Price v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 ROBIN PRICE, Case No. 3:22-cv-04300-JD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE ATTORNEY’S FEES v. — 9 — 10 RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, — 11 — Defendant. — 12 — 13 In this benefits dispute under ERISA, plaintiff Robin Price, an employee of Medtronic, 14 Inc., requests reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in securing payment and reinstatement of long15 term disability benefits. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 19. After Price initiated this lawsuit, defendant Reliance 16 Standard Life Insurance Company (Reliance Standard) reinstated his benefits. See Dkt. No. 20 17 ¶ 48. The parties advised the Court that their dispute had been resolved in all respects except for 18 the matter of attorney’s fees. See Dkt. No. 14 at 2. Price now requests an award of $68,545 in 19 attorney’s fees, and an additional $8,000 for drafting his reply brief in support of a fee award, for a 20 total of $76,545. Dkt. Nos. 19, 31. The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed, and 21 Price’s motion is granted in part. 22 The parties do not dispute that Price is entitled to reasonable fees. ERISA provides that 23 “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” are available “to either party” in the Court’s discretion. 29 24 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(1); see also Dimry v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, No. 25 3:16-cv-01413-JD, 2018 WL 6726963 , at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2018). In contrast to other 26 statutes, Section 1132(g)(1) does not limit awards to “prevailing parties.” Hardt v. Reliance 27 Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251-52 (2010). All that is required is that the party seeking 1 citation omitted). The discretion to award fees is guided by the “general rule” that a successful 2 ERISA plaintiff should, in the ordinary course, receive fees from the defendant. Smith v. CMTA3 IAM Pension Tr., 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Dimry, 2018 WL 6726963 , at *1. 4 There is no question that Price achieved success by getting Reliance Standard to reinstate his 5 benefits. Reliance Standard itself concedes that it “is not challenging Plaintiff’s right to seek a 6 reasonable fee.” Dkt. No. 28 at 7 (emphasis in original). 7 The salient question is whether the requested fees are reasonable. Price initially sought 8 hourly rates of $850 for Glenn Kantor, founding partner of Kantor & Kantor, and $700 for Sally 9 Mermelstein, of counsel. See Dkt. No. 19 at 11. In a reply brief, Price proposed a lower hourly 10 rate of $800 for attorney Kantor. See Dkt. No. 31 at 10. Price supports these hourly rates with 11 evidence of prevailing rates in the market in the form of declarations from ERISA attorneys not 12 involved in this dispute, and citations to fee awards in other cases that approved similar, though at 13 times lower, hourly rates. See Dkt. Nos. 20-21, 23-26. The attorneys also provided their time 14 records, which present in a lodestar approach the time spent on specific tasks by each lawyer, and 15 the amount billed for these tasks. See Dkt. No. 20-1. 16 These materials amply satisfy a claimant’s burden of submitting evidence supporting the 17 reasonableness of hourly rates, time use, and overall bills. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 18 424, 433 (1983); Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007). Reliance 19 Standard says that “substantial reductions” to Price’s fee request are warranted, in that the request 20 reflects “padded and over billing for form documents, inefficiency, excessiveness, time spent on 21 unnecessary activities, and use of higher hourly attorneys when lower hourly attorneys are 22 available at Kantor & Kantor to handle a run of the mill ERISA case.” Dkt. No. 28 at 7. 23 Some trimming is warranted to a modest extent. To start, the Court declines to award 24 Price fees for time spent on the reply brief. The reply brief reiterates many of the points raised in 25 Price’s initial fees brief, changes the hourly rate sought for attorney Kantor without explanation, 26 and suggests that counsel for both parties have not handled this fee dispute with the level of 27 professionalism and civility expected in this District. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 31 at 1 (“If and only IF 1 accurate, Plaintiff would be in total agreement that the amount billed was 2 EXTRAORDINARILY excessive . . . .”) (emphasis in original). Although attorney Kantor 3 submitted a declaration in which he says that he “spent in excess of 10 hours drafting the brief,” 4 Dkt. No. 31-1 ¶ 20, no billing records were submitted in support of this additional request. In 5 addition, Price is already seeking fees for over ten hours of work billed on the initial brief. See 6 Dkt. No. 20-1 at ECF p. 8. Consequently, the time spent on the reply brief was unreasonable and 7 is excluded in full. 8 This leaves the $68,545 that Price requests for all the work performed prior to the reply 9 brief. The figure is based on an hourly rate of $850 for attorney Kantor. But, as previously noted, 10 Price agreed to an $800 hourly rate in the reply brief, and that number is more in line with the 11 rates cited in his supporting declarations. As for attorney Mermelstein, Reliance Standard 12 complains that her $700 hourly rate is excessive because she is based in Minnesota. See Dkt. No. 13 28 at 13. But the $305 hourly rate it proposes is too low for an attorney of Mermelstein’s 14 experience, and would be grossly out of line with even the $700 rate that it proposes for attorney 15 Kantor. See id. at 12. A more reasonable hourly rate, considering prevailing rates in the 16 community and the fee declarations submitted by Price, is $650 for Mermelstein. The resulting 17 subtotal, after adjusting both attorneys’ hourly rates, is $64,160. 18 A further reduction is warranted for unreasonable and excessive hours. The billing records 19 indicate that the attorneys spent a significant amount of time communicating with Price, and 20 reviewing email exchanges involving their client. Plaintiff’s counsel defends this time on the 21 basis that Price “was highly anxious about the litigation from the outset” and that an unusual, 22 backdated letter added to Price’s case file by a Reliance Standard employee “added to [Price’s] 23 anxiety level” and “required both [attorneys] to spend hours upon hours calming him down, which 24 added numerous hours to the time expended.” Dkt. No. 31 at 8-9. Counsel says that Reliance 25 Standard must “take his plaintiff as he finds him,” id. at 9 n.7, invoking the “eggshell” plaintiff 26 concept. The concept is inapposite here. The pertinent inquiry is whether the hours billed were 27 reasonably expended. It is certainly appropriate for an attorney to be paid for a reasonable amount 1 reassuring an “extraordinarily” anxious client is not subject to full compensation. Id. at 7. The 2 || Court finds that a 25% reduction is appropriate under the circumstances, resulting in a total fee 3 award of $48,120. 4 This award is warranted under the guidelines in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 5 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). Strictly speaking, these factors are not contained in Section □□□□□□□□□□ 6 and are not required by statute to be taken into account. See Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254-55 . However, 7 || the Ninth Circuit has “traditionally” looked to the Hummell guidelines and requires that they be 8 considered, which Hardt did not foreclose. Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan, 9 |} 608 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2010) (citing Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255 n.8); see also Dimry, 2018 WL 10 || 6726963, at *2. 11 The award here satisfies the five Hummell factors. First, Reliance Standard manifested a 12 || degree of culpability and bad faith in terminating Price’s benefits in the manner that it did. 5 13 Second, there is no dispute that it has the ability to pay the claimed fees. Third, the award should 14 || have a deterrent effect on Reliance Standard from engaging in similar conduct in handling other 3 15 || benefits. The fourth factor is neutral. And the fifth factor favors an award, given that Reliance a 16 || Standard’s reinstatement of Price’s benefits indicates that his position was meritorious. It is also 3 17 worth noting that the case was resolved in fairly short order with a minimum of active litigation. 18 Consequently, Price is awarded $48,120 in attorney’s fees. Pre-judgment interest was not 19 requested and the Court declines to award it. See Blankenship v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of 20 || Boston, 486 F.3d 620, 627-28 (9th Cir. 2007). 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: March 22, 2023 — 23 — — 24 — 25 JAMEYPONATO United tates District Judge — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —