Washington v. United States of America

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 9 — JASON LEVETTE WASHINGTON, 10 Case No. 23-cv-00447-JST (RS) Plaintiff, — 11 — v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 RECUSAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., — 13 — Defendants. — 14 — 15 Plaintiff Jason Levette Washington filed a motion to recuse Judge Jon S. Tigar from this 16 action. Washington asserts Judge Tigar “demonstrated an unreasonable bias or prejudice” against 17 him, improperly disregarded evidence, cannot be impartial in this action due to having a close 18 relationship with another (unspecified) Defendant, and is politically biased. Dkt. 6, at 2. For the 19 reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. 20 A party may move to recuse a judge from presiding in a given case. Motions to recuse fall 21 under two statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 . Section 144 provides for 22 recusal where a party files a timely and sufficient affidavit averring that the judge before whom 23 the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against the party or in favor of an 24 adverse party, and setting forth the facts and reasons for such belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 . 25 Similarly, § 455 requires a judge to recuse himself or herself “in any proceeding in which his [or 26 her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a), including where the judge 27 “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” id. § 455(b)(1). 1 The substantive test for personal bias or prejudice is identical under §§ 144 and 455. See 2 United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Specifically, under both statutes, recusal 3 is appropriate where “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the 4 judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622 , 626 5 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Consequently, an affidavit filed under § 144 will raise a 6 question concerning recusal under § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1) as well. Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867 . A 7 federal judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden is therefore on the party seeking recusal 8 to overcome this presumption. See, e.g., Saddozai v. Davis, No. 18-cv-5558, 2019 WL 13216339 , 9 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2019). Recusal is not warranted where claims of bias are purely 10 speculative. Yagman, 987 F.2d at 626 . 11 Washington claims Judge Tigar has demonstrated bias against him “throughout the 12 proceedings” and “disregarded crucial evidence,” Dkt. 6, at 2, but fails to specify any instances of 13 bias or examples of disregarded “crucial evidence.” This allegation, without more, is insufficient 14 to warrant recusal. Washington also alleges Judge Tigar has a “close professional” relationship 15 with a Defendant in this action that “could affect” his ability to be impartial. Id. Washington does 16 not identify which Defendant he means nor does he otherwise allege facts demonstrating bias or 17 prejudice. See id. Again, this sort of speculative assertion, unsupported by evidence, is insufficient 18 to warrant recusal. See Yagman, 987 F.2d at 626 . The Ninth Circuit has declined to find recusal 19 required where a presiding judge had a friendship with a defendant. See Sewer Alert Comm. v. 20 Pierce County, 791 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1986). Recusal is warranted where the circumstances 21 of a personal relationship would lead a reasonable person to conclude a judge’s impartiality might 22 reasonably be questioned, but no such circumstances have been alleged here. Third, Washington 23 alleges Judge Tigar is politically biased. Yet again, Washington fails to explain what that political 24 bias might be or to support this allegation with evidence. Washington suggests various exhibits in 25 this action show political preference without detailing how specific exhibits might do so. 26 None of Washington’s conclusory, speculative claims are sufficiently supported to make a 27 showing that a reasonable person would doubt Judge Tigar’s impartiality in this case. Recusal is 1 not warranted under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455 , and the motion for recusal is 2 denied. — 3 — 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. — 5 — 6 Dated: October 30, 2023 7 ' RICHARD SEEBORG 8 Chief United States District Judge — 9 — — 10 — ll a 12 — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — € = 17 — 6 — Zz 18 — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — 28 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL CASE No. 23-cv-00447-JST (RS)