Shwiyat v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.

— 1 — — 2 — — 3 — 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 6 — 7 AUSTIN SHWIYAT, Case No. 3:23-cv-00283-JSC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 36 — 11 — Defendant. — 12 — 13 Austin Shwiyat filed suit against Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., alleging various 14 California Labor Code violations pursuant to the California Private Attorney General Act 15 (“PAGA”), California Labor Code §§ 2698–2699. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Defendant removed this case to 16 federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction because some of Plaintiff’s claims are 17 completely preempted by federal law. (Dkt. No. 1.) Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s 18 motion for partial summary judgment and motion for leave to file supplemental evidence in 19 support of its partial motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 36, 49.) After carefully 20 considering the briefing, and with the benefit of oral argument on December 14, 2023, the Court 21 GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment and GRANTS 22 Defendant’s motion to file supplemental evidence. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Defendant removed this PAGA action based on federal question jurisdiction, asserting at 25 least some of Plaintiff’s claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Managements 26 Relations Act (“LMRA”) (Dkt. Nos. 1) The Court issued an Order to Show Cause to Defendant to 27 show subject matter jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 22), and, after reviewing Defendant’s response (Dkt. 1 jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 31.) Indeed, at a June 1, 2023 hearing, Plaintiff conceded “at least some of 2 the claims for some of these allegedly aggrieved employees are preempted.” (Dkt. No. 46 at 4: 23 4.) As a result, the parties agreed to dismiss from the case those claims Plaintiff agreed are 4 preempted by the LMRA and have Defendant file a motion for partial summary judgment 5 regarding preemption of claims on which there remained dispute. (Dkt. No. 34.) 6 Defendant accordingly moved for partial summary judgment, requesting the Court dismiss 7 Plaintiff’s PAGA meal, rest period, and overtime claims, and corresponding derivative claims, 8 brought on behalf of certain union employees, on the grounds those claims are completely 9 preempted by federal law. (Dkt. No. 36.) After Defendant moved for partial summary judgment, 10 Plaintiff moved to remand and for leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 41, 42.) 11 Defendant also moved for leave to file supplemental evidence in support of its partial motion for 12 summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 49.) 13 The Court denied Plaintiff’s remand motion because Defendant had met its burden of 14 showing some of the PAGA claims are completely preempted by the LMRA. (Dkt. No. 65.) The 15 Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, finding Plaintiff’s proposed amendments 16 futile because they would not achieve Plaintiff’s explicit goal to facilitate remand. (Id.) 17 However, the Court did not decide Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment or 18 Defendant’s motion for leave to file supplemental evidence because the Court questioned whether 19 Plaintiff, a non-union employee, has standing to bring PAGA claims on behalf of unionized 20 employees. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021). After reviewing 21 briefing from both parties, the Court concluded Plaintiff has standing to litigate whether Plaintiff’s 22 PAGA claims seeking penalties on behalf of unionized employees are preempted by federal law. 23 (Dkt. No. 71.) 24 DISCUSSION 25 Defendant moves for partial summary judgment on the grounds of federal preemption of 26 certain PAGA claims for three groups of employees: (1) meal, rest, and overtime claims, as well 27 as derivative claims, brought on behalf of ready-mix drivers; (2) meal period claims, and 1 claims, and derivative claims, on behalf of construction employees. 2 I. LEGAL STANDARD 3 Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 4 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving 5 party bears the burden of producing evidence negating an essential element of each claim on 6 which it seeks judgment or showing the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence sufficient to 7 satisfy its burden of proof at trial. Nissan Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099 , 8 1102 (9th Cir.2000). “[T]he inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such 9 materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” United 10 States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Once the moving party meets its burden, the 11 nonmoving party must show a material factual dispute exists. California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 12 772, 780 (9th Cir.1998). 13 II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 14 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 permits objections at the summary judgment 15 stage to evidence when “the material cited . . . cannot be presented in a form that would be 16 admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). So, “[a]t summary judgment, a party does not 17 necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial.” Nevada Dep't of 18 Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). 19 However, “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support . . . a motion [for summary judgment] must 20 be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that 21 the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 22 Plaintiff objects (1) Mark Epstein lacks personal knowledge of work performed by union 23 employees because he “has not personally observed any of these union employees performing 24 work for the relevant period for this PAGA lawsuit,” (Dkt. No. 56 at 8); (2) Tricia Reedy lacks 25 personal knowledge as to Defendant’s “ready-mix [truck] operations” and as to the work 26 performed by Defendant’s employees. (Id. at 9-12.) 27 Mark Epstein is Defendant’s Senior Labor Relations Manager. (Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 1.) Mr. 1 of facility at each location relevant to those agreements. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-4; 10-12.) Given Mr. 2 Epstein’s job as Senior Labor Relations Manager, he has personal knowledge sufficient for this 3 testimony as to the validity and scope of these collective bargaining agreements. See In re 4 Kaypro, 218 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Personal knowledge may be inferred from a 5 declarant’s position.”). Mr. Epstein also asserts he has “personal knowledge of the job duties 6 performed” by “union workers.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Specifically, he asserts employees at aggregate 7 quarries “excavate stone, rocks, and gravel” (Id. ¶ 3); “[m]embers of the Laborers’ union . . . 8 perform manual labor around the plant such as digging trenches, helping with excavations, or 9 picking up rocks that fall off trucks” (Id. ¶ 5); and certain of Defendant’s employees drive 10 “commercial motor vehicles . . . and transport property (ready mix concrete).” (Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 10.) 11 Plaintiff objects that in his deposition, Mr. Epstein admitted he has not personally observed any of 12 these union employees performing work duties during the relevant time periods. (Dkt. No. 57-4 at 13 46-49.) While Mr. Epstein lacks personal knowledge to testify as to any of the actual work 14 performed day-by-day by specific employees, he has personal knowledge as to their duties 15 according to the collective bargaining agreements and company job descriptions. 16 Tricia Reedy is a Human Resources Manager for the Defendant’s Pacific Region. (Dkt. 17 No. 38 ¶ 1.) She asserts “[t]hrough [her] years of experience providing human resources services 18 for . . . Martin Marietta, [she has] knowledge if the ready-mix business including various 19 regulations that would cover the company’s ready mix drivers.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Ms. Reedy explains 20 “[a] ready-mix truck is a heavy duty vehicle used throughout the construction industry to carry 21 ready-mixed concrete.” (Id. ¶ 4.) She asserts “drivers of “ready-mix trucks . . . are required to 22 have either a Class A or Class B commercial drivers’ license.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Ms. Reedy further 23 declares “Martin Marietta is a federal motor carrier registered with the Federal Motor Carrier 24 Safety Administration.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Ms. Reedy also explains the job duties of various employees 25 covered by collective bargaining agreements: some “employees work in the quarries and perform 26 job functions related to the quarries’ operations, primarily excavation and maintenance” (Id. ¶ 7); 27 others have job duties that “include manual labor related to grading and paving work at the various 1 Defendant’s human resources managers, Ms. Reedy has personal knowledge to testify to the job 2 duties of Defendant’s employees, the licensure requirements for employees, and Defendant’s 3 registration with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. 4 During her deposition, Ms. Reedy also specifically testified about the weight of ready-mix 5 trucks. She stated “[a] ready-mix truck is a heavy-duty vehicle” that “weighs over 27,000 pounds, 6 unloaded.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) However, in Ms. Reedy’s deposition, Ms. Reedy indicated the way she 7 knew the weight of the ready-mix trucks is she had “done interviews with . . . one of the 8 transportation managers. And at one time, he told me that that’s how much the trucks weigh 9 unloaded.” (Dkt. No. 57-4 at 107.) Ms. Reedy admitted she never saw the trucks weighed and 10 never reviewed paperwork indicating the weight of the trucks. (Id. at 112.) The Court will not 11 consider Ms. Reedy’s conclusions as to the weight of ready-mix trucks, as Ms. Reedy lacks 12 personal knowledge. However, the Court will consider the rest of Ms. Reedy’s testimony. 13 III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE 14 Defendant moves for leave to file supplemental evidence in support of its motion for 15 partial summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 49.) In Defendant’s original motion for summary judgment, 16 Defendant relied on the declaration of Ms. Reedy, who stated “the ready-mix trucks weight over 17 27,000 pounds, unloaded.” (Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 5.) After Defendant filed its motion, Plaintiff noticed 18 the 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant’s persons most knowledgeable regarding the evidence 19 submitted in support of Defendant’s motion. (Dkt. No. 59 -1 at 2.) Defendant identified Ms. 20 Reedy as the person most knowledgeable as to the “contents and statements” contained in both her 21 own declaration and the declaration of Cole Jacobs. (Dkt. No. 59-3 at 1.) 22 As discussed above, during her deposition, when asked how she knows the weight of 23 Defendant’s ready-mix trucks, Ms. Reedy stated “at one time, [a transportation manager] told me 24 that’s how much the truck weighs unloaded” (Dkt. No. 59-4 at 107.) Ms. Reedy does not recall 25 when she was told this. (Id. at 112.) 26 Defendant now offers a supplemental declaration of Cole Jacobs, Vice President of Sales 27 and Market Development for Defendant, “to show that the ready-mix trucks meet the respective While each specific ready-mix truck may weigh slightly differently 1 due to various specifications and use frequency, Martin Marietta’s ready-mix trucks (including those that were used in California) 2 generally weigh over approximately 27,000 pounds unloaded. Fully loaded, these trucks weigh much more than 27,000 pounds and can 3 weight up to approximately 72,000 pounds. 4 (Dkt. No. 50-2 ¶ 4.) 5 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1), “[i]f a party fails to properly support an 6 assertion of fact” the Court may “give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact.” 7 Defendant argues Rule 56(e)(1) provides the court “discretion to permit additional summary 8 judgment evidence.” (Dkt. No. 49 at 4.) The parties dispute what standard the Court should use 9 in exercising that discretion: Plaintiff argues Defendant must “establish good cause” for 10 supplementing the record with Mr. Jacobs’ declaration, (Dkt. No. 58 at 8); Defendant asserts 11 Plaintiff fails to explain why the good cause standard applies to Rule 56(e)(1), and even if the 12 good cause standard applies, Defendant “meets the good cause standard.” (Dkt. No. 61 at 6). 13 Some courts have indicated a party’s good faith is an appropriate consideration when deciding a 14 Rule 56(e)(1) motion. See Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & 15 Power Dist., No. 2:10-CV-00290-DAE-BGM, 2017 WL 2721437 , at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 14, 2017) 16 (granting a party’s request to supplement the record because the request was “appropriate, relevant 17 to the underlying issues, made in good faith, and is not unfairly prejudicial”); George v. Nw. Mut. 18 Life Ins. Co., No. C10-668-RSM, 2011 WL 3881476 , at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2011) (allowing 19 party to supplement the record under Rule 56(e) because there was “no evidence” of “bad faith”). 20 However, Plaintiff does not cite to any cases indicating Rule 56(e)(1) requires the moving party to 21 demonstrate good cause to supplement the record. So, the Court will consider Defendant’s “good 22 faith” to be relevant to the exercise of its discretion under Rule 56(e)(1), but not dispositive. 23 Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion, arguing it “represents an improper effort to supplant 24 the binding testimony of [Defendant’s] designated person most knowledgeable under Federal Rule 25 of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).” (Dkt. No. 58 at 2.) While “[a] corporation generally cannot present 26 a theory of the facts that differs from that articulated by the designated Rule 30(b)(6) 27 representative,” that “general proposition . . . applies only where the purportedly conflicting 1 deemed as clarifying or simply providing full context for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.” Snapp v. 2 United Transportation Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1103 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citations 3 omitted). Here, the testimony of Mr. Jacobs did just that: it clarified and provided additional 4 context to Ms. Reedy’s deposition testimony. 5 Plaintiff also objects Mr. Jacobs lacks “personal knowledge of the actual weight of any 6 single ready-mix truck operated by any single employee” of Defendant. (Dkt. No. 58 at 8.) 7 Plaintiff argues Mr. Jacobs “hypothesizes that the weight of [Defendant’s] ready-mix trucks 8 exceed 27,000 pounds based upon the weight of a cubic yard of concrete,” but Mr. Jacobs “does 9 not state that he as ever weighed one of [Defendant’s] ready-mix trucks or concrete” or reviewed 10 any “documentation regarding the weight” of the trucks. (Id. at 8-9.) However, Mr. Jacobs 11 testified he has “20+ years of experience in the ready-mix industry” and, as part of his job has 12 “knowledge of the production and fleet capabilities” of ready-mix trucks. (Dkt. No. 50-2 ¶¶ 3-4.) 13 Given Mr. Jacobs’ job history and position, he has sufficient personal knowledge to testify as to 14 the weight of ready-mix trucks. See In re Kaypro, 218 F.3d at 1075 . Further, as will be explained 15 later in this Order, Plaintiff has no good faith basis for disputing the trucks weigh more than 16 27,000 pounds. 17 So, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for leave to file supplemental evidence. The 18 Court will consider Mr. Jacobs’ declaration. 19 IV. MERITS OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 20 A. Plaintiff’s Meal, Rest, and Overtime Claims, and Derivative Claims, on behalf of Ready-Mix Drivers — 21 — Defendant seeks summary judgment over the meal, rest, and overtime claims, as well as — 22 — derivative claims, Plaintiff has brought on behalf of ready-mix drivers for three reasons: (1) — 23 — California’s meal period requirements do not apply to Defendant’s ready-mix drivers; (2) the — 24 — Federal Motor Carrier Service Administration’s Hours-of-Service regulations preempt California’s — 25 — meal and rest period rules for ready-mix drivers; and (3) California’s overtime compensation — 26 — requirements do not apply to Defendant’s ready-mix drivers. — 27 — 1. California’s Meal Period Requirements for Union Ready-Mix Drivers — 1 — Both parties agree California Labor Code § 512 exempts “commercial driver[s]” from its — 2 — meal period requirements if those employees are covered by a “valid collective bargaining — 3 — agreement.” Cal. Lab. Code § 512 (e)(1); (f)(2). Further, “valid collective bargaining agreement” — 4 — is defined as one that: — 5 — expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working 6 conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning 7 application of its meal period provisions, premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly rate of pay of not less 8 than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage rate. — 9 — Cal. Lab. Code § 512 (e)(2). 10 Defendant seeks summary judgment over ready-mix drivers covered by the collective 11 bargaining agreements identified at ECF Numbers 29-11, 29-12, 29-13, 29-15, 29-16, 29-19, and 12 29-20. (Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 10). Plaintiff does not dispute the agreements meet the requirements of 13 Labor Code section 512(e) and (f); instead, Plaintiff urges the record evidence is insufficient to 14 support a finding Defendant’s ready-mix drivers are “commercial drivers” and fails to demonstrate 15 all Defendant’s ready-mix drivers are covered by the collective bargaining agreements. 16 a. Commercial Drivers 17 California Labor Code §512(g)(1) defines “commercial driver” as “an employee who 18 operates a vehicle described in Section 260 or 462 of, or subdivision (b) of Section 15210 of, 19 the Vehicle Code.” Cal. Lab. Code § 512 (g)(1). Section 260 of the Vehicle Code defines 20 “commercial vehicle” as “a motor vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code or 21 used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, 22 used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.” Cal. Veh. Code § 260 . 23 Subdivision (b)(1) of Section 15210 of the Vehicle Code defines “commercial motor vehicle” as 24 “any vehicle . . . that requires a class A or class B license[.]” Cal. Veh. Code § 15201 (b)(1). 25 Defendant asserts its ready-mix drivers meet “both definitions” because they “transport 26 property (ready-mix concrete), and require either a class A or class B license to operate” ready27 mix trucks. (Dkt. No. 36 at 12.) The Court agrees. Ms. Reedy attests ready-mix trucks “carry 1 Class A or Class B commercial drivers’ license.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) 2 Plaintiff responds Ms. Reedy’s testimony is insufficient to support a finding Defendant’s 3 ready-mix drivers require a class A or B license because Ms. Reedy is a “human resource 4 professional” and does not have personal knowledge of the licensure requirements for ready-mix 5 trucks. But, Ms. Reedy—as a human resource professional— has personal knowledge of job 6 requirements for particular positions, including licensure requirements. Further, even if the Court 7 accepts Plaintiff’s argument, Plaintiff does not dispute ready-mix trucks carry ready-mix concrete; 8 therefore, the drivers of those trucks are commercial drivers because they operate “a motor vehicle 9 . . . designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.” Cal. Veh. Code § 10 260. Since California Labor Code §512(g)(1) uses “or” in describing the different definitions of 11 commercial drivers, this alone is sufficient to establish ready-mix drivers are commercial drivers. 12 Plaintiff also complains he was not given the opportunity to conduct discovery as to 13 whether these ready-mix drivers do other work in addition to their ready-mix driving. Plaintiff did 14 not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). And, even construing his opposition as 15 satisfying Rule 56(d), he does not identify any good faith basis to believe the ready-mix drivers 16 perform work outside that set forth in the proffered job descriptions and governing collective 17 bargaining agreements. Further, even if such evidence could be developed, he has not cited any 18 caselaw suggesting the evidence would be legally relevant to whether the drivers qualify as 19 commercial drivers. 20 So, according to California law, Defendant’s ready-mix drivers are commercial drivers. 21 b. Collective Bargaining Agreements for Ready-Mix Drivers 22 Plaintiff asserts Defendant “has not provided any evidence to establish that all of its ready23 mix drivers were covered by a collective bargaining agreement as required by Section 512.” (Dkt. 24 No. 56 at 15.) But Plaintiff fails to explain any deficiency in the collective bargaining agreements 25 Defendant cited or in any way explain how Defendant’s proof is lacking. At oral argument, 26 Plaintiff was also unable to describe what discovery he would need to make such a showing. 27 *** 1 Plaintiff’s PAGA meal-period claims on behalf of ready-mix drivers covered by the collective 2 bargaining agreements identified at ECF Numbers 29-11, 29-12, 29-13, 29-15, 29-16, 29-19, and 3 29-20. Defendant has established its ready-mix drivers are commercial drivers with a qualifying 4 collective bargaining agreement according to California Labor Code § 512, thus, those ready-mix 5 drivers are exempt from California’s meal-period requirements under § 512. 6 2. Whether the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act Preempts Ready-Mix Drivers’ Rest Period Claims — 7 — The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) has concluded California’s — 8 — rest break rules contained in California Labor Code § 512 are preempted by the FMCSA’s Hours9 of-Service regulations “as applied to property-carrying commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers — 10 — covered by the FMCSA's hours of service regulations.” California’s Meal and Rest Break Rules — 11 — for Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers; Petition for Determination of Preemption, 83 Fed. Reg. 12 67470-01 (Dec. 28, 2018); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 2785 v. Fed. Motor Carrier — 13 — Safety Admin., 986 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Trescott v. Fed. Motor Carrier — 14 — Safety Admin., 142 S. Ct. 93 (2021) (upholding the FMCSA’s preemption determination). — 15 — Defendant’s ready-mix drivers are “property-carrying commercial motor vehicle (CMV) — 16 — drivers.” As described above, Defendant has established ready-mix drivers meet the definition for — 17 — “commercial driver” under § 512(g)(1). Moreover, Mark Epstein testified ready-mix drivers — 18 — transport property, namely, ready-mix concrete. (Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 10.) Finally, “[r]eady-mixed — 19 — concrete delivery vehicle[s]” are specifically mentioned in the FMCSA hours-of-service — 20 — regulations. See 49 C.F.R. § 395.1 (t). Plaintiff argues Defendant’s evidence is insufficient to — 21 — establish “that its ready-mix drivers were commercial drivers” because Mr. Epstein “has not — 22 — actually observed union employees performing their job duties during the relevant time period for — 23 — this PAGA action.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 15, 16.) However, for the reasons stated above, the Court — 24 — denies Plaintiff’s objection Mr. Epstein lacks personal knowledge. Plaintiff fails to raise any — 25 — genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s ready-mix drivers are “property-carrying — 26 — commercial drivers.” — 27 — Plaintiff also urges the FMCSA regulations do not preempt Plaintiff’s claims because the 1 FMCSA regulations only apply to commercial drivers who operate in interstate commerce; so, if 2 “the transportation takes place within a single state,” then the California rest period claims are not 3 preempted by the FMCSA regulations. (Dkt. No. 56 at 15.) Since Defendant has presented no 4 evidence its ready-mix drivers ever cross state lines, Plaintiff asserts Defendant has not established 5 the federal hours-of-service regulations preempt any of the ready-mix drivers’ rest period claims. 6 See 49 C.F.R. § 390.3 (a)(1) (“The FMCSA hours-of-service regulations apply to “all employers, 7 employees, and commercial motor vehicles that transport property or passengers in interstate 8 commerce.”); Reich v. Am. Driver Serv., Inc., 33 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Any motor 9 carrier that engages in interstate commerce is subject to the Secretary of Transportation's 10 jurisdiction, see 49 U.S.C. § 10521 . . . [E]ven a minor involvement in interstate commerce as a 11 regular part of an employee’s duties can subject that employee to the Secretary of Transportation’s 12 jurisdiction. . . Nevertheless, an employee’s minor involvement in interstate commerce does not 13 necessarily subject that employee to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction for an unlimited 14 period of time [citations] and if the employee's minor involvement can be characterized as de 15 minimis, that employee may not be subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction at 16 all.”) (citations omitted). 17 Defendant responds it “is a federal motor carrier registered with the Federal Motor Carrier 18 Safety Administration.” (Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 6). According to Defendant, this is sufficient to establish 19 the FMCSA preempts Plaintiff’s rest period claims on behalf of ready-mix drivers. See also Razo 20 v. Cemex Constr. Materials Pac., LLC et al., No. CV-2011-175-MWF-KSX, 2021 WL 325638 , at 21 *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2021) (finding FMCSA preemption of ready-mix drivers’ claims even 22 though the defendant provided no evidence any of defendant’s employees ever operated in 23 interstate commerce because the defendant itself was covered by the FMCSA regulations). But 24 Defendant has not provided any evidence or argument as to what it means to be “registered” with 25 the FMCSA and how such registration satisfies the interstate commerce requirement. So, 26 Defendant has not yet established its ready-mix drivers are subject to FMCSA regulations. 27 Of note, Plaintiff cites Valiente v. Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC, for the 1 hours-of-service regulations. No. 219-CV-04217-VAP-KKX, 2020 WL 8812885 , at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2 Apr. 24, 2020). In Valiente, the defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings based on 3 FMCSA preemption of the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at *1. The court held the “FMCSA’s hours of 4 service regulations expressly apply only to drivers operating in interstate commerce.” Id. at *2. 5 Since the complaint did not allege the plaintiffs drove in interstate commerce, the court held the 6 FMCSA’s regulations did not preempt California labor law. However, the Ninth Circuit’s 7 decision in that same case recognized FMCSA preemption applies “with respect to truck drivers 8 subject to federal regulations.” Valiente v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 54 F.4th 9 581, 583 (9th Cir. 2022). 10 As the parties’ submissions do not sufficiently address the question as to what interstate 11 commerce nexus is required for FMCSA preemption, and thus whether it is satisfied on this 12 record, Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s rest period claims brought on behalf of 13 ready-mix drivers. 14 3. California’s Overtime Compensation Requirements for Ready-Mix Drivers — 15 — Plaintiff’s complaint alleges “Plaintiff and Aggrieved Employees were not properly paid — 16 — for overtime hours worked despite routinely and consistently working more than 8 hours per day — 17 — and 40 hours per week in violation of the California Labor Code.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff — 18 — does not connect any specific provisions of California’s Labor Code to his overtime claim—either — 19 — in his complaint or his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Id.) However, in — 20 — his complaint, when pleading his PAGA claim, Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to civil penalties — 21 — according to “California Labor Code §§ 203, 204, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, and 1198.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Of — 22 — those provisions, California Labor Code § 510 addresses overtime requirements. — 23 — “In California, wage and hour claims are governed by two sources of authority: provisions — 24 — of the Labor Code, enacted by the Legislature, and a series of wage orders, adopted by the — 25 — Industrial Welfare Commission.” Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020) — 26 — (citing Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 421 P.3d 1114, 1119 ). “California’s ‘wage orders are to be — 27 — accorded the same dignity as statutes.’” Id. at 1070 (quoting Troester, 421 P.3d at 1119 ). 1 Defendant insists Wage Order 4 governs its ready-mix drivers. 2 California’s Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Order 4-2001 (“Wage Order 4”) 3 provides overtime pay requirements for “all persons employed in professional, technical, clerical, 4 mechanical, and similar occupations.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11040(1), (3)(A). While 5 California Labor Code § 510 provides overtime compensation requirements, California Labor 6 Code § 515 explains the Industrial Welfare Commission can maintain “an exemption from 7 provisions regulating hours of work that was contained in a valid wage order in effect in 1997” 8 and the commission “may review, retain, or eliminate an exemption from provisions regulating 9 hours of work that was contained in a valid wage order in effect in 1997.” Cal. Lab. Code § 10 515(b). Wage Order 4 has been in effect since 1988, so Wage Order 4 provides an exemption to 11 California Labor Code § 510. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040 (1988, vol. 19.).” Further, the 12 overtime compensation requirements of Wage Order 4 “are not applicable to employees whose 13 hours of service are regulated by:” (1) the FMCSA “Hours of Service of Drivers” regulations; or 14 (2) “Title 13 of the California Code of Regulations, subchapter 6.5, Section 1200, and the 15 following sections, regulating hours of drivers.” Id. § 11040(3)(K). Plaintiff does not dispute 16 Wage Order 4 applies to ready-mix drivers but argues Defendant has not established either 17 exemption applies. (See Dkt. No. 56 at 16-18.) 18 As discussed above, Defendant has not established as a matter of law its ready-mix drivers 19 are subject to the FMCSA hours-of-service regulations. So, that exemption has not been 20 demonstrated. 21 However, Defendant’s ready-mix drivers fall under the second exemption of Wage Order 22 4: “Title 13 of the California Code of Regulations, subchapter 6.5, Section 1200” applies to certain 23 vehicles, including “commercial motor vehicle[s] with a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or 24 more pounds.” Cal. Veh. Code § 34500 (k). For purposes of this section, “commercial motor 25 vehicle” is defined as “any vehicle . . . that requires a class A or class B license[.]” Cal. Veh. 26 Code § 15201(b)(1). Defendant’s ready-mix trucks have a gross vehicle weight rating of over 27 26,0001 pounds (Dkt. No. 50-2 ¶ 4), and require a Class A or B driver’s license. (Dkt. No. 38 ¶¶ 1 Plaintiff contends Defendant has only established the ready-mix trucks “generally weigh 2 over approximately 27,000 pounds unloaded,” (Dkt. No. 50-2 ¶ 4), so Defendant has failed to 3 establish all their ready-mix trucks have a gross vehicle weight rating of over 26,0001 pounds. 4 However, under California law, “gross vehicle weight rating” is “the weight specified by the 5 manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single vehicle.” Cal. Veh. Code § 350 (a). Defendant has 6 established ready-mix trucks carry concrete, and weigh “up to approximately 72,000 pounds” fully 7 loaded. (Dkt. No. 50-2 ¶ 4.) As before, Plaintiff complains he has not had sufficient opportunity 8 to conduct discovery. But, he took a 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant. And, more importantly, as 9 was established at oral argument, he has no good faith basis for believing additional discovery will 10 dispute Defendant’s evidence as to the loaded weight of the ready-mix trucks. There is no genuine 11 dispute each ready-mix truck’s gross vehicle weight rating exceeds 26,001 pounds. 12 So, neither California Labor Code § 510 nor Wage Order 4 provide a basis for Plaintiff’s 13 overtime claims on behalf of ready-mix drivers. Plaintiff does not cite to any other California 14 Labor Code provision providing a basis for those claims. Defendant’s motion for summary 15 judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s overtime claims on behalf of ready-mix drivers. 16 4. Derivative Claims for Ready-Mix Drivers 17 The Court GRANTS summary judgment on Plaintiff’s meal and overtime claims brought 18 on behalf of ready-mix drivers and DENIES summary judgment on Plaintiff’s rest period claims 19 on behalf of ready-mix drivers. So, the Court also DENIES summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 20 derivative claims for failure to maintain and provide accurate time and payroll wages and failure 21 to timely pay wages upon separation, as these claims may be derivative of the rest period claims 22 rather than of the dismissed claims. 23 B. Meal Period Claims, and Derivative Claims, on behalf of Construction Employees — 24 — The parties agree California’s meal period requirements do not apply to “an employee — 25 — employed in a construction occupation” if covered by a qualifying collective bargaining — 26 — agreement.1 Cal. Lab. Code § 512 (e)-(f)(1). Defendant asserts the collective bargaining — 27 — 1 agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-7, 29-8, 29-9, 29-17, and 29-18 cover 2 quarry employees who “are employed in a construction occupation.” Defendant also asserts the 3 collective bargaining agreement identified by ECF Number 29-28 covers employees who perform 4 grading and paving work on road construction sites, therefore those employees are also employed 5 in a construction occupation. 6 California’s Labor Code defines “construction occupation” as: 7 [A]ll job classifications associated with construction by Article 2 (commencing with Section 7025) of Chapter 9 of Division 3 of the 8 Business and Professions Code, including work involving alteration, demolition, building, excavation, renovation, remodeling, 9 maintenance, improvement, and repair, and any other similar or related occupation or trade. — 10 — Cal. Lab. Code. § 512(g)(2). — 11 — Plaintiff does not contest the validity of these collective bargaining agreements. Instead, — 12 — Plaintiff argues Defendant is a “materials supplier and not a contractor,” so Defendant’s — 13 — employees do not fall under the construction occupation definition. (Dkt. No. 56 at 12.) He cites — 14 — to California Business and Professions Code § 7052 which states the chapter “does not apply to — 15 — any person who only furnishes materials or supplies without fabricating them into, or consuming — 16 — them in the performance of, the work of a contractor.