Alert Enterprise, Inc. v. Rana

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 ALERT ENTERPRISE, INC., Case No. 22-cv-06646-JSC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 10 IMRAN RANA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 39 Defendants. [12] 13 Plaintiff Alert Enterprise, Inc. brings trade secret claims against Defendants Imran Rana 14 and SoloInsight, Inc. (Dkt. No. 23.)1 Alert and Mr. Rana stipulated to stay the claims against Mr. 15 Rana pending arbitration. (Dkt. No. 34.) SoloInsight now moves to dismiss Alert’s three 16 remaining claims on two grounds: (1) Alert fails to state a claim against SoloInsight and (2) the 17 California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) supersedes two of Alert’s claims. (Dkt. No. 18 39.) Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, and having had the benefit of oral argument on 19 March 9, 2023, the Court GRANTS SoloInsight’s motion to dismiss all three claims. 20 BACKGROUND 21 A. Complaint Allegations 22 Alert is an “industry leader in cyber-physical security convergence” principally operating 23 out of Fremont, California and incorporated in Delaware. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2-3 ¶¶ 2, 7.) In 2010, 24 Alert hired Mr. Rana and promoted him to various roles over the following 12 years, eventually 25 naming him Senior Vice President of Global Sales. (Id. at 8-9 ¶¶ 30-31.) Mr. Rana resigned from [27] 1 Alert on October 9, 2022, and subsequently began working as Chief Revenue Officer for Alert’s 2 direct competitor, SoloInsight. (Id. at 9, 12 ¶¶ 32, 48.) 3 Mr. Rana repeatedly met with SoloInsight’s founder and CEO prior to his resignation, 4 during which Defendants collectively conspired to steal confidential trade secret information from 5 Alert. (Id. at 12 ¶ 46.) On four days between September 26 and October 10, 2022, Mr. Rana 6 downloaded over 2,600 files from Alert’s Google Drive, including both customer and product 7 information Alert considers trade secrets. (Id. at 9-11 ¶¶ 35-36, 41-45.) Mr. Rana also transferred 8 an unknown quantity of files from his work laptop onto a four-terabyte USB drive. (Id. at 13 ¶¶ 9 49-51.) He then employed two anti-forensic software programs to destroy evidence of his actions, 10 delete additional files from Alert’s systems, and ensure nothing could be recovered. (Id. at 13-14 11 ¶¶ 52, 56-59.) As of the complaint filing, Mr. Rana has not returned any of the files in question 12 nor submitted his devices for examination by a neutral third party. (Id. at 15 ¶¶ 63-66.) 13 Alert notified SoloInsight of its concerns regarding Mr. Rana by two letters sent October 14 21 and 26, 2022. (Id. at 16 ¶ 67.) In these letters, Alert also requested SoloInsight “conduct a 15 reasonable investigation and adopt measures to ensure Mr. Rana does not transfer materials to 16 SoloInsight or otherwise use Alert trade secret information to aid SoloInsight in competing with 17 Alert.” (Id. at 16 ¶ 67.) On November 1, 2022, SoloInsight called Alert and represented none of 18 Alert’s files had been uploaded to its systems. (Id. at 16 ¶ 70.) However, SoloInsight refused to 19 confirm whether it investigated Alert’s claims or screened Mr. Rana in any way. (Id.) 20 B. Procedural History 21 Alert filed suit in this Court against Mr. Rana on October 28, 2022, claiming: (1) trade 22 secret misappropriation under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”); (2) breach of 23 employment contract; and (3) knowing destruction of data in violation of California Penal Code 24 section 502(c). (Dkt. No. 1.) On November 15, 2022, Alert filed its First Amended Complaint 25 (“FAC”), which added SoloInsight as a defendant to the DTSA and Section 502(c) claims. (Dkt. 26 No. 23 at 17, 22.) Alert also added a third, new claim against SoloInsight in the FAC: intentional 27 tortious interference with Mr. Rana’s employment contract. (Id. at 21.) 1 Alert and Mr. Rana stipulated to a preliminary injunction staying the claims against Mr. 2 Rana while they proceed in arbitration. (Dkt. No. 34.) SoloInsight now moves to dismiss the 3 three remaining claims, arguing: (1) Alert fails to state a claim against SoloInsight and (2) CUTSA 4 supersedes Alert’s tortious interference and Section 502(c) claims. (Dkt. No. 39.) 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 7 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To satisfy this requirement, the complaint 8 must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 9 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability 10 requirement,” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 12 For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in 13 the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving 14 party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 15 Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Determining whether a complaint states 16 a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 17 its judicial experience and common sense.”) (cleaned up). The court does not accept the plaintiff’s 18 legal assertions as true. See United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) 19 (“[O]nly pleaded facts, as opposed to legal conclusions, are entitled to the assumption of truth.”). 