs in support of and in opposition 15 to summary judgment. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their 16 arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 17 rules as follows. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history in this matter. This 20 case concerns decedent Jeremey Conaway’s detention and incarceration in the Solano 21 County’s Justice Center Detention Facility where he committed suicide in his cell. 22 Relevant to this supplemental order is the court’s December 3, 2021 initial order on 23 defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Dkt. 131. In that order, the court denied the 24 CFMG defendants’1 motion for summary judgment in its entirety and granted partial 25 summary judgment for the County of Solano and Sheriff Ferrara (“County defendants”). 26 Id. Specifically, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Ferrara in his [27] 1 individual capacity on plaintiff’s first cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment and 2 deliberate indifference. Id. at 8. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of 3 Sheriff Ferrara in his individual capacity on plaintiff’s second cause of action for 4 deprivation of substantive due process rights. Id. at 9. The court further granted Sheriff 5 Ferrara qualified immunity on these causes of action. Id. at 10. With respect to the third 6 cause of action, the court found that six of the eight alleged unconstitutional policies or 7 practices could not survive the County defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 8 granted the County defendants summary judgment accordingly. Id. 9 The court ordered supplemental briefing on three topics that the parties’ original 10 summary judgment briefs did not adequately address: “(1) whether Sheriff Ferrara is still 11 liable in his supervisory (or official) capacity on claims 1 and 2 for any constitutional 12 violations committed by the CFMG defendants; (2) whether the court’s findings on the 13 eight asserted policies, practices, or omissions should be applied to the CFMG 14 defendants named in claims 1 and 2, notwithstanding the denial of the CFMG 15 defendants’ motion for summary judgment; and (3) whether the County remains a 16 defendant on all claims asserted against the CFMG defendants given the court’s 17 findings.” Id. at 20. 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 First, plaintiff has not shown that Sheriff Ferrara is liable in his supervisory 20 capacity for the alleged constitutional violations committed by the CFMG defendants. “An 21 official may be liable as a supervisor only if either (1) he or she was personally involved in 22 the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection exists between the 23 supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 24 F.3d 809 , 819–20 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The requisite 25 causal connection can be established by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or 26 by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew 27 or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. 1 supervise the CFMG defendants, or have knowledge of any alleged constitutional 2 violations committed by the CFMG defendants. As such, no reasonable juror could find 3 Sherriff Ferrara liable in his supervisory capacity. 4 Plaintiff has also not shown that Sheriff Ferrara is liable in his official capacity. 5 Official capacity suits “ultimately seek to hold the entity of which the officer is an agent 6 liable, rather than the official himself.” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 7 2015). “When both a municipal officer and a local government entity are named, and the 8 officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a 9 redundant defendant.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep't, [10] 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008). The County is named as a defendant, thereby making 11 Sheriff Ferrara a redundant defendant and not a necessary party. The court thus 12 dismisses Sheriff Ferrara as a defendant in his official capacity. Accordingly, summary 13 judgment is granted in favor of Sheriff Ferrara on all causes of action. 14 Second, the court finds that six of the eight policies asserted against the CFMG 15 defendants and the County cannot survive summary judgment. To impose municipal 16 liability under § 1983, a “plaintiff must prove: (1) [the inmate] had a constitutional right of 17 which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to 18 deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force 19 behind the constitutional violation.” Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961 , 973 (9th Cir. 20 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court previously ruled in favor of the 21 County defendants that the following alleged policies were either not viable or were not 22 the moving force behind the asserted constitutional violations in this lawsuit: (1) the 23 County policy of placing suicidal inmates under Mental Health Observation (“MHO”) and 24 housing them in cells with alleged suicide hazards; (2) failure to train mental health staff 25 on the MHO policy; (3) CFMG’s failure to implement an MHO policy; (4) CFMG’s failure 26 to require psychological consultations of MHO inmates who pose risks to themselves; (5) 27 the County practice of housing suicidal inmates in cells with bunk beds and sheets; and 1 with the County defendants, these policies or practices were either not viable against 2 CFMG or were not the moving force behind any constitutional violation committed by 3 CFMG defendants. The court’s earlier denial of CFMG defendant’s motion for summary 4 judgment was largely based on the way in which that motion was presented. The court, 5 having now spent considerable time reviewing the briefs and evidentiary record in this 6 case, has reconsidered the earlier decision and now grants summary judgment in favor of 7 the CFMG defendants on these six policies, practices or omissions. 8 Third, all parties are in agreement that the County is liable for the CFMG 9 defendants’ actions with respect to the remaining two practices/omissions if they are 10 found to violate the Constitution. Those practices/omissions are as follows: (1) CFMG’s 11 custom of treating “priority 1” tasks as routine, and (2) CFMG’s failure to have a policy 12 requiring employees to review an inmate’s prior medical records when providing 13 treatment. Accordingly, the County remains a defendant along with the CFMG 14 defendants in this lawsuit with respect to these two practices only; no other policies, 15 practices or omissions will be tried. 16 The case management conference scheduled for May 19, 2022 is VACATED. 17 Instead, this matter is re-referred to Magistrate Judge Beeler for a further settlement 18 conference to take place as soon as her calendar permits. If the case does not settle, the 19 parties shall submit a stipulation as to a trial date after which the court will either enter a 20 revised pretrial order with pretrial instructions or schedule a trial setting conference. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: April 12, 2022 23 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 24 United States District Judge