Vigil-Villela v. Kijakazi

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [6] 7 ROSEMARIE V., Case No. 21-cv-02192-AGT 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 10 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Re: Dkt. No. 36 Defendant. [12] 13 Plaintiff, the prevailing party in this social-security case, has moved for an award of 14 attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). 15 Dkt. 36. Defendant opposes the motion on the sole basis that the amount of fees requested, 16 $27,752.97, is unreasonable. Dkt. 37. As explained below, the Court finds that the amount 17 plaintiff seeks is reasonable and therefore grants her motion. 18 * * * 19 When awarding attorneys’ fees under the EAJA, a district court must determine the 20 reasonableness of the fees sought. Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). “The 21 most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours 22 reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting 23 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The appropriate number of hours includes “all 24 time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an 25 attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a 26 matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431 . The fee applicant “must exercise ‘billing judgment,’ i.e., the 27 fees must be for services for which a private client would pay.” Valle v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1 properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory 2 authority.”)). Courts should generally “defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to 3 how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 4 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). An applicant may also be awarded fees for hours spent litigating an 5 EAJA fee award. See I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 166 (1990). 6 Here, plaintiff has submitted declarations from the two attorneys at Bay Area Legal Aid 7 who worked on her appeal: Roselee Molloy, who billed 75.25 hours of time on this matter, and 8 Joanna Parnes, who billed 45 hours of time. See Dkt. 36-4 (Molloy Decl.) & Dkt. 36-5 (Parnes 9 Decl.). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable under 10 Ninth Circuit standards—$217.54 for 2021 and $231.49 for 2022.1 See Dkt. 36-1 at 7 & n.2; 11 Statutory Maximum Rates Under the EAJA, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory12 maximum-rates/ (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A)). Instead, defendant objects to the requested 13 fees as unreasonable and excessive because plaintiff’s counsel “are experienced social security 14 practitioners who should not have needed so much more than the average time (30 hours) that a 15 plaintiff’s attorney typically spends on a district court social security case to draft arguments for 16 six issues commonly raised in such cases, none of which in this case was particularly unusual or 17 complex.” Dkt. 37 at 3. Defendant maintains that awarding plaintiff “a third of [the requested] 18 amount—$9,250.99—would be generous compensation in this case.” Id. at 5 . The Court 19 disagrees, and finds that plaintiff is entitled to the full amount of requested fees for the following 20 reasons. 21 First, it is “an abuse of discretion to apply a de facto policy limiting social security 22 claimants to twenty to forty hours of attorney time in ‘routine’ cases.” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. 23 Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather, the determination of “how much time 24 an attorney can reasonably spend on a specific case . . . will always depend on case-specific 25 factors including, among others, the complexity of the legal issues, the procedural history, the size [27] 1 Plaintiff’s counsel billed 6 hours of time in 2021 (6 x $217.54 = $1,305.24) and 114.25 hours of 1 of the record, and when counsel was retained.” Id. Although “a district court will always retain 2 substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award,” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 , a reduction 3 of fees greater than 10 percent requires “specific” and “persuasive” reasons from opposing 4 counsel. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112, 1116 (holding that “the district court can impose a small 5 reduction, no greater than 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based on its exercise of discretion and without 6 a more specific explanation”). Defendant’s request here would result in a more than 60 percent 7 reduction in the amount of fees and the amount of hours for which plaintiff’s counsel is 8 compensated. This, however, “is a clear contravention of Ninth Circuit precedent: ‘courts cannot 9 drastically reduce awards simply because the attorney has requested compensation for more than 10 forty hours or make reductions with a target number in mind. Instead, district courts must explain 11 why the amount of time requested for a particular task is too high. Any other approach fails to 12 give deference to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment.’” Valle, 2018 WL 1449414 , at *2 13 (quoting Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136 ). 14 Second, and contrary to defendant’s suggestions otherwise, “social security disability cases 15 are often highly fact-intensive and require careful review of the administrative record, including 16 complex medical evidence.” Costa, 690 F.3d at 1134 n.1; see also Elizabeth B. v. Kijakazi, 2023 17 WL 3029261 , at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023) (“Social security cases involve a myriad of complex 18 legal issues as well as oftentimes a voluminous administrative record.”). This case was no 19 exception. The administrative record exceeded 1,070 pages and included three sets of 20 administrative hearing transcripts, two ALJ decisions, and over 650 pages of medical records and 21 opinion evidence detailing plaintiff’s multiple physical and mental health conditions. And 22 plaintiff’s counsel, who did not represent plaintiff at the administrative level and had to familiarize 23 themselves with the record, prepared a comprehensive motion for summary judgment that raised 24 seven substantive issues, each with multiple components—and nearly all warranted reversal of the 25 ALJ’s decision. As plaintiff correctly notes, her disability claim “had been once remanded by the 26 Social Security Appeals Council, there were three [administrative] hearings, and the issues were 27 complex, involving the combination of mental and physical impairments as well as vocational 1 at 2. That plaintiff’s counsel collectively spent 79 hours reviewing the record, researching the 2 legal issues, and drafting the motion for summary judgment is not unreasonable or excessive given 3 the extensive administrative record and the need to address the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s 4 credibility and the opinions of her numerous medical sources. The same is true for the 35.5 hours 5 counsel spent on the reply brief. As the Court’s 26-page summary judgment order demonstrates, 6 plaintiff’s case was factually and legally complex and required substantial analysis of numerous 7 issues. See Dkt. 32. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the 114.5 hours counsel 8 collectively spent preparing the summary judgment briefing which led to the reversal of the ALJ’s 9 decision, and the 5.75 hours counsel spent preparing the present motion for attorneys’ fees, are 10 reasonable. See Valle, 2018 WL 1449414 , at *2 (awarding $25,092.19 in fees for the 116.9 hours 11 counsel spent appealing the ALJ’s decision and the 9.75 additional hours they spent litigating the 12 EAJA fee motion). 13 Finally, the fact that plaintiff’s counsel are “experienced in social security law is not a 14 basis to reduce [their] requested hours.” Mitford v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 6052006 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. 15 Dec. 21, 2021) (collecting cases holding same). Defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s counsel 16 “should not have needed so much more than the average time (30 hours)” to litigate this case 17 simply because they “are experienced social security practitioners” is rejected. See Bell v. 18 Berryhill, 2018 WL 452110 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (rejecting similar argument and 19 noting that plaintiff’s “case presented a voluminous record and numerous issues, and the 20 Commissioner offers no more than her unsupported opinion that ‘experienced’ counsel should 21 have spent less time on various aspects of the litigation”); Arik v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1576711 , at *6 22 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (observing that defendant’s “arguments with regard to the amount of 23 time spent on various tasks . . . appear to be based on defense counsel’s own opinion, and 24 [defendant] does not provide any expert or other credible authority to suggest that the time billed 25 is unreasonable”), adopted, 2011 WL 2470907 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2011). Nor does any of 26 counsel’s requested time appear to be “unnecessarily duplicative.” See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1113 27 (explaining that “necessary duplication—based on the vicissitudes of the litigation process— ] unnecessarily duplicative work that the court may legitimately cut the hours’); see also Bell, 2018 2 |} WL 452110, at *4 (recognizing that “representation by two attorneys in a social security case is 3 || not automatically unreasonable” and finding that defendant “provided no evidentiary basis” to 4 || support reducing counsel’s requested hours based on duplication) (citation omitted). 5 Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s request for $27,752.97 in attorneys’ fees is 6 || reasonable. Because plaintiff assigned her EAJA fees to her counsel, see Dkt. 36-2, defendant 7 || shall pay the amount requested, subject to any offset allowed under the Treasury Department’s 8 Offset Program, directly to counsel.” 9 te OK OK 10 The Court grants plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $27,752.97. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. gq 12 Dated: November 30, 2023 [13] ALEX. TSE 15 United States Magistrate Judge [17] Oo Z 18 [25] 26 | 2 Defendant relies on Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 597 (2010), to argue that “if the Court awards 97 || EAJA fees, it must specify that Plaintiff is the payee.” Dkt. 37 at 6. However, “courts in this district have concluded that Ratliff does not prevent payment of a fee award directly to the attorney 28 if there has been a valid assignment and the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government.” Valle, 2018 WL 1449414 , at *3 (citing cases).