20 DISCUSSION 21 I. Alert Fails to Adequately Plead SoloInsight’s Trade Secret Misappropriation. 22 To state a claim for direct trade secret misappropriation under DTSA, a plaintiff must 23 allege “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a trade secret, (2) that the defendant misappropriated the 24 trade secret; and (3) that the misappropriation caused or threatened damage to the plaintiff.”2 25 InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653 , 657–58 (9th Cir. 2020). The statute [27] 2 In addition to these elements, DTSA requires some part of the misappropriation to occur on or 1 defines misappropriation as: (a) the “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who 2 knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means;” (b) the 3 disclosure of a trade secret without the owner’s consent; or (c) the use of a trade secret without the 4 owner’s consent. Attia v. Google LLC, 983 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 5 1839(5)(A)-(B)). 6 SoloInsight does not dispute Alert plausibly alleges Mr. Rana misappropriated its trade 7 secrets. It argues Alert does not plausibly allege it misappropriated any trade secrets; in particular, 8 that there are no allegations suggesting Mr. Rana gave the trade secrets to SoloInsight or that, after 9 he became a SoloInsight employee, he or SoloInsight used the trade secrets, and that without such 10 allegations Alert cannot state a claim. The Court agrees. 11 A. Conspiracy 12 Alert first appears to contend its allegations support an inference SoloInsight conspired 13 with Mr. Rana to steal its trade secrets. (Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 37, 46, 54, 80.) It insists its allegations 14 Mr. Rana met with SoloInsight’s founder and CEO several times during September and October 15 2022, announced his resignation from Alert on October 9, 2022, and downloaded massive 16 amounts of Alert’s trade secrets—most of it in the days just before and just after he announced his 17 resignation from Alert—support an inference of SoloInsight’s involvement in Mr. Rana’s theft. 18 (Id. ¶¶ 36, 46.) Not so. They support an inference SoloInsight interviewed Mr. Rana several 19 times prior to offering him a job and that Mr. Rana had decided to join SoloInsight before he 20 downloaded the trade secrets, but not an inference that SoloInsight directed him to do so. That 21 SoloInsight represented that Alert’s confidential material had not been uploaded to its systems 22 without otherwise confirming it had conducted an investigation to support that representation does 23 not support a plausible inference SoloInsight was aware of and conspired with Mr. Rana to steal 24 Alert’s confidential information. 25 B. Respondeat Superior 26 Next, Alert insists it allegations are sufficient to state a misappropriation claim against 27 SoloInsight based upon respondeat superior. Whether an employer is vicariously liable for an 1 “was committed within the scope of employment.” Brain Injury Ass’n of Cal. v. Yari, No. 19-CV2 5912, 2020 WL 3643482 , at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020). Misappropriation of trade secrets is 3 “within the scope of employment when it is performed, at least in part, to benefit the employer, 4 though the employer may forbid it.” SolarCity Corp. v. Pure Solar Co., No. 16-CV-01814, 2016 5 WL 11019989 , at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2016) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 6 742, 756 (1998)). 7 Alert argues it has plausibly alleged Mr. Rana took its trade secrets to benefit his future 8 employer, SoloInsight, and that such allegation is sufficient to state a misappropriation claim 9 under respondeat superior. The Court agrees Alert has plausibly alleged Mr. Rana took Alert’s 10 trade secrets with the intent to benefit his future employer, SoloInsight. But it has not cited any 11 law suggesting the future employer of a person who steals a company’s trade secrets for the 12 benefit of the future employer is liable under respondeat superior, absent an allegation the future 13 employer subsequently used the trade secrets or the wrongdoer used the trade secrets once he 14 actually became employed. There are no such allegations of fact here. 15 None of the cases Alert cited support its theory of liability. In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. 16 Chung, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1024 , 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2020), for example, a Plantronics executive 17 (Puorro) received trade secret information from a Cisco employee (Williams) in exchange for 18 professional coaching and advocacy for Williams’ employment at Plantronics. Because Cisco and 19 Plantronics operate in the same industry, the court held it reasonable to infer Puorro acquired the 20 information from Williams to benefit Plantronics. Id. at 1057 . Therefore, the misappropriation 21 fell within Puorro’s scope of employment and Cisco adequately stated a claim against Plantronics 22 under vicarious liability for Puorro’s actions. Id. Vicarious liability was alleged because Puorro 23 was a Plantronics employee at the time he received the trade secrets, not because Williams took 24 the information from Cisco for Plantronics’ benefit and was later offered employment at 25 Plantronics as a result. Id.; see also Navigation Holdings, LLC v. Molavi, No. 19-CV-02644, 2020 26 WL 5074307 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (finding vicarious liability claim sufficiently pled 27 when the former employee-defendant used trade secrets to divert millions of dollars in orders from 1 corporate defendants); Brain Injury Ass’n, 2020 WL 3643482 , at *6 (same when employee2 defendant created a competing business and used the plaintiff’s confidential information to help 3 her new business); SolarCity, 2016 WL 11019989 , at *5 (holding employee-defendant was acting 4 within the scope of his employment with defendant-company when he used plaintiff’s confidential 5 information to solicit leads for the defendant-company). This factual distinction makes sense. 6 How can a person be acting within the scope of his employment with an entity for whom he is not 7 yet employed? See Solar City, 2016 WL 11019989 , at *5 (“[U]nder the doctrine of respondeat 8 superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the 9 scope of the employment.”) (emphasis added and cleaned up). As Alert does not allege any facts 10 that support a plausible inference Mr. Rana took, used, or disclosed Alert’s trade secrets after he 11 became a SoloInsight employee, it does not state a misappropriation claim against SoloInsight 12 based upon respondeat superior. 13 Alert’s conclusory allegations that Mr. Rana was acting as SoloInsight’s agent when he 14 took the trade secrets (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 23 at 9-10 ¶ 37) are insufficient. Alert must allege facts 15 that support a plausible inference he was acting as SoloInsight’s agent. See, e.g., Canilao v. City 16 Commercial Investments, LLC, No. 20-CV-08030, 2022 WL 10584905 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 17 2022) (holding allegation that third parties were “vested with agency to beautify and upkeep the 18 premise of the property as agents of the [d]efendant” to be conclusory, providing “[n]o specific 19 facts satisfying Twombly and Iqbal”). It has not done so. 20 As Alert does not plausibly allege any SoloInsight employee took, used, or disclosed 21 Alert’s trade secrets while a SoloInsight employee, it does not state a DTSA claim against 22 SoloInsight based upon respondeat superior. 23 C. Ratification 24 The FAC also fails to plausibly plead ratification. Ratification is “the affirmance of a prior 25 act done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual 26 authority.” Kristensen v. Credit Payment Services Inc., 879 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2018) 27 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01(1)); see J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 201 common law agency principles from the Restatement (Third) of Agency.”) (internal citations 2 omitted). 3 Alert’s ratification theory is that once it informed SoloInsight of Mr. Rana’s conduct, 4 SoloInsight refused to conduct a reasonable investigation or adopt measures to screen Mr. Rana 5 from using any improperly acquired information to benefit SoloInsight. But, as explained above, 6 there are no well-pleaded facts supporting an inference that, at the time Mr. Rana committed the 7 alleged misappropriation, Mr. Rana was acting as SoloInsight’s agent. Therefore, Alert fails to 8 plead the predicate agency relationship upon which a theory of ratification is based. See Canilao, [9] 2022 WL 10584905 , at *5 (“In the Ninth Circuit, agency through ratification presupposes an 10 existing agency relationship.”). 11 Alert cites Cisco to illustrate how ratification should apply “where an employer fails to 12 investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort.” 462 F. Supp. 13 3d 1024 at 1057. But in Cisco, the complaint included extensive factual allegations detailing how 14 the employer-defendant had received confidential information and failed to take action to avoid 15 benefiting from it. Id. at 1057-58. Upon learning confidential trade secrets from an interviewee, 16 for example, executives for the employer-defendant requested additional information rather than 17 cautioning the interviewee against such disclosures. Id. at 1057. 18 Here, by contrast, Alert does not allege facts supporting a plausible inference SoloInsight 19 received, disclosed, or benefitted from Alert’s confidential information. (Dkt. No. 23 at 16 ¶¶ 6720 70.) SoloInsight responded to Alert’s concerns on November 1, 2022, representing that none of 21 Alert’s files had been uploaded to SoloInsight’s systems. (Id. at 16 ¶ 70.) Alert cannot state a 22 ratification claim by merely contending that SoloInsight has not—to Alert’s satisfaction—rebutted 23 Alert’s suspicion SoloInsight received confidential information. See Cisco, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 24 1057-58. 