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7052 . However, — 17 — Cal. Lab. Code. § 512(g)(2) refers to “Article 2 (commencing with Section 7025) of Chapter 9 of — 18 — Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code.” Cal. Lab. Code. § 512(g)(2). Article 2 of — 19 — Chapter 9 of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code, titled “Application of Chapter,” — 20 — consists of Sections 7025 to 7035. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code div. 3, ch. 9., art. 2. Article 3 of — 21 — Chapter 9 of Division 3 of the Business and Professions code is titled “Exemptions” and consists — 22 — of sections 7040 to 7054.5. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code div. 3, ch. 9., art. 3. So, the “supplier” — 23 — — 24 — exemption for “any employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement, so long as the — 25 — agreement meets certain requirements.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11160 (10)(E). Plaintiff does not argue Wage Order 16 provides the basis for his meal period claims, but instead asserts “Section — 26 — 512 [of the California Labor Code] controls over any inconsistent provisions of the Wage Order 16.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 18.) So, Plaintiff has waived any meal period claims based on Wage Order — 27 — 16, and the Court will proceed by analyzing Plaintiff’s meal period claims based on California 1 exemption Plaintiff cites is not relevant to the definition of “construction occupation” in California 2 Labor Code § 512(g)(2). 3 Moreover, California Labor Code § 512 exempts the individual “employee employed in a 4 construction occupation,” not a construction employer as a whole—a distinction that is 5 particularly relevant given other subsections refer to various “industr[ies],” suggesting they apply 6 to the categorization of the employer’s work, rather than the employee’s individual categorization. — 7 — Cal. Lab. Code § 512 (f)(1). So, it is irrelevant that Defendant as a company is a materials 8 supplier—what matters is whether the particular jobs of particular employees covered by 9 qualifying collective bargaining agreements meet the statutory definition of “a construction 10 occupation.” § 512(f)(1). 11 Defendant has established the collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF 12 Numbers 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-7, 29-8, 29-9, 29-17, 29-18, and 29-28 cover employees who “are 13 employed in a construction occupation.” At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded employees subject 14 to the collective bargaining agreement identified at ECF No. 29-8 are employed in a construction 15 occupation. The collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 16 29-7, 29-8, 29-9, 29-17, and 29-18 cover “aggregate quarries” which are “above ground mine[s]” 17 where “employees excavate stone, rocks, and gravel.” (Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 3.) These individuals may 18 “operate[e] or repair[] the heavy equipment” in the quarry or “perform manual labor around the 19 plant, such as digging trenches, helping with excavations, or picking up rocks that fall off trucks.” 20 (Id. ¶ 5.) All these employees work on-site. (Id. ¶ 12.) All of this work “involve[es] alteration, 21 demolition, building, excavation, renovation, remodeling, maintenance, improvement,” or 22 “repair,” so all of it qualifies as a construction occupation under the California Labor Code. Cal. 23 Lab. Code. § 512(g)(2). 24 While Plaintiff asserts “[Defendant]’s assertion that its union employees are employed in a 25 construction occupation is superficial at best” (Dkt. No. 56 at 19), Plaintiff does not identify any 26 evidence to dispute these employees work construction jobs. And, as recounted above, Plaintiff 27 did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit and has not otherwise identified what evidence could create a 1 California Business & Professions Code § 7052 does not apply to the construction workers 2 definition, then these unionized employees are “construction workers” according to California 3 Labor Code § 512(g)(2). So, Defendant’s evidence that employees subject to the collective 4 bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-7, 29-8, 29-9, 29-17, 295 18, and 29-28 are employed in a “construction occupation” is undisputed. 6 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s PAGA 7 meal period claims on behalf of employees subject to the collective bargaining agreements 8 identified by ECF Numbers 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-7, 29-8, 29-9, 29-17, 29-18, and 29-28. 9 Moreover, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s PAGA 10 claims that are derivative of these meal period claims. 11 C. Rest Period Claims, and Derivative Claims, on behalf of Construction Employees — 12 — Plaintiff alleges “Defendant required Plaintiff and Aggrieved Employees to work through . — 13 — . . rest periods.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff further asserts “[p]ursuant to California law, an — 14 — employee is entitled to . . . three ten-minute rest periods if required to work more than ten hours.” — 15 — (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff does not cite to any specific California Labor Code statute for his rest break — 16 — claims, either in his complaint or briefing papers. Defendant asserts Wage Order 16-2001 (“Wage — 17 — Order 16”), which regulates “Wages, Hours and Working Conditions for Certain On-Site — 18 — Occupations in the Construction, Drilling, Logging and Mining Industries,” provides the basis for — 19 — Plaintiff’s rest period claims. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11160 . Since the main purpose of — 20 — Defendant’s business is “mining,” (Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 2 (“As a national company, Martin Marietta's — 21 — primary focus is the mining of aggregate materials (including sand, gravel, crushed stone, etc.)”), — 22 — Wage Order 16 applies to Defendant. Plaintiff does not dispute these rest period claims are based — 23 — on Wage Order 16. — 24 — Wage Order 16 provides for “ten (10) minutes net rest time for every four (4) hours — 25 — worked, or major fraction thereof.” Id. § 11160(A); see also Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7 (b) (“An — 26 — employer shall not require an employee to work during a meal or rest or recovery period mandated — 27 — pursuant to, an . . . order of the Industrial Welfare Commission.”). The Order applies to “all 1 persons employed in the on-site occupations of “construction,” “drilling,” and “mining.” Cal. 2 Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11160(1). 3 Wage Order 16 contains an exemption for its rest period requirements if an employee is 4 subject to a valid collective bargaining agreement with “equivalent protection.” Id. § 5 11160(11)(E). Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s PAGA rest period claims on 6 behalf of employees subject to the collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 7 29-2, 29-3, 29-9, and 29-28, asserting these individuals are “employed in the on-site occupations 8 of construction,” “drilling,” or “mining,” so the exemption to Wage Order 16’s rest period 9 requirements applies to these individuals. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11160 (1). 10 Defendant has established employees subject to the collective bargaining agreements 11 identified by ECF Numbers 29-2, 29-3, 29-9, and 29-28 are subject to Wage Order 16. As 12 discussed above, at oral argument Plaintiff conceded employees subject to the collective 13 bargaining agreement identified at ECF No. 29-8 are employed in a construction occupation— 14 meaning Wage Order 16 applies to their conduct. Moreover, Wage Order 16 defines “mining” 15 occupations as “miners, and other associated and related occupations . . . required to engage in 16 excavation or operations above or below ground.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11160 (2)(L). The 17 collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-2, 29-3, 29-9 cover “aggregate 18 quarries” which are “above ground mine[s]” where “employees excavate stone, rocks, and gravel,” 19 and therefore cover employees working in mining operations. (Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 4.) This work all 20 qualifies as on-site occupations of “construction” or “mining.” 21 Plaintiff does not dispute the relevant collective bargaining agreements provide “equivalent 22 protection[s]” to Wage Order 16. However, Plaintiff argues Wage Order 16’s exemption does not 23 apply because Defendant “failed to present admissible evidence based on personal knowledge 24 sufficient to establish LMRA preemption of rest period claims.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 19.) Specifically, 25 Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s declarants “neither witnessed workers perform their job duties during 26 the relevant time period” nor were present at “the relevant facilities during the relevant time 27 period.” (Id. at 20.) But, again, Plaintiff presents no evidence to dispute that these employees are 1 tit. 8, § 11160(1). And, Plaintiff has not submitted a Rule 56(d) affidavit seeking to stay the 2 |} summary judgment proceedings until Plaintiff can conduct further discovery, nor identified a good 3 faith basis for believing discovery will create a genuine dispute of material fact. So, Defendant’s 4 || evidence about the job duties of these employees is undisputed. 5 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's PAGA 6 || rest period claims on behalf of employees subject to the collective bargaining agreements 7 identified by ECF Numbers 29-2, 29-3, 29-9, and 29-28. The Court also GRANTS Defendant’s 8 || motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's PAGA claims that are derivative of these rest 9 || period claims, including “failure to maintain accurate time records, failure to provide accurate 10 || wage statements, and failure to pay all wages owed upon separation.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 18.) 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the above reasons, the Court rules as follows: 13 e Defendant’s motion for leave to file supplemental evidence is GRANTED. 14 e Summary judgment on PAGA meal and overtime claims brought on behalf of ready-mix 3 15 drivers subject to the collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-11, a 16 29-12, 29-13, 29-15, 29-16, 29-19, and 29-20 is GRANTED. 17 e Summary judgment on PAGA rest claims on behalf of ready-mix drivers is DENIED. Zz 18 e Summary judgment on the PAGA derivative claims on behalf of ready-mix drivers is 19 DENIED in light of the denial of the claim based on rest breaks. 20 e Summary judgment as to PAGA meal period claims on behalf of employees subject to the 21 collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-7, 29-8, 22 29-9, 29-17, 29-18, and 29-28 is GRANTED. 23 e Summary judgment as to Plaintiff's PAGA claims that are derivative of these meal period 24 claims is also GRANTED. 25 e Summary judgment as to Plaintiff's PAGA rest period claims on behalf of employees 26 subject to the collective bargaining agreements identified by ECF Numbers 29-2, 29-3, 2927 9, and 29-28 is GRANTED. 28 e Summary judgment as to PAGA claims that are derivative of these rest period claims, 1 including failure to maintain accurate time records, failure to provide accurate wage 2 statements, and failure to pay all wages owed upon separation, is GRANTED. 3 Discovery is open. The Court will hold an initial case management conference on January 4 11, 2024 A joint case management conference statement is due January 4, 2024. 5 This Order disposes of Docket Numbers: 36, 49. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: December 20, 2023 — 8 — 9 ne JAQQUELINE SCOTT CORL 10 United States District Judge 1] a 12 — 13 — — 14 — — 16 — — 17 — Z 18 — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 — — 26 — — 27 — — 28 —