Yamasaki v. Natrol, LLC

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 VENUS YAMASAKI, Case No. 23-cv-00182-JD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE TRANSFER AND 9 v. PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 NATROL, LLC, Defendant. [11] 12 Defendant Natrol, LLC’s pending motions, Dkt. Nos. 20, 23, are suitable for decision 13 without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The hearing that was set for July 20, 2023, is vacated. 14 Natrol has asked to transfer venue to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 15 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). Dkt. No. 20. A transfer is denied. As the Supreme Court stated in Atlantic 16 Marine, “the overarching consideration under § 1404(a) is whether a transfer would promote ‘the 17 interest of justice.’” Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. District Court for Western District of 18 Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013). Natrol’s main argument for transfer is that Judge Walter in the 19 Central District has already decided a very similar case, Scarpo v. Natrol, LLC, No. 21-1979 (C.D. 20 Cal.), and so the interests of conserving judicial resources and preventing forum shopping warrant 21 a return to the Central District. But plaintiff has advised that Scarpo has been dismissed and 22 closed. Consequently, there is no obvious reason for a transfer to the Central District, especially 23 since there is no basis to assume that the case would be assigned to Judge Walter. 24 Natrol has not otherwise met its burden of establishing that the Central District of 25 California is “the more appropriate forum for the action.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 26 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000). A case-specific consideration of convenience and fairness does not 27 show, for example, that the cost of litigating in the Central District is likely to be significantly less 1 choice of forum is not dispositive here, it also is not irrelevant. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 , 2 739 (9th Cir. 1987). Overall, the Court finds that a transfer is not warranted. 3 Natrol has also filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal 4 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Dkt. No. 23. On the somewhat atypical facts and circumstances 5 here, the Court finds that plaintiff Yamasaki lacks Article III standing for her claims for injunctive 6 relief under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the Unfair Competition Law. Plaintiff has 7 expressly alleged that defendant’s “Cognium Products are not capable of having any effect beyond 8 that of a placebo” because it is “scientifically impossible for silk protein hydrolysate to provide the 9 brain health and memory benefits that Natrol promises.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4. Plaintiff also alleges that 10 silk protein hydrolysate is the single active ingredient in the Cognium Products, and, contrary to 11 Natrol’s claims, “silk protein hydrolysate is digested in the human gastrointestinal track, the same 12 way any other protein is ingested,” and so cannot “cross the blood-brain barrier” and impact the 13 brain. Id. ¶¶ 4, 28, 29. 14 In effect, plaintiff herself has stated that, as a matter of hard science and human 15 physiology, Natrol cannot work as advertised. In this unusual factual situation, plaintiff cannot 16 plausibly allege that she “would like to” purchase this product again in the future, or that she 17 “might purchase the product in the future, despite the fact it was once marred by false advertising 18 or labeling, as she may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the product was improved.” Davidson 19 v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 889 F.3d 956, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff has categorically 20 alleged that the products that Natrol manufactures, with their single active ingredient of silk 21 protein hydrolysate, cannot ever improve her memory and brain health. These allegations 22 distinguish this case from cases like Davidson, 889 F.3d at 971 , where the circuit found, at the 23 motion to dismiss stage, that plaintiff’s injury was real and not merely abstract where she had 24 alleged that “she would purchase truly flushable wipes manufactured by Kimberly-Clark if it were 25 possible.” 26 While the Court has considerable doubt that plaintiff can plausibly allege around the 27 science she embraces, it is not prepared to dismiss with prejudice without affording Yamasaki an 1 opportunity to amend. Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief under the CLRA and UCL are 2 || consequently dismissed with leave to amend. 3 Plaintiff has made a claim for damages under the CLRA and in a breach of express 4 || warranty claim. Dkt. No. 1 56, 79. Plaintiff's UCL claim for equitable restitution is dismissed 5 without prejudice for lack of equitable jurisdiction pursuant to Guzman v. Polaris Industries Inc., [6] 49 F.4th 1308 (9th Cir. 2022), and Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corporation, 971 F.3d 834 (9th 7 Cir. 2020). As plaintiff acknowledges, “Guzman established that the Court lacks equitable 8 || jurisdiction over [her] claims for equitable restitution because the CLRA provides an adequate 9 || remedy at law.” Dkt. No. 32 at 1. 10 Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under the CLRA and UCL are dismissed with leave 11 to amend. Her claim for restitution under the UCL is dismissed without prejudice. An amended 12 || complaint consistent with this order is due by August 18, 2023. No additional claims or parties 13 may be added without express leave of Court. 14 The initial case management conference that was set for July 20, 2023, is vacated pending 3 15 further order. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 17 |) Dated: July 17, 2023 [19] JAMES#ONATO 20 United fftates District Judge