Hendrik Block v. 7-Eleven, Inc

[2] 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION [6] 7 HENDRIK BLOCK, Case No. 21-cv-00048-BLF 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART 10 7-ELEVEN, INC, et al., AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 11 Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 [Re: ECF Nos. 49, 50] [13] 14 Plaintiff Hendrik Block asserts claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 15 Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 , et seq. (“ADA”), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. 16 Civ. Code §§ 51, et seq. (“Unruh Act”), and California Health and Safety Code § 19955. ECF No. 17 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id. 18 Before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. Defendants 719 Eleven, Inc., Ha To dba 7-Eleven #29943, and Southwest Expressway Investors, Ltd., a California 20 Limited Partnership (“Defendants”) seek summary judgment that Plaintiff lacks standing, that his 21 sole federal claim is moot, and that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 22 over the remaining state law claims. ECF No. 49 (“Mot.”); ECF No. 55. Plaintiff opposes the 23 motion. ECF No. 52 (“Opp.”). Plaintiff seeks summary judgment that Defendants are liable 24 under the Unruh Act. ECF No. 50 at 2; ECF No. 50-7; ECF No. 56. Defendants oppose the 25 motion. ECF No. 53. 26 The Court finds these motions suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 27 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff brought this action after encountering barriers to his access at a 7-Eleven 3 convenience store at 1430 Fruitdale Avenue in San Jose, California (“the Facility”). As he was 4 trying to make his way toward the Facility entrance, Plaintiff claims he tripped and almost fell 5 over a large pothole located in the access aisle at the base of the curb ramp. ECF No. 50-3 6 (“Block Decl.”) ¶¶ 17–18; ECF No. 50-4. After installing a new accessible parking stall with 7 adjacent access aisle and curb ramp, Defendants closed the Facility to the public, and it will not be 8 reopened as a convenience store operated by 7-Eleven or its affiliates in the future. ECF No. 50-1 9 (Stipulation re: Undisputed Facts, “SUF”) ¶¶ 2–3, 10. 10 Plaintiff estimates that he has been a party to roughly 25 ADA lawsuits. Ex. A (Deposition 11 of Hendrik Block taken July 5, 2023, “Block Depo.”) 21:2–15 (“Q. Can you give me an estimate 12 of how many ADA lawsuits you have been a party to? A. Maybe 25 or around there. I'm not sure 13 exactly.”). 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 “A party is entitled to summary judgment if the ‘movant shows that there is no genuine 16 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” City of 17 Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 56(a)). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” 19 and a dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier 20 of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 21 248 (1986). 22 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of 23 the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 24 interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material 25 fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the moving party 26 must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or 27 defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element 1 Inc., 210 F.3d 1099 , 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, 2 the Court “does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there 3 is a genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 , 559–60 (2006). Where the 4 moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate 5 that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 6 325; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 8 produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. If the 9 nonmoving party does not produce evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving 10 party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 . “The court must view the 11 evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the 12 nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049 . “[T]he ‘mere existence of a scintilla of 13 evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position’” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary 14 judgment. First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 891 F. Supp. 510 , 513–14 (N.D. Cal. 15 1995) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ). “‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 16 rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” First 17 Pac. Networks, 891 F. Supp. at 514 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., [18] 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Evidentiary Objections 21 The court first addresses the parties’ evidentiary objections. Defendants made several 22 objections to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 53-1, 53-2, but have since 23 withdrawn those objections. ECF No. 54. Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ “Statement of 24 Uncontroverted Facts,” ECF No. 49-1, for violating Civil L.R. 56-2(a). ECF No. 52 at 1. 25 According to Civil L.R. 56-2(a), “[u]nless required by the assigned Judge, no separate statement 26 of undisputed facts or joint statement of undisputed facts shall be submitted.” Plaintiff’s objection 27 is sustained, and the Court has not considered this document. The Court notes that neither party 1 B. Plaintiff Has Standing But His Sole Federal Claim is Moot 2 Plaintiff’s sole federal claim seeks “injunctive relief, attorney fees, costs, [and] legal 3 expense” for violation of the ADA. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.) ¶ 33. Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s 4 injunctive claims are moot” and that “he lacks standing to pursue them” because the Facility is 5 permanently closed. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff argues that he has standing because “[the Facility] was 6 undisputedly a public accommodation at the time of Plaintiff’s visit, and Defendants have 7 presented no evidence to refute that the barriers alleged by Plaintiff existed while the Store was 8 open.” Opp. at 3. However, “Plaintiff does not dispute for purposes of this motion that his claims 9 for injunctive relief appear moot.” Id. 10 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that he has standing. “The existence of federal jurisdiction 11 ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. 12 Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 570 13 n.4 (1992) (noting the “longstanding rule that jurisdiction is to be assessed under the facts existing 14 when the complaint is filed.”). Thus, “[t]he requisite personal interest,” i.e., standing, “must exist 15 at the commencement of the litigation[.]” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 16 (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 , (2000) (citation omitted). Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has 17 lost standing merely because the Facility was permanently closed after litigation commenced is 18 without merit because the store was open when the complaint was filed. SUF ¶¶ 2–3, 10. Thus, 19 the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff does not have standing. 20 The Court, however, agrees with the parties that the ADA claim is moot. “Because a 21 private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e., for removal of the barrier) under the ADA, . 22 . . a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting 23 a plaintiff’s ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). This 24 rationale for mootness logically extends to stores that have been permanently closed. The parties 25 do not dispute that the Facility “has been permanently closed to the public and will never reopen at 26 such location,” SUF ¶¶ 2–3, and that “[n]o goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 27 accommodations are offered to the general public at this location.” Opp. at 3; see also Mot. at 3. 1 Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim. The Court notes that 2 it is not making any factual determinations about the ADA claim. 3 C. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s State Law Claims [4] 5 Defendants next argue that upon granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claim, 6 the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Mot. at 4–5. 7 Plaintiff argues that “the mooting of Plaintiff’s ADA claim does not mean his state claims must be 8 dismissed.” Opp. at 6. Plaintiff adds that because “Plaintiff’s claims have already survived a 9 motion to dismiss, the same set of facts underlying both Plaintiff’s state and federal claims have 10 been fully explored through fact and expert discovery, and the remaining issues have been fully 11 briefed, it would be duplicative to dismiss Plaintiff’s damages claim at this stage and require him 12 to bring an entirely new action in state court merely to recover the $4,000 in damages.” Id. at 7. 13 The Court recognizes that this case has been pending for over two years and has proceeded 14 though discovery and summary judgment motions. However, the docket shows that this Court has 15 not made any substantive rulings on Plaintiff’s state law claims and its dismissal of the federal 16 claim was not on the underlying merits of the claim. It is in this posture that the Court revisits 17 whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 18 A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “in 19 exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 20 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(4). “Dismissal under § 1367(c)(4) entails a two-part inquiry.” Arroyo v. Rosas, [21] 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021). “First, the district court must articulate why the 22 circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4).” Id. (quoting Exec. 23 Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of California, 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994), 24 overruled on other grounds by California Dep't of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 25 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Second, in determining whether there are ‘compelling reasons for declining 26 jurisdiction’ in a given case, the court should consider what ‘best serves the principles of 27 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine’ 1 (referring to the Gibbs values set out in United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 2 (1966))). “These two inquiries are ‘not particularly burdensome.’” Id. (quoting Executive 3 Software, 24 F.3d at 1558). “A court simply must articulate why the circumstances of the case are 4 exceptional in addition to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs values provide[s] compelling 5 reasons for declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.” Ibid. 6 A district court may also “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if it 7 “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3); Arroyo, [8] 19 F.4th at 1215 (“no abuse of discretion declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) 9 when ADA claims had been dismissed and state law claims might raise additional issues”) (citing 10 Oliver, 654 F.3d at 911 ). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before 11 trial, the [Gibbs values] will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining 12 state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, n.7; Oliver, 654 F.3d at 911 . 13 Because Plaintiff’s only federal claim is now moot, nothing suggests that the instant matter 14 is any more than a usual case in which the Gibbs values points to dismissal under § 1367(c)(3). 15 Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1215 ; Oliver, 654 F.3d at 911 . Alternatively, the posture of this case—that 16 Plaintiff is a “high-frequency” litigant bringing ADA and Unruh Act claims together— also meets 17 the Ninth Circuit’s definition of “exceptional circumstances” that would “permit an exercise of 18 case-specific discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4).” Arroyo, 19 F.4th 19 at 1212–13. Analyses of dismissal under § 1367(c)(3) and § 1367(c)(4) thus converge to 20 evaluation of the Gibbs values—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—which the 21 Court now considers in turn. 22 First, the Court finds that the judicial economy and convenience factors weigh in favor of 23 declining supplemental jurisdiction. The Court has granted Defendants’ motion for summary 24 judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADA claim, and the Court has not expended substantial resources on 25 this case. 26 The Court also finds that the fairness factor weighs in favor of declining supplemental 27 jurisdiction, as Plaintiff is a high-frequency litigant who may be engaging in forum-shopping to 1 jurisdiction would be unfair to the Defendant. See Shayler v. 1310 PCH, LLC, 51 F.4th 1015 , 2 1018 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing the “procedural oddity” between California’s “attempt[ ] to limit 3 abusive lawsuits under these statutes by imposing stricter procedural requirements and higher 4 filing fees” on high-frequency litigants in state court and the ability to “circumvent the restrictions 5 on high-frequency litigants by filing their complaints in federal court, asserting federal question 6 jurisdiction over the ADA claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims”). 7 Finally, the Court finds that the principle of comity weighs strongly in favor of declining 8 jurisdiction because “retention of supplemental jurisdiction over ADA-based Unruh Act claims 9 threatens to substantially thwart California’s carefully crafted reforms in this area and to deprive 10 the state courts of their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Arroyo, [11] 19 F.4th at 1213 (9th Cir. 2021). 12 Thus, the Court finds it is both within its discretion and proper to decline to exercise 13 supplemental jurisdiction under both § 1367(c)(3) and § 1367(c)(4). 14 D. Plaintiff’s Motion 15 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s sole federal claim is moot because the Facility is closed and 16 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. As 17 such, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied as moot. 18 IV. ORDER 19 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 20 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff does not have standing is 21 DENIED. 22 2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff’s ADA claim is moot is 23 GRANTED. 24 3. Defendants’ request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 25 the remaining state law claims is GRANTED. 26 4. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment that Defendants are liable under the Unruh 27 Act is DENIED as moot. 1 Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state 2 court. [3] 4 Dated: January 29, 2024 ° BEA f ee FREEMAN 6 United States District Judge [12] © [16] = 17 Z 18