Mattingly v. California Department of Parks and Recreation

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION [7] 8 MICHAEL JOSEPH MATTINGLY, Case No. 23-cv-03754-VKD 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING CALIFORNIA 10 v. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION’S MOTION TO 11 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF DISMISS FEDERAL CLAIMS PARKS AND RECREATION, et al., 12 Re: Dkt. No. 18 Defendants. [13] 14 Plaintiff Michael Joseph Mattingly sues the California Department of Parks and Recreation 15 (“CDPR”) and several of its officers, asserting federal and state law claims for violations of his 16 civil rights. The officer defendants answered the complaint. Dkt. No. 10. CDPR moves pursuant 17 to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims. Dkt. No. 18. Mr. 18 Mattingly opposes the motion. Dkt. No. 22. The matter is deemed suitable for determination 19 without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The November 7, 2023 hearing is vacated. Upon 20 consideration of the moving and responding papers, the Court grants CDPR’s motion to dismiss 21 Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims.1 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 According to his complaint, on July 31, 2021 Mr. Mattingly participated in a small protest 24 at Twin Lakes Beach in Santa Cruz, California. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 12. The protesters were 25 surrounded by the individual officer defendants. Id. ¶ 11. Mr. Mattingly says that, after singing [27] 1 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 1 protest music, he packed up his music equipment and then attempted to provide written notice to 2 defendant Officer Estes that state park police “lacked lawful authority to arrest or cite individuals 3 for being on the beach.” Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Mattingly alleges that while he was attempting to give this 4 notice, Officer Estes “armed with a weapon, moved his body into [Mr. Mattingly]’s chest forcing 5 [Mr. Mattingly] to back up into a group of waiting officers.” Id. ¶ 14. The complaint further 6 alleges that Mr. Mattingly was then assaulted by armed Officers Tabone, Weaver, and Thorne 7 from behind. Id. ¶ 15. Two officers reportedly knocked the notice and a recording device out of 8 Mr. Mattingly’s hands and then handcuffed him “using an unlawfully posted curfew sign as the 9 reason for [his] arrest.” Id. Mr. Mattingly says that the officers did not inform him that “he was 10 under arrest or would be arrested for code violations before he was assaulted and put in 11 handcuffs.” Id. ¶ 16. He maintains that he did not pose any threat to the officers and that there 12 was no lawful reason for his arrest. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 31, 32. He further alleges that he was 13 unlawfully detained, and that discovery obtained in a state court proceeding reveals that the 14 officers had targeted the protesters to suppress their free speech. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 105. 15 According to the complaint, after a jury trial in state court proceedings, “all charges were 16 dismissed [on] November 30, 2022.” Id. ¶ 10. 17 On July 27, 2023, Mr. Mattingly filed the present action against CDPR and its officers, 18 asserting violations of his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , based on the Fourth 19 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (claim 1), the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 20 (claim 2), and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (claim 3), as well as a claim for 21 violation of the California Constitution, article X, section 4 (claim 4), and a “California 22 Government Claim” (claim 5). Mr. Mattingly seeks damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive 23 relief “enjoining the [defendants] from engaging in further violations of [his] constitutional 24 rights.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 135-144. 25 CDPR moves to dismiss Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims, arguing that the Eleventh 26 Amendment bars these claims and that a § 1983 claim cannot be stated against CDPR because it is 27 not a “person” under the statute. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 While it “may be described as either creating an immunity for states or establishing a 3 jurisdictional limitation on federal courts,” Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of 4 Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869 , 873 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Amendment “does not 5 automatically destroy a court’s original jurisdiction,” Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 6 U.S. 381 , 389 (1998). “Rather, the Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a 7 sovereignty defense should it choose to do so.” Id.; see also Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 8 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have stated that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not 9 implicate a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction in any ordinary sense and that it should be 10 treated as an affirmative defense.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Miles v. California, [11] 320 F.3d 986, 988, 989 (9th Cir. 2003) (A “dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is 12 not a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . . . We treat Eleventh Amendment 13 immunity as an affirmative defense.”). The Court evaluates a motion to dismiss based on 14 Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Steshenko v. Gayrard, 44 F. Supp. 15 3d 941, 947-49 & n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 16 While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, dismissal for failure to state a claim is 17 warranted if the complaint fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 18 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 12(b)(6). A complaint must include facts that are “more than labels and conclusions, and 20 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 21 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 22 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Only plausible claims 23 for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679 . In a challenge to the sufficiency of a 24 pleading under Rule 12(b)(6), all material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and 25 construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 26 Cir. 2001). 27 III. DISCUSSION 1 named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch. & 2 Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). It is well “establish[ed] that an unconsenting State 3 is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of 4 another state.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Dittman v. California, 191 5 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In the absence of a waiver by the state or a valid congressional 6 override, [u]nder the eleventh amendment, agencies of the state are immune from private damage 7 actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.”) (internal quotations and citation 8 omitted). “A federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court’s jurisdiction over 9 that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 . 10 With respect to CDPR, the gravamen of Mr. Mattingly’s claims is that CDPR posted a 11 curfew sign at Twin Lakes Beach, without a proper permit, had unlawful policies and practices, 12 and did not properly train its officers, and thus violated his rights under federal and state law. See 13 Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 23, 95, 101, 108, 124, 127, 128. 14 CDPR was created by the California Legislature to administer California’s state parks. See [15] Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 501 , 504; see also Cal. Gov. Code § 900.6 (“‘State’ means the State and 16 any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State claims 17 against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller.”). District courts in California have 18 found that CDPR is a state agency for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to 19 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . See, e.g., Paul v. Redwood Nat’l & State Parks Dep’t, No. 17-cv20 07197-SI, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106877 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2018) (dismissing CDPR 21 from § 1983 civil rights action “because the CDPR, as a state agency, is immune from suit under 22 the Eleventh Amendment.”); Hahn v. Cal, Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, No. 2:09-cv-01479-JAM23 GGH, 2009 WL 3048716 , at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (dismissing claims against CDPR 24 because “[a]s a state agency, [CDPR] is protected by the Eleventh Amendment and cannot be sued 25 in federal court for any of the claims for relief,” including those under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ). Mr. 26 Mattingly appears to acknowledge that there is no basis under § 1983 to sue CDPR, although he 27 contends that the constitutional nature of his claims override any Eleventh Amendment immunity. 1 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state 2 treasury even though the claim arises under the Constitution.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 120 . “The 3 [Eleventh] Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims 4 that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Id. 5 There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, “Congress may 6 abrogate that immunity pursuant to its lawmaking powers conferred by the United States 7 Constitution.” Steshenko, 44 F.Supp.3d at 949 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 8 80 (2000)). Second, a State may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, by consenting to suit. [9] Id. (citing College Sav. Bank Florida v. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 , 10 670 (1999)). Third, “under the Ex parte Young doctrine, immunity does not apply when the 11 plaintiff chooses to sue a state official in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive 12 relief.” Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996)); see also Ex parte 13 Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-57 (1908). 14 “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to 15 claims brought under § 1983 in federal court.” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025-26. Additionally, “the 16 Supreme Court has held that ‘§ 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment 17 immunity.’” Id. at 1026 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 , 169 n. 17 (1985)). 18 Moreover, CDPR has not waived immunity under the Eleventh Amendment insofar as CDPR 19 asserted the defense with respect to Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims in its response to the 20 complaint. Finally, the Ex Parte Young exception only applies to claims against state officials, not 21 against state agencies, such as CDPR. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 22 812, 821 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Lazar, 237 F.3d 967 , 976 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001); Steshenko, 44 F. 23 Supp. 3d at 950. 24 In any event, Mr. Mattingly’s complaint does not assert plausible § 1983 claims against 25 CDPR because “a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of 26 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); see also id. at 69 (“We find nothing substantial in the 27 legislative history that leads us to believe that Congress intended that the word ‘person’ in § 1983 1 or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes 2 are not ‘persons’ under § 1983.) (quotations and citation omitted). 3 Accordingly, all of Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims against CDPR are dismissed. 4 Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “provides that leave to amend should be 5 freely given when Justice so requires,” because “the court must remain guided by the underlying 6 || purpose of Rule 15... to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 7 technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation 8 || marks and citation omitted). “The decision of whether to grant leave to amend nevertheless 9 || remains within the discretion of the district court,” which may deny leave to amend if allowing 10 amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 11 party seeking amendment has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 12 || 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). On the present 13 record, the Court concludes that there are no additional facts that could be alleged in an amended 14 || pleading that would permit Mr. Mattingly to press his federal claims against CDPR. Accordingly, 15 Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims against CDPR are dismissed without leave to amend. 16 || Iv. CONCLUSION = 17 Based on the foregoing, CDPR’s motion to dismiss Mr. Mattingly’s federal claims is 18 granted. The federal claims asserted against CDPR are dismissed without leave to amend. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: November 2, 2023 [21] 22 Vrain ®, LeDarche Virginia K. DeMarchi 23 United States Magistrate Judge