Webb v. State of California Superior Court, County of San Mateo

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 ANTHONY L. WEBB, Case No. 21-cv-07100-JST 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. [9] Re: ECF No. 21 10 STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et 11 al., Defendants. [13] 14 Plaintiff, an inmate at Maguire Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se action pursuant to [15] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . His amended complaint (ECF No. 21) is now before the Court for review under 16 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. ECF No. 24. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 25 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). 4 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 5 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 7 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 8 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 9 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 10 B. Complaint 11 The operative complaint names the following defendants: the State of California; the 12 executive office of San Mateo Superior Court, judicial officer Jeffrey Finigan, and judicial officer 13 V. Raymond Swope. 14 The complaint makes the following allegations: Plaintiff has received inadequate 15 representation from his attorney Paul DeMeester. See generally ECF No. 12. According to the 16 initial complaint, Mr. DeMeester is representing Plaintiff in a state criminal case, C No. 19-SF17 000710. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff has sued Mr. DeMeester in C No. 20CIV02367. On November 18 12, 2020, Judge Finigan denied Plaintiff’s request to discharge Mr. DeMeester as his defense 19 attorney, in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be represented by counsel free of any 20 conflict of interest. The San Mateo Superior Court and Judge Swope deprived Plaintiff of due 21 process when they refused to enter default judgment against Mr. DeMeester where Mr. DeMeester 22 failed to timely answer the complaint filed against him by Plaintiff. See generally ECF No. 21. 23 Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction requiring Mr. DeMeester to cease representing Plaintiff in 24 his criminal case and requiring the San Mateo County Superior Court to enter default judgment 25 against the defendants in C No. 20-CIV-02367 or engage in civil litigation to hold the State of 26 California liable to Plaintiff for $500,000 in statutory damages. See generally ECF No. 12. 27 This action will be dismissed for the following reasons. First, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 1 Plaintiff’s claims. Second, Section 1983 prohibits the claims for injunctive relief against 2 defendants Judges Finigan and Swope. 3 1. Abstention 4 Plaintiff’s request that the Court order that Mr. DeMeester cease representing him in state 5 court criminal case C No. 19-SF-000710 is barred by Younger because it would require the 6 Court’s interference with ongoing state court criminal proceedings. Younger provides that federal 7 courts should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings except under extraordinary 8 circumstances, such as cases of proven harassment, prosecutions undertaken by state officials in 9 bad faith, and other extraordinary cases where irreparable injury can be shown. Younger, 401 U.S. 10 at 43-45, Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 86 (1971). Younger abstention is required when: (1) 11 state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state 12 interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. 13 See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). A 14 fourth requirement has also been articulated by the Ninth Circuit: that “the federal court action 15 would enjoin the state proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with 16 the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 17 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). Younger abstention is appropriate here because the 18 state proceedings are ongoing; the Supreme Court has held that state criminal proceedings 19 implicate important state interests, see Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“states’ interest 20 in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most 21 powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief”); 22 Plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his claim in the pending state proceedings through 23 direct appeal and collateral review; and the practical effect of the injunctive relief sought would 24 require this Court to directly interfere with state court proceedings. Finally, Plaintiff has not 25 demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances that would constitute an exception to Younger 26 abstention, only alleging that a conflict of interest exists because he created one by filing a lawsuit 27 against Mr. DeMeester. 1 default judgment against the defendants in C No. 20-CIV-02367 or engage in civil litigation to 2 hold the State of California liable to Plaintiff for $500,000 in statutory damages is a de facto 3 request that the Court overturn or otherwise review a state court decision. Under Rooker4 Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state court 5 decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing a petition for 6 a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See District of Columbia Court of 7 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 , 416 8 (1923); Mothershed v. Justices, 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 9 applies even when the state court judgment is not made by the highest state court. See Worldwide 10 Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888 , 893 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 11 essentially bars federal district courts “from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that 12 is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 , 1139 13 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 , 284 14 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired 15 its name: cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court 16 judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 17 review and rejection of those judgments.”). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here because 18 Plaintiff’s requests for relief would require the Court to review state court decisions. 19 2. Judges Finigan and Swope 20 While the doctrine of judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief in Section 21 1983 actions, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), Section 1983 provides that “in 22 any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 23 capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 24 declaratory relief was unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Where the injunctive relief requested 25 would require the federal court to supervise ongoing state judicial proceedings, federal courts 26 should refrain from issuing an injunction as a matter of comity. See Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 539 . 27 Here, the challenged actions taken by defendants Judges Finigan and Swope were actions taken in 1 declaratory relief is unavailable. Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief against Judges Finigan and 2 Swope fail as a matter of law. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES this action as barred by Younger 5 and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In addition, Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief against 6 || Judges Finigan and Swope are barred by Section 1983 and therefore fail as a matter of law. The 7 dismissal is with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against 8 || Plaintiff, deny all pending motions as moot, and close the case. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: November 16, 2022 [11] JON S. TIGA 12 United States District Judge [16] = 17 Z 18