25 II. Alert Fails to Adequately Plead SoloInsight’s Tortious Interference with Contract. 26 Alert’s second claim against SoloInsight asserts intentional interference with contractual 27 relations between Alert and Mr. Rana. (Dkt. No. 23 at 21 ¶¶ 98-99.) Alert’s theory is SoloInsight 1 confidential information. (Id. at 21-22 ¶¶ 101-05.) And in return, SoloInsight offered Mr. Rana 2 an executive position as Chief Revenue Officer. (Id.) 3 To state a claim for interference with contract, the allegations must plausibly show: “(1) a 4 valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this 5 contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional or negligent inducement of a breach or disruption of the 6 contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) 7 resulting damage.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099 , 1105 (9th 8 Cir. 2007) (citing Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 19 Cal.4th 26, 55 (Cal. 1998)). 9 Alert fails to make factual allegations supporting a plausible inference element three is 10 met. Although the FAC repeatedly concludes Mr. Rana acted as SoloInsight’s agent, it includes 11 “no specific allegations to back up” the claim that SoloInsight induced Mr. Rana’s actions. 12 Athena Feminine Techs., Inc. v. Wilkes, No. C 10-04868 SBA, 2011 WL 4079927 , at *7 (N.D. 13 Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); see Hong Kong Ucloudlink Network Tech. Ltd. V. Simo Holdings Inc., No. 14 18-CV-05031-EMC, 2019 WL 4345912 , at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2019) (holding a claim one 15 party “directed” another to resign in furtherance of a conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets 16 “conclusory in nature” and could not be credited under Twombly or Iqbal). 17 Having failed to plead facts supporting a plausible inference SoloInsight intentionally or 18 negligently induced a breach of Mr. Rana’s contract, Alert does not adequately state a claim for 19 tortious interference. 20 III. Alert Fails to Adequately Plead SoloInsight’s Liability Under Section 502(c). 21 Alert also argues SoloInsight is liable for Mr. Rana’s violation of California Penal Code 22 section 502(c) under respondeat superior and standard conspiracy liability. (Dkt. No. 41 at 19-20.) 23 As previously discussed, Alert does not plead factual content supporting a plausible inference of 24 SoloInsight’s liability by respondeat superior. Alert also fails to state a Section 502(c) claim 25 under standard conspiracy liability. 26 California Penal Code section 502, the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud 27 Act, imposes liability on any person who “knowingly accesses and without permission takes, 1 Penal Code § 502(c)(2). Though Section 502 is a criminal statute, it empowers the owner of the 2 affected computer system to “bring a civil action against the violator for compensatory damages 3 and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” Id. § 502(e)(1). 4 To state a claim under Section 502, a plaintiff must allege only knowing access, not 5 unauthorized access. United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 789 (9th Cir. 2016). Simply 6 using valid login credentials and subsequently misusing the information obtained constitutes a 7 Section 502(c) violation. Christensen, 828 F.3d at 790 ; see Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, No. 168 cv-03166-JST, 2017 WL 783617 , *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017). To plead a civil conspiracy under 9 California law, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the 10 wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.” 11 See Wasco Prod., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 12 Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)). To 13 plead the “formation and operation” of a conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege an “agree[ment] to 14 commit wrongful acts.” See id. 15 Here, Alert alleges “Mr. Rana, at the direction and in conspiracy with SoloInsight, engaged 16 in criminal acts in violation of California Penal Code section 502 by accessing and removing 17 Alert’s data without authorization and by maliciously deleting information from Alert’s data 18 storage systems.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 22 ¶ 107.) Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to show 19 SoloInsight’s involvement in a conspiracy. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (holding “a 20 conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to 21 show” conspiracy); see also Glass Egg Digital Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-CV-04165, 2018 22 WL 500243 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018) (holding allegations one party was “acting on behalf 23 of defendants” and “concocted a scheme” with two other parties were “conclusory” and 24 “insufficient to show [the defendant’s] involvement in a conspiracy”). 25 Alert therefore fails to adequately plead SoloInsight’s conspiracy liability for Mr. Rana’s 26 violation of Section 502(c). [27] 1 IV. CUTSA Supersedes Alert’s Tortious Interference and Section 502 Claims. 2 “Under California law, CUTSA provides the exclusive civil remedy for conduct falling 3 within its terms and supersedes other civil remedies based on . . . the same nucleus of facts as trade 4 secret misappropriation.” Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1064 (N.D. 5 Cal. 2017 ) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.7 (b)). To survive supersession, Plaintiffs must allege 6 materially distinct wrongdoing such that the claim remains viable after removing the trade secret 7 facts. See, e.g., GeoData Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Am. Pac. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., No. CV 158 04125VAP (JEMx), 2016 WL 6601656 , at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016) (holding breach of 9 fiduciary duty by use of misappropriated information is not materially distinct from CUTSA 10 claims); SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity, No. 12-CV-00694-LHK, 2012 WL 6160472 , at *9 (N.D. 11 Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing, among other claims, a tortious interference claim because the 12 plaintiff’s “property interest in non-trade secret information” is not “qualitatively different” from 13 the interest conferred by CUTSA). 14 Alert argues its tortious interference and Section 502(c) claims are not based on the same 15 nucleus of facts as its trade secret misappropriation claim. According to Alert, the 16 misappropriation claim is based on Mr. Rana’s downloading, retention, and potential disclosure of 17 confidential information. (Dkt. No. 23 at 21 ¶ 102.) The remaining claims, by contrast, are based 18 on Mr. Rana’s deletion of files, use of anti-forensic programs, and failure to return company 19 property. (Id. at 21 ¶ 101, 107.) 20 This is a hollow distinction. Mr. Rana deleted files and used anti-forensic programs 21 specifically to cover up evidence of his misappropriation. (Compare id. at 18 ¶ 80 (describing Mr. 22 Rana’s misappropriation by accessing and downloading confidential information) with id. at 22 ¶ 23 107 (describing Mr. Rana’s violation of Section 502(c) by accessing and deleting confidential 24 information).) SoloInsight is only a relevant party “in its capacity as an entity that allegedly 25 received or might receive misappropriated trade-secret information.” (Dkt. No. 42 at 11.) 26 Therefore, “stripped of facts supporting trade secret misappropriation,” Alert’s tortious 27 interference and Section 502(c) claims have no connection to SoloInsight and do not constitute an 1 independent injury. See Waymo, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 1062 . CUTSA therefore supersedes both 2 claims. 3 Alert argues its Section 502(c) claim is not susceptible to supersession because CUTSA 4 does not supersede “(3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade 5 secret.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2436.7 (b). No published California state court cases address “whether 6 CUTSA supersedes a claim brought under [Section 502(c)], and federal courts are divided on the 7 issue.” Phonexa Holdings, LLC v. O’Connor, No. B308548, 2022 WL 3698220 , at *28 (Cal. Ct. 8 App. Aug. 26, 2022); compare Henry Schein, 2017 WL 783617 , at *5 (determining plaintiff’s 9 Section 502(c) claims were based on the same nucleus of facts as trade secret misappropriation 10 and were therefore superseded by CUTSA), with Heieck v. Federal Signal Corp., No. SACV 1811 02118 AG (KESx), 2019 WL 6873869 , *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019) (holding because Section 12 502(c) is a criminal statute, claims under it are not superseded by CUTSA). As discussed earlier, 13 Section 502 allows the owner of a computer system to bring a civil action “against the violator for 14 compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” Cal. Penal Code § 15 502(e)(1) (emphasis added). So, CUTSA does not improperly supersede a criminal remedy here, 16 but rather another civil claim “based on the same nucleus of facts as trade secret 17 misappropriation.” Waymo, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 1064 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.7 (b)). 18 CONCLUSION 19 Accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, Alert does not plead factual content 20 sufficient to draw a reasonable inference SoloInsight is liable for trade secret misappropriation, 21 tortious interference with contract, or violation of Section 502(c). The latter two claims are also 22 superseded by CUTSA. SoloInsight’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with 20-days leave to 23 amend. As discussed at oral argument, if Alert chooses not to amend, the Court will dismiss the 24 claims against SoloInsight without prejudice. 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated: March 16, 2023 [3] 4 ne JAGQUELINE SCOTT CORL 5 United States District Judge [11] g 12 [13] ii © [16] = 17 Z 18