Bickford Tamayo v. Saul

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 MICKINZIE T., Case No. 20-cv-06932-DMR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 9 v. ATTORNEYS' FEES 10 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Re: Dkt. No. 30 11 Defendant. 12 Plaintiff Mickinzie T. moves the court pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 13 (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 , for an award of attorneys’ fees after securing a remand to the Social 14 Security Administration (“SSA”) for an immediate award of disability benefits on January 5, 15 2022. See Mickinzie T. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-06932-DMR, 2022 WL 44694 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 16 2022). Kilolo Kijakazi, the Commissioner of Social Security, opposes the motion. This matter is 17 suitable for resolution without a hearing. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons given below, the court 18 grants Plaintiff’s motion. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disabled Adult Child and Supplemental 21 Security Income benefits in January 2017. The SSA denied the application in June 2017 and again 22 on reconsideration in September 2017. She then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge who 23 found her not disabled on August 26, 2019. After the Appeals Council denied her request for 24 review, Plaintiff filed this action, seeking judicial review on numerous grounds. On January 5, 25 2022, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s 26 motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for an immediate award of benefits. 27 Mickinzie T., 2022 WL 44694 , at *4-5. 1 [Docket No. 30.] In her reply brief, Plaintiff asks for an additional $1,957.86 in fees for litigating 2 the current motion. [Docket No. 32.] 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 The EAJA provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in cases seeking 5 judicial review of federal agency action: 6 [e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other 7 expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency 8 action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of 9 the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. — 10 — — 11 — 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). “Thus, eligibility for a fee award in any civil action requires: (1) that 12 the claimant be a ‘prevailing party’; (2) that the Government’s position was not ‘substantially 13 justified’; (3) [and] that no ‘special circumstances make an award unjust.’” Comm’r v. Jean, 496 14 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). 15 To be deemed the prevailing party under the EAJA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) 16 as a factual matter, the relief sought by the lawsuit was in fact obtained as a result of having 17 brought the action, and (2) there was a legal basis for the [plaintiff’s] claim.” Andrew v. Bowen, — 18 — 837 F.2d 875, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The government’s position is 19 substantially justified if the government proves that it has a “reasonable basis in law and fact.” 20 Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 21 552, 565 (1988)); accord Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 22 This analysis focuses on “the particular issue on which the claimant earned remand” and not on 23 whether the government’s ultimate determination was substantially justified. Hardisty, 592 F.3d 24 at 1078 (citation omitted). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party because her suit 27 secured a remand of the SSA’s final administrative decision. See Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1 the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of 2 whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”). The Commissioner does not contend that 3 her position here was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 4 Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an award as a prevailing party under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d). 5 When awarding a party attorneys’ fees pursuant to the EAJA, the court must determine the 6 reasonableness of the fees sought. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). This 7 inquiry generally entails determining “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 8 multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 433 9 (1983)). An award may be reduced if the movant provided inadequate documentation of the fees 10 requested, the hours spent by counsel were unreasonable, or the movant achieved “limited 11 success” in the litigation. Id. at 1146-47 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 436-37 ). 12 Plaintiff submits declarations from the two attorneys who worked on her case: Ralph 13 Wilborn, who billed 67.75 hours of time on this matter, plus an additional nine hours for 14 preparation of the reply on this motion; and David J. Linden, who billed 4.3 hours of time on this 15 matter. [Docket Nos. 30-2 (Wilborn Decl., Mar. 10, 2022); 30-3 (Linden Decl., Mar. 10, 2022); 16 32-1 (2d Wilborn Decl., Apr. 4, 2022).] Plaintiff seeks the statutory mandated hourly rates, which 17 are $217.54 for work performed in 2021 and $207.78 for work performed in 2020. Mot. 5-6 18 (citing https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited Sept. 25, 19 2022)). 20 The Commissioner does not dispute the hourly rate for either Wilborn or Linden. Nor does 21 she dispute the reasonableness of the hours requested by Linden. Rather, she generally objects to 22 the hours billed by Wilborn as “excessive” for what she describes as a “routine case, particularly 23 given the “considerable experience” of counsel. Opp’n 2. The Commissioner notes that Wilborn 24 has specialized in social security law since 1984 and previously served as an administrative law 25 judge for the SSA, while Linden has approximately 35 years of experience with disability appeals 26 and is certified as a specialist in social security disability advocacy by the California State Bar. Id. 27 at 2-3. Given this collective experience, the Commissioner argues, the total hours billed in this 1 arguments” for social security cases and the amount of time Wilborn spent on the opening brief— 2 47.75 hours—was unnecessary and excessive. Id. at 3. She also argues that the 15 hours Wilborn 3 billed for work related to the reply brief was excessive since the only issue on reply was the 4 remedy. Id. at 4. The Commissioner contends that the court should award Plaintiff no more than 5 $7,815.90 in attorneys’ fees for both Linden and Wilborn. Id. at 4. 6 “Social security cases are fact-intensive and require a careful application of the law to the 7 testimony and documentary evidence, which must be reviewed and discussed in considerable 8 detail.” Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Notwithstanding the 9 Commissioner’s argument that this case was “quite simple” and “routine,” the administrative 10 record in this case was over 2,800 pages long and Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision on 11 numerous grounds. See Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132 , 1134 n.1 (9th Cir. 12 2012) (noting that “the term ‘routine’” as used to describe social security disability cases “is a bit 13 of a misnomer” since such cases “are often highly fact-intensive and require careful review of the 14 administrative record, including complex medical evidence”). 15 Moreover, although “a district court will always retain substantial discretion in fixing the 16 amount of an EAJA award,” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163, a reduction of fees greater than 10 percent 17 requires “specific” and “persuasive” reasons from opposing counsel. Moreno v. City of 18 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (allowing a small reduction of no more than a 10 19 percent at the court’s discretion). Here, the Commissioner’s request would result in a 50 percent 20 reduction in the amount of fees requested by Plaintiff’s counsel and appears to be based solely on 21 defense counsel’s opinion about the amount of time that Wilborn should have spent on the case. 22 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts should generally “defer to the winning 23 lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Id. at 24 1112. Having carefully reviewed the time entries, the court finds that the number of hours claimed 25 are not excessive. Accordingly, it awards Plaintiff $15,631.79 for 67.75 hours of work by 26 Wilborn and 4.3 hours of work by Linden. The court also concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to 27 fees incurred in preparing the reply brief for this motion. Jean, 496 U.S. at 161. Plaintiff’s 1 Finally, as Plaintiff assigned her EAJA fees to counsel, this fee award shall be paid directly 2 || to counsel, subject to any debt offset. [See Administrative Record at 170-73 (representation 3 agreement containing assignment).] See Valle v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-02358-JSC, 2018 WL 4 1449414, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018) (“[a]s Plaintiff assigned her EAJA fees to [counsel] (Dkt. 5 No. 26-3), Plaintiff’s award, subject to any debt offset, shall be paid directly to Plaintiff's 6 || counsel.” (citing cases)). 7 || IV. CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys’ fees is granted in 9 the amount of $17,589.65. 10 EY SO» IT IS SO ORDERED. ey □□ S O ORDERED = 12 || Dated: October 3, 2022 Z2/Nyr 185 5 < Zz vt MI. Ryn, RYY □□□ 14 eh ses MOD kets □□ iL a Sy > Ko A 16 oO DISTRICS = 17 Z 18 — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —