Doe v. County of Sonoma

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 JOHN DOE, Case No. 16-cv-05195-JD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS v. [9] 10 COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Defendants. [12] 13 Pro se plaintiff John Doe alleges a number of constitutional violations arising from an 14 involuntary detention in a psychiatric hospital under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welfare 15 & Insts. Code § 5000, et seq. (the LPS Act). Doe’s claims against the state of California and the 16 California Attorney General were dismissed with prejudice, and his claims against Sonoma 17 County and three Sonoma County employees were dismissed with leave to amend. See Dkt. No. 18 67. Doe filed a first amended complaint (FAC) asserting claims against the individual County 19 defendants and challenging the constitutionality of the certification procedures under the LPS Act. 20 Dkt. No. 68. The claims were dismissed with prejudice because the FAC did not add facts to 21 plausibly show that the County defendants acted pursuant to a pattern, practice, or policy sufficient 22 to state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Dkt. No. 75. 23 Doe appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Dkt. 24 No. 87. The circuit court found that the claims against the California state defendants were 25 properly dismissed. Id. at 2 . The claims against the County defendants were remanded for the 26 Court to “consider in the first instance whether Doe alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible 27 claim against these defendants in their individual capacities.” Id. at 2-3 . The Court was also 1 asked to consider Doe’s constitutional challenge to the LPS Act’s certification procedures, “and 2 the proper defendants for such claim in the first instance.” Id. at 3 . 3 The individual County defendants, Steve MacDonald, Dr. Lisa Walker, and Danielle 4 Santos, filed a renewed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 5 No. 93. The motion is granted, and the FAC is dismissed with leave to amend. 6 LEGAL STANDARDS 7 The Court previously discussed the standards that govern the pleading requirements of 8 Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6), and the liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings. See Dkt. 9 No. 67 at 3. That discussion is incorporated here. 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , “a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct 11 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct 12 deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 13 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Doe v. Sempervirens Mental Health Facility, No. 14-cv14 00816-JD, 2015 WL 4238242 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2015), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 515 (9th Cir. 15 2017) (unpublished). 16 The County defendants say that they are entitled to qualified immunity, which is a shield to 17 individual liability under § 1983. See Dkt. No. 93 at 11-13; Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 18 Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 964 (9th Cir. 2010). Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit,” 19 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted), and it cloaks public officials 20 from liability unless “(1) the facts adduced constitute the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) 21 the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Mitchell v. 22 Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 443 (9th Cir. 2016). “The first prong ‘calls for a factual inquiry’ while 23 the second is ‘solely a question of law for the judge.’” Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 436 F. 24 Supp. 3d 1305, 1309 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 25 2010)). “[B]oth prongs must be satisfied for a plaintiff to overcome a qualified immunity 26 defense,” and they need not be considered in any particular order. Id. (quoting Shafer v. Cty. of 27 Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017)); see also Prebilich v. City of Cotati, No. 1 “The linchpin of qualified immunity is the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.” 2 Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, [3] 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987)). “Qualified immunity does not demand absolute perfection from 4 officers in the performance of their duties. So long as the challenged conduct was objectively 5 reasonable in light of the legal rules prevailing at the time it occurred, the officer will be immune 6 from suit.” Shen, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 1309 (citing Rosenbaum, 663 F.3d at 1075-76 ). 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 9 The FAC does not plausibly allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. Doe’s main 10 theory appears to be that the County defendants subjected him to “unlawful detention,” 11 “deprivation of liberty,” and “false imprisonment” in violation of the Fourth Amendment by 12 placing him under involuntary psychiatric holds under Cal. Welfare & Insts. Code §§ 5150 and 13 5250 without probable cause. Dkt. No. 68 ¶¶ 8-12, 14. Doe certainly has a constitutional right to 14 be free from detention without probable cause. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th 15 Cir. 2007). The problem is that he has not plausibly alleged a lack of probable cause. 16 Under Cal. Welfare & Insts. Code § 5150 , probable cause exists “if facts are known to the 17 officer ‘that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to entertain a strong 18 suspicion, that the person detained is mentally disordered and is a danger to himself or herself.’” [19] Id. (quoting People v. Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d 283, 288 (1983)). Probable cause must be based 20 on “‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 21 reasonably warrant [the officer’s] belief or suspicion.’” Id. (quoting Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 22 288). “‘Each case must be decided on the facts and circumstances presented to the officer at the 23 time of the detention and the officer is justified in taking into account the past conduct, character, 24 and reputation of the detainee.’” Id. (quoting Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 288 ). “[P]robable 25 cause means ‘fair probability,’ not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence.” United 26 States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 27 The FAC does not plausibly allege a lack of probable cause. To the contrary, it indicates 1 paranoid schizophrenic,” and had threatened to commit “suicide by cop” approximately two 2 months earlier. Dkt. No. 68 ¶¶ 2, 4, 8-12. Doe says that the report of his prior suicide threat 3 cannot support probable cause because it is stale hearsay. Dkt. No. 94 at 2-3. But two months 4 hardly make the threat stale, and a probable cause determination is not bound by a strict 5 application of the rules of courtroom evidence. See Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 1166 , 1171 6 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010). Defendants were perfectly free to consider Doe’s “past conduct, character, 7 and reputation.” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1220 (internal quotation omitted). 8 The FAC hints that the County defendants may have violated Doe’s Fourteenth 9 Amendment due process rights, but it is unclear whether that may be a procedural or substantive 10 right, or both. See Dkt. No. 68 ¶¶ 8-12, Prayer for Relief ¶ 2. Doe may not allege that he suffered 11 a procedural due process injury because he did not receive a hearing or other review prior to or 12 during his 72-hour detention. See Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The 13 initial 72 hours of detention [under section 5150] is justified as an emergency treatment. It is 14 recognized that a probable cause hearing cannot be arranged immediately.”); see also Walsh v. 15 AMD Sacramento, No. 2:13-cv-2077 MCE KJN, 2014 WL 4472752 , at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 16 2014), aff’d sub. nom. Walsh v. Am. Med. Response, 684 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2017) 17 (unpublished). 18 The FAC does not make allegations of unsafe conditions of confinement, unreasonable 19 restraints, or inadequate mental health treatment that might support a substantive due process 20 claim against the County defendants. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 324 (1982) 21 (confined persons have protected liberty interests in “safe conditions” and “reasonably 22 nonrestrictive confinement conditions”); Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) 23 (due process “requires states to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health 24 treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released”). 25 For the negligence claim against Santos, “‘mere negligence or lack of due care by state 26 officials does not trigger the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore does not state 27 a claim under § 1983.’” Sempervirens, 2015 WL 4238242 , at *3 (quoting Wood, 851 F.3d at 1 remain at the facility, does not plausibly establish the gross negligence, recklessness, or 2 “deliberate indifference” that have been found to support a § 1983 claim. See Dkt. No. 68 ¶ 12; 3 Sempervirens, 2015 WL 4238242 , at *3 (citing Wood, 851 F.3d at 1214). 4 An ostensible Second Amendment claim against MacDonald is also not plausibly alleged. 5 The FAC does not state facts indicating that MacDonald played a role in “the seizure of Plaintiff’s 6 personal property, a collection of firearms, by Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office Deputies for 7 safekeeping during the pendency of the psychiatric hold.” See Dkt. No. 68 ¶ 9. 8 Overall, nothing in the FAC or in Doe’s opposition brief suggests that the actions of the 9 County defendants were objectively unreasonable in any way. Even so, in light of Doe’s pro se 10 status, a final opportunity to amend is granted. The claims in the FAC are not sufficiently 11 developed to permit a qualified immunity analysis, and so consideration of immunity is deferred 12 pending the filing of a second amended complaint. See Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844 , 851 13 (9th Cir. 2001); Prebilich, 2021 WL 5964597 , at *3. 14 II. THE LPS ACT 15 The FAC’s sixth cause of action alleges that commitment to a psychiatric hospital under 16 the LPS Act “is tantamount to a judicial commitment requiring due process protections under the 17 Fourteenth Amendment.” Dkt. No. 68 ¶ 15. Doe says that the commitment certification and 18 review processes of the LPS Act lack due process protections, and that requiring patients to 19 affirmatively seek a writ of habeas corpus to trigger assistance of counsel and judicial review 20 violates due process. Id. ¶¶ 15-24 . He also says the LPS Act is unconstitutional because it 21 stigmatizes patients with mental illnesses, restricts their ability to possess firearms, and diminishes 22 their credibility under federal and state evidence law. Id. ¶¶ 28-30 . Doe appears to seek 23 injunctive or declaratory relief for these alleged violations. See id. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 3-4. 24 A threshold problem is that Doe has not named a proper defendant for these claims. State 25 officials may be sued for the purpose of enjoining the enforcement of an unconstitutional state 26 statute. See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th 27 Cir. 2013) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). But an individual state official “must 1 connection “must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory 2 || power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an 3 official to suit.” Jd. (internal quotation omitted). 4 The FAC does not identify a state defendant who satisfies these requirements for the LPS 5 Act claim. The County defendants are not state officials and consequently are not proper 6 || defendants for that. Even with the liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings, the Court may 7 || not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 8 the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The sixth cause of action is dismissed with 9 || leave to amend. 10 || I. STATE LAW CLAIMS 11 Because the federal claims have been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise 12 || supplemental jurisdiction over any California state law claims that Doe asserts in the FAC. See 5 13 || Prebilich, 2021 WL 5964597 , at *3. CONCLUSION 3 15 The FAC is dismissed with leave to amend. Doe may file an amended complaint that is 16 || consistent with this order by February 15, 2023, and he may not add any new claims without the 3 17 Court’s permission. A failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal with prejudice 18 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: January 25, 2023 [22] 73 JAMES PONATO United Jtates District Judge