Richards v. Mueller

[3] 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION [7] 8 L.R.,1 Case No. 23-cv-03421-PHK 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 10 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DENYING MOTION TO SEAL 11 ROBERT MUELLER, et al., CASE 12 Defendants. Re: Dkts. 2, 3 [13] Pro se Plaintiff L.R. brings this action against seventy-seven named and unnamed [14] defendants, asserting claims predicated on the following: “18USC 1341 [sic]; 18USC 242 inter [15] alia [sic], fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, THIS ARROSE [sic] [16] OUT OF FRAUD IN THE SSA!” [Dkt. 1 at 1]. Before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff’s [17] application to seal the case file [Dkt. 2]; and (2) Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma [18] pauperis (“IFP”). [Dkt. 3]. [19] I. IFP Application [20] A plaintiff instituting a civil action in federal court must ordinarily pay a filing fee. See 28 21 U.S.C. § 1914 (a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(1), a federal court “must authorize the [22] commencement” of a civil suit without prepayment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits an [23] affidavit which “includes a statement of all assets” and which shows that the plaintiff is “unable to [25] 1 In actions involving requested review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security [26] Administration, the Court generally refers to plaintiffs only by their initials (or by first name and last initial) out of an abundance of caution and regarding for their privacy. Given the nature of the [27] allegations in the complaint, it is not entirely clear that this action is an appeal of a decision by the 1 pay such fees or give security therefor.” Because the statute does not itself define what constitutes 2 insufficient assets to warrant IFP status, the determination of indigency falls with the Court’s 3 discretion. See Williams v. Cnty. of Ventura, 443 F. App’x 232, 233 (9th Cir. 2011). “The 4 granting or denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases is within the sound 5 discretion of the district court.” Venable v. Meyers¸ 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (per 6 curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090 (1974). 7 “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant 8 cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 9 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 , 10 339 (1948)). The affidavit must provide “sufficient details concerning [the applicant’s] income, 11 assets, and expenditures[.]” Williams, 443 F. App’x at 233 . “[T]here is no formula set forth by 12 statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” 13 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty 14 ‘with some particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Id. (quoting United States v. McQuade, [15] 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). “[O]ne need not be absolutely destitute to obtain the benefits 16 of the [IFP] statute.” Id. (quoting Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960)). 17 Here, Plaintiff avers that they have never been employed. [Dkt. 3 at 1-2]. Plaintiff attests 18 to have no income aside from government support. Id. at 2. Plaintiff attests to have no assets 19 besides a wheelchair worth approximately $10,000. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff’s affidavit indicates that 20 Plaintiff’s monthly expenses are either equivalent to or exceed Plaintiff’s monthly income. Id. 21 Based on the information provided in the affidavit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 22 adequately shown that they are entitled to IFP status. Specifically, the Court finds that paying the 23 filing fee in this case would clearly pose a substantial economic hardship on Plaintiff and would 24 result in Plaintiff’s inability to afford the necessities of life for some period of time. Escobedo, 25 787 F.3d at 1234. While each case is to be determined on its specific facts, the Court is cognizant 26 that this Plaintiff’s application is similar to other IFP applications granted under factually 27 analogous, if not virtually identical, circumstances. See, e.g., Bernard M. v. Kijakazi, No. 23-cv1 plaintiff was unemployed, had no income other than government assistance, had no assets aside 2 from $10 in a bank account, and had monthly rent expenses exceeding monthly income). Because 3 Plaintiff’s affidavit demonstrates that Plaintiff’s monthly liabilities equal their monthly resources 4 and that they have very few other assets upon which to draw, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 5 demonstrated they qualify to proceed in forma pauperis. 6 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma 7 Pauperis [Dkt. 3] is GRANTED. 8 II. Motion to Seal 9 Plaintiff also moves to restrict public access to the docket and seal all documents 10 associated with this case. [Dkt. 2]. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 11 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records 12 and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 13 U.S. 589 , 597 n.7 (1978); see also Folz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122 , 1133 14 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In this circuit, we start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court 15 records.”). “This right is justified by the interest of citizens in ‘keep[ing] a watchful eye on the 16 workings of public agencies.’” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 , 1178 (9th 17 Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). The right, however, “is not absolute and can be 18 overridden given sufficiently compelling reasons for doing so.” Folz, 331 F.3d at 1135 ; see, e.g., 19 Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1989). 20 A party seeking to seal court documents “bears the burden of overcoming th[e] strong 21 presumption [of public access] by meeting the ‘compelling reasons’ standard.” Kamakana, 447 22 F.3d at 1178 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking to seal court documents must 23 articulate “compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings” that “outweigh the general 24 history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.” Id. at 1179. Such compelling 25 reasons include “the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate 26 libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. (citations omitted). “The mere fact that the 27 production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further 1 In addition, in this District, all parties requesting sealing of documents in the docket must 2 comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5. That rule requires, among other things, that the moving party 3 provide “the reasons for keeping a document under seal, including an explanation of: (i) the 4 legitimate private or public interests that warrant sealing, (ii) the injury that will result if sealing is 5 denied, and (iii) why a less restrictive alternative to sealing is not sufficient.” Civil L.R. 796 5(e)(1). The rule also requires the moving party to provide “evidentiary support from declarations 7 where necessary.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c)(2). The proposed sealing order must be “narrowly tailored 8 to seal only the sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c)(3). “Motions to seal entire pleadings or 9 briefs are strongly disfavored and will be granted only in extraordinary circumstances.” Civil L.R. 10 79-5(e); see Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (noting the preference for redactions so long as they 11 “have the virtue of being limited and clear”); Murphy v. Kavo Am. Corp., No. 11-cv-00410-YGR, [12] 2012 WL 1497489 , at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (denying motion to seal exhibits but 13 directing parties to redact confidential information). 14 Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to seal the entirety of all the documents in the Court’s case 15 file, which includes the Complaint, Plaintiff’s IFP application, this Court’s standardized Social 16 Security Procedural Order, and the Recusal Order issued by the previous Judge assigned to this 17 case. As support for the sealing request, Plaintiff’s “Application To File Under Seal Application 18 To Seal The Case Filing” states only the following: 19 I WAS INFORMED BY SSA WORKER [sic] THAT I MUST FILE THIS CASE BEFORE I TURN 65 YEARS OLD WHICH IS TODAY AT 7:47 PM [20] 21 I DISAGREE WITH THIS BECAUSE I THINK THEIR DATE IS WRONG – IT SHOULD BE AUGUST 7th 2024 BUT I MUST ACT NOW TO PRESERVE THIS 22 DATE TODAY 23 [Dkt. 2 at 1]. 24 Further, in the complaint itself, Plaintiff wrote “APPLICATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 25 BECAUSE I BELIEVE THE DEFENDANTS TOLD ME THE WRONG DATE TO FILE!” 26 [Dkt. 1 at 1]. 27 In light of the legal standards discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown ] Specifically, Plaintiff does not identify any legitimate private or public interests that warrant 2 || sealing court records, does not explain any potential injury that will result if the sealing request is 3 denied, and does not discuss why a less restrictive alternative to sealing (such as redaction) would 4 || not be sufficient. Civil L-R. 79-5(c)(1). The fact that Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed person 5 || working in the Social Security Administration informed him that he must file this complaint on a 6 || particular date (and the fact that Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of the deadline) is not adequate 7 || cause to seal this entire case file. See Yesipovich v. Berryhill, No. C 15-00112 WHA, 2018 WL 8 3304609, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2018) (finding plaintiff failed to show compelling reason to 9 || seal court documents associated with prior Social Security appeal). 10 Further, Plaintiff's blanket request to seal all docket entries is not “narrowly tailored” to 11 only that which must be sealed. See Doe v. Lee, No. C 13-04029 LB, 2014 WL 630936 , at *2-3 12 || (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) (denying plaintiffs motion to seal entire case file, where the request 13 || was not “narrowly tailored” to only “sealable material” as required by Civil L.R. 79-5(a)). 14 To the extent Plaintiff may somehow be concerned about revealing his confidential 3 15 || medical information or other sensitive personal data, the Court notes that members of the public a 16 do not have electronic access to Social Security court records, except for the docket sheet, orders, 2 17 || and opinions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c); Civil L-R. 5-1(c)(5)(B)(@).. And as noted above, this Court Z 18 || partially redacts plaintiffs’ names in written orders issued in social security cases to further 19 || mitigate privacy concerns, as suggested by the Committee on Court Administration and Case 20 || Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff's application to seal [Dkt. 2] is DENIED. The Clerk is hereby 22 || directed to unseal this case and unseal all documents previously filed under seal. [23] 24 || ITISSO ORDERED. 25 || Dated: May 13, 2024 eg 4 | % [26] 27 United States Magistrate Judge